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THE MATHEMATICS OF COLLISION AND THE COLLISION OF MATHEMATICS 
IN THE 17TH CENTURY 
  
 This dissertation charts the development of the quantitative rules of collision in 
the 17th century. These were central to the mathematization of nature, offering natural 
philosophy a framework to explain all the changes of nature in terms of the size and 
speed of bodies in motion. The mathematization of nature is a classic thesis in the history 
of early modern science. However, the significance of the dynamism within mathematics 
should not be neglected. One important change was the emergence of a new language of 
nature, an algebraic physico-mathematics, whose development was intertwined with the 
rules of collision. The symbolic equations provided a unified system to express 
previously diverse kinds of collision with a new representation of speed with direction, 
while at the same time collision provided a practical justification of the otherwise 
"impossible" negative numbers. In private manuscripts, Huygens criticized Descartes's 
rules of collision with heuristic use of Cartesian symbolic algebra. After he successfully 
predicted the outcomes of experiments using algebraic calculations at an early meeting of 
the Royal Society, Wallis and Wren extended the algebraic investigations in their 
published works. In addition to the impact of the changes in mathematics itself, the rules 
of collision were shaped by the inventive use of principles formulated by 'thinking with 
objects,' such as the balance and the pendulum. The former provided an initial framework 
to relate the speeds and sizes of bodies, and the latter was key both in the development of 
novel conservation principles and made possible experimental investigations of collision. 
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This dissertation documents the formation of concepts central to modern physical 
science, and re-evaluates the mathematics of collision, with implications for our 
understanding of major figures in early modern science, such as Descartes and Huygens, 
and repercussions for the mathematization of nature. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indeed, if from history one learned nothing else than the variability of views, it would be 
invaluable. Of science, more than anything else, Heraclitus’ words are true: 'One can not 
go up the same stream twice.' Attempts to fix the fair moment by means of textbooks have 
always failed. Let us, then, early get used to the fact that science is unfinished, variable.  
 
     —Ernst Mach, The History and Root of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy (1872)   
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The natural philosophical understanding of the world was changing in the early 
17th century. Specifically, how change itself was understood, was changing. In other 
words, we see a development of new kinds of explanations of the changes occurring in 
nature. Collision—two bodies bumping into each other—and the mathematical study of 
collision are key components in these developments. For example, the qualitative 
Aristotelian account of change, which appealed to the four elements (earth, air, water, 
fire) and the four qualities (hot, cold, wet, dry), was in contest with various versions of 
the mechanical philosophy, which appealed to little more than matter and motion—
phenomena are explained by reducing them to unobservable bits of matter moving and 
interacting through contact.   
Thomas Harriot claimed that his porisms on the reflection of bodies "lead together 
towards the innermost Mystery, or the understanding of Natural Philosophy."1 Isaac 
Beeckman studied collision to better understand the behavior of the corpuscles in his 
physico-mathematical explanations of natural phenomena. And René Descartes presented 
his rules of collision as an extension of his third law of nature, the impact law; they 
constitute the fundamental principles of his natural philosophy. Similarly, according to 
Christiaan Huygens, "nature consists of certain particles, from the motion of which all the 
diversity of things arises, and by the extremely rapid impulse of which light is propagated 
and spreads through the immense spaces of the heavens in a moment of time, [...] this 
examination [of nature] will seem to be helped no small amount if the true laws by which 
motion is transferred from body to body be made known."2 Thomas Sprat, an early 
member of the Royal Society, and its first historian, highlighted Christopher Wren's 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 HMC 241/VIA f. 23r. 
2 HOC 16: 150. Translation by Richard Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics: The Science of Dynamics in 
the Seventeenth Century (New York: American Elsevier, 1971), 147. 
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"doctrine of motion," which was "propos'd as the Principles of all Demonstrations in 
Natural Philosophy: Nor can it seem strange, that these Elements should be of such 
Universal use; if we consider that Generation, Corruption, Alteration, and all the 
Vicissitudes of Nature, are nothing else but the effects arising from the meeting of little 
Bodies, of differing Figures, Magnitudes, and Velocities."3   
Establishing the mathematical rules of collision was a central problem that 
bridged several areas and methods of investigation, including physical optics, the 
principles of natural philosophy, mechanics, and experimental philosophy. The recent 
invention of the telescope, and Harriot's and Galileo's astronomical observations, had 
sparked renewed interest in lenses, their optical properties, and the precise description 
and explanation of refraction and reflection. Harriot's account of collision in De 
reflexione corporum rotundorum was likely intended as a physical explanation of light. 
There are several connections between Descartes's impact law and his explanations of 
reflection and refraction. And Huygens highlighted "the extremely rapid impulse of 
which light is propagated" as one of the "diversity of things [that] arises" from the 
collision of particles. Although the motion of particles could explain the behavior of 
light, Descartes's rules of collision were given a place prior to this particular context, 
among the principles of his philosophy. Huygens's De motu corporum ex percussione 
was primarily inspired by the Galilean tradition of mechanics, and Beeckman's 
explanation of the corpuscles in his physico-mathematics relied on the pseudo-
Aristotelian Mechanical Problems. Christopher Wren and John Wallis brought the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal Society of London (London: T. R. for J. Martyn and J. Allestry, 
1667), 312. 
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investigation of collision into the domain of the new experimental philosophy at the 
Royal Society to establish what they called the laws of nature. 
 Mathematics, and the perceived relationship between mathematics and the world, 
was also changing. Several interpretations of mathematics were in contact, influencing 
each other. For example, the two pillars of mathematics, arithmetic and geometry, were 
about different things: the subject matter of arithmetic was discrete quantity, whereas 
geometry was about continuous quantity. They were for different purposes: arithmetic 
was a tool of calculation; geometry was a system in which one could provide 
demonstrations of propositions using only a handful of first principles. Of course, 
practically, before a person can prove something they usually first go through a process 
of discovery—they work backwards, and figure out what all of the right pieces are, 
before putting them into place in a demonstration. The guide to this process was called 
the analytic method. Many in the 17th century believed that the ancient Greeks must have 
had this method in order to write such sophisticated synthetic proofs (where all the pieces 
are put back together), but they had for one reason or another suppressed it. One of the 
innovations of the 17th century was Descartes’s "analytic geometry" or algebra of lines. 
The symbolic calculating techniques of a kind of sophisticated arithmetic were brought 
together with geometry as a problem-solving tool. And many believed that algebra must 
be the lost ancient method of analysis. Two kinds of mathematics came together, and 
through interaction, algebra became understood as analytic geometry. Combining these 
two, one could then represent lines by symbolic equations, which rely on the operators of 
arithmetic.  
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 The fields of mathematics were diverse and changing in the 17th century. In 
general, the studies of collision can be construed as part of "physico-mathematics," or in 
the metaphor used in the 17th century, the language of the book of nature. This is distinct 
from pure mathematics, which was abstract, or practical mathematics, which was 
primarily instrumental, although both of these play their part in the development of the 
rules of collision. The various fields and subfields of mathematics, such as arithmetic, 
geometry, and algebra, were increasing in number. John Dee, for example, categorized 21 
"Sciences and Artes Mathematicall" in his Mathematicall Præface to the first English 
edition of Euclid's Elements.4 In addition to these fields, there were several different 
"schools" of mathematics, such as the classical traditions stemming from Euclid, 
Archimedes, or the pseudo-Aristotelian Mechanical Problems, or the traditions of 16th 
and 17th century "practical mathematics" supported by Robert Recorde, John Dee, 
Thomas Diggs, and Petrus Ramus, or the tradition of analysts such as François Viète, 
William Oughtred, and René Descartes. Along with these fields and traditions, there were 
tensions among these differences, thus a "collision of mathematics."   
 The changes that mathematics was undergoing, and the particularities of these 
fields and traditions, impacted the development of the rules of collision, just as the rules 
of collision would have an impact on the interpretation of mathematics, namely the 
interpretation of negative quantities. Contrary to past historians, who have presumed that 
the technical aspects of mathematics can be avoided to focus on the conceptual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 John Dee included a foldout insert with his preface to first English translation of Euclid's Elements 
(1570), which contained an elaborate taxonomy of the varieties of mathematics. Calling this chart his 
"Groundplat of my MATHEMATICALL Præface," he elaborated on each of the twenty-one "Sciences and 
Artes Mathematicall" in the preface itself. 
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development of science, we will see that the technicalities of mathematics (some of them 
quite simple) are intrinsic to the conceptual development of science.5  
 As the natural world was increasingly being investigated mathematically, 
mathematics itself was developing. The rules of collision are a focal point of these 
changes. Not only did the 17th century see a "mathematization of nature," but there were 
significant changes in the mathematics of nature. Specifically, developing in tandem with 
the rules of collision was the emergence of an algebraic physico-mathematics. This new 
mathematics of nature made possible novel conceptualizations of the directionality of 
motion, and provided a unified expression of collision in a system of equations with two 
unknowns. The arithmetic-algebraic operators + and − provide a new expression of 
contrary motion, and conversely the contrary motions involved in collision would provide 
(in the work of John Wallis, for example) a legitimation of heretofore "impossible 
quantities" such as negative numbers.  
 This dissertation focuses on the contemporary mathematics of the seventeenth 
century. I do not ignore the technical aspects of mathematics as if they were irrelevant to 
the conceptual development of science. And as much as possible, I do not reconstruct the 
seventeenth century theories of collision in modern mathematics, as if mathematics were 
a purely neutral language. Using this historically sensitive methodology, I provide 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Richard Westfall, for example, explains that in his history of ideas, he "attempted to define the problems 
on which they expended themselves in their terms, and to see their proposed solutions in relation to the 
intellectual equipment at their disposal." However, he does not consider the technical aspects of 
mathematics part of the conceptual development. "Whereas I devote no attention to social factors, I devote 
very little more to technical mathematical questions. I do not mean to deny in any way the importance of 
mathematics in seventeenth-century dynamics. With the calculus, for example, a whole new range of 
problems hitherto beyond the grasp of quantitative mechanics became amendable to exact treatment. My 
central concern has focused on conceptual issues, however; and during the development of dynamics up to 
Newton, such matters appear to me to have been central to the science of dynamics." Westfall, Force in 
Newton's Physics, ix-xi.  
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significant reinterpretations of Descartes's rules of collision and the development of 
Huygens's theory, and articulate an important change in the mathematization of nature. 
Descartes's works on collision and mathematics are of pivotal importance. His 
conservation principle, the "impact law," and the 7 rules of collision in the Principles of 
Philosophy framed a new vision of the world. It set the topic—the mathematical study of 
collision—as an area of investigation, and inspired the hopes of the next generation of 
thinkers who sought to explain all the changes of nature in terms of quantitative rules of 
collision. They accepted the general manner of posing the problem, but were critical of 
Descartes's results and the means of arriving at those results. Although Descartes did not 
use the symbolic algebra from his analytic geometry in his physics, his immediate 
successors would do so fruitfully, with devastating consequences for Descartes's own 
theory of collision. Because of its central importance, a historiographical essay on 
Descartes's physics has been included as an appendix to the dissertation.  
Descartes's mathematics also played a pivotal and ironic role in the emergence of 
an algebraic physico-mathematics. Beeckman investigated the apparent "destruction" of 
motion in the collision of bodies, using the proportions from the pseudo-Aristotelian 
balance. Rather than focus on the loss of motion, Beeckman's colleague, Descartes, 
changed the emphasis to the "quantity of motion," and put the conservation of this 
quantity at the heart of his system. Nevertheless, the mathematics of Descartes's early 
view of collision is strikingly similar to Beeckman's use of the pseudo-Aristotelian 
balance. Descartes developed analytic geometry, but did not use his symbolic algebra in 
his physics. However, with attention to the historicity of the mathematics in the Principia 
philosophia, we find the classical analytic method underlying Descartes's rules of 
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collision. Huygens, in his early manuscripts, then uses Descartes's symbolic algebra to 
criticize Descartes's theory of collision—he shows that Cartesian quantity of motion is 
not conserved and the rules are inconsistent. Huygens's heuristic work with algebra likely 
served as scaffolding for a new principle, the conservation of Cartesian quantity of 
motion with direction. He also used symbolic algebra at the Royal Society to predict the 
outcomes of experiments with colliding pendulum bobs. Huygens's algebra remained in 
his manuscripts, and he formulated his theory of collision in the axiomatic tradition of 
Archimedes and Galileo, using classical conceptions of quantities. Huygens deliberately 
avoided the production of negative quantities in the algebraic investigation of collision in 
his manuscripts. Two of the members who were present at Huygens's successful 
predictions, John Wallis and Christopher Wren, would go on to developed their own 
theories of collision. They not only expressed them algebraically, but Wallis would use 
the notion of contrary motion, which is central in investigations of collision, to legitimize 
the notion of a negative number, and Wren would claim that nature itself obeys the 
algebraic rules of addition and subtraction.   
  The dissertation focuses on the theories of collision by Isaac Beeckman, René 
Descartes, Christiaan Huygens, Christopher Wren, and John Wallis. There are a set of 
interpersonal links directly connecting their ideas, but more importantly their works each 
had a role in the emergence of an algebraic physico-mathematics. Thomas Harriot, as he 
is in many ways, is an exception. His draft De reflexione corporum rotundorum brought 
together geometric diagrams, symbolic equations, and the study of collision before 
anyone else. But he did so in a way that is strikingly different from his successors. He did 
not publish his account, and none of his successors appear to have been familiar with De 
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reflexione. His work is included in this study to show, through contrast, the different 
ways mathematics was used to express physical quantities such as motion and body in 
collision. It also shows that the pairing of positive and negative signs directly together 
with the directionality of motion was not obvious, nor should it be taken for granted.       
 Each chapter compares and contrasts two sets of work. In chapter 2, Harriot's 
theory of collision from his manuscripts is paired with Beeckman's thoughts on collision 
from his Journal. Chapter 3 compares Descartes's early view of collision from his 
correspondence and Le Monde with Descartes's later view of collision in the Principia 
philosophia. With attention on this important shift, and the historicity of his mathematics, 
I provide a new interpretation of Descartes's rules of collision. Chapter 4 compares 
Huygens's work with that of Descartes. It emphasizes Huygens's use of Cartesian 
symbolic algebra against Descartes's physics in Huygens's manuscripts, and the 
subsequent axiomatic formulation of Huygens's theory in the tradition of Archimedes and 
Galileo. And chapter 5 compares the theories of Wallis and Wren at the Royal society, 
highlighting their experiments, and their published algebraic laws of motion. 
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Chapter 2  
First investigations: Harriot and Beeckman on collision 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
I have now led you to the doors of nature’s house, wherein lie its mysteries. If you cannot 
enter because [the doors] are too narrow, then abstract and contract yourself into an 
atom, and you will enter easily. And when later you come out again, tell me what 
wonders you saw. 
 
 —Harriot to Kepler, 2 December 1606 
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Introduction 
 
 
 Harriot's manuscript, De reflexione corporum rotundorum, and Beeckman's 
studies in his Journal are among the first mathematical investigations of collision. 
Elsewhere in their works, both relied on the motion and interaction of the smallest bodies 
in their explanations of natural phenomena. Their investigations of collision each turn the 
focus from collision as a fruitful explanans to collision as explanandum.   
 Harriot's work brought symbolic equations together with a geometric diagram to 
understand collision. Although De reflexione was not directly influential on the 
development of the rules of collision, it serves as an important contrast class. In this text 
we see a possible combination of key mathematical concepts with collision, but one 
which ultimately did not prevail. Examining Harriot's unique study of collision highlights 
the significance of fundamental concepts, such as the roles of positive and negative signs 
to indicate direction, that were not immediately recognized.  Harriot's work also 
underscores the importance of the historical mathematical concepts in the formation of 
theories of collision. 
 Beeckman wrote on collision not to establish rules or express a principle of 
conservation, but rather, to investigate what he considered to be a problematic puzzle in 
his own corpuscular natural philosophy. The manner in which he investigated collision 
relied on the relations of quantities from the pseudo-Aristotelian account of the balance.   
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Section 1  
Thomas Harriot on the Reflection of Round Bodies 
 
 
1.1 – Kepler’s question: Thomas Harriot's physical explanation of light 
Thomas Harriot (1560-1621) explained why it is important to understand the 
"reflection of round bodies" on the first folio of his manuscript, De reflexione corporum 
rotundorum, Poristica duo (1619).6 By understanding this "dignified" and 
"extraordinary" topic one will be guided towards the "innermost Mystery, or the 
understanding of Natural Philosophy."7 Harriot's "Mystery" was likely the underlying 
nature of light.8    
In October 1606 Johannes Kepler wrote to Harriot to discuss optics.9 Two years 
prior, Kepler had published the Astronomiae pars optica (1604). But, as he explained in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The history of Harriot’s manuscripts is complex, and is tied to the changing status of his reputation, as 
well as the changing assessment of the measure of the influence of his unpublished ideas. See Gordon 
Batho, "Thomas Harriot’s manuscripts," in Thomas Harriot: An Elizabethan Man of Science, ed. by Robert 
Fox (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2000), 287-297. Matthias Schemmel, The English Galileo: Thomas 
Harriot’s Work on Motion as an Example of Preclassical Mechanics, 2 vols. (Berlin: Springer, 2008), 245-
755. Shirley, Biography, 1-37. Jacqueline Stedall, A Discourse Concerning Algebra: English Algebra to 
1685, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 97-100, 111-125. Stedall, Great Invention, 3-34. 
Stevens, Hariot the Mathematician, Philosopher, & Scholar, 161-192, 193-203. R. C. H. Tanner, “Henry 
Stevens and the Associates of Thomas Harriot,” in Thomas Harriot: Renaissance Scientist, ed. by John W. 
Shirley (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 91. R. C. H. Tanner, “The Study of Thomas Harriots’ Manuscripts: I. 
Harriot’s Will,” History of Science 6 (1967): 1-16. R. C. H. Tanner, “The Study of Thomas Harriots’ 
Manuscripts: II. Harriot's Unpublished Papers,” History of Science, 6 (1967): 17-40. 
7 HMC 241/VIA f. 23r. De reflexione corporum rotundorum, Poristica duo. “With dignity they [the 
porisms] are among extraordinary matters, which lead together towards the innermost Mystery, or the 
understanding of Natural Philosophy.” Sunt etiam dignitate inter præcipuam quæ ad Naturalis philosophiæ 
penetralia siuè Mysteria conducunt intelligenda. Also see the translations in the following three classic 
papers on Thomas Harriot's De reflexione. Martin Kalmar, "Thomas Hariot's De Reflexione Corporum 
Rotundorum: An Early Solution to the Problem of Impact," Archive for History of Exact Sciences 16 
(1977): 202. J. A. Lohne, "Essays on Thomas Harriot: I. Billiard Balls and Laws of Collision; II. Ballistic 
Parabolas; III. A Survey of Harriot's Scientific Writings," Archive for History of Exact Sciences 20 (1979): 
201. Jon V. Pepper, "Harriot’s Manuscript on the Theory of Impacts," Annals of Science 33 (1976): 133. 
8 For an extensively argued paper on the general relationship between optics and collision in the 17th 
century see Russell Smith, "Optical reflection and mechanical rebound: the shift from analogy to 
axiomatization in the seventeenth century, Part 1," British Journal for the History of Science 41 (2008): 1-
18, and "Part 2," British Journal for the History of Science 41 (2008): 187-207. Harriot's De reflexione 
corporum rotundorum is discussed in Smith, "Optical reflection," 7-18. 
9 Jacquot, "Harriot's Reputation," 180-1; Lohne, "Brahe of Optics," 115. In this letter, Kepler also asked 
Harriot questions on the topic of refraction and the colors of the rainbow.  
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his letter to Harriot, the Astronomiae pars optica had not touched on the physical nature 
of light, which might explain, rather than merely describe, phenomena such as refraction.  
I was overjoyed, excellent Herriot, when Johannes Eriksen, the bearer of these 
letters, told me there lived in England a man well versed in all mysteries of 
nature, who if not impeded, was eager to correspond with me through letters, and 
who possesses, especially in optics, new and unknown principles, by which both 
my optical book and all previously published are found to be not only deficient, 
but even erroneous...10 
 
According to Lohne, Kepler had attempted to draw insights into the nature of light from 
the collision of bodies. "[Kepler] found, however, that although so many authors had 
discussed motion, none of them had said anything useful about collisions."11 Although 
perhaps unknown to Kepler at the time, Harriot may well have had a physical explanation 
for refraction of the very kind that Kepler had considered—one based on the collision of 
bodies. The evidence for Harriot's position is indirect. It comes from the correspondence 
with Kepler, as well as a manuscript essay, Synopsis of the Controversie of Atoms,12 
written by a former student of Harriot, Nathaniel Torporley, after Harriot's death, in 
which Harriot's views are criticized.  
 Torporley describes Harriot's explanation of phenomena, such as refraction, as 
follows. A transparent body is composed of atoms organized in a regular array with 
empty space between them. Light reflects off one atom and to another and back to 
another in a zigzag fashion. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Johannes Kepler, Joannis Kepleri Astronomi Opera Omnia, vol. 2 (Frankfurt: Heyder & Zimmer, 1859) 
67. Kepler to Harriot, 2 October 1606. “Lecto meo libro ignorare non potes, quibus in quaestionibus a te 
cupiam erudiri, adeo frequenter ad tui similium provacavi solertiam. Capite I. principiis usus sum 
theologicis magis quam optics, quae res arguit, me naturam lucis penitus ignorare.” Translation quoted in J. 
A. Lohne, "Thomas Harriott (1560-1621), The Tycho Brahe of Optics," Centaurus 6 (1959): 115. Also see 
Jean Jacquot, "Thomas Harriot’s Reputation for Impiety," Notes and Records of the Royal Society 9 (1952): 
180-1.   
11 Lohne, "Essays on Thomas Harriot," 207. Unfortunately, Lohne does not cite any sources wherein 
Kepler may have expressed this intuition. 
12 Nathaniel Torporley, "A Synopsis of the Controversie of Atoms," Birch MS 4458 ff. 6-8, in Jean Jacquot, 
"Thomas Harriot's Reputation for Impiety," Notes and Records of the Royal Society 9 (1952): 184.   
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Figure 1. From Torporley's essay, "A Synopsis of the 
Controversie of Atoms" 
 
Since the human eye cannot directly observe the motion of atoms, nor can it discern 
distances of only a couple atoms in length, to normal human observation light appears to 
move in straight lines. When the light moves from one transparent body to another, the 
regular arrangement of atoms is different, which affects the angles in the reflecting zigzag 
path of light.13 
Torporley had been close to Harriot. He was entrusted to edit Harriot's 
mathematical manuscripts14 and to publish the results of his studies.15 Torporley was well 
qualified for this task, since he had been personally tutored by Harriot, and had also spent 
time in France as an assistant to the mathematician François Viète in 1591, the very time 
of the publication of Viète's Algebra nova.16 It was through Torporley that Harriot 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Robert Goulding, "Chymicorum in morem: Refraction, Matter Theory, and Secrecy in the Harriot-Kepler 
Correspondence," in Thomas Harriot and His World: Mathematics, Exploration, and Natural Philosophy 
in Early Modern England, ed. by Robert Fox (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2012), 41-6. Also see 
Jacquot, "Harriot's Reputation," 180. 
14 Robert Hugh Kargon, Atomism in England from Hariot to Newton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966) 33.   
15 John W. Shirley, Thomas Harriot: A Biography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) 2. Harriot named 
Torporley in his will. "I ordayne and Constitut the aforesaid Nathaniell Thorperley first to be Ouerseer of 
my Mathematicall writinges to be received of my Executors to pervse and order and to separate the Cheife 
of them from my waste papers, to the end that after hee doth understande them hee may make vse in 
penninge such doctrine that belonges vnto them for publique vses as it shall be thought Convenient by my 
Executors and him selfe." Quoted in Shirley, Biography, 2. Also see Jacquot, "Harriot's Reputation," 165. 
16 Shirley, Biography, 3. Also see Jon V. Pepper, "A letter from Nathaniel Torporley to Thomas Harriot," 
British Journal for the History of Science, 3 (1967): 285-90, for an account of a letter Torporley sent to 
Harriot, which shows that Torporley and Viète had been friends as early as 1586. A problem Viète passed 
to Harriot while Torporley was in France can be found among "Harriot's mathematical and scientific 
papers" held at the British Library, Add. MS 6782 f. 483.   
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became "so intimately familiar" with Viète's algebra.17 However, after Harriot's death, 
Torporley did not publish the mathematical writings. To amend this situation, Walter 
Warner, another of Harriot's close friends, assembled and published a volume on algebra 
under the title Artis Analyticae Praxis (1631). Much of Harriot's reputation for centuries 
to come would rest solely on this publication. Recent scholarship by Jacqueline A. 
Stedall has shown that "the editors selected and reordered Harriot's work in such a way 
that the Praxis often bears little resemblance to the manuscripts, and fails to do full 
justice to the quality and originality of Harriot’s insights."18 Four centuries prior, 
Torporley appears to have felt the same way and criticized the editors for the way they 
presented Harriot’s work, going to such lengths as to prepare a title page of a work which 
would fix these problems called, The Analytical Corrector of the posthumous scientific 
writings of Thomas Harriot.19 Unlike Stedall in the 21st century, Torporley in the 17th did 
not publish the correction. Also, unlike Stedall, Torporley himself severely criticized 
Harriot. On the title page he included a double-edged eulogy of his deceased mentor and 
associate: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Jacqueline A. Stedall, "Reconstructing Thomas Harriot's Treatise on Equations." In Thomas Harriot and 
His World: Mathematics, Exploration, and Natural Philosophy in Early Modern England, edited by Robert 
Fox, 53-64 (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2012), 53-4. Also see Jacqueline A. Stedall, The Great 
Invention of Algebra: Thomas Harriot's Treatise on Equations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) 
3-7, 17-20, for an account of the relationship between Harriot, Torporley, and Viéte. 
18 Stedall, Great Invention, 3. Stedall has done extensive archival work to rectify the poor presentation of 
Harriot’s algebra. She writes that “the relevant sheets are now separated and dispersed amongst the 
surviving manuscripts, but Harriot’s pagination, the mathematical content and other contemporary evidence 
allow them to be reassembled in what appears to be the original sequence. The result is a lucid and self-
contained Treatise on Equations.” In 2003 Stedall published this “treatise” for the “first time in its original 
form.”    
19 Shirley, Biography, 5. Also see Henry Stevens, Thomas Hariot, the Mathematician, the Philosopher and 
the Scholar: Developed Chiefly from Dormant Materials, with Notices of His Associates, Including 
Biographical and Bibliographical Disquisitions Upon the Materials of the History of 'Ould Virginia' 
(London: Privately Printed, 1900) 174. Also see Nathaniel Torporley, "Corrector Analyticus, or strictures 
on the Artis Analyticæ Praxis of  
Thomas Harriot," in A collection of letters illustrative of the progress of science in England, from the reign 
of Queen Elizabeth to that of Charles the Second, ed. James Orchard Halliwell-Phillipps (London: R. & J. 
E. Taylor, 1841), 109-116.   
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As an excellent Mathematician, one who very 
seldom 
As a bold Philosopher, one who occasionally 
As a frail Man, one who notably 
 
erred, 20 
 
 
Torporley then went on to announce an outright attack on Harriot’s philosophy: 
 
For the more trustworthy refutation of the pseudo-philosophic atomic theory, 
revived by him and, outside his other strange notions, deserving of reprehension 
and anathema.21  
 
It is in Torporley's careful assault, A Synopsis of the Controversie of Atoms, that we find a 
reconstruction of Harriot's atomistic explanation of the nature of light. Torporley 
presented what he took to be Harriot's general maxims,22 and then concentrated on 
Harriot's explanation of the "refraction phenomena observed in a hollow sphere of 
crystal," wherein "refraction consisted in a series of reflexions."23 
Harriot replied to Kepler on 2 December 1606. He provided Kepler with a table of 
angles of refraction, which he had derived from experimental investigation.24 But in the 
letter he also suggested that dense and transparent bodies only appear to be continuous, 
and, in keeping with Torporley's account, are actually composed of both parts and vacua. 
Harriot defended this position by referring to a phenomenon from common experience: 
when a ray hits dense transparent surfaces it appears to be partly reflected and partly 
refracted.  
[The body] has corporeal parts which resist the rays, and incorporeal parts [vacua] 
which the rays penetrate. And so refraction is nothing else than an internal 
reflection, and the part of the rays which received inside, although to the sense it 
appears straight, is nevertheless composed of many [straight-line segments].25 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Stevens, Hariot the Mathematician, Philosopher, & Scholar, 174.   
21 Ibid., 174. Stevens reproduced and translated into English the entire title page of the Corrector 
Analyticus.  
22 Jacquot, "Harriot's Reputation," 183. 
23 Ibid., 180.  
24 See Lohne, "Brahe of Optics" for a detailed analysis of Harriot's experimental work on refraction.  
25 Kepleri Opera omnia 2:72. Harriot to Kepler, 2 December 1606. Translation quoted in Kargon, Atomism 
in England, 130. Also see Jacquot, "Harriot's Reputation," 180. 
	   18 
 
Harriot closed his letter to Kepler with language similar to the opening words of De 
reflexione corporum rotundorum, where he explained why it is important to understand 
the reflection of round bodies.  
I have now led you to the doors of nature’s house, wherein lie its mysteries. If you 
cannot enter because [the doors] are too narrow, then abstract and contract 
yourself into an atom, and you will enter easily. And when later come out again, 
tell me what wonders you saw.26 
 
 
1.2 – Mathematics and the mysteries of nature: not pure, mixed, practical, or applied  
De reflexione corporum rotundorum is unique. It contains geometric 
constructions, a complex set of symbolic equations, and a causal account of motion. 
Although Harriot had worked in many of the domains of mathematics of his time, De 
reflexione does not fit easily into the established traditions of pure mathematics, mixed 
mathematics, or practical mathematics. It may well be a natural philosophy of light 
investigated with mathematics, but it is not a work of mathematical optics.   
 Thomas Harriot (1560-1621) did not explain the distinctions between the various 
mathematical sciences. His contemporaries, Christoph Clavius (1537-1612) and Francis 
Bacon (1561-1526), did. Christoph Clavius's commentary on Euclid's Elements went 
through five editions from 1573-1613. It included an account of Proclus's (410-485) 
philosophy of mathematics, and two taxonomies of the mathematical sciences.27 
According to Proclus’s Pythagorean taxonomy, a distinction is drawn between those 
mathematical sciences that consider multitude (i.e. discrete quantities), and those that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ibid. Translation quoted in Kargon, Atomism in England, 130.      
27 H. M. Mulder, "Pure, Mixed and Applied Mathematics: The Changing Perception of Mathematics 
through History," Nieuw archief voor wiskunde, 8 (1990): 32.  Proclus’s writings, specifically his 
commentaries on Euclid’s first book, were only rediscovered in the 16th century. Simon Grynaeus edited 
the first Greek text of Proclus’s Commentary on Euclid’s First book, which was published in 1533 as an 
appendix to his edition of Euclid. Francis Barocius published the first Latin translation in 1560.    
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consider magnitude (i.e. continuous quantities). Each of these can be studied in two ways: 
multitude as "simple and subsisting in itself" (Arithmetica) or multitude "in relation to 
other numbers" (Musica); and magnitude can be studied as stationary (Geometria) or in 
motion (Astronomia).28   
Pythagorean 
Multitude    Magnitude 
 simple  in relation  stationary  in motion 
Arithmetica  Musica  Geometria  Astronomia 
 
The other classification provided by Proclus is that of Geminus (fl. 70 BCE). Geminus 
drew a distinction between sensibles and intelligibles. The latter are "objects aroused by 
the soul herself and contemplated in separation from embodied forms."29 These comprise 
arithmetic and geometry. He includes the six sciences—mechanica, astronomia, optica, 
geodesia, musica, and logistica [i.e. calculation]—in the category of sensibles.  
         Geminian 
Intelligibles   Sensibles  
arithmetic  mechanica 
geometry  astronomia 
 optica 
 geodesia 
 musica 
 logistica 
 
 Clavius's preferred distinction was between pura (pure) and mixta (mixed). The 
use of the word "mixed" was new to the late 16th and early 17th century, but it would be 
taken over in many classifications of mathematics. It included not only the "Pythagorean" 
harmony and astronomy, but the "Geminian" mechanica, optica, geodesia, and logistica. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ibid., 30.  
29 Ibid., 30.   
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By the 18th century the number of mixed mathematics had increased to about twenty.30 
Only in the 19th century would the term (and conception of mathematics) be displaced by 
"applied mathematics,"31 in which an abstract mathematical structure is used to model 
some phenomenon or process in the world.    
 Harriot's near contemporary, Francis Bacon, explained the meaning of "mixed" 
mathematics, and described the distinction between it and "pure" mathematics in the 
context of his larger categorization of knowledge in Of the Proficience and Advancement 
of Learning (1605).     
[T]o pure mathematics belong those sciences which handle Quantity entirely 
severed from matter and from the axioms of the natural philosophy. These are two 
Geometry and Arithmetics; . . . Mixed Mathematics has for its subject some 
axioms and parts of natural philosophy, and consider quantity in so far as it assists 
to explain, demonstrate, and actuate these.32  
 
This notion of "mixed mathematics," understood as the mixing of parts of natural 
philosophy into the axioms of mathematics, is a much more ancient tradition.33 It bears a 
relationship to the Aristotelian notion of "composite science." Geometry investigates 
"physical lines, but not qua physical" – they are abstracted from the physical. Optics and 
astronomy, on the other hand, investigate "mathematical lines qua physical, not qua 
mathematical." In so far as the objects of study of the composite sciences were physical, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Mulder, "Pure, Mixed and Applied," 32. By the 18th century, the definition of "mixed" mathematics had 
become fairly well established; for example, according to Chalmer's 1728 Cyclopaedia: "Mathematics are 
divided into pure and abstract; and mix'd. Pure Mathematics consider Quantity abstractedly; and without 
any relation to Matter: Mix'd Mathematics consider Quantity as subsisting in material Beings, and as 
continually interwove." Quoted in Mulder, "Pure, Mixed and Applied," 34. 
31 Gary I. Brown, "The Evolution of the Term 'Mixed Mathematics,'" Journal of the History of Ideas 52 
(1991): 81-102.   
32 Quoted in Brown, "Evolution of the Term," 81-82.  Bacon included architecture, “engineery,” 
perspective, and cosmography to his list of mixed mathematics in addition to astronomy and music.  
33 Brown, "Evolution of the Term," 81-82;  Mulder, "Pure, Mixed and Applied," 31;  Margaret Osler, "New 
Wine in Old Bottles: Gassendi and the Aristotelian Origin of Early Modern Physics," Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 26 (2002): 167. 
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the science was "subordinated" to physics; in so far as the attributes were mathematical 
and not physical, the science was subordinated to mathematics.34  
 Mixed mathematics is distinct from the modern notion of "applied mathematics." 
It was also distinct from the 16th and 17th century tradition of "practical mathematics," 
which included topics such as surveying, cartography, and navigation.35  
 Harriot had done significant work in each of pure, mixed, and practical 
mathematics. In pure mathematics, for example, he derived and used the "binomial 
theorem for fractional indices...long before Newton," and rectified the plane equiangular 
spiral as well as the twisted loxodromic curve on the sphere, which Descartes had thought 
to be "beyond human knowledge."36 He extended Viète's work, De numerosa potestatum 
resolutione (On the numerical solution of equations), on the structure and solution of, 
what we would now call, "polynomial equations."37 Harriot was well versed in practical 
mathematics as a surveyor, navigator, practical astronomer,38 and "excellent calculator."39 
He gave instruction in the use of instruments and charts to his patron Sir Walter Ralegh 
and the captains of Ralegh's expeditions, and took part in transatlantic voyages to North 
America.40 Harriot investigated topics in mechanics such as projectile motion.41 He also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Brown, "Evolution of the Term," 82.  
35 E. G. R. Taylor, The Mathematical Practitioners of Tudor and Stuart England (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1954). 
36 Jon V. Pepper, "Thomas Harriot and the Great Mathematical Tradition." In Thomas Harriot and His 
World: Mathematics, Exploration, and Natural Philosophy in Early Modern England, edited by Robert Fox 
(Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2012), 14-17. 
37 Stedall, "Reconstructing," 53-7. 
38 J. A. Bennett, "Instruments, mathematics, and natural knowledge: Thomas Harriot's place on the map of 
learning," in Thomas Harriot: Elizabethan man of Science, ed. by Robert Fox (Burlington: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2000), 137-152. 
39 Pepper, "Great Mathematical Tradition," 15. 
40 Pascal Brioist, "Thomas Harriot and the Mariner's Culture: On Board a Transatlantic Ship in 1585." In 
Thomas Harriot and His World: Mathematics, Exploration, and Natural Philosophy in Early Modern 
England, edited by Robert Fox (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2012), 183-5. 
41 Matthias Schemmel, The English Galileo: Thomas Harriot’s Work on Motion as an Example of 
Preclassical Mechanics, 2 vols. (Berlin: Springer, 2008). 
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made significant discoveries in mixed mathematics, specifically mathematical optics. 
Harriot successfully determined what we now call "Snell’s Law" using experiments well 
before Descartes published his account of the sine law of refraction in the Dioptrics 
(1637), and before Willebrord Snell circulated his results in manuscript form around 
1621.42 He also measured the dispersion of white light with the aid of a prism, 
determined the radius of the rainbow, and showed that the rays of green and red light 
have different refrangibilities.43   
 Harriot worked extensively throughout the recognized domains of mathematics, 
and traversed several traditional intellectual boundaries.44 Although Harriot was well 
versed in mathematical optics, and although De reflexione may well be connected to his 
studies of light, it does not easily fit into the category of mixed mathematics. Rather, it 
appears to be an explanation of the nature of light. If refraction is an "internal reflection" 
as Harriot claimed in a letter to Kepler, then De reflexione corporum rotundorum is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 John W. Shirley, "An Early Experimental Determination of Snell's Law," American Journal of Physics 
19 (1951): 507-8. Also see Lohne, "Brahe of Optics," 113-121. Pepper, "Great Mathematical Tradition," 
15.   
43 Lohne, "Brahe of Optics," 113-121. Also see J. A. Lohne, "The Fair Fame of Thomas Harriott: Rigaud 
versus Baron von Zach," Centaurus 8 (1963) 69-84.  Kargon provides additional references to optics in 
Harriot's manuscripts in Kargon, Atomism in England, 23. Harriot also maked numerous references and 
notes on the optical works of the 11th century mathematician Alhazen through out the manuscripts. Add. 
MS 6789 ff. 415-423. "Alhazen" appears in another series of folios: Add. MS 6789 ff. 168, 174-182. De 
puncto reflexionis in sphærico convexo and De puncto reflexionis in sphærico concava. The following 
references to Alhazen are written on the top of the latter series of folios: Alhazen. p. 170  lib. 5. n. 73 (Add. 
MS 6789 f. 174); Alhazen. part. 149 (Add. MS 6789 f. 178); Alhazen. part. 169 (Add. MS 6789 f. 179); 
Alhazen 146 part (Add. MS 6789 f. 180); Alhazen, part 146 (Add. MS 6789 f. 181); Alhazen. part. 146 
(Add. MS 6789 f. 182). Also see Stevens, Hariot the Mathematician, Philosopher, & Scholar, 179. 
44 J. A. Bennett has called Harriot a "challenging and pioneering figure – a traveler and an interloper on the 
map of learning." See Bennett, "Instruments, mathematics, and natural knowledge," 151. Stephen Clucas 
has emphasized a similar point, stressing his many "diverse practices" and the "different faces of Thomas 
Harriot, and how these faces have changed according to changing conceptions of the knowledge field of his 
times." See Stephen Clucas, "Thomas Harriot and the field of knowledge in the English Renaissance," in 
Thomas Harriot: An Elizabethan Man of Science, ed. by Robert Rox (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 
2000), 93, 135. Robert Fox framed the introduction to the 2012 collection of Harriot Lectures in terms of 
Harriot's "many worlds." See Robert Fox, "The Many Worlds of Thomas Harriot," in in Thomas Harriot 
and His World: Mathematics, Exploration, and Natural Philosophy in Early Modern England, ed. by 
Robert Fox (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2012), 1. 
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mathematical account of this process. Whether or not Harriot had developed a thorough 
natural philosophy or was committed to atomism as some have suggested,45 the 
mathematical account of collision in De reflexione, which Harriot introduced as 
"lead[ing]...towards the innermost Mystery, or the understanding of Natural Philosophy," 
was novel. 
   
1.3 – Geometrical constructions, symbolic equations, and numerical calculations  
 De reflexione corporum rotundorum, Poristica duo was written no later than June 
13, 1619, but based on "ancient notes" from several years prior. It was written at the 
request of Harriot’s imprisoned patron, Henry Percy, the ninth Earl of Northumberland 
who had been locked in the Tower of London since 1606 on charges of treason for his 
alleged affiliation with the conspirators of the Gunpowder Plot.46 As it happens, the Earl 
was set free only days after Harriot died in July 1621.47 Harriot’s previous patron and 
long time friend, Sir Walter Ralegh, had been executed on the scaffold on 29 October 
1618. Harriot was present at Ralegh’s last moments alive. According to the notes he took 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 There has been an on-going disagreement regarding the existance and extent of Harriot's natural 
philosophy.  Although Harriot did not write an explicit treatise on natural philosophy, several historians 
claim that a coherent natural philosophy uniting atomism, alchemy, and optics is apparent in the 
manuscripts. For example, see Hilary Gatti, "The natural philosophy of Thomas Harriot," in Thomas 
Harriot: Elizabethan man of Science, ed. by Robert Fox (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2000), 64-92. 
Also see Goulding, "Chymicorum in morem." Others, notably John Henry, argue that there is no such 
natural philosophy; Harriot was primarily a mathematician and not interested in natural philosophy. See 
John Henry, "Harriot and Atomism," in Mathématiques et connaissance du monde réel avant Galilée, ed. 
by Sabine Rommevaux (Montreuil: Omniscience, 2010), 113-54. John Henry, "Thomas Harriot and 
Atomism: a reappraisal" History of Science 20 (1982): 276-296. John Henry, "Why Thomas Harriot was 
Not the English Galileo," in Thomas Harriot and His World: Mathematics, Exploration, and Natural 
Philosophy in Early Modern England, ed. by Robert Fox (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2012), 113-138.   
46 G. R. Batho, S. Clucas, and Anna Beer, "The Prison Writings of Sir Walter Raleigh and the Ninth Earl of 
Northumberland," The Durham Thomas Harriot Seminar, Occasional Papper 9 (University of Durham, 
1996): 1. Also see Shirley, Biography, 327-357.  
47 Gatti, "The natural philosophy of Harriot," 64. 
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on Ralegh's final speech, his patron "speake iustly & truely."48 When Harriot sent the 
treatise on the reflections of round bodies to the Earl, he included a letter, dated 13 June 
1619, which indicates some of the practical reasons for writing the treatise:  
Sr: when Mr Warner & Mr Hues were last at Syon, it happened that I was 
perfectting my auntient ^ notes papers of the doctrin of reflections of bodyes. Unto 
^ whom I imported the Magisteryes of thereof, to the end to make your Lord thus 
aquainted with them as occasion served. And least that some perticulars might be 
mistaken or forgotten, I thought best since to set them downe in writing. Whereby 
allso nows at times of leasure when your minde is free from matters of greater 
waight, you may thinke & consider of them, if you please. Yt had bin verie 
conuenient I coufe to have written of this doctrine more at longt or particularlie to 
have set downe the first princeples with such other of elementall propositions, as 
all doubtes might haue bin cleered prevented: but my infirmitie is yet so 
troublesome, that I am forced, as well that, as other traits to let alone till time of 
better abilitie. | In the meane time I haue made choyce of two propositions in 
whose explication you shall find I hope the summe of all... 49 
 
Some of these "auntient notes of the doctrin of reflections of bodyes" may include folios 
containing numerical calculations,50 one of which is reproduced below as figure 3. The 
above quote also indicates that this is a topic that had been discussed with a circle of 
scholars, including Warner and Hues, and that the treatise was written based on ideas that 
were quite old. Nevertheless, the form that the treatise took was not yet to the satisfaction 
of its author, specifically it does not begin with first principles.   
Contained in the manuscript notes and the prepared but unpublished treatise are 
three kinds of mathematics—the geometric diagram (and construction, written in prose), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Shirley, Biography, 446. "[The] half-sheet of wrinkled and battered foolscap which he kept among his 
miscellaneous papers" on which he kept notes on Ralegh’s speech is at the British Library, Add. MS f. 
533r. Also see Mark Nicholls, "Last Act? 1618 and the Shaping of Sir Walter Ralegh's Reputation," in 
Thomas Harriot and His World: Mathematics, Exploration, and Natural Philosophy in Early Modern 
England, ed. by Robert Fox (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2012), 165-182.  
49 Harley MS 6001-2 ff. 21r-22v. Charles Cavendish had copied, in his own hand, many of Harriot’s 
manuscripts, including De reflexione. Following the letter, Cavenish wrote: "Syon June 13 .  1619 |  Mr: 
Harriots letter to my Lo: Northumberland: annexed to his treatise of Reflexions: in th? fus?o lent me to 
transcribe by Sr: Th: Alesburie." Following this, Cavendish has several pages of notes on the treatise. Text 
transcribed by me from the manuscript held at the British Library. 
50 Add. MS 6786 f. 383, Add. MS 6789 f. 101.  
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two types of symbolic equations (representing two levels of abstraction), and numerical 
calculations—all brought to the service of a single phenomenon, the reflection of round 
bodies.   
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Figure 2. HMC 241/VIA folio 23r. Image courtesy of the MPIWG Library 
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Figure 3. Add. MS 6786 folio 393. Image courtesy of the MPIWG Library and ECHO 
http://echo.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/ 
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 Symbolic algebra and the physical interpretation of the negative sign would have 
an important role in the development of the rules of collision, just as the rules of collision 
would have an important role in the development of the interpretation of negative 
numbers, as we will seen throughout this dissertation. Harriot's work on collision is 
fascinating since it is expressed in part in symbolic algebra and uses what initially 
appears to be negative numbers. And De reflexione, together with Beeckman's 
independent and simultaneous work in his Journal, is among the first mathematical 
studies of collision. Harriot's De reflexione does not appear to have been directly 
influential on the development of the rules of collision. Whereas Beeckman's work may 
well have been. For instance, Descartes's early view of collision bears a striking 
resemblance to that of Beeckman. Nevertheless, Harriot's De reflexione is important. In 
this text we see a possible combination of key mathematical concepts with the concepts 
of collision, that ultimately did not prevail. The use of algebraic equations to express 
collision in which positive and negative signs indicate the direction of motion, seems 
obvious in hindsight. It may seem so simple that we risk overlooking their importance. 
This can be clarified by examining some of the alternative approaches that did not 
ultimately come to be accepted.  
Harriot not only used an algebraic formalism to express the reflection of bodies, 
but he appears, at least prima facie, to use the negative sign to represent certain kinds of 
speeds. This is remarkable since the legitimacy of negative numbers was disputed at the 
time and would continue to be debated for years to come.51 Harriot’s use of the negative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 For mathematicians in the 17th century it was difficult to accept that a magnitude could be smaller than 
nothing. Some algebraists, such as Cardano and Descartes called them "defective," "fictitious," or "false," 
whereas others simply ignored the negative roots of polynomials. Some, such as Descartes, drew a 
distinction between "species" marked by a negative sign such as -2A which were deemed acceptable in 
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sign, I would like to stress, is quite different from the familiar approach. The geometric 
construction is  fundamental in De reflexione. The set of equations is a symbolic 
expression of the steps of the construction. Positive and negative signs refer to the 
addition or removal of a line. They do not refer directly to the direction of motion. The 
equations do, however, provide a means to calculate the motion of bodies after collision, 
as is exemplified by the arrays of numbers seen in figure 3.   
 
1.3.1 – Negative signs – not contrary direction 
 
There are multiple examples of a negative sign before a number in Harriot's work 
on collision, which can be seen above in figure 3 as well as below in table 1. The 
equations from Add MS 6786 f. 393 include four numbers to the left of the equality sign 
(excluding the numbers above and below the others, and the number to the left of the 
vertical line). An addition or subtraction sign together with one number follows the 
equality sign to the right. These numbers correspond to the algebraic terms in the 
equations from De reflexione (on the right of the table). The two numerical equations, 
one written above the other, correspond to the two algebraic equations, which are linked 
by a set of zig-zag equality signs. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
mathematics, and negative numbers, such as -2 which were thought to be impossible. See Helena M. 
Pycior, Symbols, Impossible Numbers, and Geometric Entanglements: British Algebra through the 
Commentaries on Newton’s Universal Arithmetick (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 82-3.  
Even John Wallis, who would champion the usefulness of negative numbers, acknowledged that they were 
"impossible." See John Wallis, A Treatise of Algebra, Both Historical and Practical, Shewing the original, 
progress, and advancement thereof, from time to time, and by what steps it hath attained to the heighth at 
which now it is (London: John Playford for Richard Davis, 1685) 264-5.   
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Table 1. Numerical equations from Add MS 6786 f. 393. Diagram, symbolic equations from 
HMC 241/VIA f. 23r. 
 
“gb” in the upper equation and “BG” in the lower equation do not refer to the 
multiplication of the algebraic term “g” by “b.” Rather these refer to the geometric lines 
gb and BG in the diagram. The body at a moves to b where it meets the body which has 
moved in equal time from A to B. After they meet, the former body moves to c and the 
latter body moves to C. The line gb indicates the vertical component of the velocity of the 
former body after the collision. Similarly BG, is the vertical component of the velocity of 
the latter body after collision. According to Harriot, the lines on the diagrams actually 
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refer to the nutus of a body, rather than "component of velocity." This notion can be 
translated as "tendency."  
The numbers to the left of the line in each numerical equation refer to the 
magnitudes of the diagonal lines ab and AB. For now, we can think of these as the initial 
velocity of the two bodies. The numbers above and below the first terms of the equations 
refer to the horizontal component of the initial velocity, just as the numbers above and 
below the terms after the equality sign refer to the horizontal component of the final 
velocity.  Looking back at figure 3, we see that this horizontal component stays the same 
before and after the collision in every case.  
What looks like the fraction 1/6 to the right of the numerical equation in table 1 
refers to the ratio of the sizes of the bodies. In this case, the body which moves from a to 
c to b is to the larger as 1 is to 6.  
Just as gb is the vertical component of the final velocity (or nutus), the algebraic 
symbol  refers to the vertical component of the initial velocity of the smaller body at b 
at the moment of collision. This can be seen if we refer back to figure 2 (the first folio 
image), and note the identity between bd and  in the equations with geometric symbols 
and the equations with algebraic symbols above them. Thus, in the above table of images 
(table 1) we have an example of what appears to be a negative initial speed52 of the 
second larger body, –8. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Harriot does not use the  modern conventional distinction of “speed” to refer to a scalar quantity and 
“velocity” to refer to a vectoral quantity. However, I have used “speed” here instead of “velocity,” because 
I am referring to a specific quantity and because Harriot’s use of a negative sign does not necessarily refer 
to a particularly directed quantity. I have used “velocity” elsewhere, even though Harriot uses the Latin 
term celeritas (swiftness or speed), because in the abstract, Harriot’s notion of celeritas does include a 
directional component.   
€ 
b 
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 Harriot presents a scenario of collision with the same quantities, except the larger 
and smaller bodies have been reversed. The above mentioned set of numerical equations 
is the fourth from the top in figure 3. The set with the bodies reversed is the fourth after 
the horizontal line. This set can also be found in table 2.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Numerical equations from Add MS 6786 f. 393. Diagram, symbolic equations from 
HMC 241/VIA f. 23r. 
 
Harriot has used the same initial speeds 25 (diagonal), 15 (horizontal), 20 (vertical) for 
the body moving from a to b to c, and 10 (diagonal), 6 (horizontal), –8 (vertical) for the 
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body moving from A to B to C, just has he had before. However, here the larger and 
smaller bodies have been reversed. The ratio of the body moving through abc to the body 
moving through ABC is 6 to 1, rather than 1 to 6. In this scenario the smaller (rather than 
the larger body) has an initial vertical speed of –8. We also see that the final speed of the 
body described in the first equation is negative, –18. 
 Harriot used negative signs in relation to numbers and symbols in his work on 
collision. However, the role of the negative sign differs from their modern role as 
indicating contrary directions of motion. This can be seen clearly with two examples. The 
bodies described in the above mentioned set of numerical equations in table 2 initially 
move in the same direction. This is indicated by the second term after the vertical line, as 
will be explained below. However, the velocity of the larger body is accompanied by a 
positive sign and the velocity of the smaller body is accompanied by a negative sign. 
Moreover, after collision, both bodies continue to move in the same direction in this 
scenario, and yet a negative sign accompanies the larger body and a positive sign 
accompanies the smaller body after collision. In the second example, when bodies 
rebound and each change direction after meeting, as is depicted in figure 4 below, all the 
velocities before and after collision are positive. 
 
1.3.2 – Operations and Constructions 
 
 Despite the algebraic formalism in De reflexione and despite the numerical 
calculations based on these equations, Harriot's mathematics of collision is fundamentally 
geometrical. The two forms of symbolic equations, and the lists of numerical calculations 
represent a hierarchy of abstraction, that is nevertheless rooted in a geometric 
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construction. This strategy—beginning with a geometrical representation and ending with 
numerical calculations by means of symbolic algebraic expressions—is consistent with 
Harriot's general mathematical treatment of other topics in his manuscripts.53 The steps of 
the construction dictate the operations in the equations, and the construction provides the 
meaning of the symbolic and numerical terms. 
 De reflexione describes how to perform a geometrical construction to determine 
the "quality and quantity of the motion" after the bodies have "knocked" (feriunt) into 
each other, making a mutual "blow" (ictus). The "force" (vis) or "active power" of a body 
(potentia activa) acts in the blow, which is created from the meeting of the bodies in 
motion. This is the cause. The effect, which is what is to be investigated in the study, is 
the "second motion" caused in each body by the mutual blow. The resulting "second" 
"apparent motion of the body" (motus corporis apparens), is built up from the elemental 
action of the moving bodies, just as a geometric construction is built up from elemental 
lines. The motions have various tendencies (nutus), which are compounded, subtracted, 
and transposed by the force of the moving bodies produced from the mutual blow. Rather 
than a conservation principle or a proportion derived from the mechanical law of the 
lever, the second apparent motion is produced from three actions, which correspond to 
three steps in the construction of the diagram.54   
 The central vertical line, seen in figure 4 below, is to be drawn through the center 
of the two bodies at the point of contact.  The new nutus acquired by the mutual blow of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Schemmel, English Galileo, 49. "Harriot's mathematical treatment of a mechanical problem usually 
begins with a geometrical representation of its relevant aspects...and ends with numerical calculations in 
which definite values for the sought quantities are determined. The algebraic formalism enables Harriot to 
calculate quantities that do not stand in a relation to the known quantities that is simple enough to be 
directly read off from the geometrical represenation." 
54 HMC 241 VIA f. 24. "Thus first the lesser body b, whose quantity [of motion] must be separated into 
three parts, occasioned by as many actions, distinct according to their nature, and as follows." Translation 
by Lohne, "Essays on Thomas Harriot," 202.   
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the bodies will be depicted along this line. Next, perpendiculars are to be drawn to the 
nutus line from where the motions of the bodies started. The resulting lines determine the 
force or active power (vires siue potentias actiuas) of the given bodies in the case of the 
mutual blow.  
To understand the first action, and to perform the first part of the construction of 
the diagram, Harriot asks the reader to consider how the body at capital B, if it was equal 
to that at small b and at rest, would react to small b, if small b struck it with a force as if it 
moved from d to b.55 He claims that the body at B would "resist and repel it with a 
resistance equal to the force received, viz, that from b to d."56 In other words, if B = b, 
and if B is initially at rest, then B would repel b giving it a new nutus, which happens to 
be the same magnitude as db (the component of b’s original motion), but directed in the 
opposite manner. bd on the diagram is thus the first part of the second apparent motion.57 
We should note that this line segment, bd, is found in the bottom set of equations, and its 
counterpart in algebraic notation, 𝑏, is in the upper set of equations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 In the text Harriot is not consistent in his naming conventions. At times the name B refers to a point on 
the diagram, at other times B designates the body at point B. The phrase "body B" is likely a short hand for 
his other phrase "the body at B." Either the names of the bodies change after equal durations of time a, b, c 
and A, B, C respectively, or the bodies are unnamed and occupy differently named positions in equal times. 
The latter interpretation seems more plausible than the former. However, when Harriot switches to his two 
forms of symbolic equations (one of which uses conventions from geometric diagrams such as two-letter 
names for lines, and the other which uses algebraic symbols such as single letters with overlines to indicate 
lines) the letter B as well as the letter b refer directly to the body at the point. After Harriot’s death, Charles 
Cavendish had access to many of Harriot’s papers from 1621 through 1654. In his study and attempt at 
systematizing Harriot’s work on the reflection of round bodies, Cavendish used another system of notation 
altogether, which involves superscripts. For example bd = 1a, de = 2a, and the "excess" ef = 3a, where a 
refers to the smaller body. See Harley MS. 6002  ff. 21r – 22v   
56 HMC 241 VIA f.25 Translation by Lohne, "Essays on Thomas Harriot," 202.   
57 It is not insignificant that the initial nutus of the body in motion is designated db. The nutus from the first 
action—the nutus from the other body—is designated bd. This is a convinient convention for indicating the 
direction of a tendency (nutus) on Harriot’s diagrams.   
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Figure 4. Annotated from HMC 241/VIA folio 23r. 
 
 
But it is not the case that the body at capital B is at rest. So, still assuming that the 
two bodies are equal, the motion of the body now at capital B is taken into account for the 
second action. A motion equal to that of the vertical component of the motion (the nutus) 
of the body at B is added to the nutus bd. On the diagram one constructs a line equal in 
magnitude to DB, signified as de. Thus, de is the second part of the second apparent 
motion. We also find this step of the construction explicitly in the two sets of equations. 
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Figure 5. Annotated from HMC 241/VIA folio 23r. 
 
 
 It may not actually be the case that capital B is equal to small b. If it is larger, then 
it would produce an effect larger than be (the sum of the two parts of the motion already 
described). And if smaller, it would produce a smaller effect. So, some additional 
quantity should be included. This additional nutus, signified as ef, is to be as the extent to 
which body B exceeds b is to body B. In other words,  𝐵 ∶ 𝐵 − 𝑏 ∷ 𝑏𝑒 ∶ 𝑒𝑓 
 Although explicitly left unstated in Harriot’s text, we see from the upper 
equations that Harriot has used the method of 4th entry,58 to transform the proportion into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Schemmel, English Galileo, 49. Schemmel discusses Harriot’s use of this method in his section on 
Harriot’s algebra. 
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an equation and has solved it for ef.59 In the bottom set of equations we see that the third 
term, the correction value, ef, has been added. 
      
Figure 6. Annotated from HMC 241/VIA folio 23r. 
 
 
The three lines have been drawn on the diagram, but the end of the line is no 
where near the smaller body, which is at point b. Harriot writes that the smaller body 
would have continued to move the same space in the same time if it had not hit 
anything—on the diagram, the line ab would be extended by a length equal to itself. 
However, there is the additional nutus (the three actions) due to the mutual blow. On the 
diagram three lines are added, bd, de, and ef, which correspond to these three actions (the 
additional nutus). The ictus does not annul the original nutus of body b. (The original 
tendency of body b, recall, is ab; this is the tendency of its original motion). Rather, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 𝐵 ∶ 𝐵 − 𝑏 ∷ 𝑏𝑒 ∶ 𝑒𝑓  is transformed into the equation, !!!! = !!!!" , where 𝑏𝑒 = 𝑏 + 𝐵. This is then solved: 𝑒𝑓 = (!!!)(!!!)! , which corresponds to the third term in Harriot’s upper set of equations.     
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original nutus is deviated by the ictus. On the diagram, the line fc is drawn parallel to ab, 
but at the end of line ef rather than the end of line de, which is where it would be drawn 
had the two bodies never met. This essentially removes the line segment fg from the 
central line of nutus, and the apparent second motion of the smaller body, can be 
constructed from b to c. Harriot argues that the three additional tendencies (bd, de, ef) and 
the original tendency of the body (ab, now deviated to fc)  compose the apparent second 
motion of the smaller body, which on the diagram is the construction of the line bc.  Thus 
in the equations we see fg, which is equal in magnitude to , is subtracted. In order to 
produce gb.  
      
Figure 7. Annotated from HMC 241/VIA folio 23r. 
 
 
 This same construction is repeated for the larger body that moves from A to B to 
C. First assume that the body it meets is its same size and at rest. This constructs line BD. 
Then take into consideration that the other body, b, is moving. This constructs line DE. 
€ 
b 
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And third, modify the line thus far constructed according to the correction value. Since 
the other body, b, is smaller than B, it would produce an effect smaller than BE. Some 
quantity should be removed. This quantity is signified as EF. Harriot's correction term, 
EF, has been criticized by several historians. This will be discussed more below in 
section 1.3.3. 
The operations in the equations correspond to the steps of the geometric 
construction. The equations refer directly to the lines of the diagram, and only 
secondarily to "physical quantities" such as the nutus themselves. This can most clearly 
be seen by the presence of the terms s and S. There are many equalities indicated in 
Harriot’s symbolic notation. For instance the upper bracketed equations are set equal to 
the lower bracket of equations. I have taken this link to indicate a definition of terms, for 
instance, 𝑒𝑓 = (!!!)(!!!)! . Similarly, the geometric line bd is 𝑏. The set of upper 
equations is a higher level in a hierarchy of abstraction. Nevertheless, even these 
equations are rooted in the diagram. The lower set of equations, as a whole, states that dD 
is equal to gG. It is tempting to interpret this as statement that the total speed prior to the 
meeting of bodies (dD) is equal to the total speed after the meeting of the bodies (gG). 
However, strictly speaking, the total speed prior to the meeting is indicated by the sum of 
speed 𝑏 and speed 𝐵. However, the geometric notation, dD, actually refers to the line. 
Since 𝑏 refers to line bd and 𝐵 refers to line BD, strictly speaking, dD is not equal to the 
total speed prior to the meeting. There is the space that the bodies themselves occupy on 
the diagram. S refers to the radius of the body at B and s refers to the radius of the body at 
b. Even though this conflates different kinds of quantities, Harriot still includes the half 
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width of each body so that the line corresponds to the algebraic symbols and vice versa, 
as can be seen in the vertical equation: 𝑑𝐷 = 𝑏 + 𝑠 + 𝑆 + 𝐵 
 The symbols in the central brackets can also be understood as a single equation. 
Note that in both sets of brackets the first term of the lower equation is preceded by an 
addition sign. When all the terms are added and subtracted on the left side of the 
equation, it amounts to the line segments gb and BG.  The combination of these two line 
segments is nearly equivalent to the line gG, which is the line indicated to the right of the 
brackets and equal sign. However, it is only nearly equivalent to gG. What is missing, 
geometrically, is again the space that the bodies themselves occupy. This is resolved by 
adding s, the radius of the smaller body, and S, the radius of the larger body. These terms 
are included in both the geometrical symbolic equations as well as the algebraic symbolic 
equations.  The addition of the s’s appears to be done purely for the sake of maintaining a 
strict correspondence to the diagrams. The line segments, such as gb or BG, designate the 
physical quantities of the nutus (tendencies). S, on the other hand, designates the length 
of the radius of the larger body. The difference in the kind of quantity—tendency on the 
one hand and length of the radius of body on the other hand—is collapsed by the 
diagrammatic representation. Because of the constraints of the drawing itself, both kinds 
of quantities are represented as a length. In order for the equation to correspond to the 
diagram it too must include the radius of the body. Thus equations do not directly 
represent the quantities such as the total nutus before the meeting and the total nutus after 
the meeting. If they did, the radius of the bodies would be irrelevant. Instead, the 
equations refer to the geometric diagram.  
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Perhaps Harriot realized the awkwardness of these values and thus did not include 
them in the proper equations themselves, relegating them to an "in-between" status. They 
appear in-between the two equations in each set.  
Despite the awkwardness of the S's, the equations and diagrams economically 
contain a great amount of information from Harriot's porisms. For example, not only are 
the upper and lower bracketed equations equated, as well as the equations within the 
brackets, the terms are also linked by zigzag equalities. bd is equal to DE which appears 
to be equal to fg. bd is the nutus of the body b from the first action; it was created by the 
active power of the body at B taken to be at rest; the nutus produced was equal in 
magnitude to the initial speed of bd (if the body had moved along the line of nutus) but in 
the opposite direction. This is set equal to DE.  DE, if you recall, is the nutus produced in 
the second action on the body at B; it is created by adding a quantity equal to the 
magnitude of the initial motion of the first body b, which is bd. And fg is the amount 
subtracted off the line of nutus once the original motion has been deviated to the end of 
the constructed line of nutus due to the mutual ictus made by the meeting of the bodies. 
This original motion had a vertical nutus equal to bd.60 The symbolic expressions, with 
their zigzag equalities contain the information described in this paragraph and more. 
Whereas a verbal description, such as this very paragraph, is difficult to follow, the 
symbolic expression is elegant, simple, and intelligible.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 In other words, the nutus from the first action on the smaller body is the same magnitude as the second 
action on the larger body, which is also the same magnitude as what is removed due to the original nutus of 
the smaller body’s motion. The smaller body receives a nutus from the larger body which is equal to the 
original nutus of the smaller body, but in the opposite direction. This is the first action with respect to the 
smaller body. The motion of the smaller body imparts a nutus on the larger with a magnitude equal to the 
original nutus of the smaller body. This is the second action with respect to the larger body. Since the 
original nutus of the smaller body is not annulled, but deviated by the mutual ictus made by the meeting of 
the bodies, this nutus, which is subtracted off, is equal in magnitude to itself and to the nutus of the second 
action with respect to the second body.  
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All the magnitudes are non-negative, since they correspond to line segments. The 
negative signs, such as that in front of fg, serve the purpose of operations. They do not 
indicate the "quality" of the quantity, e.g. whether it is a negative quantity or a positive 
quantity. Recall from section 3.1.1 that if a body continues to move in the same direction 
after it meets another body, then the sign of the number or symbol representing its motion 
changes from positive to negative. From working through the construction, we know that 
the nutus (for the second motion of the smaller body) are constructed above the point of 
contact; and the nutus (for the second motion of the larger body) are constructed below. 
We could imagine a line separating these two domains.  If the first body continues to 
move in the same direction after collision, then it will have meant that enough quantities 
have been subtracted off the line of construction that the entire line has been removed and 
a line segment extends to the other side of the point of contact in the construction. Since 
the removal, or subtraction, of a line segment is indicated with a negative sign, this line is 
numerically presented with a negative symbol.   
Also, recall that if the second body initially moves in the same direction as the 
first, it appears to have a negative speed. The value in question is the first term of the 
equation, which results from the first action. Technically it is not the initial velocity of 
the body at all. Rather it is the nutus imparted on the body in question by the other body, 
if we assume the other body is at rest and equal in size. Thus a body moving from D to B 
would acquire a nutus from body b equal in magnitude, but in the opposite direction BD.  
If the larger second body moves in the same direction as the smaller first body, when the 
two bodies meet, the vertical nutus DB of the larger body is drawn above the imagined 
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line. It is a quantity subtracted off the line of construction for the apparent motion of the 
larger body.  
 
1.3.3 – Numerical Calculations and Symmetry 
 
 In addition to the diagram, the set of geometric symbolic equations, and algebraic 
symbolic equations, which are on the first folio of De reflexione, Harriot also has lists of 
numerical equations, such as those in figure 3 above. The latter equations appear to have 
been used to calculate and compare various possible outcomes of colliding bodies. They 
were likely instances of "mathematical experimentation" with his established structure, 
possibly as an investigation of symmetry. Nevertheless, a facet of Harriot's equations, 
namely the term corresponding to the "third action," is inconsistent with principles of 
symmetry, but not for the reasons that several commentators of Harriot's work have 
suggested.  
 The list of numerical equations in figure 3 is not representative of all possible 
combinations of differently sized bodies with different speeds. However, charting out all 
possible combinations was of interest to Harriot. The folio in figure 8 depicts a taxonomy 
of eleven different scenarios in which two bodies could meet, e.g. both bodies move in 
opposite directions or the same direction, the speeds are different or equal, one body is at 
rest, the bodies are of different or equal size.   
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Figure 8. Add MSS 6788 f. 228, courtesy of MPIWG Library 
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In the 17th century, Sir Charles Cavendish appears to have used this taxonomy as a guide 
in his notes on Harriot's De reflexione.61 Martin Kalmar, in the 20th century, has also 
used this taxonomy as a guide in his reconstruction of Harriot's theory of collision, which 
attempts to uncover its basic principles.62 
 The list of numerical equations, on the other hand, depicts a series of fairly 
redundant kinds of collisions. Most are scenarios in which both bodies initially move in 
the same direction. The striking feature of the numerical equations in figure 3 is that the 
five sets of equations above the horizontal line closely correspond to the five sets of 
equations below the horizontal line. The various initial tendencies (nutus) are the same 
between the corresponding equations, but Harriot has reversed only the relative sizes of 
the bodies. The ratio of the bodies in the first set is 2/3 whereas the ratio of the bodies in 
the first set after the horizontal line is 3/2, just as the second sets are 0/4 and 4/0, the third 
sets are 1/3 and 3/1, the fourth sets are 1/6 and 6/1, and the fifth sets are 0/12 and 12/0. 
Another striking feature is that the second and fifth sets of equations (both above and 
below the line) include a ratio between the bodies in which one term of the ratio is zero. 
These equations are marked by a double set of asterisks in parentheses. What Harriot's 
intentions were with these equations is not entirely clear. Nevertheless the sets of 
equations are suggestive of an investigation into principles of symmetry.   
 Historians have criticized Harriot's De reflexione for failing to properly 
incorporate principles of symmetry into its equations. The term corresponding to the 
"third action," described above as the "correction term," is the primary target. Some of 
the criticisms of this term are a product of the historians' reconstructions of Harriot's 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Harley MS 6001-2 ff. 21r-22v.   
62 Kalmar, "Hariot's De Reflexione," 206. 
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theory of collision into modern algebraic equations. With a proper understanding of 
Harriot's own mathematics, these criticisms are irrelevant. However, even with a 
historicist understanding of the mathematics in De reflexione the third term, particularly 
in the second of the equations in the sets, is problematic.  
 Modern textbook presentations of collision use two conservation principles, 
expressed by two algebraic equations with two variables: the conservation of momentum 
and the conservation of energy. 𝑚!𝑣!! +𝑚!𝑣!! = 𝑚!𝑣!! +𝑚!𝑣!! !!𝑚!𝑣!!! + !!𝑚!𝑣!!! = !!𝑚!𝑣!!! + !!𝑚!𝑣!!! 
In order to predict the motions of the bodies after collision the two equations are solved 
simultaneously to determine the two unknown values for the final velocities. Despite the 
significant differences in the concepts used by Harriot and modern textbooks, there is a 
similarity in form between Harriot's equations and those derived by the conservation of 
momentum and energy.   
𝑣!! = 𝑣!! + (𝑚! −𝑚!)(𝑣!! − 𝑣!!)𝑚! +𝑚!  
 𝑣!! = 𝑣!! + (𝑚! −𝑚!)(𝑣!! − 𝑣!!)𝑚! +𝑚!  
 
Table 3 
 
Harriot's equations have four terms on one side of the equation. Two of those terms are 
the same, the first and fourth, which are added and then subtracted. In the upper equation 
this is 𝑏  − 𝑏. In this lower equation this is +𝐵  − 𝐵. Despite the simplicity and 
redundancy of this operation, it is included in every set of numerical calculations in the 
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list of equations in figure 3. This is another indication that the equations correspond 
directly to the construction of the diagram. Once this term is "cancelled" from Harriot's 
equations, what remains is an equation with terms similar to the initial speed of the 
second body added to a polynomial containing the difference of the initial speeds of the 
bodies, multiplied by the difference of the bodies, divided by the body. All this is equal to 
a term similar to the final speed of the first body.  
 Lohne, Pepper, and Kalmar have claimed that Harriot's correction term should 
have included the size of both bodies added in the denominator. According to their 
analysis, Harriot's term does not have the required "symmetry properties." 63 These 
authors have also reconstructed Harriot's theory of collision in modern mathematics. 
Lohne, for example, explicitly wrote: "I shall not use Harriot's "geometrical methods to 
introduce the formulæ of collision; rather, I shall use the now well known principles of 
conservation of "quantity of motion" and "kinetic energy" (force vive)."64 Lohne went on 
to derive a reconstructed version of Harriot's equations from these "well known principles 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Lohne, "Essays on Thomas Harriot," 195, 196. "In HARRIOT’S correction term [the term corresponding to 
the third action] we note that the denominator B disturbs the symmetry of his equations. ... Did HARRIOT 
fail to notice that reciprocity in action ought to be described by analogous reciprocity in his formulæ? Or 
did he not wholly understand that in principle (and in mathematical formulæ) the two bodies should be 
interchangeable? ... In his coefficient to this relative velocity he fails to see that the magnitudes of both 
balls should be represented in the denominator." Also see Pepper, "Harriot on the Theory of Impacts," 135, 
140. "To the modern view the determination of ef and EF is unsatisfactory. I do not mean merely that the 
result does not accord with later views, but that it is unsymmetric between the two spheres. ... [F]or 
example in the case of the smaller sphere, its component of velocity along the line of centres is bg, where 
bg = df + ef = BD + k(bd+BD) and k is the factor which enables the relative masses to be taken into 
account. In an obvious notation, Harriot explicitly uses 𝑘 = !!!!!!!  for the smaller sphere, and –k for the 
larger, which k lacks the necessary properties. The alternative expression !!!!!!!!!! does possess the required 
symmetry and antisymmetry properties, and it is remarkable, to say the least, that Harriot, who as an 
algebraist knew as much about symmetry as any contemporary, and who in his work on centres of gravity 
understood mean points, should have produced the fraction ½ rather than 1/5. Perhaps the only safe moral 
to draw from the situation is that constant cares should be taken against coming to believe that problems 
which may later seem easy really are easy, even to those of great talent who produce the earlier 
investigations. Where new or only partly formulated ideas are concerned, nothing is easy." Also see 
Kalmar, "Hariot's De Reflexione," 215-17. 
64 Lohne, "Essays on Thomas Harriot," 191. 
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of conservation." These authors' suggestions that the correction term could be improved if 
Harriot had added both bodies b + B rather than merely B, may well be due to their 
reliance on modern equations such as those in table 3. There is no reason why Harriot 
would have included the sum b + B in the denominator. The top equation describes the 
added nutus body b receives from its interaction with body B. The third term takes into 
account that body B is larger than body b. Since B is larger than b, the nutus imparted to b 
will be proportionally larger than be (the nutus imparted to b if b and B were the same 
size). This extra amount (ef) is to the nutus (be) as the amount the larger body exceeds the 
smaller (B−b) is to the larger body (B). In other words, 𝑒𝑓 ∶ 𝑏𝑒 ∷ 𝐵 − 𝑏 ∶ 𝐵. There is no 
apparent reason for the proportion to be 𝑒𝑓 ∶ 𝑏𝑒 ∷ 𝐵 − 𝑏 ∶ 𝐵 + 𝑏.  
 The second equation describes the added nutus body B receives from its 
interaction with body b. The third term takes into account that body b is smaller than 
body B. Since b is smaller than B, the nutus imparted to B will be proportionally smaller 
than BE (the nutus imparted to B if B and b were the same size). Thus some quantity, EF, 
should be subtracted from BE. Harriot uses the same quantity for ef and EF. In the second 
equation the quantity is subtracted, rather than added as it was in the top equation. That 
Harriot made them equal is made explicit on the first folio of De reflexione: a vertical 
equality symbol extends across the two equations binding together ef and EF. Moreover, 
the corresponding third terms for both equations in each set are equal in every numerical 
example in figure 3. That they are equal is problematic. To be consistent with Harriot's 
reasoning regarding the third term, EF should not be equal to ef.  Since the nutus 
imparted to B will be proportionally smaller than BE, some amount, EF, should be 
subtracted from BE.  This amount (EF) is to the nutus (BE) as the amount the smaller 
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body falls short of the larger (B−b) is to the smaller body (b). In other words, 𝑒𝑓 ∶ 𝑏𝑒 ∷𝐵 − 𝑏 ∶ 𝑏. 
 
* * * 
 
 Thomas Harriot claimed that one should investigate the "reflection of round 
bodies" because it leads to the "innermost Mystery, or the understanding of Natural 
Philosophy." This "mystery" was likely the underlying nature of light. If light is to be 
understood by the collision of bodies, Harriot's manuscript, De reflexione corporum 
rotundorum, presents the mathematics of the causal account of collision. It does so with a 
geometric construction and symbolic equations. Elsewhere in Harriot's manuscripts he 
presents lists of numerical equations, based on these sets of symbolic equations, which 
were likely used to "mathematically experiment" with the structure he had developed. 
Although Harriot made significant contributions in pure, mixed, and practical 
mathematics, De reflexione does not easily fit into any of these traditional categories. It is 
not a work in mathematical optics, but it may well be a natural philosophy of light 
investigated with mathematics.  
 Harriot's equations appear to use negative numbers. However, on closer 
inspection, we see that the negative sign does not directly indicate the direction of 
motion. Rather, Harriot's equations should be understood as a symbolic expression of the 
steps of a construction. The positive and negative signs indicate the operation of adding 
and removing lines from the diagram. They do not refer directly to the direction of 
motion. Nevertheless, the equations do provide a means to calculate the motion of bodies 
after collision.  
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 Three lines of the construction corresponds to three actions involved in the 
collision. The construction begins with the simple conceptual scenario as if the two 
bodies were of equal size, one in motion and one at rest. It is elaborated to include the 
motion of the other body, and elaborated again to include the relative sizes of the two 
bodies. With each action, an additional step of the geometrical construction is included. 
The steps of the construction are abbreviated first by geometrical symbols (such as bd 
and de) and arithmetical operations for the steps of the construction. This abbreviated 
construction is then further abstracted to algebraic symbols (such as 𝑏 and 𝐵) and 
operators, but still linked together with the former in a network of equality signs. The 
symbolic term corresponding to the third action has been criticized by historians for 
conflicting with symmetry principles. Although the term for the third action is 
problematic, the common criticism—that the denominator ought to include both b and 
B—seems to be informed by a reconstruction of Harriot's work into modern equations, 
and a comparison with the equations for the conservation of momentum and energy. This 
is not a criticism of Harriot's ideas, but a criticism of a mathematical fiction inspired by 
Harriot's ideas. Concepts from symbolic algebra are key to the development of theories of 
collision. Removing or reconstructing the historical mathematics erases a key element 
from the historical narrative of the development of the rules of collision.  
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Section 2  
Isaac Beeckman's mathematical studies of the loss of motion from collision 
 
2.1 – Beeckman's Question  
Motion in a vacuum never increases, but decreases. Why, may I ask, then is 
universal rest not brought about?65  
 
Beeckman posed this question in a marginal heading at the end of the first mathematical 
study of collision that he included in his Journal (1618). This study had begun with the 
title: "In what manner motion in a vacuum is impeded by means of collision."66 Its 
purpose was to mathematically investigate the amount of motion lost upon every 
collision. With enough collisions, universal rest would be brought about. But nature is not 
universally at rest. Things move. Thus Beeckman concluded: "so with this [the above 
mathematical account of collision] in place, motion in a vacuum can never be intelligible. 
Faster motions, can be drawn to an end."67 Every entry in Beeckman's Journal that 
includes a mathematical investigation of collision takes on this problem of the 
consequential loss of motion. Among his last discussions of collision in the Journal 
(1634),68 for example, Beeckman was still grappling with this mathematically justified 
puzzle at the heart of his philosophy of nature. In a marginal heading he wrote: "Can it be 
that motion in a vacuum could increase?"69 Again, he cites mutual collisions causing rest. 
"Therefore," he asks, "why doesn’t everything in the end rest? Can it be that fire has an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Beeckman, Journal 1:266-7. Motus in vacuo nunquam crescit, sed decrescit. Cur igitur tandem non fit 
universalis quies? 
66 Beeckman, Journal 1:265-6. Motus in vacuo ab occurrentibus quomodo impediatur. 
67 Beeckman, Journal 1:266. His ita positis nunquam motus in vacuo potest intelligi ad celeriorem motum 
vergere. Not only are fast motions brought to a standstill, but all bodies currently at rest are on account of 
the motions of equal collisions. See Beeckman, Journal 1:266. Omnia tandem spectare ad quietem propter 
aequales occursus. 
68 His final comments are found in two sections, one dated between August and 15 October 1634, and the 
other dated betweeen 15 October and November 1634.  
69 Beeckman, Journal 3:363. Motus an in vacuo crescere possit. 
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influence to some extent? Or can it be that the very action of reflection in a vacuum is to 
such a degree unknown?"70  
 These questions were particularly significant for Beeckman. His explanations of 
natural phenomena relied on the motion and interaction of corpuscles and ultimately of 
atoms. Beeckman was among the first in Europe to be committed to the program of 
explaining all natural changes in terms of corpuscular mechanisms, based on their size, 
shape, arrangement, and motion.71 The term Beeckman used to describe this was 
"physico-mathematics." As Gaukroger and Schuster have shown, in 1618 (the same year 
as Beeckman's first mathematical investigations of collision), Beeckman met Descartes, 
and together they worked on problems in mathematics, mechanics, and music theory; and 
they applied physico-mathematical corpuscular explanations to the hydrostatics of 
Stevin.72 The interaction of small bodies was a fruitful explanans of natural phenomena. 
However, the explanation of these interactions themselves posed a significant problem 
for Beeckman. His investigations into the collision of the smallest parts of matter seemed 
to have as a consequence that motion would be lost upon each impact. This was 
significant enough that Beeckman claimed to have:  
An argument against those who admit atoms, and so indeed against myself, this 
objection, which by my judgment is so great that I cannot solve it.73 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Beeckman, Journal 3:364. Cur non igitur tandem omnia quiescunt? An ignis hic aliquid potest? Aut an 
ejus actio tam est ignota quam reflectio in vacuo?  
71 Stephen Gaukroger and John Schuster, “The hydrostatic paradox and the origins of Cartesian dynamics” 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33 (2002): 551. Also see John D. North, "Stars and atoms," in 
Thomas Harriot: An Elizabethan Man of Science, ed. by Robert Rox (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 
2000) 192. North claims that a source of what he calls Beeckman's “crude corpuscularianism” comes from 
the introduction to Hero of Alexandria’s Pneumatica. As we will see below, Beeckman was likely familiar 
with this work, since it is on a list of texts that Snel had recommended to Beeckman. North also notes that 
Lucretius may well have been an influence on Beeckman and "[o]ne should remember that Lucretius was 
less pernicious than the other atomists in Christian eyes, since in Book V of De rerum natura he maintained 
that the world had a beginning and would probably have an end." See North, "Stars and atoms," 215. 
72 Gaukroger and Schuster, "Hydrostatick paradox," 550-8. 
73 Beeckman, Journal 2:100. Argumentum contra eos qui atomos <admittunt>, atque adeò contra 
meipsum, objicio hoc, quod meo juditio tantum est ut ipse nequeam solvere. 
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Connected to the loss of motion for Beeckman was the issue of reflection. Atoms were by 
definition the smallest parts of matter. As such they cannot be compressed. Since they are 
absolutely hard and cannot compress, Beeckman did not think they could spring off each 
other. Atoms would move together after meeting. But, as Beeckman admits, "reflection is 
indeed observed in an infinite multitude of phenomena, it seems that the doctrine of 
atoms is fundamentally overthrown by these phenomena."74 Collision as an explanans 
was fruitful in Beeckman's physico-mathematical account of nature. Collision as the 
explanandum was problematic.  
 The collision of the smallest parts of matter seemed to entail that motion is lost in 
each collision and that no rebound is possible. This conflicts with the obvious 
observations that nature is full of motion and rebound. Beeckman's studies of collision 
are mathematical investigations of the amount of motion lost in each collision.   
   
2.2 – Mathematical Education and Practical Mathematical Vocation   
 While Beeckman was in Leiden studying theology (1607-1610), he met with 
Rudolph Snel (1546-1613) who gave Beeckman a mathematical reading list. See table 4. 
In the passage of the Journal in which Beeckman explained the organization and content 
of the list, Beeckman claimed that anything he grasped on the subject of mathematics was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Ibid., 2:100. Rather than rely on atoms themselves, Beeckman attempted to devise an elemental theory, 
with traditional elements similar to those of Aristotle, built from collections of atoms held together by 
various structures. Different arrangements of “congeries” of atoms determines the different elements. These 
congeries were the functional units of explanation, which allowed Beeckman to deemphasize atoms 
themselves as the unit of explanation. See Gaukroger and Schuster, "Hydrostatic paradox," 553-554.  Also 
see John Schuster, "Descartes and the Scientific Revolution, 1618-1634: An Interpretation" (PhD diss., 
Princeton University, 1977) 62. Beeckman's mathematics of collision was on the level of atoms. He did, 
however, have some qualitative comments about the collision of congeries of atoms (corpuscles) as well. 
Since these congeries could have interstitial vacua, Beeckman speculated that they, unlike the atoms from 
which they are composed may rebound after meeting. Beeckman did not, however, explain the elastic 
bonds that would be required to hold these congeries together. 
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because it had been "soaked up" [haurire] from these books.75 Snel had known Petrus 
Ramus while a student in Marburg, when Ramus had visited in 1596 and 1570.76 Ramus 
had advocated severe pedagogical reform, targeting what he considered to be the 
uselessness and pointless complexity of Scholastic philosophy. Two years later Ramus 
was killed in Paris during the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre.77 The same year Snel 
began to lecture on the philosophy of Ramus at a Calvinist university in Marburg.78 Later, 
while a physician in his hometown, students from Leiden asked Snel to give them 
lectures on mathematics. In 1580 he was granted a position at the university, "but on the 
condition that he would be dismissed as soon as another mathematician turned up who 
had more experience or a better reputation."79 According to Ramus, mathematics should 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Beeckman, Journal 4:19. "These were the authors that, having been asked by me at that time, father 
Snellius indicated to me "Mathesin" to be studied, with the prior he had ordered me to divide the 
mathematical art into its parts, as I have shown in the first column; which follow the very thing he wrote. 
Nothing beyond these did he produce anything of assistance to me, not because he might have refused, but 
because I had not asked. And therefore I was in front of necessary work, anything I grasped was soaked up 
from these books." Hi fuerunt auctores quos Snellius pater olim a me rogatus, mihi indicavit ad Mathesin 
exercendam, cum prius jussisset me dividere artem methematicam in suas partes, quod feci uti videre est in 
prima columna; quæ sequuntur ipse scripsit. Neque præter ea mihi quicquam auxilij tulit, non quod 
denegaverit, sed quod ausus non essem rogare. Ideoque necessarium fuit pro labore, quicquid teneo, ex ijs 
libris haurire. 
76 Theo Verbeek, "Notes on Ramism in the Netherlands," in The Influence of Petrus Ramus: Studies in 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Philosophy and Sciences, ed. by Mordechai Feingold, Joseph S. 
Freedman, and Wolfgang Rother (Basel: Schwabe, 2001) 38-9. 
77 Foxe, John. Acts and Monuments, vol. 12 (London: John Day, 1583) 2153. "The bodies of the dead were 
caryed in Cartes to be throwne in the Riuer, so that not onely the Riuer was all steined therwith, but also 
whole streames in certayn places of the City did runne with goare bloud of the slayne bodyes. So greate 
was the outrage of that Heathenish persecution, that not onely the Protestantes, but also certayne whome 
they thought indifferent Papists they put to the sword in sted of Protestantes. In the number of them that 
were slayne of the more learned sort, was Petrus Ramus, also Lambinus an other notorious learned man, 
Plateanus, Lomenius, Chapesius, with others." The editors of John Foxe's The Acts and Monuments Online 
provide a biographical sketch of Pierre de la Ramée (Petrus Ramus) as well as a more detailed account of 
his death quoted from the Dictionnaire général de biographie et d'histoire (Paris, 1869). "Ramus died on 
the third day of the massacre (26 August), being sought out by a band of assassins encouraged (it was 
alleged) by a university rival, Pierre Charpentier, in his university rooms in the Collège de Presles, from 
where he was thrown out of the window, still alive, and dragged by his feet to be dumped in the river 
Seine." 
78 Klaas van Berkel,  "A note on Rudolf Snellius and the early history of mathematics in Leiden," in 
Mathematics from Manuscript to Print 1300-1600, ed. by Cynthia Hay (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) 
157. According to Berkel, Snel's students were so impressed that, without his knowledge or consent, they 
published his lectures on Ramus.  
79 Berkel, "A note on Snellius," 157.  
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be little more than a systematic treatment of the methods used by merchants, navigators, 
surveyors, and engineers. Snel would likely have been sympathetic to such reforms, but 
he also thought that it was possible to gain new knowledge that was not already contained 
in the classical texts and corpus of mathematics by looking at the work of merchants, 
craftsmen, and musicians.80 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Ibid., 157. "Ramism as taught by Snellius was a plea for breaking down the social and intellectual 
barriers between the theoretical science inside the university and the practical arts outside." 
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Mathematical 
authors 
recommended 
to me by father 
Snellius 
SIMPLE AND MIXED MATHEMATICS 
Simple Geometria Ramus81 
Euclid 
Hero 
Arithmetica Ramus82  
Boethius 
Euclid 
Mixed 1. Astronomia Ptolomy 
Copernicus 
Astrology Ptolomy83 
Hermes 
Gnomonica Ptolomy <de> Analemmate, 
Comandinus 
Clavius 
Johan Baptista 
Meteoroscopia Regiomontanus 
Dioptrica Hero 
2. Optica 
Catoptrica 
Euclid 
Ptolomy 
Vitello 
Sciagraphia Stevin 
Comandinus 
3. Geodaesia Hero 
Cosmographia Orontius 
Ptolomy 
Chorographia sub Geographia 
4. Canonica, id est Musica 
practica 
Glareanus 
5. Arithmetica practica Ramus 
Calvinius 
alij. 
6. Mechanica Hero 
Comandinus 
Pappus 
Table 4. This table is a transcription and translation of Beeckman, Journal 4: 17-19 (282 recto).  
The editor of the Journal has researched the specific texts that would have been available to 
Beeckman, some of which Beeckman explicitly cited in his Journal. I have only noted three. 
 
Snel's taxonomy, in the list he gave to Beeckman, expands on the ancient 
framework attributed to Geminus by Proclus and reiterated by Clavius, mentioned in 
section 1. It also provides a more practical orientation to the areas of "mixed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Praelectiones in Geometriam Rami published by Snellius (Francof., 1590).  
82 Rami Arihmeticae libri duo cum explicationibus published by Snellius (Francof., 1596; ibid. 1599). 
83 Beeckman also used Cardano's commentaries on Ptolemy. See Beeckman, Journal 2:136, particularly the 
entry for 11 November 1620. 
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mathematics." Rather than use the intelligible/sensible distinction, Snel used "simple" and 
"mixed." Geometry and arithmetic are the two pillars of mathematics, but they are not 
referred to as "abstract" or "pure." And they are represented primarily by Snel's own 
works on Ramist arithmetic and geometry.84 The mixed mathematics are organized into 
six groups, which correspond in outline to the six groups of Geminus’ sensibles—the (1) 
mathematics of the heavens (astronomia), (2) the mathematics of light (optica), (3) the 
mathematics of the land/mapping (geodesia), (4) practical music (musica), (5) practical 
arithmetic (logistica), and (6) mechanics (mechanica). Although "mixed mathematics" 
does not necessarily imply any practical application (only that the principles of the 
mathematics are mixed with principles drawn from nature), in Snel's categorization we 
see a distinct "practical" focus, particularly in the subfields of the first three groups. For 
instance, the first group, which I have called the mathematics of the heavens, contains not 
only astronomy, but the study of astrology which served as an important tool for 
medicine as well as the prediction of the weather. Also included in this group is the study 
of instruments – an entire branch dedicated to the sundial (gnomon) and another 
dedicated to various other astronomical instruments used to find the meridian, the 
elevation of the pole, the obliquity of the equator, and the position of the stars (dioptrica), 
which would have been useful in navigation and cartography. 
 Beeckman had intended to become a minister.85 After his theological studies at 
Leiden, Beeckman stayed for several months at the Huguenot academy of Saumur (1612) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Rami Arithmeticae libri duo, cum explicationibus (Francof., 1596; ibid. 1599); Praelectiones in 
Geometriam Rami   (Francof., 1590). 
85 Beeckman had been in Leiden to study theology. He was there when a set of famous debates were taking 
place between two members of the theology faculty, Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609) and Franciscus 
Gomarus (1563-1641), which would create a rift in the Dutch church between those who would become 
known as the Arminians or Remonstrants, and the Gomarists or the Contra-Remonstrants. Arminius argued 
for reforming some Calvinist tenets, particularly the doctrine of predestination. Upon his death his 
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and was accepted as "proponent of the ministry" in 1613.86 However, Beeckman could 
not find a place as a minister.87 Instead he entered the profession of his father, becoming 
a candle-maker. He also repaired the water-works in breweries and gardens.88 In 1618 he 
received a medical degree from Caen in France. The dissertation was on fevers, but the 
speech he gave prior to his dissertation defense was primarily about mathematics, its 
relationship to nature and other fields of study, and the limits of reason.89 Soon after he 
held a position as conrector at the Latin school in Veere, where he also laid water 
conduits and worked on the dikes. This was followed by a position as conrector in 
Utrecht. At this time he had several exchanges with burgomasters and magistrates, who 
were craftsmen themselves, providing them advice on technical improvements in 
navigation, advice on drainage, and advice on the building of mills. In 1620 he acquired 
another position as conrector, this time in Rotterdam. Here, in conjunction with some 
craftsmen, the physician Fornerius, and the mathematician Stampioen, he founded a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
followers issued five articles of remonstrance (protest). In 1618 the Dutch Reformed Church met, led by 
Leiden professor Gomarus, at the national Synod of Dort to settle the issue, ultimately rejecting each of the 
five articles of remonstrance as heresy. Beeckman strongly maintained a Calvinist contra-remonstrant 
doctrine, even opposing the wedding of his sister to his own friend, Justinus van Assche, who supported the 
views of Arminius. See R. Hookyaas, "Science and Religion in the Seventeenth Century: Isaac Beeckman 
(1588-1637)," Free University Quarterly 1 (1950): 175.     
86 Hookyaas, "Science and Religion," 170. 
87 Beeckman did not find a place as a minister in his hometown of Middelburg or anywhere in the province 
of Zeeland. This was due to the reputation of the Beeckman family name. His father strongly opposed the 
practice of baptizing the children of "Romish" parents, which the leading theologians and ministers in 
Zeeland advocated. See Hookyaas, "Science and Religion," 171. Also see Klaas van Berkel, Albert van 
Helden, and Lodewijk Palm, eds., A History of Science in the Netherlands: Survey, Themes and Reference 
(Boston: Brill, 1999).  
88 Gaukroger and Schuster, "Hydrostatic paradox," 553n.  
89 Beeckman, Journal 4: 40-45. In the speech Beeckman divides philosophy into a mathematical part and 
physical part. Although he admits that physical knowledge is more prestigious, he maintained that to obtain 
any physical knowledge, the need for mathematics is very great. Prior to giving the speech at the University 
of Caen, Beeckman seems to have first rehearsed several of the ideas, which can be found in Beeckman, 
Journal 1: 131-2.    
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Collegium Mechanicum. In 1627 he accepted an offer to become rector of the School of 
Dordrecht. Beeckman's inaugural lecture was on his philosophia physico-mathematica.90 
 
2.3 – The Proportions of Machines 
 Just prior to Beeckman's first mathematical study of collision in his Journal, and 
just prior to the defense of his dissertation at the University of Caen, Beeckman wrote on 
the relationship between faith and reason, and theology and philosophy. He divided 
philosophy into two parts: "one considers the essence of things" and "the other considers 
the proportion things have to each other." The former he called "physics" and "the latter 
mathematics and mechanics."91 The proportion can be between numbers, or weights, or 
lengths, or speeds, or anything that is a quantity. According to Beeckman, mathematics 
and mechanics, unlike physics, is about the relationship between quantities. 
In Beeckman's studies of collision, he relied on proportions, wherein the relations 
were between elements of machines. The material constraints of the machine itself had 
been removed, but the relevant proportions remain.92 For instance, to establish the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Beeckman, Journal 4: 122-126. Beechman gave an inaugural speech when he was made rector of the 
School of Dordrecht (recorded in his Journal in June 1627). Also see Berkel et al., History of Science in the 
Netherlands, 411. Hookyaas, "Science and Religion," 172.  
91 Beeckman, Journal 1:132.   
92 Bertoloni Meli has referred a broader pattern of transformation  in seventeenth century mechanics, called 
"dematerialization," in which Beeckman's work is an example. "Dematerialization" was particularly 
important to the study of collision. It refers to "transformations involving the removal of material 
constraints through a process of mental abstraction ... the same proportions or relations valid for the 
constrained case were supposed to remain valid also in the unconstrained one." Bertoloni Meli describes 
two other patterns of transformation. These include "unmasking" and "morphing."  The first involves "the 
recognition that apparently complex and elaborate objects or devices can be shown to consist of simple, 
known ones in disguise, as in a metaphorical removal of a veil or a mask. In these cases simple visual 
inspection—at times with minimalist interventions—enabled the reduction of several seemingly intractable 
cases to established ones. The term "unmasking" captures the minimal intervention required in these cases."  
"Morphing" on the otherhand, "required some degree of intervention and elaboration: the issue was not 
simply to point to a different way of looking at an object by metaphorically removing a veil or a mask, but 
to perform a series of operations—in line with my characterization of thinking with objects, either mentally 
or experimentally, with thought and real experiemtns—leading from one object or device to another." 
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principle that the largest weight is moved in a vacuum by means of the smallest force, he 
used the example of the difficulty of moving various weights hung by different lengths of 
cord. First, Beeckman noted that a weight hung by a cord is moved easily by a light 
impulse [momentum]. However, using the same cord, but doubling the weight, will 
require a "not so light impulse." But, if the doubled weight is hung by a cord of doubled 
length, then it will be moved equally by as light of an impulse as the former. The cause of 
the difficulty of moving a body is the pull of the center of the earth. In a vacuum, 
Beeckman says, nothing is pulled back by means of the center of the earth. This, 
presumably, is suggested by imagining a weight hung by longer and longer lengths of 
rope.93  
Beeckman claimed that the same holds true (that the largest weight will be moved 
by means of the smallest force, in a vacuum), if a resting body should be touched by a 
moving body. However, Beeckman claimed that the body that was resting will be moved 
with the following stipulation [pacto]: "If each is of equal body [corporeitatis], both will 
be moved twice as slow as the former was moved."94 This pacto (and its explanation), 
will be of central importance to his broader account of collision, or, as he puts it in a 
marginal note: "In what way motion in a vacuum is impeded by means of collision 
[occurrentibus]."95 He provided a line of reasoning for this. The two bodies have the 
same quantity. Since the two bodies move together after meeting, the same impetus 
[impetus] that moved the first body, now must sustain twice as large a body as before. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
"...the term 'morphing'...capture[s] these creative transformations." See Domenico Bertoloni Meli, "Patterns 
of Transformation in Seventeenth-Century Mechanics." The Monist 93 (2010): 579. 
93 Beeckman, Journal 1:265. December 1618. The following is the marginal note that introduces the first 
instance of Beeckman’s work on collision: Pondus maximum in vacuo a minima vi moveri probatur.   
94 Beeckman, Journal 1:265-6. Quod quiescebat movebitur cum moto hoc pacto: Si utrumque est aequalis 
corporeitatis, utrumque movebitur duplo tardiùs quàm priùs motum movebatur.  
95 Beeckman, Journal 1:265-6. Motus in vacuo ab occurrentibus quomodo impediatur.  
	   62 
Necessarily, it will proceed slower proportionally.96 This line of reasoning is true, 
according to Beeckman, because of the proportions that one observes in machines: 
For it is observed [animadvertitur] in all machines, as twice the weight, having 
undergone an equal force, the same ascends twice as slow as the first weight.97 
 
The proportions are rooted in machines. Not only is the general claim—"the largest 
weight is moved in a vacuum by means of the smallest force"—justified by thinking 
about machines, but his specific pacto is also fundamentally a proportion rooted in 
machines.    
The quantities used in the above statement do not appear to map obviously onto 
the collision of bodies. In the former he describes weight, force, and a more slowly 
ascending motion. In the latter he describes "body" [corporeitas]98 – not weight [pondus] 
– and motion with no mention of ascending. The latter could be described as a 
"dematerialized balance." The proportions remain valid, but the material constraints have 
been removed. Moreover, it is a very specific treatment of the law of the lever as found in 
the pseudo-Aristotelian99 work, The Mechanical Problems. 100   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Beeckman, Journal 1:266. "Truly with so many parts belonging to the resting body as the moving body, 
and it brings an equal progressing motion to them, it is with the same impetus [impetus] that it must sustain 
twice as large a body as before, necessarly it is to proceed slower by so much..." Cùm enim tot partes insunt 
quiescenti ac moto, et motum aequalem progressum illi adfert, id est cùm idem impetus debet sustinere 
duplò majus corpus quàm antè, necessè est tantò etiam tardiùs procedere...  
97 Beeckman, Journal 1:266. Emphasis in original. [I]d enim in omnibus machinis animadvertitur, ut 
duplex ponduss aequali vi sublatum, etiam duplò tardiùs ascendat quàm prius pondus.   
98 Note that this word is not corpus, corporis. Rather, it is corporeitas, corporeitatis. Beeckman appears to 
be referring to the amount of material in a body. The corporeitas does not necessarily correspond to the 
amount of space the body occupies, and he claims that it is possible for bodies occupying a smaller space to 
have a larger corporeitas than bodies occupying a larger space. See Beeckman, Journal 2:52.   
99 Thomas Winter has argued that the Mechanical Problems was authored by Archytas. See Thomas Nelson 
Winter, "The Mechanical Problems in the Corpus of Aristotle," Faculty Publications, Classics and 
Religious Studies Department Paper 68 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2007), accessed January 21, 
2015,  http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/classicsfacpub/68. 
100 Gaukroger and Schuster, "Hydrostatic paradox," 555; Schuster, "Descartes and the Scientific Revolution 
(dissertation)," 66-7. For a discussion of the importance of the lever, as well as inclined planes, pendulums, 
springs, and strings, in mechanics and natural philosophy, see Domenico Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with 
Objects (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). 
	   63 
 In the opening pages of the pseudo-Aristotelian Mechanical Problems, the author 
directly connects mechanical movement to the lever, the lever to the balance, the balance 
to the circle, and the circle to the "marvelous" unity of opposites.101 According to the 
author, the marvel of mechanical advantage stems from something even more 
marvelous—the unity of opposites in the circle.102 The opposites to which the author 
refers include the following: the circle "derives from the moving and the standing, whose 
nature is opposite each the other;" "the perimeter...generates opposites: the hollow and 
the curved;" and "it moves backwards and forwards at the same time."103 According to 
the Mechanical Problems, "many of the marvels about the motion of circles derive from 
the fact that, on any one line drawn from the center, no two points are swept at the same 
pace as another but always the point further from the motionless end is quicker."104 
Problem 3 of The Mechanical Problems asks "Why is it that small forces can 
move great weights by means of a lever[?]"105 The weight which is moved, to the weight 
which moves it, is inversely proportional to the lengths of the arms of the lever. The 
reason for this, according to the author of the Mechanical Problems is due to speed. 
Consider two circles, a larger and smaller circle with the same center. Imagine that both 
are drawn on the same disk. Now imagine a straight line drawn from the smaller circle, 
through the center and to the larger circle; at the intersections of this line and the circles 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 [pseudo] Aristotle, Mechanical Problems, in Minor Works, trans. by Walter Stanley Hett (Loeb 
Classical Library, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1936), 334. "Everything about the balance is 
resolved in the circle; everything about the lever is resolved in the balance, and practically everything about 
mechanical movement is resolved in the lever." Translation by Winter, "Mechanical Problems," 2. 
102 Aristotle, Mechanical Problems, 332. "The circle contains the first principle of all such matters. This 
falls out quite logically: it is nothing absurd for a marvel to stem from something more marvelous still, and 
most remarkable is for there to be opposites inherent in each other, and the circle is made of opposites." 
Translation by Winter, "Mechanical Problems," 2. 
103 Aristotle, Mechanical Problems, 332. Translation by Winter, "Mechanical Problems," 2. 
104 Aristotle, Mechanical Problems, 334. Translation by Winter, "Mechanical Problems," 2. 
105 [pseudo] Aristotle, Mechanical Problems, in Minor Works, trans. by Walter Stanley Hett (Loeb 
Classical Library, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1936), 353.  
	   64 
are points. If one rotates the disk, the speed of the point on the larger circle will move 
faster than the speed of the point on the smaller circle. Now imagine that the center of the 
circle is a fulcrum and the radius of the smaller circle is the smaller arm of a balance, and 
the radius of the larger circle is the larger arm of a balance. The author of The 
Mechanical Problems claims that the speed of a body is inversely proportional to the 
weight. If the balance rotated, the longer arm of a balance would sweep out a larger arc of 
a circle than the short arm of a balance. Given the same force, a body at the end of the 
longer arm will move faster than that at the shorter arm. The equilibrium of the balance is 
understood similarly. The weights are inversely proportional to the speeds of the weights. 
A heavier weight closer to the fulcrum would move slower than the lighter weight farther 
from the fulcrum, if the balance rotated about the fulcrum in a circle. If these weights and 
speeds are inversely proportional, the balance is in equilibrium. 
 
Figure 9. Image reproduced from Winter, "Mechanical Problems," 11. 
 
 
If there are two weights, one twice as large as the other, the larger will ascend 
twice as slowly as the first weight, given the same force, since the radius of the circle that 
the larger weight sweeps out is twice as small as the radius of the circle of the smaller 
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weight. Thus we can see the relationship between the concepts from what Beeckman 
observes in all machines and the collision of bodies. The "equal force," "weights" and 
"ascending slowly" are all from the Mechanical Problems tradition of explaining the 
action of the lever. In particular, the "Aristotelian" explanation of the lever provides a 
framework in which to understand the proportions between speed and weight of bodies. 
In addition to the similarity of the concepts used, there are other reasons to think 
that Beeckman was working with ideas from this tradition of the Mechanical Problems, 
such as pedagogical traditions, and direct references to the text and its commentaries in 
the Journal. As noted in section 2.2, there is a pedagogical connection between Petrus 
Ramus and Isaac Beeckman, primarily through Snel. According to Paul Lawrence Rose 
and Stillman Drake, Ramus had lectured on the Mechanical Problems and "even 
overcame in this matter his aversion to Aristotle, whom he actually praised [in his 
Scholarum Mathematicarum] for having writing a mathematical work such as the 
Mechanica."106 Moreover, Beeckman had clearly read and studied the Mechanical 
Problems as we see in his Journal entry from 18 June 1619.107 And after Bernardino 
Baldi’s translation and commentary, In mechanica Aristotelis problemata exercitationes, 
was published 1621, Beeckman took notes on Baldi's studies of several of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Paul Lawrence Rose and Stillman Drake, "The Pseudo-Aristotelian Questions of Mechanics in 
Renaissance Culture,” Studies in the Renaissance 18 (1971): 99-100. Petrus Ramus, Scholarum 
Mathematicarum Libri XXXI (Basel, 1569) 21.   
107 Beeckman, Journal 1:318. Beeckman's marginal heading is: "[A thing] is cut better by the motion of an 
ax than by the weight. Why?" Securis motu meliùs secatur quàm pondere. Cur. In the text Beeckman refers 
directly to problem 19. See Aristotle, Mechanical Problems, 375 for the corresponding passage. The editor 
of the Journal, Cornelis de Waard, includes the following note on the editions available to Beeckman: "Le 
texte grec des Quaestiones mechanicae fut publié déjà au vol. IV de l'édition des Oeuvres d'Aristote, 
publiée par Aldus Manutius (Venise, 1498), puis à la fin du vol. I des ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ἅπαντα, publiés 
par Erasme (Basileae, 1531; réimpr. 1539). On le trouve également au vol. VI de ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ τὰ 
εὑρισκόµενα, publiés par Frid. Sylburgius (Francfort, 1585). On a aussi deux éditions a part: celle de Paris, 
Wechel, 1566, in-4o et celle Graece, emendata, Latina facta et commentariis illustrata ab Henrico 
Monantholio (Paris, 1599), in-4o."  
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questions.108 In the commentary, Baldi criticized the dynamic arguments regarding the 
law of the lever. "[He] rejected the idea that the speed could be considered the cause of 
the working of the lever, because it was inconceivable to explain the equilibrium of the 
balance by referring to motion."109 Beeckman appears to defend the Mechanical 
Problems tradition directly against this kind of criticism. In 1629 he wrote: 
The cause of equilibrium therefore can be motion, even if the bodies in 
equilibrium are not moved. For the cause of equilibrium is past and future motion. 
During the present, to be sure, the body is at rest because past and future motions 
occasion rest.110 
 
There is also evidence that Beeckman agreed with Mersenne’s explicit defense of the 
"Aristotelian" explanation of the balance.111 Beeckman did so by referring to what he had 
written "a little before concerning motion."112 He explicitly states: "Namely I said that the 
amount of matter [corporeitatem] and motion are reciprocal to each other. Thus the same 
must be concluded concerning the balance." Sic etiam ratiocinandum de bilance.113 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Beeckman, Journal 2:278-81. Questions 2, 8, 17, 18, 24, and 32 are mentioned by name in his notes 
around December 1626 and March 1627.   
109 Elio Nenci, Bernardino Baldi's In mechanica Aristotelis problemata exercitationes, communicated by 
Jürgen Renn and Antonio Becchi, trans. by Adriano Carugo. Max Planck Research Library for the History 
and Development of Knoweldge Sources 3 (Edition Open Access, 2011): 19. Also see Paolo Palmieri, 
"Breaking the circle: the emergence of Archimedean mechanics in the late Renaissance" Archive for 
History of Exact Sciences 62 (2008): 306-7, 325-9. Palmieri argues that "Bernardino Baldi debunked the 
miraculous nature the circle, trying, as he saw it, to correct the errors of the pseudo-Aristotle by means of 
Archimedes and Guido Ubaldo."   
110 Beeckman, Journal 3:134. Translation quoted in Schuster, "Descartes and the Scientific Revolution 
(dissertation)," 68. 
111 The editor of the Journal, Cornelis de Waard, included the following note on the source of Mersenne's 
defense: Livre second de l’Harmonie univerrselle. Où l’harmonie de toutes les parties du Monde est 
expliquee tant en general qu’en particulier. Par le Sieur DE SERMES (marque d’imprimeur). A Paris, 
pour Guillaume Baudry, Rue des Amandiers. près le College des Grassins. M. DC. XXVII. Avec privilege 
du Roy. – in-8o; 18pp. suivies des pp. 305-477. 
112 Beeckman, Journal 3:128-9. He seems to be referring to what he had written earlier that month on 13 
September 1629. Beeckman continues: "For it follows from them [what he had written a little before] that a 
sphere twice as heavy [as another sphere], that is, having twice as much matter, but moving twice as slowly 
[as the other sphere], will be stopped after colliding with it, that is, both spheres will be at rest" (Beeckman, 
Journal 3:133), translation quoted in Schuster, "Descartes and the Scientific Revolution (dissertation)," 66. 
113 Beeckman, Journal 3:133. Dictum est enim corporeitatem et motum inter se reciprocari. Sic etiam 
ratiocinandum de bilance.     
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2.4 – Collision and the pseudo-Aristotelian balance 
The reciprocal relationship between motion and corporeitatem on the model of 
the balance as understood by the pseudo-Aristotelian Mechanical Problems is the key to 
the mathematics of Beeckman’s studies of collision of atoms. The bodies (corporeitatem) 
are inversely proportional to the speeds of the bodies. 𝑐! ∶ 𝑐! ∷ 𝑠! ∶ 𝑠! 
 
c1 is the size of the body initially in motion and c2 is the aggregate size of the two bodies 
involved. s1 is the speed of the body initially in motion and s2 is the speed of the two 
bodies moving together. Recall that the aggregate size of the two bodies is the relevant 
quantity for Beeckman because the smallest parts of nature cannot compress. Thus, the 
bodies do not rebound. The two bodies move together after the meeting. So, under this 
relation from the pseudo-Aristotelian balance, given equally sized bodies, one initially in 
motion and one initially at rest, the motion of the aggregate will be twice as slow as the 
initially moving body. This inverse proportion from the pseudo-Aristotelian balance 
maps onto Beeckman's pacto for the collision of bodies.  
And the same now if the resting body should be touched by a body having been 
set in motion whithersoever. Now the body that was resting will be moved by the 
moving body with this stipulation [pacto]: if each is of equal body, both will be 
moved twice as slow as the former was moved.114 
pacto 
before bodies meet after bodies meet 
                    
  
     s           
                     
                        
                        s/2 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Beeckman, Journal 1:265-6. 23 November - 26 December 1618. Idemque si quod corpus quiescens a 
quocumque corpore moto tangatur. Quod quiescebat movebitur cum moto hoc pacto: Si utrumque est 
aequalis corporeitatis, utrumque movebitur duplo tardiùs quàm priùs motum movebatur. 
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In the subsequent paragraphs in Beeckman’s note from December 1618, all 
organized the marginal title “In what way motion in a vacuum is impeded by means of 
collision,” Beeckman describes various combinations of sizes and speeds of bodies. The 
intention is not to systematically present “rules of collision” as some historians have 
claimed,115 rather it is to show precisely that motion is impeded in every case.  
In those collisions in which one body is initially at rest, he considers instances 
where the larger body is at rest and instances where the larger body is initially in motion. 
In the framework of the former, he determines the impeded speed resulting from a 
collision where the larger resting body is twice the size, and another where the larger 
resting body is three times the size. In keeping with his motivation to show in what way 
motion in a vacuum is impeded by means of collision, the focus of these calculations is 
on how much is removed [demuntur] from the initial speed. In the case where the larger 
resting body is twice the size, 2/3 is removed from the initial speed, in the latter case 
where the larger body is three times the size, ¾ is removed. The focus on the amount 
removed appears very deliberate. In fact, it requires an additional (although quite simple) 
step in the calculation. Since there is a reciprocal relationship between body and speed, if 
the body after collision is thrice the size, then the speed will be a third the original. 
Rather than state that the motion after collision is a third the speed of the motion before 
collision, Beeckman focuses on how much must have been removed to produce such a 
speed.   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 For instance, see Gaukroger and Schuster, "Hydrostatic paradox," 555-6.  
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before bodies meet after bodies meet 
                     
  
     s           
                     
                            
                           s/3 
Larger body is initially at rest. Larger body is twice the size of the smaller.  
The motion of the aggregate, c2, is 1/3 the speed of the body initially moving.  
2/3 is removed from the initial speed because of the collision. 
 
 
 
before bodies meet after bodies meet 
                     
  
     s           
                     
                            
                           s/4 
Larger body is initially at rest. Larger body is three times the size of smaller.  
The motion of the aggregate, c2, is 1/4 the speed of the body initially moving.  
3/4 is removed from the initial speed because of the collision. 
 
In the framework where the larger body is initially moving, he considers the 
situation where the larger initially moving body is twice the size. Again the focus is on 
how much is removed, in this case 1/3 of the motion, even though the final speed (2/3 the 
original) is more directly attainable from the proportion.    
before bodies meet after bodies meet 
                     
  
     s           
                     
                            
                           !!𝑠 
Larger body is initially moving.  
Larger body is twice the size of the smaller body (at rest).  
Motion of the aggregate, c2, is 2/3 the speed of the body initially moving.116  
1/3 is removed from the initial speed because of the collision. 
   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116  𝑐! ∶ 𝑐! ∷ 𝑠! ∶ 𝑠!. Let 𝑐! = 2𝑚. Let 𝑐! = 3𝑚. Since 𝑐!𝑠! ∝ 𝑐!𝑠!, and since 𝑠! = !!𝑠!, then 2𝑚𝑠! =3𝑚!!𝑠!. 
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Beeckman then presents scenarios in which both bodies are initially in motion. In 
1618 he wrote, without any additional explanation, that when "equal bodies meet 
mutually with an equal speed to each other, they will exactly rest, each with an abrogated 
motion."117 When he returned to the subject in 1620, he provided more explanation: "the 
one will remove [auferet] the motion of the other; indeed neither will propel the other, 
since neither remains with any [motion] in the circumstance by means of the other."118 In 
1620 he explicitly specified that he is referring to the smallest parts of nature: bodies 
without pores, or those that in general cannot be "reflected" [non possunt reflecti]. In 
other words his notes are about perfectly hard atoms with no interstitial void. 
Interestingly, in this context he claimed that if he were discussing bodies with pores or 
"connected bodies" i.e. his micro-corpuscles, then there would be need to include an 
account of reflection.  Regarding "connected bodies," he states, in passing, that they 
would be reflected to such a degree as each was impinging the other, with nearly the 
same speed and from the same way that they had come.119  It is important to note that 
they would be reflected with only nearly [fere] the same speed. He did not discuss the 
collision of these "connected bodies" at length, nor did he provide any mathematical 
examples of reflecting bodies. They are only mentioned in passing. 
The notion that the motion of a body "removes" or "carries off" the motion of 
another body is relied upon in his final scenarios, where both bodies are in motion. He 
used this idea to transform the situation where equal bodies have different speeds into one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Beeckman, Journal 1:266. Quae aequalia aequali celeritate sibi mutuo occurrunt, directe quiescent, 
abrogato utriusque motu.   
118 Beeckman, Journal 2:45. At si duo corpora aequalia aequali motu in vacuo secundùm rectam lineam 
sibi invicem occurrant, in ipso occursu quiescent et alterum alterius motum auferet; neutrum enim alterum 
pellet, cùm neutrum aliquâ in re ab altero superetur.   
119 Beeckman, Journal 2:45. [Q]uod si fiat, poterunt tam apti esse ad reflectionem ut utrumque alteri 
impingens, fere eadem celeritate et eadem via, qua venerat, reflexum redeat. 
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of the kinds already discussed, namely where one body is in motion and one is at rest. So 
for example, he wrote that given equal bodies with unequal speeds, "if they meet each 
other mutually, the smaller speed is removed from the larger and the excess moves with 
half the subsequent motion as the fast part was moved."120 When Beeckman returned to 
the topic in 1620 he provides a detailed example of this scenario. 
If therefore equal bodies mutually meet with each other in a straight line with 
unequal speeds, the first smaller speed is removed from the larger and the body is 
then considered as resting and would be brought together with the remaining 
speed of the larger speed, from which the smaller speed was removed through 
subtraction. For example: If one body is moved in the same time through four 
stadia, where the other [is moved] through two stadia, in the collision of these 
bodies they must remove two stadia from the four, and the two which remain, will 
be divided in two; these conjoined bodies are moved therefore in the same time by 
a single stadium. However you will understand that the smaller speed must be 
removed from the larger [speed], if you will consider that in equal bodies an equal 
motion itself is mutually removed; therefore this part of the speed resists it by an 
equal speed, with the remaining speed not impeded.121 
 
before bodies meet after bodies meet 
                                       
  
     𝑣!                                              𝑣! 
                     
                          
                          !!!!!!  
Bodies same size. Both initially in motion, but different speeds.   
Motion of the aggregate, c2, is the difference of initial speeds, divided by 2. 
 
The outcomes described thus far in Beeckman's account of collision are consistent with 
those produced by modern equations of the conservation of momentum for inelastic 
equations.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Beeckman, Journal 1:266. At si sibi mutuò occurrant, aufertur minor celeritas à majore moveturque 
utrumque secundum dimidium motum excessûs versus quam partem celeriùs movebatur. 
121 Beeckman, Journal 2:46.  Si igitur aequalia corpora sibi invicem occurrant in lineâ rectâ inaequali 
celeritate, primum aufertur minor celeritas à majore et id corpus tum consideratur ut quiescens 
conferturque cum residuâ celeritate majoris celeritatis, unde minor celeritas per sub | stractionem ablata 
fuit. Exempli gratiâ: Si unum corpus eo tempore moveatur per quatuor stadia, quo alterum per duo stadia, 
in concursu horum corporum auferenda sunt duo stadia à quatuor, et duo quae restant, bisecanda; 
movebuntur ergo corpora haec conjuncta eodem tempore per unicum stadium. Auferendam autem esse 
minorem celeritatem à majore intelliges, si consideraveris in aequalibus corporibus aequalis motûs se 
mutuò auferre; hîc igitur ea pars celeritatis resistit aequali celeritati, residuâ celeritate non impeditâ. 
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𝑚!𝑣!! +𝑚!𝑣!! = (𝑚! +𝑚!)𝑣! 
(ia)  Bodies the same size. One initially in motion, the other initially at rest  
(ib)    Larger body is initially at rest. Larger body is twice the size of the smaller  
(ic)  Larger body is initially at rest. Larger body is three times the size of the 
smaller  
(ii)  Smaller body is initially at rest. Larger body is twice the size of smaller 
body   
(iii)  Both bodies initially moving with same speed, and the same size  
(iva) Bodies the same size. Both bodies initially moving with different speeds  
 
For example, even the two-step approach taken in the (iva), where Beeckman first 
"transforms" the scenario into (ia), produces the same numerical result as would be found 
using the conservation of momentum in inelastic collisions.   𝑚! = 𝑘 = 𝑚! 𝑙𝑒𝑡   𝑣!! = 4 𝑙𝑒𝑡   𝑣!! = 2 𝑘𝑣!! − 𝑘𝑣!! = (𝑘 + 𝑘)𝑣! 𝑣! = !!!!  
Beeckman provided two more examples in his notes that are not consistent with 
the strategy he took in the above six scenarios. They also do not happen to be consistent 
with the modern equation for the conservation of momentum for inelastic collision.  
(ivb)  Larger is twice the size, but the bodies move with equal speed  
(ivc)  Larger is twice the size, and the smaller body is slower by twice  
 
The strategies that Beeckman employed in the previous six scenarios are not applicable. 
The original framework, derived from the balance, requires that one body be at rest. He 
extended this framework to include two equal bodies moving with various speeds by 
having one motion "remove" the motion of the other. For instance, (iva) is transformed 
into (ia). In these latter two scenarios both bodies are in motion and the bodies are not the 
same size. Regarding (ivb) Beeckman wrote:  
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The larger body by twice, if it meets the other [body] equally in swiftness, 
destroys122 half the speed and indeed carries it off by means of itself; the 
remaining speed is divided in two and each is moved slower by four than the 
larger body was moved before.123    
 
According to the modern equation, each body should be moved (together) slower by 
three than the larger body was moved before.124 Beeckman, on the other hand, concluded 
that each body would be moved slower by four than the larger body was moved before. A 
plausible explanation of Beeckman's rationale is that he appears to note that the ratio of 
body to speed in the smaller moving body is half that of the ratio of body to speed in the 
larger moving body. Thus ½ the speed is "destroyed" when they meet. This ½ speed is 
then divided between the two bodies involved, to produce a speed that is ¼ the original. 
If this is the rationale he used, it is not entirely clear to me why he neglected the sizes of 
the bodies at this step.125 
Beeckman revisited the topic of collision (viz. motion impeded by means of 
collision) multiple times throughout his Journal. In 1620, for example, he drew many of 
the same conclusions. In addition, he included new ideas regarding limiting cases, he also 
addressed in general terms a scenario akin to (ivb). Notably, he concluded different 
results.  
However, if the bodies are unequal, in truth equal speeds, the smaller body is 
removed from the larger and then the smaller is considered as resting. If therefore 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Note the word being used here – perdit (from perdo, perdere) meaning “to destroy” and rapit (from 
rapio, rapere) meaning “to seize, to carry off.” Clearly this is in keping with Beeckman’s investigation of 
the manner in which motion is hindered or impeded. 
123 Beeckman, Journal 1:266. Duplò verò majus corpus, si alteri aequed) celeri occurrat, perdit dimidium 
celeritatis, et siquidem id secum rapit; reliquum dimidium bisecatur moveturque utrumque quadruplò1) 
tardiùs quàm majus corpus antè movebatur. 
124 Given that 𝑚! = 2𝑚!, and 𝑣!! = 𝑠 = 𝑣!! , then by the conservation of momentum for inelastic 
collisions: 2𝑚!𝑠 −𝑚!𝑠 = (2𝑚! +𝑚!)𝑣!. It follows that 𝑣! = !!!!!! = !!𝑠.  
125 In the case of (ivb), one motion cannot "carry off" the motion of the other, to transform the scenario into 
another in which one body is at rest as he did for (iva). Since the speeds are equal, there would no motions, 
if one carried off the other.   
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the remaining of the larger body is equal to the smaller body, each will be moved 
by half of the former speed, just as we before heard.126  
 
This is substantially different from the above solution. If the larger body is twice the size 
of the smaller, then according to the entry from 1620, 1 is removed from 2 to produce 1. 
Therefore the remainder of the larger is equal to the smaller. Thus the smaller body (of 
size 1) is taken to be at rest. The larger body, now reduced to size 1, meets a body at rest 
which is also size 1. Just as was discussed in the first example (i), the speed of the 
initially moving body is divided by two. Obviously this is not equal to ¼ as derived 
above, nor is it equal to 1/3 as derived from the modern equation.   
 
2.5 – "Perpetually revived and enlivened" 
 After a body collides with another, the initial motion is impeded. Beeckman's 
mathematical studies of collision investigated the amount of motion that is "removed," 
"destroyed," or "carried off,"127 in each impact. This was done in service to the question 
he had first posed in his very first study: "why, may I ask, then is universal rest not 
brought about?" Beeckman maintained this focus in all of his studies of collision 
beginning in the winter of 1618, again in the spring of 1620, the fall of 1629, and the fall 
of 1634.   
 Some historians have claimed that Beeckman's work on collision is a source of 
Descartes's notion of the "conservation of the quantity of motion."128 Beeckman used the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Beeckman, Journal 2:46. Si autem inaequalia sint corpora, aequalis verò celeritas, auferetur minus 
corpus à majore et tum minus considerabitur ut quiescens. Si igitur residuum majoris corporis sit aequale 
minori corpori, movebitur utrumque dimidio pristinae celeritatis, sicut antè audivimus. 
127 Auferre – to remove (Beeckman, Journal 2:45); perdere – to destroy (Beeckman, Journal 1:266); rapere 
– to carry off (ibid).   
128 Richard Arthur, “Beeckman, Descartes and the Force of Motion,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 
45 (2007): 3. Cornelius de Waard, the editor of Beeckman's Journal also made a similar claim see Journal 
2:265n "Dans la suite de cette note Beeckman va déduire les lois du choc des corps mous au moyen du 
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inverse proportion of speeds and bodies before and after collision. This proportion 
describes a balance in equilibrium, so at least implicitly Beeckman may have presumed 
that the product of speed and body remains the same before and after collision. However, 
nowhere did Beeckman assert such a claim. Beeckman was concerned primarily with 
what he described as the destruction of motion. In all of the quantitative scenarios of 
collision, described above in section 2.4, the focus is on the amount of motion that is 
removed in each collision.  
 His study in 1618 is introduced with the heading, "in what way motion in a 
vacuum is impeded by means of collision," and the study was concluded with the 
statement, "Motion in a vacuum never increases, but decreases."129 The emphasis remains 
on the amount of motion that is "removed" when he returned to the topic in 1620.130 The 
question that he posed in his first study, why is universal rest not brought about, is raised 
again in 1629. He claims that he would like to "render an account why everything in the 
universe does not in the end rest," but his studies of collision seem to show that motion 
must decrease. Even little bodies can stop larger bodies—in a passage contrary to 
Descartes's fourth rule in which a smaller body cannot move a larger, Beeckman notes 
that "one atom...will move the entire Earth... Thus the little [bodies] stop the larger 
[bodies]..." Nevertheless he continued to wonder how motion in a vacuum could be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
principe de la conservation de la quantité de mouvement. On ne voit aucune intervention de Descartes, 
quoiqu'il puisse avoir eu connaissance de ces lignes. Plus tard (1644) celui-ci publia ces lois, mais il les 
appliqua à des corps qu'il considérait comme durs." Also see Journal 3:129n "C'est à dire la quantité de 
mouvement (mv) se conserve. Un passage du Monde de Descartes, commencé à la fin de 1629 (cf. Oeuvres, 
t. XI (1909), pp. 41-43) peut faire supposer que ce théorème qui a joué un si grand rôle dans sa philosophie, 
lui était alors connu."   
129 Beeckman, Journal 1:265-7.  
130 Beeckman, Journal 2:45-7. Rather than discuss the "transfer" of motion, Beeckman consistently uses 
words such as auferet: "one [body] will remove ("carry away" auferet) the motion of the other." 
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increased.131 This was still his primary concern in 1634.132 He surmised that motion can 
take place in a vacuum, as long as something produces it. He provided examples of 
stones being launched in the air by boys using sticks, presumably as an example of 
motion increasing,133 but then he immediately noted that two equal bodies meeting with 
equal speeds will stop. Moreover, he still faced the problem of explaining source of 
movement in the boys, and how it is possible that the motion in boys increases as they 
grow: "the arteries of boys frequently seem to pulse, as the meagerness of the corpuscles 
require of them. Yet hence forth it increases, becomes strong etc. Then the pulse is very 
good, as I said before."134 The world is full of what appears to be instances of motion 
increasing, but Beeckman's mathematical studies of collision show that motion must 
decrease. In 1634 he was still asking the same question: "why doesn’t everything in the 
end rest? Can it be that fire has an influence to some extent? Or can it be that the very 
same action as reflection in a vacuum is to such a degree unknown?"135 
 In Beeckman's first study, he wrote: "so with this [the mathematical account of 
collision] in place, motion in a vacuum can never be intelligible. Faster motions, can be 
drawn to an end."136 According to his mathematical account of collision, universal rest 
should be produced. But it is not. One observes that motion not only seems to persist but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Beeckman, Journal 3:128-9.   
132 Beeckman, Journal 3:363-4.   
133 Beeckman, Journal 3:363. "[This might occur] by means of that method which boys move a ball 
upwards, quickly inflicting it with a large beam of wood. Let AB be a line. About C has been set a stapedi 
or stone; a ball is set at the extremity towards B. A boy strikes the other extremity at A. The ball quickly 
ascends as the hitting-stick is moved downwards." 
134 Ibid. 
135 Beeckman, Journal 3:364. Cur non igitur tandem omnia quiescunt? An ignis hic aliquid potest? Aut an 
ejus actio tam est ignota quam reflectio in vacuo?  
136 Beeckman, Journal 1:266. His ita positis nunquam motus in vacuo potest intelligi ad celeriorem motum 
vergere. 
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it seems in some instances to increase. In the absence of a satisfying rational account,137 
he appealed to divine intervention:  
Whence it follows that only Deum Opt. Max. is able to conserve motion with the 
largest bodies about to be moved by means of the largest speed, whose 
remainders, one after another, the forever contemplating being perpetually revives 
and enlivens [perpetuo resuscitant et vivificant].138  
 
After a body collides with another, the initial motion is impeded. Part of the motion is 
"removed," which leaves a remainder [reliquum] of that motion. According to Beeckman, 
it is this remainder of motion that God "revives" and "enlivens." This notion of 
"conservation" is quite different from that of Descartes and subsequent natural 
philosophers. For Descartes, the principle of the "conservation of quantity of motion" 
would be prior to laws of motion and the rules of collision. Rooted in the immutable 
action of God, the constancy of the quantity of motion would be the “universal and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 In 1618 Beeckman wrote an essay on faith, reason, theology, and philosophy, in which he discussed the 
limits of reason, and considered how those limits fit into his taxonomy of "what comes into our thinking." 
Many of these same ideas were presented again in the speech he gave when receiving his medical degree 
from Caen, France later that year, which can be found in Beeckman, Journal 4:40-5.  An example of the 
limits of reason is the attempt to understand infinity and eternity. He claims that proportions are absurd 
regarding the infinite; and "therefore we do not comprehend it. ... Although we may seem to understand 
infinity with the mind, it will slip away." Our thinking is circumscribed and limited to the finite. See 
Beeckman, Journal 1:131. However, according to Beeckman’s view, there are other ways in which things 
can "enter our thinking." For example, "we believe with faith," i.e. through conscientia. In Beeckman’s 
speech upon receiving his medical degree later in 1618, he explained what is meant by this term. "The mind 
moves around some divine things and simply believes and agrees, not because it understands that, but by 
some supernatural impulse, which part perhaps is not ineptly called the conscientia." See Beeckman, 
Journal 4:40-5. But this is contrary to the knowledge established by reason. It is the role of reason and 
philosophy to seek out the extremities. However, not everything that "comes into our thinking" by means of 
an appeal to divinity is in the realm of conscientia. According to Beeckman, the knowledge of some of 
God's actions are taken to be the very epitome of reason: "Truly, what is more divine than the revolutions 
of the wandering stars [erraticarum] liable to no error? What is their motor? Who is the author? Who is 
their ruler [praeses]? Can it not be the most certain deduction that we assent to that some intelligence so 
eloquently joined [coaptavit] these? By no means differently do we certainly understand that a helmsman is 
holding the helm of the ship, when the ship is directed straight to the port?" See Journal 4:40. Several years 
before his dissertation speech, he also expressed the rationality of design in his atomic nature through an 
analogy to architecture: "Without a doubt as architects prepared the first houses: door, window, post, beam, 
covering, stone, as King Solomon constructs the first beginning of the temple ... so the God of nature 
fashioned the natural beginnings, which mutually come together to each other, they correspond as keys and 
pores, as definite things hence are born: stones, trees, animals..." See Journal 1:23. 
138 Beeckman, Journal 1:266-7  
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primary [...] cause of all the movements in the world.”139 In 1634 Beeckman concluded 
that, "therefore motion created once by God is conserved forever no less than material 
itself." 140 But, for Beeckman, God intervenes contrary to the consequences of his 
mathematical account of collision to revive and enliven the remainders of motion upon 
each collision. Beeckman's notion of the conservation of motion is a deus ex machina  
   
* * * 
  
 Beeckman explained various natural phenomena by means of the motion, 
arrangement, and shape of corpuscles behaving according to the principles of mechanics. 
This "physico-mathematics," in which collision was the explanans, was fruitful for both 
Beeckman and his colleague René Descartes. However, the collision of atoms as an 
explanandum proved to be a longstanding puzzle for Beeckman. His mathematical 
studies of the collision of the smallest bodies seem to show that motion was impeded 
upon each impact. Accordingly, all motion should come to universal rest. But nature 
appears to be continually in motion, and there are instances in which motion increases. 
Each of Beeckman's mathematical studies of collision are framed by this question and 
related concerns: in what manner is motion impeded by collision, why is universal rest 
not brought about, and is it possible for motion to increase? His mathematical 
investigation of collision was not a positive account of the rules of collision, or the 
expression of a principle of conservation. Rather, they are an investigation of the amount 
of motion that is "removed," "destroyed," or "carried off" in each collision. He appealed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 AT VIII 61. Principia II 36. Translation quoted in Valentine Rodger Miller and Reese P. Miller, trans., 
Principles of Philosophy (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983) 58.  
140 Beeckman, Journal 3:369.   
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to divine intervention to explain why, contrary to his mathematical studies, motion does 
not come to universal rest. According to Beeckman, God continually revives and enlivens 
the remainders of motion upon each collision.  
 For Beeckman, mathematics and mechanics were primarily about the 
relationships between quantities. The mathematics Beeckman used to study collision was 
centered on the proportions of machines. Specifically, he relied on the pseudo-
Aristotelian account of the balance in his investigation of collision. This framework, in 
which the speeds before and after collision are inversely proportional to the sizes of the 
bodies before and after collision (after collision the size is the aggregate of both bodies), 
did not provide a unified strategy for every scenario of collision. Nevertheless, it was 
influential, and would be taken up in Descartes's early account of collision, as we will see 
in the next chapter. And the balance would come to have a central role in each account of 
collision covered in this dissertation.  
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Chapter 3  
Descartes on material contact: changing the rules of collision 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
I do not promise you to set out here exact demonstrations of all the things I will say. It 
will be enough for me to open to you the path by which you will be able to find them 
yourselves, whenever you take the trouble to look for them. Most minds lose interest when 
one makes things too easy for them. And to compose here a setting that pleases you, I 
must employ shadow as well as bright colors. Thus I will be content to pursue the 
description I have begun, as if having no other design than to tell you a Fable.   
 
     —from Descartes's 7th chapter, "On the Laws of Nature of this New World," of The World   
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Section 1  
Introduction 
 
Descartes's rules of collision were perceived as problematic at best by his 
contemporaries. They were not, however, insignificant. His work was pivotal. 
Descartes’s conservation principle, the "impact law," and the 7 rules of collision in the 
Principles of Philosophy framed a new vision of the world. It set the topic—the 
mathematical study of collision—as an area of investigation, and inspired the hopes of 
the next generation of thinkers who sought to explain all the changes of nature in terms of 
quantitative rules of collision. They accepted the general manner of posing the problem, 
but were critical of Descartes's results and the means of arriving at those results.  
Descartes’s work is a turning point. Descartes’s older colleague, Isaac Beeckman, 
who also wrote on collision, but who did not publish on the topic, had used mechanical 
principles similar to those that Descartes would use, and Descartes’s early calculations of 
collision are akin to those found in Beeckman’s Journal. However, as we have seen in 
the previous chapter, Beeckman kept returning to the topic of the mathematical study of 
collision because it seemed to present a problem with his corpuscularian matter theory. 
Beeckman’s study of collision led him to the conclusion that motion should be reduced 
upon each impact of the smallest parts of matter. These parts of matter must be perfectly 
hard and thus, according to Beeckman, there is no rebound. And yet motion does not 
come to a halt, nor does every corpuscle attach to every other corpuscle after collision, 
resulting in a motionless block of matter. This puzzled Beeckman. Ultimately he saved 
his corpuscularianism with a deus ex machina: God continually "enlivens" motion upon 
each collision, contrary to what Beeckman’s mathematics seemed to show. Although 
Beeckman mathematically analyzed the transfer of motion in collision, he did not have a 
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mathematical analysis of rebound. As we will see, although Descartes’s early views on 
collision used calculations similar to those of Beeckman, his later view of collision seems 
to have been expressly designed to have the means to calculate instances of rebound. 
Descartes also shifted the focus from Beeckman’s concern with the apparent decrease in 
motion, to the persistence of—not motion—but what Descartes called the "quantity of 
motion." 
The rule of collision that articulated the conditions of rebound in Descartes’s 
Principles of Philosophy, rule 4, was almost immediately challenged and shown to be 
false by the young Christiaan Huygens. As we will see in the next chapter, Huygens used 
the analytical tools developed by Descartes himself to challenge Descartes’s rules of 
collision.   
Descartes’s mathematical studies of collision are unique. He contended with the 
problem without two components that would later prove to be key to its solution. He did 
not use a form of mathematics capable of expressing a system of equations with two 
variables. And he did not make use of the pendulum, which would become an important 
object to empirically measure speeds before and after collision. Descartes has at times 
been cast as a rationalist who had a purely mathematical vision of nature and whose 
method included deducing physics from first principles. We find a different Descartes in 
his work on collision—someone using mechanical principles, common experience, and 
observations to justify his understanding of the forces involved in collision, and who at 
times appealed to what appear to be entirely qualitative notions. What is revealed in 
Descartes’s studies of collision and its ultimate publication, is not the notes for the most 
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optimal rationalist deduction, but rather someone who was actively contending with a 
new problem.  
Descartes’s understanding of collision changed and developed. After a review of 
the status of Descartes's work on collision throughout the history of science, this chapter 
will establish that a significant change did in fact occur in Descartes's understanding of 
collision. Emphasizing the development of Descartes’s view of collision shines new light 
on several issues of contention in Descartes’s physics, provides a unique perspective of 
Descartes’s intellectual activity, and begins to explain some of the more perplexing 
features of Descartes’s rules of collision in their final form. The chapter describes but 
does not explain why Descartes's view changed. The crucial change took place in 1639, 
which is also when Johannes Marcus Marci's De proportione motu was published in 
Prague. Suggestively, Descartes's later view shares significant similarities with Marci. 
However, more research is required to establish influence. Notably this chapter 
emphasizes the crucial change in 1639, rather than the relatively minor changes, 
previously documented by Garber, after 1644 among the Latin and French editions of the 
Principles and the letter to Clerselier.    
With particular attention to the historicity of mathematics, the rules of collision in 
Descartes's mature work will not be reconstructed in modern mathematics. Descartes 
famously contributed to the emerging field of analytic geometry, by using symbolic 
algebra as an analytic method for solving geometrical problems. However, he did not use 
symbolic algebra anywhere in his account of collision, or in his physics generally. With 
attention to Descartes's own mathematical expressions, the focus in the rules of collision 
will be on the contest between forces in collision, which is described by Descartes's 
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impact law. Doing so, Descartes's rules of collision will be organized in a new way, 
which uncovers an underlying pattern running throughout the rules. This new 
interpretation of Descartes's rules of collision not only stays true to the texts themselves, 
but also resolves several perennial interpretive difficulties that historians have faced.   
 
 
 
Section 2  
A brief history of the histories of Descartes and collision, 1847—present 
 
 René Descartes is a complex and important figure. The significance of his work, 
particularly on collision, has had a tumultuous place in the histories of science. His ideas 
have been judged to be an outright obstacle to the development of science, but also 
heralded as an emblem of perhaps the most important trend in the scientific revolution. 
His rules of collision have been ignored as entirely insignificant, analyzed with intense 
care, rejected as erroneous, and lamented as underdeveloped. Whether he was an obstacle 
or visionary, a genius or a misguided armchair philosopher, he continues to hold a 
primary place in the history of early modern science.  
 Descartes's historic stature merits an extended historiographical essay. Such an 
essay can be found in appendix 1. In what follows, I touch on some of the themes that are 
directly relevant to the rules of collision, such as the rise and fall of Descartes's place in 
the narrative of the mathematization of nature, the changing status of the rules of 
collision, and the common criticisms of Descartes's physics. The section will conclude by 
positioning this chapter within the tradition of histories of the science of Descartes.       
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2.1 – The rise and fall of Descartes's place in the narrative of mathematization   
In the first half of the twentieth century, E. A. Burtt141 and E. J. Dijksterhuis142 
argued that the mathematization of nature was one of the key developments leading to the 
emergence of modern science. They also claimed that Descartes significantly defended 
the notions that (a) the structure of the world is mathematical and that (b) this structure 
should be understood using a universal mathematical method. This theme was absent in 
earlier histories of science and mechanics by William Whewell143 and Ernst Mach.144 For 
Whewell, the essence of science should not be considered to be mathematical at all.145 
Mach, using modern mathematical reconstructions, was interested in showing that the 
deeply held, but sometimes-confused, fundamental principles in the history of mechanics 
could be derived from clearer modern principles.146 Although the mathematization of 
nature has been influential since Burtt and Dijksterhuis, Descartes’s place in it was 
almost immediately criticized. According to Alexandre Koyré, for example, Galileo 
should receive credit rather than Descartes.147 Moreover, as Paul Mouy,148 Koyré,149 and 
many others have alleged, although matter may be identified with extension for 
Descartes, the details of his physics are qualitative and not quantitative. Additionally, the 
narrative crafted by Dijksterhuis and Burtt relies on claims that have since proven to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science, New York, 1924. Revised 
Edition 1932 (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1954).   
142 E. J. Dijksterhuis, Mechanization of the World Picture: Pythagoras to Newton, Amsterdam, 1950, trans. 
C. Dikshoorn and reprinted (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).   
143 William Whewell, The History of the Inductive Sciences, from the Earliest to the Present Time, vol. 2 
(London: Parker, 1857). William Whewell, The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded upon their 
History, vol. 1 (London: Parker, 1847). 
144 Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics: a critical and historical account of its development (Chicago: 
Open Court, 1893). Ernst Mach, The History and Root of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy 
(Chicago: Open Court, 1909). 
145 Whewell, Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, 162-3. 
146 Mach, The Science of Mechanics, 305-31.  
147 Alexandre Koyré, Galileo Studies (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1978), 201. 
148 Paul Mouy, Le Développement de la Physique Cartésienne, 1646-1712 (Paris: Vrin, 1934), 144. 
149 Koyré, Galileo Studies, 90. 
	   87 
controversial at best, such as the significance and enduring role of the mathesis 
universalis, described by Descartes in the early and incomplete work the Regulae ad 
Directionem Ingenii.150 Although historians gave Descartes an important position in the 
early statements of the thesis of the mathematization of nature, later historians quickly 
challenged his physics as not being mathematical at all with some claiming that his 
published physics is as qualitative as that of Aristotle. Moreover, there has been a shift 
from a narrower view of Descartes's physics to a view of a more far-reaching Cartesian 
"natural philosophy," of which Descartes's physics is only one part.151      
 
2.2 – The status of the rules of collision: from insignificant to incomplete  
The rules of collision (in general and Descartes’s in particular) were notably 
insignificant in the histories of sciences by Whewell and Mach. Mach makes no mention 
of them in the history of the conservation of work, although he does mention principles 
developed prior to the rules of collision as imperfectly articulating the notion of the 
conservation principle. In his history of mechanics, the rules of collision are mentioned 
only in so far as they were an opportunity to enunciate prior principles of mechanics. 
Whewell claimed that they expressed a confused connection to momentum and the true 
"third law of nature."152  
More so than their relation to the laws of nature or momentum, the rules of 
collision became significant in histories of science when connected to various presumed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Chikara Sasaki, Descartes’s Mathematical Thought (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 202. 
John Schuster, "Descartes’ Mathesis Universalis: 1619-28," in Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and 
Physics, ed. Stephen Gaukroger (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1980), 41-96.  
151 Stephen Gaukroger, John Schuster, and John Sutton, eds., Descartes’ Natural Philosophy (New York: 
Routledge, 2000). 
152 Whewell, History of the Inductive Sciences, 56. 
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early modern trends: mathematization, mechanism and the mechanical philosophy (Burtt, 
Dijksterhuis, Aiton,153 Westfall154). However, the Cartesian rules of collision bear a 
debated connection to mathematization since Descartes did not clearly quantify notions 
such as the "quantity of motion," "the moving force," and "the force of resistance." He 
did, however, "calculate" the resulting speeds of bodies in his rules of collision, although 
significantly he did not do so with algebraic calculations. The Cartesian rules bear a 
perplexing connection to mechanism since the bodies involved in collision are described 
in situations that cannot be realized in Descartes's system of the world—in the rules they 
are isolated from all other bodies, whereas Descartes's system of the world insists on a 
plenum. And as several historians have noted, in the plenum everything depends on 
everything else, and thus the system is much too complex to be expressed in 
mathematical form. Although Descartes’s rules have always been considered to be 
problematic, if not incorrect outright, in the context of the mechanical philosophy, they 
proved to be a fruitful starting place for later work, namely the work of Christiaan 
Huygens, Christopher Wren, and other members of the Royal Society. They captured the 
enduring hope of describing all the "vicissitudes" of the world in terms of matter in 
motion. The quantitative rules of collision were to be the new alphabet of the language of 
nature.    
Although the rules of collision would become incredibly important, Costabel, 
Gabbey, and Garber have suggested that his rules of collision may not have been all that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 E. J. Aiton, “The Vortex Theory of the Planetary Motions,” Annals of Science: a quarterly review of the 
history of science since the renaissance, 13 (1957): 249-264. E. J. Aiton, The Vortex Theory of Planetary 
Motions (New York: American Elsevier Inc., 1972).   
154 Richard Westfall, The Construction of Modern Science: Mechanisms and Mechanics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
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significant for Descartes himself. They claim that the rules were never fully developed, 
and were hastily attached to the Principia Philosophia at a late date.155   
 
2.3 – Criticisms of Descartes's physics   
Mach criticized Descartes’s apparent neglect of using experience to test his ideas, 
and thought that Descartes was generally overconfident. He criticized Descartes’s 
conceptions (such as quantity of motion) for being indistinct, and disapproved of what he 
took to be Descartes's method: asserting that there are "self evident" a priori truths from 
which to deduce physics. Both Whewell and Mach agreed that, in general, Descartes’s 
work in physics pales in comparison to Galileo’s, and according to Koyré it pales even 
with respect to the program of the mathematization of nature. Ultimately, according to 
Mach at least, Descartes’s work in physics was insignificant and would be completely 
effaced.156  
Whewell judged Descartes’s laws of motion to be false in substance. Some, just 
as Paul Tannery,157 have made exceptions for the first two laws, but the third law (the 
impact law) in particular has been deemed incorrect. The key problem, as Dijksterhuis 
and Westfall have indicated, is that Descartes did not understand velocity and momentum 
as vector quantities. However, others, such as Aiton, have claimed that Descartes's 
primary mistake was that he thought impact was the only cause of changes in motion.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Pierre Costabel, "Essai critique sur quelques concepts de la mécanique cartésienne," Archives 
Internationales d’Histoire des Sciences 20 (1967): 235-52. Alan Gabbey, “Force and Inertia in the 
Seventeenth Century: Descartes and Newton,” in Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics, ed. 
Stephen Gaukroger (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980), 265. Daniel Garber, Descartes’ metaphysical physics 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 231, 242, 252.   
156 Mach, The Science of Mechanics,  250, 273-4.  
157 Paul Tannery, “Sur les règles du choc des corps d’après Descartes,” in AT IX part 2, 327-30.  
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Similarly, historians since at least Whewell have claimed that his rules of mutual 
impact of bodies were erroneously given. For many, such as Diederik Korteweg158 and 
Dijksterhuis, the rules were considered to be relevant only insofar as they were corrected 
by Huygens. Even if the rules of impact are understood "on their own terms," Descartes 
has been criticized, by Aiton for example, for failing to adequately explain the connection 
between the third law and the rules of collision, particularly those rules which involve 
equal forces, i.e. those that seemingly cannot be derived from the third law, which 
requires a contest between forces. And, as many have noted, if Descartes held a relative 
notion of motion, as has been the received view,159 then Descartes’s rules of collision are 
inconsistent, e.g. rule 4 and rule 5. 
Whewell has observed that, generally, those in the 17th century conflated the 
principles of statics and dynamics, and attempted to use static notions such as weight to 
measure dynamic forces such the force of impact. According to Westfall, the notion of 
force was particularly problematic in the mechanical philosophy; Descartes and the 
mechanical philosophy were an obstacle to the successful synthesis of the trend of 
finding mechanisms underlying natural phenomena and the trend of mathematical 
platonic-pythagoreanism, whereas Newton successfully united these trends. Descartes 
relied on a notion of the force of a moving body and had no explanation for force as a 
cause of motion. Alan Gabbey has also criticized Descartes's notion of force, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 The applied mathematician and historian of mathematics, Diederik Korteweg, was the lead editor of the 
Oeuvres Complètes de Christiaan Huygens from 1911 through 1927. Volume 16 includes Huygens's work 
on collision, as well as substantial notes on Descartes's rules of collision (HOC 16: 4-5n). The volume had 
been started by Korteweg, who was responsible for pages 1-186, 202-212, but, like Tannery and the AT, 
his death prevented him from completing it. J. A. Vollgraff oversaw its completion as well as the remaining 
volumes of the project. Notably, E. J. Dijksterhuis also worked on volume 16 (pages 344-349, 392-412, 
463-469). It is Huygens’s work on musicology in the first part of volume 20 to which Dijksterhuis 
contributed the most. See HOC 22: 816. 
159 Garber has notably challenged the recieved view of Descartes's notion of motion in Descartes's 
Metaphysical Physics.  
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primarily for failing to clearly explain its ontological status. Unlike Westfall, Gabbey has 
claimed that Descartes's notion of force (particularly the force of resistance of a body at 
rest) anticipates Newton.160 In doing so, Gabbey has relied on an important, although 
mistaken, interpretation of the force of resistance, which has roots in Aiton's work on the 
topic.   
For some commentators, such as Burtt and Koyré, Descartes’s explanations of 
phenomena by material contact in vortices indicate a wrong turn generally. His physics 
was consequently too complex to express in mathematical form. Despite Descartes’s 
presumed mathematical vision of nature and mathematical method to understand nature, 
Dijksterhuis notes that there are nearly no instances of algebraic calculations, which he 
expected to find since he believed that Descartes's underlying method was akin to 
Descartes's mathesis universalis (which bears important connections to symbolic 
algebra). As Mouy, Koyré, and Garber have claimed, Descartes's published physics may 
seem mathematical, but on closer inspection it is largely qualitative, "a mathematical 
physics without mathematics."161 Garber further identifies several deep flaws with the 
details of Descartes’s physics: one notable instance is that in Descartes’s plenum, motion 
and body are circularly defined (a body is just that part of matter that moves together with 
respect to its surroundings, and motion is the separation of one part of matter from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Gabbey, "Force and inertia," 269-72.     
161 Mouy, Développement, 144. Koyré, Galileo Studies, 90. According to Mouy, "La physique cartésienne 
est une physique mathématique sans mathématiques. C'est une géométrie concrète, ce n'est pas une 
géométrie analytique, une algèbra de l'univers." This was also noted by Koyré, "It is well known that 
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Descartes and the programme for a mathematical physics in his correspondence," in Descartes’ Natural 
Philosophy, ed. Stephen Gaukroger, John Schuster, and John Sutton (New York: Routledge, 2000) 114. 
"The physics of the Principia is all words."   
	   92 
matter immediately neighboring it). This poses several problems, not the least being the 
individuation of bodies—a body at rest disappears into its surrounding.162 
 
2.4 – This chapter's place in the historiography 
Past historians such as Whewell, Mach, and Tannery have thoroughly noted the 
shortcomings of Descartes’s physics using the standard of either the "truth of the laws of 
nature" or the principles of mechanics accepted in their day to show where Descartes 
erred. The merits of Descartes's ideas have been measured by other standards as well. For 
Burtt, Dijksterhuis, and Westfall, the standard was not the truth of Descartes’s work, but 
rather the influence it had on shaping the view of the world—the metaphysical 
presuppositions of moderns (Burtt), a mathematized nature (Dijksterhuis), or the 
mechanical philosophy (Westfall). I am less interested in measuring the extent to which 
Descartes’s ideas depart from some chosen standard (whether it is modern science or a 
broader historical trend), than I am interested in making sense of Descartes’s thought-
process. In this way my study is similar to those of Aiton, Garber, and Gaukroger, who 
used neither the standard of modern science, nor that of an ensuing "world picture," but 
rather a notion that they had of Descartes himself—for Garber this was Descartes’s 
systematic project and for Gaukroger it was the interior development of Descartes.163 
However, even in these studies, modern mathematics has been used as an interpretive 
tool to reconstruct Descartes's ideas. This has imported notions that are foreign to 
Descartes's thinking, and has produced unnecessary interpretive difficulties. Attention to 
the historical mathematics is particularly important in the case of theories of collision, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 175-181. 
163 See appendix 1 for a discussion of Garber’s and Gaukroger’s contrasting explanations of some of the 
more contentious issues in Descartes’s work. 
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because mathematics is deeply interwoven with the conceptual analysis of the problem, 
and, as I will argue in chapters 4 and 5, it was in the very context of collision that 
physical applications of symbolic algebra were developing. 
 In the case of Huygens, I pay close attention to the role of algebra, particularly the 
role of signs, in the development of his theory of collision, as we will see in the next 
chapter. Most have taken these concepts for granted, and have used modern algebraic 
expressions as an interpretive tool. But these very concepts were in the process of being 
born in the early modern period—specifically in the context of collision. Huygens used 
algebra to investigate collision and to criticize Descartes's rules, but struggled to make 
sense of the solutions produced by the equations. The development of algebra (in its 
physical applications) is key for the interpretation of Huygens's achievements, as well as 
the interpretation of the development of theories of collision in general. I urge more 
restraint in the use of modern mathematics, particularly symbolic algebra, as an 
interpretive tool in histories of early modern theories of collision. Regarding Descartes, 
closer attention is given to his own way of framing the problem of collision. Mathematics 
is not a neutral system, and reconstructing Descartes's theory of collision using 
mathematical ideas that Descartes did not use, distorts the theory. It has also led to a 
mistaken interpretation of a fundamental aspect of his theory, which has subsequently 
produced unnecessary interpretive difficulties. Rather, I focus on Descartes's own 
expression of collision, specifically the contest of forces. Doing so has uncovered a 
significant shift in Descartes's own understanding of collision before and after the 
Principles of Philosophy. It has also uncovered a new organization of the rules, which has 
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led to a new interpretation of Descartes's theory of collision. This new interpretation stays 
closer to the text and resolves perennial interpretive difficulties. 
Although Descartes's rules of collision are problematic, and although they are 
difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with his definitions of motion, they are not as 
incomplete and problematic as recent historians have suggested. As the rules appear in 
the Principles of Philosophy, they set the problem of a quantitative investigation of 
collision. The underlying pattern in the rules will make clear that Descartes used a 
systematic and consistent analytic method to solve this new problem (specifically, to 
solve what was new to his "later view" of collision—the conditions of rebound). 
Although Descartes did so much to develop symbolic algebra as an analytic method in 
geometry, he never used symbolic algebra in the rules of collision. Nevertheless, 
Descartes's rules of collision have an important place in the "mathematization of nature." 
The rules of collision are quantitative—one of the few aspects of his physics that actually 
is. And the next generation of thinkers will bring Descartes's symbolic algebra together 
with the new problem of the quantitative rules of collision, with devastating 
consequences for Descartes and incredibly fruitful results for both the study of collision 
and the development of algebra.   
 
 
Section 3  
Overview of Descartes’s projects in The World and the Principles of Philosophy 
 
Descartes worked on two major texts, The World and Principles of Philosophy 
while holding his early and late views on collision respectively. In The World, Descartes 
constructed an imaginary world from mechanical principles in order to showcase his 
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account of light.164 The imagined physical world is shown to be a plenum composed of 
three elements, distinguished primarily by their size. The elements correspond to (1) 
sources of light, made of the smallest bits of matter, (2) the heavens, or that which 
transmits light, made of the medium-sized bits of matter, and (3) the Earth, or that which 
reflects light, made of the largest bits of matter. In order to present his theory of light, he 
first constructs a multiple heliocentric cosmology. Beginning with a state of chaos, he 
explains how the three elements are formed and how collections of the first element (the 
source of light) accumulate in the center of each of the indefinitely many vortices.  After 
much work and several chapters, he shows that light corresponds to linear pressure 
extending outward from the center of the swirling vortices in the plenum. Ultimately, his 
explanations are supposed to rely only on the differently sized and shaped parts of matter 
moving in contact with each other—grinding, glomming together, and knocking off each 
other’s edges—all according to three laws of nature and a principle of the conservation of 
quantity of motion. In 1633, upon the condemnation of Galileo for his argument that the 
Earth moves, Descartes broke off work on The World.165  
The Principles of Philosophy was modeled on Scholastic textbooks in its style of 
presentation, terminology, and scope of topics.166 The published work is in four parts. 
Parts II and III—The Principles of Material Objects, and The Visible Universe—offer 
content similar to The World, but reworked and presented in a new way, with some 
significant differences regarding collision. Again, Descartes constructs the world from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 AT XI 31, ll. 22-25. “For a short time, then, allow your thought to wander beyond this world to view 
another, wholly new one, which I shall cause to unfold before it in imaginary places.” Translation quoted in 
Michael S. Mahoney, trans., The World or Treatise on Light, accessed January 25, 2015, 
http://www.princeton.edu/~hos/mike/texts/descartes/world/worldfr.htm.  
165 AT I 270-3, 284-91. Descartes to Mersenne, November 1633. Descartes to Mersenne, April 1634. 
Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes' System of Natural Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 20-1. Also see Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 182.   
166 Gaukroger, Descartes' System, 32-63.  
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mechanical principles. However, unlike The World Descartes first presents The Principles 
of Human Knowledge in Part I, which provide a justification and foundation for his 
natural philosophy. In it, Descartes attempts to clear away the readers’ learned prejudices, 
and then uses the criteria of "clear and distinct ideas" to build his metaphysical categories 
from principles that anyone, even those versed in scholastic philosophy, should accept. 
Or at least he seems to hope as much. Generally, the material from The World found in 
sections II and III of the Principia is presented in a revised and expanded manner in light 
of the categories and commitments of Descartes’s metaphysics.  
 
3.1 – Collision as explanans: material contact in Descartes’s natural philosophy 
Toward the end of the Principles of Philosophy, part IV “Of the Earth,” and thus 
also the end of the work itself, Descartes provides a set of sections that summarize his 
general view.167 In doing so he summarizes the overarching principles he has used in his 
natural philosophy. The way in which he describes collision here is notable. First, he 
deftly claims in section 200 that his principles are nothing new. They are so 
commonplace (and old, obvious, and unoriginal) that no one has ever not accepted 
them.168 These principles are (1) that bodies have figures, motions, and sizes; and (2) that 
using “the laws of Mechanics (which are confirmed by certain and daily experiences)” 
one can determine “what ought to follow from the collision of these bodies.”169  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 In these last sections Descartes also distinguishes his views from those of others that the reader might be 
tempted to conflate. Particularly, Descartes distinguishes his views from the atomists.  
168 AT VIII 323.  Principia IV 200. “[...] I have used, for this purpose, absolutely no principle which was 
not accepted by Aristotle and by all other Philosophers of all periods: so that this Philosophy is not new, 
but the oldest and most commonplace of all.” Translation quoted in Valentine Rodger Miller and Reese P. 
Miller, trans., Principles of Philosophy (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983) 283.  
169 AT VIII 323. Principia IV 200. “Nempe figuras & motus & magnitudines corporum consideravi, atque 
secundum leges Mechanicœ, certis & quotidianis experimentis confirmatas, quidnam ex istorum corporum 
mutuo concursu sequi debeat, examinavi.” Translation by Miller, Principles, 283. 
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Yet who ever doubted that bodies are moved, and are moved variously according 
to their various sizes and figures; or that as a result of the collision of these 
bodies, the larger ones are divided into many smaller ones, and change their 
figures? We do not observe this through only one sense, but through several: 
through sight, touch, and hearing [sic]; and we also {very} distinctly imagine and 
{clearly} understand this.170  
 
Although many would have been committed to a great many more principles than just 
these two, Descartes’s point is that these are so basic that no one would deny them.  
What is of interest in the context of this chapter is that collision is mentioned in 
(2), and that what is of importance regarding collision is that larger bodies are divided 
into many smaller ones and change their figure. In the context of his general summary, it 
is this that Descartes names as commonplace—not that a body moving to meet another of 
some size will transfer some amount of its motion to the other. What is observed (and 
obvious to all our senses and understanding) is motion, as well as bodies dividing due to 
collision.171 The notion of collision here is not bits of matter rebounding off each other 
like billiard balls. This is in keeping with the kinds of explanations he presents of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 AT VIII 323. Principia IV 200. Translation by Miller, Principles, 283.  
171 Throughout Descartes’s early and late natural philosophy, bodies interact through material contact in 
three general of ways. Although the second and third can likely be reduced to the first, it is instructive to 
make the tripartite distinction.  (1) They move past each other in vortices. This is almost trivially true since 
a solid body is just a collection of parts of matter, which are generally at rest with respect to each other, 
whereas the parts of matter surrounding the collection are not at rest with respect to it. (2) Bodies also 
interact by pushing each other. This includes his explanation of the weight of terrestrial phenomena, and 
the motion of planets being “carried along” by the heavenly fluid. See AT VIII 92. Principia III 30. His 
explanation of light is also a form of “pushing” – as the “pressure” produced by the centrifugal 
determination (but not movement) of parts of matter outward from a vortex. See AT VIII 108-135. 
Principia III 55, “What light is,” and the subsequent explanations through section 80. In the Principia, 
magnetism too is explained as a kind of “pushing” – as the action of corkscrew-shaped parts of matter. See 
AT VIII 275-310. Principia IV 133-182. And (3), bodies interact through material contact by dividing and 
breaking each other apart. It is this last form of interaction (which, like the others, remains largely 
unchanged throughout his writings) that I would like to highlight.  This is important because it shows that 
Descartes carried over many of the same explanations from his earlier works. Significantly, some of these 
explanations -- such as the action of fire (a fluid) on solids -- include smaller bodies moving larger bodies. 
In his early work this was entirely acceptable, as he had used that scenario to illustrate the meaning of 
“quantity of motion” and its conservation, as we will see. In his later work, however, this is much more 
complicated and appears to be in tension with the principles from which his natural philosophical 
explanations are intended to follow. See Aiton, "Vortex Theory," 254-255. 
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phenomena throughout his natural philosophy in parts III (Of the Visible Universe), and 
IV (Of the Earth) of the Principles of Philosophy, as well as The World.  
Throughout Descartes's natural philosophy, phenomena are explained in terms of 
material contact. Collision is the explanans. In Descartes's "rules of collision" on the 
other hand, which are presented immediately after the laws of nature in the Principles of 
Philosophy (part II, sections 46 - 52), collision is the explanandum. Descartes presents his 
natural philosophy beginning with what he considers to be the simplest facets of nature—
body and motion—and then constructs the world from these simplest facets. Similarly, he 
begins with the simplest principles—the immutable action of God, the conservation of 
the quantity of motion, and the first two laws of nature, which describe the persistence of 
motion or rest and the persistence of the direction of motion respectively. Throughout his 
presentation, the principles increase in complexity: the third law of nature describes, in 
general, what happens to the state of motion and rest (and the direction of motion) when a 
body impacts another. The rules of collision then quantitatively present the conditions of 
rebound and the transfer of motion for specific scenarios of impact between two bodies. 
Since the world described in Descartes's natural philosophy is a plenum, bodies are 
continually in contact, motion is continually being transferred, and the direction of 
motion is continually being affected. The rules of collision are an extension of his 
synthetic presentation of principles of increasing complexity. They describe the behavior 
of bodies, as if they were in scenarios in which only two bodies exist. Immediately after 
the rules of collision Descartes begins to describe solid and fluid bodies in terms of the 
plenum. Thereafter, phenomena are generally described in terms of material contact, with 
collision as the explanans. 
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3.2 – "Conservation," the Laws of Nature, and the “Impact Law”  
According to Descartes, the laws of nature are such that given any initial set of 
conditions of matter and motion, the world that we know from our senses would 
eventually be produced. What Descartes’s describes in The World “is a self-generating 
world that begins with chaos and shapes itself in an almost emergent way into a world 
that looks like the one we inhabit.”172 In the Principles of Philosophy, Descartes 
describes a different set of initial conditions in which matter and motion are in 
“proportion or order”173 rather than chaos, and claims that the laws of nature would 
produce the same world. In the Principles, Descartes not only indicates that these are 
different initial conditions from those in The World, but he explicitly claims that the 
conditions in the Principles are false. They must be false because according to Descartes 
the account of the formation of the world in Genesis is true.174 Nevertheless, no matter 
what the initial conditions are—ordered or chaotic (or biblical)—and even if what is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Michael S. Mahoney, "The World of Descartes" (plenary address to the 7th Annual Conference of the 
Association for Core Texts and Courses, University of Notre Dame, 5-8 April 2001). Text quoted in 
Michael S. Mahoney, "The World of Descartes," accessed January 25, 2015, 
http://www.princeton.edu/~hos/Mahoney/talks/actc-descartes.html.  
173 AT VIII 101. Principia III 46. Descartes makes the following suppositions: (1) “[...] that God, in the 
beginning, divided all the matter of which He formed the visible world into parts as equal as possible and 
of medium size” (2) “[...] that He endowed them collectively with exactly that amount of motion which is 
still in the world at present” (3) “and, finally, that He caused them all to begin to move with equal force {in 
two different ways, that is}, each one separately around its own center, by which means they formed a fluid 
body, such as I judge the heaven to be; and also several together around certain other centers [...] so that 
[these] parts formed as many vortices [...] as there are now heavenly bodies in the world.” Translation by 
Miller, Principles, 106-7.  
174 AT VIII 99-100. Principia III 45. “Indeed, in order to better explain natural things, I may even retrace 
their causes here to a stage earlier than any think they ever passed through. {For example}, I do not doubt 
that the world was created in the beginning with all the perfection, which it now possesses... The Christian 
faith teaches us this, and natural reason convinces us that this is true... But, nevertheless, just as for an 
understanding of the nature of plants or men it is better by far to consider how they can gradually grow 
from seeds than how they were created [entire] by God in the very beginning of the world; so, if we can 
devise some principles which are very simple and easy to know and by which we can demonstrate that the 
stars and the Earth, and indeed everything which we perceive in this visible world, could have sprung forth 
as if from certain seeds (even though we know that things did not happen that way); we shall in that way 
explain their nature much better than if we were merely to describe them as they are now, {or as we believe 
them to have been created}. And because I think I have discovered some principles of this kind, I shall here 
briefly expound them.” Translation by Miller, Principles, 105.  
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described in the initial conditions is explicitly false, as long as the laws of nature are 
followed, the world that we know and perceive would be produced: 
[The] laws of nature are such that, even if we were to assume...the Chaos {of the 
poets, that is, a total confusion of all parts of the universe}; we could still 
demonstrate that, by these laws, this confusion must {gradually} be transformed 
into the order which is at present in the world. And...I formerly undertook to 
explain how this could have happened. [...] And it is almost impossible to imagine 
any arrangement from which we could not deduce, by these laws, the same effect; 
{since it must change continually, until it finally forms a world exactly similar to 
this one} [...].175  
 
In both The World and the Principles, the three laws of motion are much the 
same: (a) each part of matter remains in the same state until collision with other bodies 
forces it to change,176 (b) when a body transfers motion to another, it gives the other as 
much as it itself loses, otherwise it rebounds (i.e. the “impact law”),177 and (c) each part 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 AT VIII 102-3. Principia III 47. Translation by Miller, Principles, 107-8. 
176 AT XI 38. Le Monde, chapter 7. “The first is that each individual part of matter always continues to 
remain in the same state unless collision with others constrains it to change that state. That is to say, if the 
part has some size, it will never become smaller unless others divide it; if it is round or square, it will never 
change that shape without others forcing it to do so; if it is stopped in some place, it will never depart from 
that place unless others chase it away; and if it has once begun to move, it will always continue with an 
equal force until others stop or retard it.” Translation by Mahoney, The World.   
 AT VIII 62. Principia II 37. “The first law of nature: that each thing, as far as is in its power, always 
remains in the same state; and that consequently, when it is once moved, it always continues to move.” 
Translation by Miller, Principles, 59.   
177 AT XI 41. Le Monde, chapter 7. “I suppose as a second rule that, when one of these bodies pushes 
another, it cannot give the other any motion except by losing as much of its own at the same time; nor can it 
take away from the other body’s motion unless its own is increased by as much. [...] [T]he motion of a 
body is not retarded by collision with another in proportion to how much the latter resists it, but only in 
proportion to how much the latter’s resistance is surmounted, and to the extent that, in obeying the law, it 
receives into itself the force of motion that the former surrenders.” Translation by Mahoney, The World. 
AT VIII 65. Principia II 40. "This is the third law of nature: when a moving body meets another, if it has 
less force to continue to move in a straight line than the other has to resist it, it is turned aside in another 
direction, retaining its quantity of motion and changing only the direction of that motion. If, however, it has 
more force; it moves the other body with it, and loses as much of its motion as it gives to that other." 
Translation by Miller, Principles, 61.  
Garber has indicated that “there is little in the way of significant addition in the French edition of Pr II 40-
45, where Descartes sets out law 3, its explication and its defense. [...] There is reason to believe that 
Descartes hardly looked at the French translation of those sections. As Pierre Costabel has pointed out, 
there are some errors of translation in those sections that are so glaring that Descartes could hardly have 
failed to notice them, had he but read them over with any care.” Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 
248.   
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of matter tends to move in a straight line.178 Both also state that the total quantity of 
motion in the world remains the same.179 However, the order of the laws changes from 
The World to the Principles. In addition, the place of the "conservation principle" 
changes. In The World, the order is (a), (b), (c), and the conservation principle is stated 
after (a) and (b). The conservation principle is that from which (a) "parts of matter tend to 
remain in the same state," and (b) "the impact law," are supposed to follow. In the 
Principles (b) and (c) trade places. And the conservation principle is prior to all of the 
laws, being specifically called a “universal and primary [...] cause of all the movements 
in the world.”180 The laws are found in sections 37, 39, and 40, whereas the conservation 
principle is in section 36, the title of which states: "That God is the primary cause of 
motion; and that He always maintains an equal quantity of it in the universe." In contrast 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 AT XI 43-4. Le Monde, chapter 7. “I will add as a third rule that, when a body is moving, even if its 
motion most often takes place along a curved line and (as has been said above) can never take place along 
any line that is not in some way circular, nevertheless each of its individual parts tends always to continue 
its motion along a straight line. And thus their action, i.e. the inclination they have to move, is different 
from their motion.” Translation by Mahoney, The World.  
AT VIII 63. Principia II 39. “The second law of nature {which I observe} is: that each part of matter, 
considered individually, tends to continue its movement only along straight lines, and never along curved 
ones...” Translation by Miller, Principles, 60. 
179 AT XI 43. Le Monde, chapter 7. “Now it is the case that those two rules manifestly follow from this 
alone: that God is immutable and that, acting always in the same way, He always produces the same effect. 
For, supposing that He placed a certain quantity of motions in all matter in general at the first instant He 
created it, one must either avow that He always conserves as many of them there or not believe that He 
always acts in the same way.” Also see AT XI 11. Le Monde, chapter 3. “I do not stop to seek the cause of 
their motion, for it is enough for me to think that they began to move as soon as the world began to exist. 
And that being the case, I find by my reasoning that it is impossible that their motions should ever cease or 
even that those motions should change in any way other than with regard to the subject in which they are 
present. That is to say, the virtue or power in a body to move itself can well pass wholly or partially to 
another body and thus no longer be in the first; but it cannot no longer exist in the world.” Translation by 
Mahoney, The World.  
AT VIII 61-2. Principia II 36. “As far as the general {and first} cause is concerned, it seems obvious to me 
that this is none other than God Himself, who, {being all-powerful} in the beginning created matter with 
both movement and rest; and now maintains in the sum total of matter, by His normal participation, the 
same quantity of motion and rest as He placed in it at that time. ... From this it follows that it is completely 
consistent with reason for us to think that, solely because God moved the parts of matter in diverse ways 
when He first created them, and still maintains all this matter exactly as it was at its creation, and subject to 
the same law as at that time; He also always maintains in it an equal quantity of motion.” Translation by 
Miller, Principles, 58. 
180 AT VIII 61. Principia II 36. Translation by Miller, Principles, 58.   
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to God and the conservation of quantity of motion, the laws of nature are “the secondary 
and particular causes of the diverse movements which we notice in individual bodies.” In 
The World, the conservation principle is also connected directly to God (which in the 
Principles is the universal and primary cause of motion), but Descartes does not make a 
distinction between particular causes and universal causes in The World. 
As Daniel Garber has explained, the new order of the laws in the Principles is 
significant. The first two laws are “principles of persistence” that are closely related to 
the conservation principle. The first two laws concern the persistence of motion/rest and 
directionality respectively. And the conservation principle concerns the persistence of the 
total quantity of motion. The third law in the Principia, the impact law, is quite different 
from the first two. It is a “principle of reconciliation.” “[I]n the Cartesian plenum it will 
always happen that the conditional principles of persistence will come into conflict. ... 
[Law 3] tells us what is to happen next, how the two incompatible conditionally 
persisting motions are to be reconciled with one another.”181 Thus, there is a shift not just 
in the order, but a shift in the significance of the "impact law" in the system. 
  Corresponding to the new significance of the "impact law" in Descartes’s system 
is a new understanding of collision. This is seen most obviously in the change from his 
early position that a smaller body can move a larger body at rest, to his later position that 
a smaller body can never move a larger body at rest. The impact law states that when a 
moving body meets another, it meets a force of resistance. If the moving body cannot 
overcome this force of resistance, it changes direction (i.e. rebounds) retaining its motion. 
If the moving body does overcome this force of resistance, it transfers some of its motion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 203. 
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to the other. There is a contest between the force of resistance and the force of motion.182 
In Descartes's early view of collision, he does not explicitly describe under what 
conditions a body does not overcome the force of resistance. Although he states that it is 
possible, he provides no examples in which the force of resistance prevails, resulting in 
rebound. All of his examples of collision involve the transfer of motion. In his later view 
of collision, specifically in his rules of collision, Descartes explicitly presents the 
conditions in which the force of resistance is not overcome, resulting in rebound. Section 
4 presents evidence of this fundamental change and outlines the major features of his 
early view on collision.    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 John Herival, The Background to Newton's Principia: A Study of Newton's Dynamical Researches in the 
Years 1664-84 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965) 49. 
	   104 
Section 4  
Descartes's early account of collision: transfer of motion  
 
 Along with The World, a major source for our understanding of Descartes’s early 
views on collision is his April 1639 letter to Florimond de Beaune. In the letter, Descartes 
presents his ideas on motion and the conservation of quantity of motion, as well as 
several of his ideas that will undergo development in his later work, including rebound, 
the transfer of motion, and the force of resistance. The views articulated in this letter 
indicate that Descartes had considered the topic of collision (the meeting and interaction 
of two bodies, where at least one is in motion) in a different manner from what is found 
in his later “mature works” such as the Latin and French editions of The Principles of 
Philosophy (1644, 1647) and his elaborations on the topic in his correspondence with 
Claude Clerselier (1645).183 Evidence of this early view is not unique to the 1639 letter to 
de Beaune. It is supported by his other early writings including The World as well as his 
correspondence with Mersenne in the late 1630s. This indicates that Descartes did not 
hold one view on collision, a topic of importance to his physics and natural philosophy, 
as well as those of later natural philosophers and mathematicians. His views on the 
foundations of his physics were in flux throughout his career.  
 This section will characterize some of the main components of his early views on 
collision, including motion, the conservation of the “quantity of motion,” and the 
conditions of the transfer of motion in the contest between the force of resistance and the 
moving force. Focusing on this fundamental change casts new light on the rules of 
collision in the Principles of Philosophy, his later account of collision. As we will see in 
section 5, this reveals a previously unnoticed pattern connecting the rules, which better 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 See Appendix 2 for more information on the 1639 letter itself as well as an English translation. 
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captures Descartes's ideas and resolves several longstanding interpretive problems with 
the rules.   
 
4.1 – Descartes to de Beaune on the quantity of motion    
René Descartes’s friend, Florimond de Beaune (1601-1652), who would write the 
introduction184 to the first Latin edition of Descartes’s La Géométrie (1649), asked 
Descartes in a 1639 letter about the measurement of speed, as well as “the nature of 
Weight,” and what de Beaune called “Natural Inertia.” Descartes had contacted de 
Beaune earlier that spring because he wanted to know if de Beaune could build an 
instrument that would grind hyperbolic lenses—an instrument of the kind that Descartes 
described in La Dioptrique (1637).185 At the time, de Beaune had been working on his 
Méchaniques,186 to which Descartes seems to have given high praise.187 When he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 In addition to the introduction, Novis briève  (Notæ breves), de Beaune wrote De æquationum natura, 
constitutione as well as De limitibus æquationum, both of which appear in the second Latin edition of 
Descartes’s Geometry (1659). 
185 J. J. O'Connor and E. F. Robertson, "Florimond de Beaune," MacTutor History of Mathematics, 
accessed January 25, 2015, http://www-history.mcs.st-and.ac.uk/Biographies/De_Beaune.html. According 
to O’Connor’s and Robertson’s biography, “De Beaune became obsessed with the idea of making 
Descartes’ machine to grind lenses and devoted his whole time to the project. Descartes knew that de 
Beaune was the only person who had the technical proficiency, a deep understanding of mathematics and a 
fascination with astronomy. However in January 1640, despite his expertise, de Beaune cut his hand badly 
on a piece of roughly shaped glass which he was trying to cut into a hyperbolic shape. When Descartes 
heard about the accident he seemed pleased that his scientific imagination went beyond what the best 
technician could make. He wrote to Christiaan Huygens’s father: Do you think I am saddened by this? On 
the contrary, I tell you that in the very failure of the hands of the best craftsman, I understand just how far 
my reasoning has reached.”  
186 O'Connor and Robertson, "Forimond de Beaune." De Beaune’s Méchaniques was never published. In 
addition, his Dioptrique was never published. To date, there are no known manuscript copies of these 
planned/completed works.   
187 AT II 542, 543. Descartes to [Mr. de Beaune], [30 April 1639]. “Your fashion of distinguishing diverse 
dimensions in motion, and representing them by lines, is without a doubt the best that can be. ... Your 
distinction of three lines of direction...is very methodical and useful.  ... The Invention of your Curved 
Lines is very beautiful; and the reason that you give for the quadruple tension of a cord which makes the 
octave, is very ingenious and quite true.” Votre façon de distinguer diuerses dimensions dans les 
mouuemens, & de les representer par  des lignes, est sans doute la meilleure qui puisse estre. [...] Vostre 
distinction des trois lignes de direction [...] est forst methodique & vtile. [...] L’Inuention de vos Lignes 
Courbes est tres belle; et la raison que vous donnez pour la tension quadruple d’une corde qui fait 
l’octaue, est tre-ingenieuse & tres-vraye.    
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responded to de Beaune’s questions on mechanics, he touched on the topics of natural 
inertia and weight. He claimed, however, that he could not comment on the measurement 
of speed:    
I would like to be capable of responding to what you want concerning your 
Mechanics; but even though all of my Physics is nothing other than Mechanics, 
however, I have never particularly examined questions that depend on measures 
of speed.188 
 
In the letter to de Beaune, Descartes revealed why he had never examined 
questions that depend on the measurement of speed. He used two of the topics about 
which de Beaune had inquired to explain his position—speed and weight. First, Descartes 
claimed that there is a nuanced relationship between “quantity of motion” and speed, and 
maintained that the former “quantity” rather than the latter “speed” was more basic. He 
went on to claim that weight is the effect of something more fundamental, i.e. it is the 
effect of various motions of subtle matter in vortices between the Earth and the Moon. 
Presumably, the perceived and empirically measured characteristics of speeds and 
weights would not provide insight into these more fundamental quantities and motions. 
This is roughly the same position Descartes would keep in his later works on the topic. 
Another possible reason Descartes may not have examined questions that depend on the 
measurement of speed is that he had no practical way of measuring speed, at least in the 
context of collision. He does not mention ever using what would become the preferred 
method of later investigations on the topic—measuring the initial speed by the height 
from which a pendulum bob drops, and the speed after collision by the height to which 
the impacted pendulum bob is elevated and to which the initially moving bob returns. As 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 AT II 542. Descartes to De Beaune, 30 April 1639. Ie voudrois estre capable de répondre à ce que vous 
desirez touchant vos Mechaniques; mais encore que toute ma Physique ne soit autre chose que 
Mechanique, toutesfois ie n’ay iamais examiné particulierement les questions qui dépendent des mesures 
de la vitesse.  
	   107 
we will see in chapters 4 and 5, the use of this method to measure speeds before and after 
impact may have been inspired by Galileo’s studies on the pendulum, and would become 
important for Huygens’s work on collision as well as that of the members of the Royal 
Society. This is absent in Descartes work.189  
To defend his claim of a relationship between speed and “quantity of motion,” 
which will also serve as a rationale for declining to investigate the measurement of speed, 
Descartes appealed in the letter to the idea that motion can be transferred between bodies, 
and his idea that a “quantity of motion” is “conserved” in all matter. The former idea had 
been articulated as his second law of nature in his work, The World, which had been 
written 6 to 10 years earlier (but would not be published until 1677).190 The latter idea 
had also been articulated in this earlier work as that from which Descartes’s first two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 However, Descartes was familiar with some of Galileo's theoretical studies of the pendulum. For 
example, Descartes objected to Galileo's claim of isochrony in letters to Mersenne, arguing that air 
resistance and various environmental factors would interfere, likely making smaller oscillations slower than 
larger ones. AT I 73-4, 96. Descartes to Mersenne, 8 October, 13 November, and 18 December 1629. 
Beeckman had also been interested in the effect of air resistance on the pendulum (which he thought would 
affect small oscillations more than the large), and surmized that a pendulum is only isochronous in a 
vacuum. Beeckman, Journal 1:260. "If you can imagine this [oscillatory motion] as taking place in a 
vacuum, when only the tendency toward the center of the earth operates, it will perhaps correspond more 
exactly to what has been said [i.e., perfect isochrony]; for the slowness of the motion [at the extremities of 
a large oscillation or in small oscillations] is greatly affected by the air with the result that the motion turns 
out to be even much slower." Quoted and translated in Ariotti, "Aspects of the Conception and 
Development of the Pendulum," 375. Descartes also claimed that Galileo's "demonstrations" of the circle as 
the brachistochrone were not sound -- they only suceeded in showing that a body descends more quickly 
along an arc of a circle than along the chord of the same arc. AT II 379-405. Descartes to Mersenne, 11 
October 1638. Mersenne also disagreed with Galileo's claim of isochrony, but in the reverse of Descartes: 
smaller oscillations are faster than large ones. Later, Huygens, corresponding with Mersenne, also argued 
that the circular pendulum is not isochronous. Like Mersenne he contended that smaller oscillations are 
faster than large ones, but the periods of large and small oscillations can be made equal if the path of the 
pendulum is modified. He famously accomplished this by including "cheeks" to restrict the swing, which 
has the effect of gradually shortening the path of the pendulum bob. This shortened the period for larger 
amplitudes. Later Huygens, who led the way in the design of workable mechanical pendulum clocks, would 
show that a pendulum whose bob swept out the path of a cycloid rather than a circle is isochronous. See 
Piero E Ariotte, "Aspects of the Conception and Development of the Pendulum in the 17th Century," 
Archive for History of Exact Sciences 8 (1972): 329-410. 
190 AT XI 41. “I suppose as a second rule that, when one of these bodies pushes another, it cannot give the 
other any motion except by losing as much of its own at the same time; nor can it take away from the other 
body's motion unless its own is increased by as much.” Translation by Mahoney, The World.   
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laws followed.191 In the 1639 letter to de Beaune, both ideas are combined in a single 
sentence:  
there is a certain Quantity of Motion in all created Matter, which never increases 
nor decreases; and thus when a body causes another to move, it loses so much of 
its motion as it gives of it to it [the other body].192  
 
This “Quantity of Motion” is not merely an amount of “speed.” To clarify the point, he 
used a familiar example from experience—that of a stone falling from a high place and 
hitting the ground, about which he makes a surprising claim, particularly if one is familiar 
with his later works:  
...if it does not return and is stopped, I conceive that that just shakes the earth, and 
thus transfers to it its motion; but if what it moves of the earth contains 1000 
times more matter than it, transferring to it all its motion, it only gives to it a 
1000th part of its speed.193 
 
Before addressing what is surprising about this claim, let us first consider Descartes’s 
reason for making it—which is to clarify the difference between “amount of speed” and 
“quantity of motion.” The transfer of motion is not identical to the differences in speeds 
of each body before and after collision, instead one must take into consideration the size 
of the body in motion as well. It is notable that here as elsewhere Descartes does not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 AT XI 43. After discussing his first two laws of nature, (the first being that a body will continue in the 
same state once it has begun moving “until collision with others forces it to change”), Descartes explains 
upon what these two rules follow: “Now it is the case that those two rules manifestly follow from this 
alone: that God is immutable and that, acting always in the same way, He always produces the same effect. 
For, supposing that He placed a certain quantity of motions in all matter in general at the first instant He 
created it, one must either avow that He always conserves as many of them there or not believe that He 
always acts in the same way.” Translation by Mahoney, The World. 
192 AT II 543. Descartes to De Beaune, 30 April 1639. Premierement, ie tiens qu’il y a vne certaine 
Quantité de Mouuement en toute la Matiere creée, qui n’augmente, ny ne diminuë iamais; et ainsi, que, 
lors qu’vn corps en fait mouuoir vn autre, il perd autant de son mouuement qu’il luy en donne.   
193 AT II 543. Descartes to De Beaune, 30 April 1639. [C]omme, lors qu’vne pierre tombe d’vn lieu haut 
contre terre, si elle ne retourne point, & qu’elle s’arreste, ie conçoy que cela vient de ce qu’elle ébranle 
cette terre, & ainsi luy transfere son mouuement; mais si ce qu’elle meut de terre contient mille fois plus de 
matiere qu’elle, en luy transferant tout son mouuement, elle ne luy donne que la milliesme partie de sa 
vitesse. Note that if the body rebounds or returns, the quantity of motion is conserved. Quantity of motion 
here, as elsewhere in his writings, is scalar. This is a point of some importance, to which we will return 
later in the chapter.  
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define the quantity of motion as the product of the numerical measures of body and 
speed. The "Cartesian quantity of motion" has often been interpretted as an imperfect 
precursor to momentum, and has usually been expressed as the product of size and speed 
(akin to mass and velocity, mv). It has been considered "imperfect" because Descartes did 
not clearly specify what he meant by size, and because Descartes's quantity of motion is 
not a vector quantity as momentum is. Descartes could have easily expressed the quantity 
of motion as a product. He did not. The practice of doing so may well have contributed to 
some interpretive difficulties with Descartes rules of collision, as we will see more 
clearly in section 5. Whatever the quantity of motion is, Descartes held it to be true in 
principle that it remains the same. In The World, Descartes argued that this must be so 
because of the immutability of God; he used the same argument in The Principles of 
Philosophy (1644). In the 1639 letter to de Beaune, Descartes just maintained that it is so, 
without mentioning God. The resulting speeds, on the other hand, will depend on how 
much matter is in the bodies. To emphasize his point, Descartes wrote in the letter that if 
two unequal bodies have the same “quantity of motion,” then the speed of the larger 
would be less than the smaller. A body with more matter has, “in a sense,” more of what 
de Beaune seems to have called Natural Inertia:   
If two unequal bodies receive so much motion as each other, this similar quantity 
of motion does not give so much speed to the larger as to the smaller, one can say, 
in a sense, that the more a body contains of matter, the more it has of Natural 
Inertia; to which one can add that a body, which is large can better transfer its 
motion to other bodies, than a small one can, and that it can be moved less by 
them.194 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 AT II 543. Descartes to De Beaune, 30 April 1639. Et pour ce que, if deux cors inégaux reçoiuent autant 
de mouuement l’vn que l’autre, cette pareille quantité de mouuement ne donne pas tant de vitesse au plus 
grand qu’au plus petit, on peut dire, en ce sens, que plus vn cors contient de matiere, plus il a d’Inertie 
Naturelle; a quoy on peut adjouster qu’vn cors, qui est grand, peut mieux transferer son mouuement aux 
autres cors, qu’vn petit, & qu’il peut moins estre mû par eux. The passage continues: “In this way there is 
one strength of Inertia, which depends on the quantity of matter, and another which depends on the extent 
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Large bodies can transfer their motion to other bodies better than small ones, and large 
bodies better resist being moved by other bodies. So, the amount of speed and the 
quantity of motion are not identical, and thus, the quantity of motion cannot be measured 
by the speed of a body alone. How fast a body moves is balanced by “how much matter it 
contains,” or in the terminology of Descartes’s friend de Beaune, its Natural Inertia. 
Descartes, however, did not think that de Beaune needed to appeal to a notion of Natural 
Inertia as something inherent to bodies. In a letter to Mersenne around the same time 
(December 1638), which also reveals that this is a topic that had been under discussion 
among de Beaune, Descartes, and Mersenne beyond what remains in the correspondence, 
Descartes argued against natural inertia as inherent to bodies, but attributed to de Beaune 
an example that illustrates what he meant by quantity of motion and its conservation: 
I do not consider that there is any natural Inertia or inherent slowness in bodies 
any more than does M. Mydorge. Further I believe that when a man walks, he 
causes the whole mass of the earth to move by however little it may be, but at the 
same time I agree with M. de Beaune that the greatest bodies being impelled by 
an equal force, as the greatest ships are by the same wind, always move more 
slowly than the others, which should perhaps be sufficient grounds for his reasons 
without calling in a natural Inertia which cannot be proved.195 
 
 Descartes closes the 1639 letter to de Beaune by underscoring the fact that he has 
never gotten around to determining anything concerning speed, but he maintained that the 
issues that distract him from considering speed have a great deal of value:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of its area.” De façon qu’il y a vne forte d’Inertie, qui dépend de la quantité de la matiere, & vne qutre qui 
dépend de l’estenduë de ses superficies. 
195 AT II 466-7. Descartes to Mersenne, December 1638. Je ne reconnois aucune Inertie ou tardiueté 
naturelle dans les cors, non plus que M. Mydorge, et croye que, lors seulement qu’vn homme se promene, il 
fait tant soit peu mouuoir toute la masse de la terre, à cause qu’il en charge maintenant vn endroit, & 
aprés vn autre. Mais ie ne laisse pas d’accorder à M. de Beaune, que les plus grands cors, estant poussez 
par vne mesme force, comme les plus grands bateaux par vn mesme vent, se meuuent tousiours plus 
lentement que les autres; ce qui seroit peut-estre assez pour établir ses raisons, sans auoir recours à cette 
Inertie naturelle qui ne peut aucunement estre prouuèe. 
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You can see that there are many things to consider, before one can determine 
anything concerning Speed, and it is what always diverts me from it; but one can 
also account for many things by the method of these Principles, which one cannot 
attain formerly. As for the rest, I would not write to you so freely of these things, 
as I did not want to discuss this further, because the proof depends on my World, 
so I only hope that you interpret them favorably, and so I passionately wanted to 
testify to you what I follow.196 
 
 
4.2 – Evidence of a fundamental change in Descartes's understanding of collision 
Now let us consider what is surprising about Descartes’s claim in the letter. The 
stone moves the earth! More generally, in two places in the letter Descartes is committed 
to the idea that a smaller body can move a larger body: once while illustrating the balance 
between size of body and speed in the quantity of motion (“a body which is large can 
better transfer its motion to other bodies, than a small one can, and that it can be moved 
less by them”197), and again explicitly while defending his notion that this quantity is 
conserved (a stone 1000 times smaller than the earth transfers 1000th of its speed to the 
earth; if it does not bounce, it “shakes the earth” a tiny bit198).  Additionally, in the 
previous 1638 letter to Mersenne, regarding de Beaune, Descartes claims that “when a 
man walks, he causes the whole mass of the earth to move by however little it may be.” 
 These statements are in conflict with Descartes’s notorious (both to historians 
and Descartes’s peers and immediate successors) “Fourth rule” of the Principles of 
Philosophy: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 AT II 544. Descartes to De Beaune, 30 April 1639. D’où vous pouuez voir qu’il y a beaucoup de choses 
à considerer, auant qu’on puisse rien determiner touchant la Vitesse, & c’est ce qui m’en a toûjours 
détourné; mais on peut aussi rendre raison de beaucoup de choses par le moyen de ces Principes, 
ausquelles on n’a pû cy-deuant atteindre. Au reste, ie ne vous écrirois pas si librement de ces choses, que 
ie n’ay point voulu dire ailleurs, à couse que la preuue en dépend de mon Monde, si ie n’esperois que vous 
les interpretez fauorablement, & si ie ne desirois passionnément vous témoigner que ie suis.   
197 AT II 543. Descartes to De Beaune, 30 April 1639. [V]n cors, qui est grand, peut mieux transferer son 
mouuement aux autres cors, qu’vn petit, & qu’il peut moins estre mû par eux.  
198 AT II 543. Descartes to De Beaune, 30 April 1639. See note above. 
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if the body C were entirely at rest, and if C were slightly larger than B; the latter 
could never move C, no matter how great the speed at which B might approach C. 
Rather, B would be driven back by C in the opposite direction: because a body 
which is at rest puts up more resistance to high speed than to low speed; and this 
resistance increases in proportion to the difference in the speeds. Consequently, 
there would always be more force in C to resist than in B to drive.199 
 
One may be tempted to dismiss this rule as absurd with the evidence that one experiences 
smaller bodies moving larger bodies quite often in day-to-day life, they just need to move 
fast enough with respect to the larger body.200 And besides, one might be tempted to 
imagine a case in which one body is only ever so slightly larger than the other—larger by 
a fleck of dust—and conclude that it seems quite odd that the ever so slightly smaller 
body will not be able to move the larger, no matter how fast the smaller moved. Descartes 
was aware of these lines of thinking. He fully acknowledged that several of his rules 
conflicted with day-to-day experience.201 Descartes was not interested in bodies from 
day-to-day experience in the section of the Principles of Philosophy that contain his rules 
of collision, and his rules presuppose something that is actually impossible in his view of 
the world—two bodies separated from all others. Bodies that we seem to observe are 
surrounded and constantly in contact with other bodies, which affect their actions. There 
is no empty space. Moreover, he was not convinced that the best way to investigate the 
fundamental motions of matter was through experience. But it is important to note that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 AT VIII 68. Principia II 49. Translation by  Miller, Principles, 66.   
200 And, not considering friction, any speed would be enough to move the larger body.  
201 AT IX 93-4. Principes II 53. For example, just after Descartes presented the rules of collision, he wrote: 
"{Indeed, experience often seems to conflict with the rules I have just explained}. However, because there 
cannot be any bodies in the world which are thus separated from all others, and because we seldom 
encounter bodies which are perfectly solid; it is very difficult to perform the calculation to determine to 
what extent the movement of each body may be changed by collision with others. Since, {before we can 
judge whether these rules are observed or not}, we must simultaneously calculate the effects of all those 
bodies which surround the bodies in question and which affect their motion. These effects differ greatly, 
depending on whether the surrounding bodies are solid or fluid; and it is therefore necessary that we should 
immediately enquire into the difference between solid and fluid bodies." Translation by Miller, Principles, 
69.   
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Descartes held these same views in his early writings as well as his mature Principles. 
Recall that according to his letter to de Beaune (1639), he never even got around to the 
measurement of speed, nor did he seem particularly interested in it.202 The bodies that 
concerned him, and the rules by which they meet and interact, are not best accessed 
through observation, measurement, or experiment.203  This is not to say that Descartes 
was completely disconnected from the empirically known world. Contrary to what 
Dijksterhuis has claimed, Descartes’s physics is not reducible to mathematics in its 
objects and methods.204 He relied on several principles from mechanics such as those we 
have encountered in the previous chapter on Descartes’s older colleague Isaac Beeckman. 
Descartes also seems to have performed several experiments to investigate some of the 
principles underpinning his contest view of collision and the force of impact (percussion), 
which will be discussed below. He also performed some better-known experiments on the 
optical principles of the rainbow.205 Nevertheless, Descartes seems to have held two very 
different views on one of the fundamental rules of collision—a rule that was a source of 
some controversy: what happens when a smaller body meets a larger body at rest.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 It is worth considering that in Huygens’s “empirical” work on the topic of collision, he measures speeds 
indirectly using the pendulum. Huygens also shows through a variety of arguments (both mathematical and 
empirical, but primarily the former) that Descartes’s rules of collision cannot be correct. 
203 In the letter to de Beaune, I have described one of the examples as being “from experience:” a stone 
falling to the earth. I have also emphasized that Descartes’s rules appear to be about fundamental objects, 
which “experience” does not easily access (if it can at all).  It is important to remember that the example 
from experience of a stone falling is to illustrate what Descartes means when he claims that there is a 
quantity of motion (distinct from speed) and this quantity never increases or decreases, but remains the 
same in all created matter. In other words it is an easy-to-imagine scenario that illustrates a fundamental 
principle.   
204 See appendix 1 and section 2 above.   
205 Spyros Sakellariadis, "Descartes' Experimental Proof of the Infinite Velocity of Light and Huygens' 
Rejoinder," Archive for History of Exact Sciences 26 (1982): 1-4. R. Hookyaas, "Beeckman, Isaac," in DSB 
1: 567. Jed Buchwald, "Descartes' Experimental Journey Past the Prism and Through the Invisible World to 
the Rainbow," Annals of Science 65 (2007): 1-46. Also see Daniel Garber, "Descartes and Experiment in 
the Discourse and Essays," in Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes, ed. Stephen Voss 
(Oxford University Press, 1993), 288-310. Beeckman experimented on the motion of fluids, as well as the 
speed of light. Descartes responded to Beeckman's experiments on the speed of light. He also carried out 
his own famous experiments on the rainbow. 
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 The view found in the letter is not exclusive to his comments to de Beaune. It can 
be found throughout his early writings. For example, in chapter 4 of Descartes’s work, 
The World, which was likely written sometime between 1629 and 1633 (but left 
unpublished), he explicitly mentions the motion of bodies—particularly smaller bodies 
moving larger bodies—in his explanation of the action of a flame on wood. The action of 
a flame can “move” wood. This is because the flame is made of many small parts, which 
move very fast. Descartes writes: “I say also that their motion is very fast and very 
violent because [...] they would not have the force they have to act against other bodies if 
the quickness of their motion did not compensate for their lack of size.”206 Similarly, 
smaller bodies moving larger bodies at rest can be inferred from Descartes’s account of 
his three elements (small, medium, and large bodies) in chapter 5 of The World, as well 
as his account of weight in chapter 11.   
 These examples, which seem to defy rule 4, are illustrations of other concepts and 
explanations of phenomena. Stones impacting the earth and shaking it, and a man 
walking causing the earth to move, illustrate the fundamental notion of the conservation 
of quantity of motion. The examples of fire and weight are phenomena that are explained 
by the more fundamental interaction of parts of matter acting according to the laws of 
motion. One might be tempted to think that rule 4 in the Principles is not in conflict with 
these prior claims in Descartes’s earlier work because rule 4 is about fundamental 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 AT XI 8. “Now, insofar as it does not seem to me possible to conceive that one body could move 
another unless it itself were also moving, I conclude from this that the body of the flame that acts against 
the wood is composed of small parts, which move independently of one another with a very fast and very 
violent motion. Moving in this way, they push and move with them the parts of the body that they touch 
and that do not offer them too much resistance. I say that its parts move independently of one another 
because, even though several of them often act in accord and conspire together to bring about a single 
effect, we gee [sic] nonetheless that each of them acts on its own against the bodies they touch. I say also 
that their motion is very fast and very violent because, being so small that we cannot distinguish them by 
sight, they would not have the force they have to act against other bodies if the quickness of their motion 
did not compensate for their lack of size.” Translation by Mahoney, The World, chapter 2, italics added.   
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collisions in the abstract. After all, Descartes himself admits in section 56 that "a solid 
body, immersed in a fluid, can be set in motion with very little force," since "the particles 
of fluids {tend to} move with equal force in all directions."207  
 However, on December 25 of 1639, seven months after Descartes’s letter to de 
Beaune, Descartes explicitly mentioned the topic of collision in the abstract in a letter to 
Mersenne, which also conflicts with his “later view.” Here he provides ratios to describe 
the effects of bodies of numerically different sizes and speeds that meet. He presented to 
Mersenne a quantitative description of two idealized scenarios in which two bodies 
collide, and a general inference. In the second scenario, a smaller body clearly moves a 
larger body at rest: 
[I]f a body of a certain size, which moves with a certain speed, meets another 
which is equal in size, and which does not have movement, it will communicate to 
it half of its own, so that they will both go together at half the speed that [it] did at 
first; but if it meets one which is double in size, it will communicate to it two 
thirds of its movement, and as they both together do not make more ground in 
three moments, than the first made in a moment. And generally, the more the 
bodies are large, the more they must go slowly, when they are pushed by the same 
force.208  
 
The outcome of the scenario described in the second statement—a body meeting another 
at rest which is twice the size of the body in motion, and moving together after meeting—
is clearly at odds with the result described in Descartes’s 4th rule of collision in the 
Principles. In the latter, the smaller body will not move the larger.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 AT IX 95. Translation by Miller, Principles, 70.  
208 AT II 627. Descartes to Mersenne, 25 December 1639. [S]i vn corps de certaine grandeur, qui se meut 
de certaine vitesse, en rencontre vn autre qui luy soit esgal en grandeur, & qui n’ayt point de mouuement, 
il luy communiquera la moitié du sien, en forte qu’ilz iront tous deux ensemble de la moitié aussy viste que 
faisoit le Ier; mais, s’il en rencontre vn qui luy soit double en grandeur, il luy communiquera les deux tiers 
de son mouuement, & ainsy ils ne seront tous deux ensemble pas plus de chemin en trois momentz, que le Ier 
faisoit en vn moment. Et generalement, plus les corps sont grands, plus ilz doibuent aller lentement, lors 
qu’ilz sont poussez par vne mesme force. According to the editor, the following is written in the margin of 
the manuscript copy of the letter: “This is contrary to his principles.” En marge de la Copie MS., on lit: 
‘Cela est contraire à ses principes.’ 
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Scenarios of collision  
from the 25 December 1639 letter to Mersenne 
 before bodies meet after bodies meet 
SCENARIO 1 
                    
  
     s           
                     
                        
                        s/2 
SCENARIO 2 
                     
  
     s           
                     
                            
                           s/3 
GENERAL INFERENCE 
                     ...  
  
     s           
                     ...  
                            
                           s/n 
 
Scenarios of collisions with similar initial conditions to the above  
from the Principles of Philosophy 
 before bodies meet after bodies meet 
RULE 6 
                    
  
     s           
                               
                               
                         
RULE 4 
                     
  
     s           
                     
                        
             s            
 
The scenario described in the first statement in the above quote—two bodies equal in 
size, one at rest, one moving to meet it—is the same initial conditions as that found in 
Descartes’s 6th rule of collision in the Principles of Philosophy. What is described in the 
letter to Mersenne, on the other hand, is nearly identical to Isaac Beeckman’s claims 
before Descartes’s own, as well as John Wallis’s views after Descartes, i.e. after they 
meet, the bodies move together with half the speed. In the Principles of Philosophy, 
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Descartes produces a different outcome altogether: “[the body at rest] would be partly 
impelled by B and would partly repel it in the contrary direction [...]”209 Significantly, 
what Descartes presents in the letter210 is identical to what Isaac Beeckman had 
previously written. 
 That which is described in the letter is consistent with Descartes’s early view of 
collision. The conditions before the bodies meet in scenario 1 correspond to those in rule 
6 in the Principles, and those in scenario 2 correspond to rule 4, although 4 is a general 
case in which the body at rest is larger by any amount. What happens to the bodies 
after they meet is inconsistent between the 1639 letter to Mersenne (representative of his 
early view) and the Principles of Philosophy (representative of his later view).  
 Whether Descartes was discussing collision in the abstract, or illustrating the 
conservation of quantity of motion with an example of the transfer of motion of a smaller 
body to a larger at rest, or explaining a phenomenon such as fire by the material contact 
of parts of matter, they all coincide. In every situation in his early view, smaller bodies 
transfer motion to larger bodies at rest. This is in opposition to rule 4 in Descartes’s later 
view.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 AT VIII 69. "Sixth, if the body C were at rest and exactly equal in size to body B, which was moving 
toward it; necessarily, C would be to some extent driven forward by B and would to some extent drive B 
back in the opposite direction. Thus, if B were to approach C with four degrees of speed, it would {have 
to} communicate one degree to  C, and be driven back in the opposite direction with the remaining three." 
Translation by Miller, Principles, 67-8. 
210 In each scenario one of the bodies is at rest, and the other moves toward it. In the first, the two bodies 
are the same size. In the second, the body at rest is twice as large as the first. In both, the quantity of motion 
is conserved. In the first, the body initially moves with some given speed. After the bodies meet, the body 
initially in motion pushes the body initially at rest. Since the bodies move together after the collision, the 
body is twice as large, and thus moves with half of the speed of the initially moving body. In the second 
scenario, a body again initially moves with some given speed toward the body twice its size at rest. After 
the bodies meet, the body initially in motion pushes the body initially at rest. Since the bodies are now 
moving together, the body is three times as large, and thus moves with a third of the speed. In other words 
the initially moving body communicated to the other two thirds of its movement. A general inference is 
made that “the more the bodies [at rest] are large, the more they must go slowly, when they are pushed by 
the same force” (AT II 627).  
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In none of these instances does Descartes describe the rebound of bodies. He 
touches on the topic in the letter to de Beaune with the conditional clause "if [the stone] 
does not return and is stopped, I conceive that that just shakes the earth, and thus transfers 
to it its motion" and he goes on to describe the miniscule amount of motion that would be 
transferred from the stone to the earth.211 The structure of this statement is similar to the 
expressions of the impact law in The World and the Principles. Either a body will transfer 
its motion or it will rebound and not transfer motion. The outcome depends on whether or 
not the force of resistance is overcome. I have found no instances in Descartes early 
work, in which he describes a scenario where the force of resistance is not overcome. In 
other words, Descartes does not describe the conditions under which the force of 
resistance prevails, resulting in rebound. The focus is on the transfer of motion. Note that 
Descartes does not discuss the collision of fundamental parts of matter in our terms of 
elasticity or inelasticity. Similarly, the notion of perfectly hard bodies does not 
correspond to perfectly elastic collision. Some perfectly hard bodies interact with others, 
in Descartes account, in a way that appears to be what would later be called “inelastic”—
the bodies move together after collision rather than rebound.  Regardless, what is most 
important at this stage is the clear evidence of a fundamental change in Descartes’s 
understanding of collision: from initially arguing that a smaller body transfers motion to a 
larger body at rest, and later arguing that a smaller body does not transfer motion to a 
larger body at rest.   
 	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 See notes above and AT II 543. 
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4.3 – The impact law: overcoming the force of resistance to transfer motion 
Descartes’s "impact law" governs rebound and the transfer of motion between 
bodies, and operates according to the prior conservation of quantity of motion principle. 
In both The World and the Principles, the law states that when a body transfers motion to 
another, it gives the other as much as it itself loses, otherwise it rebounds retaining all of 
its motion.212 The key to Descartes’s “impact law” is the role of the contest between the 
“force of the moving body” and the “force of resistance” in the body being impacted. 
When the former wins the contest, motion is transferred. When the latter wins the contest, 
rebound occurs. In the Principles, both conditions of the law (transfer and rebound) are 
stated explicitly. And the conditions of the “contest view” of force,213 which stipulate 
when transfer occurs and when rebound occurs in terms of a contest between forces, are 
clearly articulated. Both conditions in the "contest view" are expressed in Descartes's 
earlier work as well (such as The World and several letters between Descartes, Mersenne, 
and de Beaune), although not as precisely. Here Descartes placed his emphasis on the 
transfer of motion rather than rebound. According to Descartes's early work, it is possible 
that the force of resistance could "win the contest" against the force of the moving body, 
resulting in rebound, but Descartes did not specify the conditions in which the contest 
would be won in this manner. All of his early quantitative examples—even that of a stone 
hitting the earth, which is presumably a body with an immense force of resistance—
describe the force of resistance being overcome resulting in the transfer of motion. 
Specifying the conditions in which the force of resistance is not overcome by the moving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 The "impact law" is stated as the second law in Le Monde, and the third law in Principia.  
213 Gabbey, "Force and Inertia," 243. Herival, Background to Newton, 49. The history of the "contest view" 
will be discussed in section 5.2.1 below. 
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force is precisely what Descartes later provides in the rules of collision in his Principles 
of Philosophy.   
In The World, the emphasis of the “impact law” is on the transfer of motion, and it 
works together with the conservation of quantity of motion:  
I suppose as a second rule that, when one of these bodies pushes another, it cannot 
give the other any motion except by losing as much of its own at the same time; 
nor can it take away from the other body’s motion unless its own is increased by 
as much [...]214 
 
In his explanation of the impact law in The World, Descartes describes how the transfer 
takes place in terms of resistance:  
[T]he motion of a body is not retarded by collision with another in proportion to 
how much the latter resists it, but only in proportion to how much the latter’s 
resistance is surmounted, and to the extent that, in obeying the law, it receives 
into itself the force of motion that the former surrenders.215  
 
Motion is transferred (and thus the motion of the initially moving body is retarded after 
the collision with the other body) in the following case: when the initially moving body 
overcomes the resistance of the body being impacted.  
Although not explicitly stated in the second law itself, one can easily infer from 
subsequent discussions in Descartes’s The World that the initially moving body rebounds 
if it does not overcome the resistance of the body being impacted; motion is not 
transferred and the initially moving body merely changes direction. This is discussed in 
the context of a comparison between particular qualitative examples from common 
experience, for instance air resistance retarding a moving stone (a lesser resistance 
retarding motion) versus a hard surface not slowing a moving stone (a greater resistance 
failing to retard motion): 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 AT XI 41. Translation by Mahoney, The World, chapter 7. 
215 Ibid.   
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[...] if one thinks that the more a body can resist the more it is capable of stopping 
the motion of others (as one can, perhaps, be persuaded at first), one will, in turn, 
have a great deal of trouble in explaining why the motion of this stone is 
weakened more in colliding with a soft body of middling resistance than it is 
when it collides with a harder body that resists it more. Or also why, as soon as it 
has made a little effort against the latter, it at once turns on its heels rather than 
stopping or interrupting the motion it has.216  
  
This passage illustrates the two scenarios that correspond to the two possible outcomes of 
the impact law: (1) in which the force of resistance is overcome and motion is transferred, 
and (2) in which the force of resistance is not overcome, no motion is transferred, and 
instead the moving body "at once turns on its heels rather than stopping or interrupting 
the motion it has." Note that here, as elsewhere, Descartes’s concept of (quantity of) 
motion is scalar. He makes an explicit distinction between motion and direction. This was 
deliberate on Descartes’s part, and was not merely a mistake in failing to use the notion 
of direction or, as we would say, a vector quantity in an algebraic equation.   
 The key to determine which outcome will occur is the amount of resistance a 
body offers to the colliding body. If the resistance is too great, and the colliding body 
cannot overcome it, then the body will lose none of its motion and will simply rebound 
(change direction). If on the other hand the resistance is not too great, and the colliding 
body can overcome it, then the body will transfer as much quantity of motion as it loses. 
If the colliding body “wins the contest” it transfers motion. If it “loses,” it transfers no 
motion and changes direction. There is a discontinuity between the transfer of motion and 
rebound, which is determined by a body overcoming another’s resistance.  
 The "contest view" of force is key to understanding Descartes's impact law not 
only in The World and the Principles, but it is essential for the proper understanding of 
Descartes's rules of collision as well. The rules will be discussed in section five. It is here 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Ibid.   
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that Descartes specifies the conditions in which the force of resistance is greater than the 
moving force. This is a key difference between his early and late account of collision. As 
we will see, although the contest view is apparent, and although Descartes clearly 
specified scenarios in which the force of resistance is greater, Descartes did not provide 
an especially clear explanation of what the force of resistance is. This has led to 
speculation among commentators and historians regarding the proper interpretation of the 
force of resistance in Descartes's rules of collision. Of particular interest has been the 
force of resistance in a body at rest. The traditional view has followed E. J. Aiton's 
interpretation, which took the "force of resistance" to be similar to an algebraic 
expression of the "quantity of motion." I will provide a revisionary interpretation of the 
force of resistance that corresponds to a reassessment of Descartes's rules of collision in 
section 5.3.4. 
 
 
Section 5  
Descartes's later account of collision  
 
In the early 1640s, Descartes began working on a project, which in 1644 would be 
published as Principia Philosophia. It was amended and translated into French in 1647. 
This work is often regarded as Descartes’s mature philosophy and is thought to be a 
development and synthesis of his earlier works such as Le monde, Discours de la 
méthode,217 the essays appended to the latter,218 as well as Meditationes de prima 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 AT VI 1-78 Discourse de la méthode pour bien conduire sa raison, et chercher la vérité dans les 
sciences (1637) 
218 AT VI 81-227, 231-366, 369-485. La Dioptrique, Les Météores, and La Géométrie. 
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philosophia.219 The Latin and French editions of Principles of Philosophy, together with 
some key correspondence, such as the famous letter to Clerselier in 1645 will serve as the 
source material for what I am calling “Descartes’s later view.”  
As has been shown in section 4, there is a shift in how Descartes understood 
collision–particularly in the conditions of rebound and the transfer of motion. In his early 
view, a smaller moving body transfers motion to a larger body at rest. This is the case 
whether he is describing the transfer of motion in the abstract, illustrating another 
principle, or explaining a phenomenon such as fire. In his later view, codified in rule 4, a 
smaller moving body does not transfer motion to a larger body at rest. Only the 
determination is changed, and the initially moving body changes direction and continues 
to move with the same speed. Descartes’s change to the position described in rule 4 of the 
Principia was deliberate. It is not an oversight.  
When we focus on the impact law, and the shift between Descartes's early and late 
account, we find an important connection between this law and the rules of collision. By 
focusing on the possible outcomes of the impact law, we find an underlying pattern 
running through the rules. I present this underlying pattern, and provide an alternative 
organization for the rules of collision, compared to the manner in which they are usually 
presented, which hides this pattern. The new organization reveals a common structure 
and method of Descartes's rules, and resolves several longstanding interpretive 
difficulties historians have faced regarding rule 4, the force of resistance of a body at rest, 
and the overall coherence of the rules of collision.    
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 AT VII 1-90. Meditationes de prima philosophia, in qua Dei existentia et animæ immortalitas 
demonstratur (1641) 
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5.1 – Overview of the rules of collision   
In addition to a new order of the laws of nature, Descartes adds seven “rules of 
collision” to the Principia, which did not appear in The World. In keeping with his 
presentation beginning with the simplest principles to increasing complexity, the rules of 
collision present specific scenarios of two bodies of various sizes and speeds (or at rest), 
moving either with or toward each other. There are only two bodies involved in each rule 
and there are no oblique collisions.  The bodies are taken to be perfectly hard and are 
taken to be separated from the otherwise present medium.220 After his rules are presented 
and after he describes the distinction between a solid and fluid (where a fluid is entirely 
composed of parts of moving bodies), Descartes describes how bodies would interact in a 
medium.221    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 AT VIII 67. Principia II 45. “...this could easily be calculated if only two bodies were to come in 
contact, and if they were perfectly solid, and separated from all others {both solid and fluid} in such a way 
that their movements would be neither impeded nor aided by any other surrounding bodies; for then they 
would observe the following rules.” Translation by Miller, Principles, 64. 
221 AT VIII 71. Principia II 56. AT IX 95. Principes II 56. "That the particles of fluids {tend to} move with 
equal force in all directions; and that a solid body, immersed in a fluid, can be set in motion with very little 
force." Translation by Miller, Principles, 70. Also see AT VIII 70. Principia II 53. AT IX 93-4. Principes 
II 53.  
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Rules of Impact 
Before impact After impact 
1.	  	   	   C = B     VC = VB 
 
 
 
 
 
2.	  	   	   C < B     VC = VB 
 
 
 
 
VC+B = VC = VB 
3.	  	   	   C = B     VC < VB 
 
 
 
 
4.	  	   	   B < C     C at rest 
 
 
 
 
VB before = VB after 
5. 	   	   C < B     C at rest  
 
 
 
 
 
6. 	   	   C = B     C at rest  
 
 
 
 
 
7a. 	   	   B < C     VC < VB 
 
 
 
 
If                  the excess  of C < excess of VB  
Then: 
 
7b. 	   	   B < C     VC < VB 
 
 
 
 
VB before = VB after     VC before = VC after 
If                  the excess  of C > excess of VB  
Then: 
7c. 	   	   B < C     VC < VB 
 
 
 
 
If                  the excess  of C = excess of VB  
Then: 
C B C B 
C  B C  B 
C B C B 
B  C B  C 
C  B C  B 
C B C B 
B  C B  C 
B  C 
B  C 
B  C 
B  C 
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 Descartes did not present a table such as the above to accompany his rules. 
However, an image of cubes of differing sizes was included in the Principles to illustrate 
his rules of collision.222 
 
Figure 1. Principia, part II, section 56 
Descartes also provided images of cubes of different sizes in his 1645 letter to Clerselier 
to specifically illustrate the fourth of the rules of collision.223  
 
Figure 2. Descartes to Clerselier, 17 February 1645 
 Descartes provided little explanation of his rules in the Latin Principia (1644), 
writing: “These things require no proof, because they are obvious in themselves.”224 
However, they were not obvious to his contemporaries, and Descartes was called on to 
explain himself. For example, he explained himself to his friend Claude Clerselier in a 
rather famous letter from 1645.225 Clerselier was well versed in and sympathetic to 
Descartes’s views. After Descartes’s death, he would become his literary executor and 
was responsible for publishing three volumes of Descartes’s correspondence (1657-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 AT VIII 68. Principia II 56.   
223 AT IV 185. 17 February 1645, Descartes to Clerselier.  
224 AT VIII 70. Principia II 52. Translation by Miller, Principles, 69. 
225 AT IV 183-7. Descartes to Clerselier, 17 February 1645. The letter has been translated and reproduced 
in Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 260-2. Mahoney's translation is available on his website: 
http://www.princeton.edu/~hos/Mahoney/texts/descartes/desc-mot.html#Clerselier. Accessed January 25, 
2015. 
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1667). Like many people, Clerselier seems to have been particularly confused by rule 4. 
Descartes provided some additional clarification in the French edition, Les Principes de 
la Philosophie (1647), even though Descartes himself claimed to Mersenne in April 1646 
that he did not have more than “a quarter of an hour in the entire last year” to clarify his 
laws of motion.226  Since the time of Clerselier, commentators have criticized and 
attempted to interpret Descartes's rules of collision, particularly the fourth rule.  
 
5.1.1 – Interpretive difficulties: rules of collision and conceptions of motion   
 
 Descartes's rules of collision pose several interpretive problems. On the face of it, 
they seem to be inconsistent with the received view of Descartes's notion of (relative) 
motion.227 The classic example, here, is the lack of symmetry between rules 4 and 5.228 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 AT IV 396. Descartes to Mersenne, 20 April 1646. “If you see M. Picot [the author of the French 
translation], please tell him that I have received his letters but that I cannot yet send him the continuation of 
his translation, because I have not yet succeeded, in the entire year which has passed since I reached that 
article, in finding a few moments in which to clarify my laws of movement.” Translation by Miller, 
Principles, 69n. 
227 Descartes's account of motion developed between The World and the Principles of Philosophy. In The 
World motion was simply "change of place." Descartes claimed that it was so simple that mathematicians 
assumed that motion is "easier to conceive of than the lines of mathematicians: the motion by which bodies 
pass from one place to another and successively occupy all the spaces in between." AT XI 40. Translation 
by Mahoney, The World, chapter 7. In the Principles of Philosophy, on the other hand, Descartes presents a 
two-fold definition, which includes a "vulgar conception" and a "proper conception." The former is similar 
to his previous account in The World. The latter defines motion as a transference of the neighborhood: “But 
if we consider what we should understand by motion not so much as it is commonly used but, rather, in 
accordance with the truth of the matter, then in order to attribute some determinate nature to it we can say 
that it is the transference [translatio] of one part of matter or of one body from the neighborhood [vicinia] 
of those bodies that immediately touch it and are regarded as being at rest, and into the neighborhood of 
others.” AT VIII 53-4. Principia II 25. Translation by Garber, Descartes's Metaphysical Physics, 159-60. 
The received view has interpreted this "proper conception" of motion to be relative motion. The passage 
cited to defend this view is the following: "[T]ransference is reciprocal; and we cannot conceive of the 
body AB being transported from the vicinity of the body CD without also understanding that the body CD 
is transported from the vicinity of the body AB, and that exactly the same force and action is required for 
the one transference as for the other." AT VIII 55-6. Principia II 29. Translation by Miller, Principles, 53. 
This has been called the doctrine of the "reciprocity of transfer."   
228 Rule 4 describes a small body approaching a larger body at rest. AT VIII 68. Principia (Latin) II 49. 
Rule 5 describes large body approaching a smaller body at rest. AT VIII 69. Principia (Latin) II 50. If one 
can arbitrarily choose a reference frame to describe motion, then the initial conditions of rules 4 and 5 are 
equivalent. However, the conditions described after collision in rules 4 and 5 are not equivalent. The 
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But, even with a more subtle understanding of Descartes's notion of motion (such as 
Garber's account), the rules remain problematic. With the latter approach, Descartes is 
understood to have made a meaningful distinction between motion and rest. Of primary 
importance to this difference is the immediate surrounding (i.e. neighborhood) of a part 
of matter. Motion is defined by the mutual separation (or transference) of the part and its 
neighborhood. Rest is defined by no transference between the part and its immediate 
surroundings.229 In the rules of collision, however, the two bodies are described in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
smaller body rebounds after meeting the larger body at rest in rule 4, whereas motion is transferred from 
the larger moving body to the smaller at rest and both move together after collision in rule 5. 
229 Garber has shown that Descartes did not deny the relativity of motion by arguing for something like 
“Newtonian absolute space” in which there is one privileged point of view that determines absolute motion 
and absolute rest -- regardless of whether one can perceive the difference, there is “a fact of the matter” 
with respect to absolute space. Rather, Descartes denied the relativity of motion in a very different way, but 
in a manner in which he could still argue that there is a non-arbitrary distinction between motion and rest -- 
that motion is not dependent upon a choice of point of view.  
Motion as “change of place” (the “vulgar conception of motion”) depends on an arbitrary choice 
of one place as being unmoved. Consider Descartes’s example: "someone sitting in a boat while it is 
casting off from port thinks that he is moving if he looks back at the shore and considers it as motionless, 
but not if he looks at the boat itself, among whose parts he always retains the same situation." AT VIII 53. 
Principia II 24. Translation by Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 162. Defining motion by “change 
of the neighborhood,” on the other hand, is meant to limit this arbitrariness to only one choice: 
"Furthermore, I added that the transference take place from the neighborhood of those bodies that 
immediately touch it into the neighborhood of others, and not from one place into another since...what is 
taken as a given place varies [loci acceptio varia est] and depends upon our thought. But when we 
understand by motion that transference which there is from the neighborhood of contiguous bodies, since 
only one group of bodies can be contiguous to the mobile body at a given moment of time, we cannot 
attribute many motions to a given mobile body at a given time, but only one." AT VIII 55. Principia II 28. 
Translation by Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 162-3. So, rather than choose any arbitrary place 
to determine what is and is not in motion, which can be done in innumerable ways, Descartes suggests that 
we consider only those bodies that directly surround another body (its neighborhood). There either will or 
will not be a transfer with respect to a body and those surrounding it. This does not depend on our thought.   
 However, given the doctrine of the “reciprocity of transfer,” we cannot conceive of the difference 
between “a body transporting from its neighborhood” and “the neighborhood being transported from the 
body.” In other words, although Descartes may have successfully limited the arbitrariness of motion to only 
one, it is still not clear if the body is at rest and the neighborhood is in motion or if the neighborhood is at 
rest and the body is in motion.  
 According to Garber, Descartes’s response is that motion is the “mutual separation of two moving 
bodies.” AT XI 656. Translation by Garber, Descartes's Metaphysical Physics, 167. Motion belongs to both 
the body and its neighborhood. It is “the mutual separation of a body and its contiguous neighborhood.” 
The world is a plenum of moving bodies. No act of thought or choice of point of view will change whether 
or not a part of the plenum is in transference with respect to its contiguous neighborhood. No choice of 
point of view will make it seem as if there was transference when part of the plenum is not in transference 
with its neighborhood. Thus, Descartes maintains both the doctrine of reciprocity—which in this 
interpretation does not support relativity, but rather indicates that motion is the mutual separation of a body 
and its neighborhood—and that there is a clear distinction between motion and rest. When a body is at rest 
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isolation. They are explicitly not surrounded by a neighborhood in the plenum. Thus, 
there is no meaningful way to describe a body at rest (according to Descartes's prior 
discussions), and yet three of the rules involve scenarios in which one body is at rest.   
 Costabel, Gabbey, and Garber have all argued that the rules of collision were 
added to the Principles of Philosophy late in the development of the work. Some have 
even claimed that they were hastily written and remain an unfinished draft.230 As I will 
show below, the rules taken by themselves, are not as problematic as previous 
commentators have alleged. However, they do not appear to be in harmony with the 
entirety of Descartes's system. Specifically, the rules of collision are not constrained by 
Descartes's prior definitions of motion and rest.  
 
5.2 – Impact law in the Principles of Philosophy (the contest model again) 
 In both the Latin and French Principles, the impact law remains largely the same 
as it was in The World. However, the various aspects of the “contest view” are more 
clearly stated in the law itself, rather than left to the commentary and explanation of the 
law:  
This is the third law of nature: when a moving body meets another, if it has less 
force to continue to move in a straight line than the other has to resist it, it is 
turned aside in another direction, retaining its quantity of motion and changing 
only the direction of that motion. If, however, it has more force; it moves the 
other body with it, and loses as much of its motion as it gives to that other.231  
 
The law is expressed in two conditional parts, which correspond to the possible outcomes 
of a colliding body—rebound or transfer of motion. The two sections (41 and 42) that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
there is no transference with respect to the same contiguous neighborhood. See Garber, Descartes' 
Metaphysical Physics, 156-196. 
230 Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 231, 242, 252. Gabbey, "Force and Inertia," 262-3.    
231 AT VIII 65. Principia II 40. Translation by Miller, Principles, 61.  
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follow the law are dedicated to “the proof of the first part of this law” and “the proof of 
the second part.” Rather than merely referring to whether resistance is overcome or not, 
the law in the Principles specifically refers to a “force of continuing” in the colliding 
body, which is in contest with a “force of resisting” in the body being collided into.  
As was the case in the previous accounts of the impact law, there is a clear 
distinction between motion and direction, which is emphasized in the proof of the first 
part:  
the first part of this law is proved by the fact that there is a difference between 
motion considered in itself, and its determination in some direction; this 
difference makes it possible for the determination to be changed while the 
quantity of motion remains intact232  
 
If the force of resistance is not overcome by the force of continuing, the colliding body 
changes its direction/determination but not its motion (this is due to the first law—things 
persist in their states).233 And if the force of resistance is overcome by the force of 
continuing, the colliding body loses as much of its motion as it gives to the other. This is 
due to the conservation principle—“He conserves motion; not always contained in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 AT VIII 65. Principia II 41. Translation by Miller, Principles, 62. 
233 A year after the publication of the Principia, in the midst of an ongoing exchange of letters with 
Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, the Princess wrote to Descartes on the topic of motion and direction, which 
underscores the importance of this particular distinction. After having “the leisure to read the philosophy of 
[Sir Kenelm] Digby, written in English” in which she hoped to find arguments that would challenge 
Descartes, she wrote to him instead to say: “I was completely astonished, when I arrived [at the relevant 
sections], to see that he has understood nothing – even less than what he approves in your account of 
reflection and of what he denies in your account of refraction. He does not make a distinction between the 
movement of a ball and its determination, and does not consider why a collision with a soft body reduces 
the speed, and that a hard body makes the other rebound!”  Je ne trouuay qu’vn peu deuant mon 
indisposition le loisir de lire la philosophie de M. le cheualier Digby, qu’il a fait en nglois, d’ou i’esperois 
prendre des argumens pour refuter la vostre, puisque le sommaire des chapitres me montroit deux endroits, 
ou il pretendoit l’auoir fait; mais ie fus toute estonnée, quand i’y arriuay, de voir qu’il n’auoit rien moins 
entendu que ce qu’il approuue de vostre sentiment de la reflexion, & de ce qu’il nie de celuy de la 
refraction, ne faisant nulle distinction entre le mouuement d’vne balle & sa determination, & ne 
considerant pourquoy vn corps mol qui cede retarde l’vn, & qu’vn corps dur ne fait que resister a l’autre. 
AT IV 208-9. Princess Elisabeth to Descartes, 24 May 1645. 
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same parts of matter, but transferred from some parts to others depending on the ways in 
which they come in contact.”234  
 Both Descartes's early and late views of collision operate according to the contest 
model of force and the conservation of quantity of motion. In Descartes’s early view, 
although it is possible that the force of resistance is not overcome resulting in rebound, 
Descartes never stipulates a situation in which this takes place. Each quantitative example 
of collision that he provides involves the transfer of motion. In other words, the force of 
resistance is overcome and motion is transferred. In this, Descartes's early view of 
collision is similar to that of his colleague Isaac Beeckman. Descartes's later view, on the 
other hand, does stipulate situations when the force of resistance is not overcome, which 
results in rebound. This is the key difference between Descartes's early and late view. 
Rule 4 is central to this change. In his early view, smaller bodies move larger bodies at 
rest, i.e. they overcome the force of resistance, transfer motion, and move together with 
the formerly resting larger body after collision. In his later view, a smaller body cannot 
move a larger body at rest. The force of resistance is not overcome.  
 
5.2.1 – Origins of the "contest view": Marcus Marci (1639) and the Scholastics 
 
  The "contest view" is found, as we have seen above, in Descartes's impact law in 
the Principles (1644)235 and The World (1629-33),236 as well as Descartes's discussions of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 AT VIII 66. Principia II 42. Translation by Miller, Principles, 62. 
235 AT VIII 65. Principia II 40. "This is the third law of nature: when a moving body meets another, if it 
has less force to continue to move in a straight line than the other has to resist it, it is turned aside in 
another direction, retaining its quantity of motion and changing only the direction of that motion. If, 
however, it has more force; it moves the other body with it, and loses as much of its motion as it gives to 
that other." Translation by Miller, Principles, 61. Garber has indicated that “there is little in the way of 
significant addition in the French edition of Pr II 40-45, where Descartes sets out law 3, its explication and 
its defense. [...] There is reason to believe that Descartes hardly looked at the French translation of those 
sections. As Pierre Costabel has pointed out, there are some errors of translation in those sections that are 
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motion with de Beaune (1639).237 Descartes appealed to the same contest view in other 
domains as well, such as optics and mechanical experiments. He relied on the "contest 
view" in his essay, La Dioptriques,238 in which he explained the behavior of light using 
the analogy of tennis balls encountering hard and soft surfaces. Descartes also described a 
set of experiments with hammers, lead bullets, and French chefs, which operate 
according to the contest view in letters to Mersenne. The "contest view" was not unique 
to Descartes, and can be found in the work on collision of his contemporary Johannes 
Marcus Marci. The concerns that both faced, namely the conditions under which a force 
of resistance is overcome and motion is produced, have a long history, dating perhaps to 
the seventh book of Aristotle's Physics, as well as his De caelo, and more clearly in later 
scholastic commentaries.    
In the Principles and The World, Descartes claims that a projectile should persist 
always in its motion, and yet projectiles actually slow down. This is due to air resistance. 
“For who is there who can deny that the air in which it is moving offers it some 
resistance? One hears it whistle when it divides the air.”239 The projectile overcomes the 
resistance of the air, and some of its motion is transferred thus retarding its own motion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
so glaring that Descartes could hardly have failed to notice them, had he but read them over with any care.” 
Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 248. 
236 AT XI 41. Le Monde, chapter 7. “I suppose as a second rule that, when one of these bodies pushes 
another, it cannot give the other any motion except by losing as much of its own at the same time; nor can it 
take away from the other body’s motion unless its own is increased by as much. [...] [T]he motion of a 
body is not retarded by collision with another in proportion to how much the latter resists it, but only in 
proportion to how much the latter’s resistance is surmounted, and to the extent that, in obeying the law, it 
receives into itself the force of motion that the former surrenders.” Translation by Mahoney, The World. 
237 AT II 543. Descartes to De Beaune, 30 April 1639. Descartes’s explanation of motion relied on a 
combined expression of the conservation of motion and the law of impact. In his example of a stone hitting 
the Earth, Descartes specifically drew the distinction between rebound and transfer. si elle ne retourne 
point, & qu’elle s’arreste, ie conçoy que cela vient de ce qu’elle ébranle cette terre, & ainsi luy transfere 
son mouuement... “if the [stone] does not return and is stopped, I conceive that that just shakes the earth, 
and thus transfers to it its motion...” 
238  AT VI 96-100.   
239 AT XI 41. Translation by Mahoney, The World, chapter 7. 
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From common experience one knows that bodies are slowed by the air, or water, just as 
one knows that they are not slowed more when they hit something harder, which offers 
more resistance. In some cases they are not slowed at all, and only the direction of their 
motion changes. The relationships between resistance, transfer, and rebound are codified 
in the impact law contained in both The World and the Principles. 
In La Dioptriques, Descartes used the analogy of a tennis ball in his account of 
the reflection and refraction of light. The reflection of light is a case in which a body 
meets another of greater resistance and changes its direction without losing any of its 
original speed. The refraction of light is described by the analogy of a tennis ball meeting 
another body of “middling resistance” such as a cloth tapestry. The analogous tennis ball 
meets a cloth whose resistance it overcomes and passes through, but in doing so its 
motion is retarded. Descartes used a similar example in his discussion with Mersenne in 
1639 on the topic of the effect of light on white and black bodies respectively. He 
explained that the parts of black bodies deaden or absorb the action of subtle matter (the 
“pressure” of subtle matter being the cause of light), whereas “white bodies do not 
receive it in them, but throw it back.” To illustrate this, he used the familiar following 
analogy: a black body is like “a tapestry which receives the movement of a ball that is 
pushed against it, and for this subject does not throw it back,” but a white body is like “a 
hard wall, which is not at all shaken by this ball, [and] does not receive it; this is why it 
causes it to reflect.”240 The force of resistance is overcome in the case of a tapestry, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 AT II 618. Descartes to Mersenne, 13 November 1639. Pour les Cors noirs, vous sçauez que ie ne 
conçoy autre chose, par la Lumiere qui donne contre ces cors, que l’action, ou l’inclination à se mouuoir 
vers eux, qu’ont les parties de la Matiere subtile qui sont pousèes, par les cors qu’on nomme lumineux, 
vers ces cors qu’on nomme noirs. Or cette action peut estre amortie par les parties de ces cors noirs, à 
cause qu’elles la reçoiuent en elles-mesmes & ne la renuoyent point, au lieu que les parties des cors blancs 
ne la reçoiuent point en elles, mais la renuoyent: ainsi qu’vne tapisserie reçoit en soy le mouuement de la 
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motion is transferred; whereas the force of resistance of a hard wall is not overcome, 
motion is not transferred, and the ball rebounds.  
Stephen Gaukroger has closely linked Descartes’s thoughts on the direction of 
motion (specifically “determination”) to the tennis ball model regarding reflection.241 He 
has also linked the tennis ball model from La Dioptriques to Descartes’s impact law, 
claiming that “what Descartes has in mind here [i.e. the impact law] is the case of light 
rays being reflected from a surface, which he models on a tennis ball being reflected from 
a surface...[as] described in La Dioptriques.”242 In other words, I take Gaukroger to be 
claiming that the origin of Descartes’s impact law (and implicitly the "contest view") 
comes from his thoughts on optics. This is not impossible. The focus of The World is on 
light, and the composition of the two works correspond: Descartes worked on The World 
between 1629-1633 and La Dioptriques was completed in draft between 1630-1632 
before being published with the Discours de la méthode in 1637.243 Moreover, this would 
not be the first time optics and collision would be linked: although Descartes probably 
was not familiar with the work, Thomas Harriot's manuscript on collision may well be 
connected to his investigation of the physical nature of light.244 However, I have not 
encountered enough evidence to support the claim for the conceptual priority of 
Descartes's thoughts on reflection/refraction over his impact law, or vice versa. Rather, I 
think it is plausible that Descartes used a common pattern to explain the interaction of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
bale qu’on pousse contre elle, & pour ce sujet ne la renuoye point; mais vne muraille dure, qui n’est 
aucunement ébranlée par cette bale, ne le reçoit point; c’est pourquoy elle la fait reflechir.  
241 Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 229-30. 
242 Gaukroger, Descartes' System, 122. Also see Gaukroger, Descartes Biography, 241-5. 
243 Gaukroger, Descartes Biography, xvi. 
244 See chapter 2.  
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bodies, whether in the form of the impact law, the reflection/refraction of light, or as we 
will see below, in a set of experiments with hammers and lead bullets.  
Alan Gabbey has claimed in his highly influential article, “Force and inertia in the 
seventeenth century: Descartes and Newton,” that the "contest view" was fairly common 
in the 17th century, and that the concept was of "evidently anthropomorphic origin."245 
Although it does seem to have been fairly common, Gabbey, unfortunately, provides no 
evidence for the latter claim regarding its alleged anthropomorphic origin.    
In an ongoing discussion from 25 December 1639 through at least 11 March 1640 
with Mersenne, Descartes presented a set of experiments, which operate according to the 
basic contest view, just as his impact law and models for reflection/refraction. He seems 
to have offered the experiments as justifications of the concept to Mersenne, who appears 
to have been skeptical. In the midst of the conversation, Descartes wrote to Mersenne to 
explain the experiment: 
I am astonished that you have not yet agreed that one can better flatten a lead 
bullet with a hammer on a Cushion or on a suspended Anvil that can give way to 
the blow, than on a firm and immobile Anvil; for it is a very common experiment. 
And there are an infinity of similar ones in Mechanics which all depend on the 
same foundation: knowing it is not enough to flatten a lead bullet from a blow 
with so much force, but that it is necessary also that this force last some time, so 
that the parts of the bullet have leisure nonetheless to change location. Now when 
this bullet is on a firm anvil, the hammer jumps back up, almost at the same 
instant that it hit it, and thus does not have the time to flatten it, whereas if the 
anvil or other bodies which support this bullet, give way to the blow, the hammer 
remains longer pressed against the opposing thing.246   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 Gabbey, "Force and Inertia," 243.  
246 AT III 10. Descartes to Mersenne, 29 January 1640. Ie m’étonne de ce que vous n’auiez pas encore ouy 
qu’on peut mieux applatir vne bale de plomb auec vn marteau, sur vn Coussin ou sur vne Enclume 
suspenduë & qui peut ceder au coup, que sur vne Enclume ferme & immobile; car c’est vne experience fort 
vulgaire. Et il y en a vne infinité de semblables, dans les Mechaniques, qui dépendent toute du mesme 
fondement: à sçauoir, ce n’est pas assez, pour platir vne bale de plomb, que de la fraper auec beaucoup de 
force, mais il fout aussi que cette force dure quelque temps, afin que les parties de cette bale ayent loisir 
cependant de changer de situation. Or quand cette bale est sur vne enclume forme, le marteau rejallit en 
haut, quasi au mesme instant qu’il l’a frapée, & ainsi n’a pas le loisir de l’aplatir tant que si l’enclume ou 
autre cors qui soutient cette bale, cedant au coup, fait que le marteau demeure plus long-temps appoyé de 
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Although here Descartes puts the issue in terms of time, it is clear that the firm anvil 
offers too much resistance for the hammer to overcome and the hammer jumps back up 
instantly. Whereas, an anvil with less resistance (because it is supported by a cushion) 
allows the hammer to transfer some of its motion to the lead bullet, subsequently 
overcoming the resistance offered by the parts of the lead bullet which are generally at 
rest with respect to each other, and thus flattening it.247 At least this seems to be 
Descartes’s line of thinking.  
 Three months later Descartes continued to argue the point, and added some 
specifications to the experiment:  
In order to do this experiment well, it is necessary to use a hammer which is not 
very large: because if it had the force to entirely flatten the bullet on the anvil, it 
would not be able to do more on the cushion. And beyond that, one must put a 
plate of iron, or another body between the bullet and the cushion, so that it does 
not sink so much inside, being hit, that the hammer pressing against this cushion 
loses its force there.248  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
contre.  The topic had been raised in the previous month as well. See AT II 631. Descartes to Mersenne, 25 
December 1639.  
247 It is notable that the experiments also correspond to at least one notion of the force of resistance that 
Descartes describes in both The World and the Principles. In his discussion of solids and liquids, he notes 
that solids offer more resistance than liquids because the parts of matter in solids are generally more at rest 
with respect to each other than the parts of matter in liquids, which are generally more in motion with 
respect to each other. He claims that there is no greater force/glue than this relative rest. In the experiments, 
Descartes describes the bullet being flattened as the parts of the bullet change location. In other words the 
“force of resistance,” as the relative rest of the parts, is overcome and the parts move with respect to each 
other. See the following for Descartes's discussions of solids and fluids. AT VIII 71. Principia II 55. “That 
the parts of solid bodies are not joined by any other bond than their own rest {relative to each other}.  
Furthermore, our reason certainly cannot discover any bond which could join the particles of solid bodies 
more firmly together than does their own rest. For what could this bond be? It could not be a substance, 
because there is no reason why these particles, which are substances, should be joined by any substance 
other than themselves. Nor is it a mode different from rest; for no other mode can be more opposed to the 
movement which would separate these particles than is their own rest. Yet, besides substances and their 
modes, we know no other kinds of things.” Translation by Miller, Principles, 70. Descartes had maintained 
such a position prior to the Principles, in The World as well. See AT XI 12-3. “Some force is necessary to 
separate them [the small parts touching one another but not moving away from one another], however small 
it may be. [...] Note also that twice as much force is necessary to separate two of them than to separate one 
of them, and a thousand times as much to separate a thousand of them. Thus, if it is necessary to separate 
several millions of them all at once, as is perhaps necessary in order to break a single hair, it is not 
surprising that a rather sensible force is necessary.” Translation by Mahoney, The World, chapter 3. 
248 AT III 34. Descartes to Mersenne, 11 March 1640. & pour bien faire cette experience, il faut se seruir 
d’vn marteau qui ne soit pas fort gros: car s’il auoit la force de platir entierement la bale sur l’enclume, il 
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In the letter, Descartes included another “experiment,” this one from the kitchens of 
Paris, to try to persuade Mersenne: 
But a more common experiment, which comes back to this same principle, and of 
which all the chefs in Paris will assure you, is that, when they want to break the 
bones of the shoulder of mutton with the back of a knife, they put it only on their 
hand or on a towel and hitting it, break it more easily than if it was on a table or 
on an anvil.249 
 
These “experiments” appear to be in support of the contest view of collision. Motion is 
transferred when the force of the moving body overcomes the resistance of the other. An 
anvil placed on a cushion, or a shoulder of mutton placed on a towel (or in one’s hand) 
reduces the resistance that the moving body must overcome. If it is reduced enough, the 
force of the moving body will overcome it and transfer motion to it. Once transferred, 
this quantity of motion overcomes the resistance of the bullet or shoulder of mutton itself, 
flattening the bullet or breaking the bones of the shoulder.  
 A contemporary of Descsartes, Johannes Marcus Marci, who was the personal 
physician to the emperors Ferdinand III and Leopold I, published De proportione motus 
in Prague in 1639.250  The work contains what is likely the first published theory of 
collision.251 According to Marci, the motion of a body is due to the continuous action of 
impulsus, which is a "transient quality." When the body is no longer directly connected to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ne pouroit faire dauantage sur le cousin. Et outre cela, on doit mettre vne plaque de fer ou autre corps 
entre la bale & le coussin, afin qu’elle ne s’ensonse pas tellement dedans estant frapée, que le marteau 
appuyant contre ce coussin y perde sa force. The italics in the translation is not in the original.     
249 AT III 34. Descartes to Mersenne, 11 March 1640. Mais vne experience plus vulgaire, qui reuient à ce 
mesm principe, & dont tous les cuisiniers de Paris vous assureront, c’est que, lorsqu’ils veulent rompre 
l’os d’vne eclanche de mouton auec le dos d’vn couteau, ils le mettent seulement sur leur main ou sur vne 
seruiette, & frapant dessus, le cassent ainsi plus aisement que s’il estoit sur vne table ou sur vne enclume.  
250 E. J. Aiton, “Ioannes Marcus Marci (1595-1667),” Annals of Science 26 (1970): 153. Knud Erik 
Sørensen, “A Study of the De proportione motus by Marcus Marci de Kronland, Part 1” Centarus 20 
(1976): 50.  
251 Knud Erik Sørensen, “A Study of the De proportione motus by Marcus Marci de Kronland, Part 2” 
Centarus 21 (1977): 257. 
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this action, the impulse diminishes.252 In Marci's theory, the weight of a body serves as a 
resistance to motion.253 On the event that two bodies collide, there is a contest between 
the impulse (of the moving body) and the resistance (i.e. the weight of the body being 
impacted). If there is an excess of impulse over resistance, then the motion of the body 
being impacted will be affected. If there is not an excess of impulse over resistance, the 
motion of the body will not be affected.254 In Marci's theory the fourth porism is an 
example wherein the impulse of a smaller moving body does not exceed the resistance of 
a larger body at rest, and thus the smaller body rebounds without moving the larger body 
at rest. This is not only a clear manifestation of the "contest view," it is also remarkably 
similar to Descartes's fourth rule.255     
Aiton has claimed that Marci's idea that "motion is determined by the excess of 
impulse over resistance, and indeed takes place only when there is such an excess"—
which is at the heart of Marci's explanations of collision—is a "scholastic doctrine."256 
The relationship between motive force, motion, and the force of resistance is discussed 
by Aristotle himself in the De caelo and the seventh book of the Physics. And the specific 
topic of the impossibility of overcoming a larger force of resistance is discussed by later 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 Aiton, "Marci," 155. See Johannes Marcus Marci, De proportione motus seu, Regula sphygmica ad 
celeritatem et tarditatem pulsuum (Prague, 1639), propositions 1, 2 and 9. 
253 Aiton, "Marci," 157. 
254 Sørensen, "Study, part 2," 262. " The impulse being designated as I, the supposition is that only if I>m 
can the impulse set the body in motion, and the velocity is decided by I = m × v." Also see Aiton, "Marci," 
157. "[H]is explanations of collisions were based on the scholastic doctrine that motion is determined by 
the excess of impulse over resistance, and indeed takes place only when there is such an excess."  
255 Marci, De proportione motus, [95]. "Porisma IV. Si globus minor percutiat majorem quiescentem, 
habeat verò majorem rationem ad suum impulsum, quam ad globum majorem, illo immoto reflectit minor." 
Aiton, "Marci," 157-8. "Scholastic ideas led Marci completely astray in Porism IV, where he envisaged a 
small ball striking a larger stationary ball, the small ball rebounding and the larger remaining at rest. In this 
case the impulse of the small ball was insufficient to overcome the resistance of the larger. The case in 
which the small ball had sufficient impulse to move the larger was covered in Porism III, where Marci 
stated that the small ball would either rebound or come to rest; in fact it always rebounds." Also see 
Sørensen, "Study, part 2," 263-5. 
256 Aiton, "Marci," 157. 
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commentators on Aristotle, such as John Philoponus, Thomas Bradwardine, and Nicole 
Oresme. According to Clagett, one can deduce from Aristotle's Physics (book VII) and 
De caelo that:  
Motion...requires some source of motion and a thing moved in continuous 
contact. More specifically it requires force and resistance. [...] In brief...with 
times and force constant, the distance traversed is inversely proportional to the 
resistance, or with distance and force constant, the time is directly proportional to 
the resistance--with the proviso that the force is sufficient to cause movement.257 
 
In other words, "speed is proportional to the ratio of the motive force to the resistance, 
provided that the force is sufficiently great to overcome resistance and produce 
movement."258 The latter italicized proviso may be implied in Aristotle's Physics and De 
caelo. But later commentators appear to have been critical of Aristotle's simple ratio of 
motive force and resistance, for its apparent tension with the proviso.   
John Philoponus rejected the simple force and resistance ratio, and opted for an 
arithmetical difference.259 As Clagett has shown, Thomas Bradwardine was also critical 
of the ratio, but he "attempted to reconcile what he believed to be two facts: (1) No 
motion takes place when force is equal to, or less than, resistance (a fact of experience, 
also implied by Aristotle's discussion). (2) The factors of force and resistance as 
determiners of speed are in some kind of ratio rather than relatable by a simple 
arithmetical difference.260 The worry regarding the simple ratio was that it seems to imply 
that any force, no matter how small, could move any resistance, no matter how large. 
Nicole Oresme stated this clearly in his commentary on the De caelo of Aristotle. After 
quoting De caelo and referring to the seventh book of the Physics Oresme states: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 Clagett, The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages, 443-4, italics added. Physics, book VII, chapter 5 
is quoted in Clagett, The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages, 428. 
258 Clagett, The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages, 432, italics added. 
259 Ibid., 437. 
260 Ibid., 437-8 
	   140 
But, saving his reverence, it is not well stated, because from this statement it 
would follow that a power could move a resistance equal to itself and that any 
power, however small, could move any resistance, however large. ... This is 
illogical and impossible.261   
 
 It is conceivable that Marci's contest between impulse and resistance, and 
Descartes's contest between a moving body and the force of resistance, have a common 
source in the scholastic commentaries on the Physics and the De caelo. For Marci, 
motion is determined by the excess of the impulse over the resistance. For Descartes, the 
impact law, in both The World and the Principles, states that motion is transferred on the 
condition that the force of resistance is overcome, otherwise it is not. Both Marci and 
Descartes began their educations in Jesuit colleges.262 However, establishing the exact 
connection to scholastic commentaries is an area for further research.   
 One of the leading characteristics of the change between Descartes's early account 
of collision and his later view is that in the latter he specifies the conditions wherein the 
force of resistance is greater and cannot be overcome. Although the impact law is stated 
in his early view as well (if the force of resistance is not overcome, no motion is 
transferred, resulting in rebound), Descartes does not specify the conditions wherein the 
force of resistance really is greater.   
 
5.3 – Traditional organization of the rules of collision and interpretive problems 
  Several historians have noted that the rules of collision appear to be presented 
according to the initial conditions of the bodies in three general cases of bodies B and C 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 Nicole Oresme, On the Book of the Heavens and the World of Aristotle, quoted in Clagett, The Science 
of Mechanics in the Middle Ages, 463-4.   
262 Aiton, "Marci," 153. Sørensen, "Study, part 1," 50. Gaukroger, Descartes Biography, 20-4, 38-61. 
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colliding.263 Each case includes three specific scenarios. Case 1: B and C move toward 
each other in opposite directions. Case 2: One body (C) is at rest. Case 3: B and C move 
in the same direction with C preceding B, but with the speed of B larger than C, so that B 
will overtake C, resulting in a collision.    
Case 1 
B & C move in opposite 
directions 
B = C, speed equal rule 1 
B > C, speed equal rule 2 
B = C, B moves faster than 
C 
rule 3 
Case 2 
One body (C) at rest 
B < C rule 4 
B > C rule 5 
B = C rule 6 
Case 3 
B & C move in the same 
direction 
C : B  <  speed B : speed C rule 7a (Latin) 
C : B  >  speed B : speed C rule 7b (Latin) 
C : B  =  speed B : speed C rule 7c (French) 
 
 Under this organizational scheme, rules 2, 3 and 7a are interpreted as examples in 
which body B prevails in the contest and continues in its original direction of motion.264 
But, as we will see below, this organizational scheme obscures the structural similarities 
among the rules. The operation of rule 2, for example, is more closely related to the rules 
involving rebound (e.g. rules 4 and 7c) than rules 3 and 7a.  
 Those who have organized the rules in the manner above have also shared an 
assumption about the force of resistance and the force of motion. Descartes did not 
clearly express how the force of resistance should be quantified. In the absence of a clear 
statement, most have assumed that both the force of motion and the force of resistance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 238. 
264 Ibid., 239. 
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should be measured by the product of body and its speed. It is important to note that, 
although most modern interpreters have assumed that the forces of resistance and motion 
are to be measured by this product (typically expressed as mv), Descartes nowhere 
explicitly states this.265 As we will see, Descartes did not state this because he did not 
intend for the force of resistance to be measured by the product; it has been an 
interpretive mistake to rely on this assumption.   
 With the traditional organizational scheme and the above-mentioned 
understanding of force, there have been several interpretational difficulties that 
commentators have perennially discussed. If the force of resistance is taken to be akin to 
the quantity of motion (interpreted as the product of body and speed mv), then the force 
of resistance in a body at rest would seem to be nil, since there is no speed. Some early 
modern thinkers held this very view, such as "Hobbes, the young Leibniz, 
Malebranche,"266 as well as William Neile, who was a member of the Royal Society and 
a correspondent with John Wallis on the topics of motion and collision in the 1660s.267 
But clearly, Descartes did not hold such a view. It runs counter to the outcomes described 
in Descartes's rules, particularly rule 4.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 Ibid. "B seems to win the contest in two circumstances, when it has the same speed as C but is larger 
than C (R2), and when it is the same size as C but is moving faster (R3). ... This suggests that in moving 
bodies, both the force for proceeding and the force of resisting are functions of size and speed alone, and 
are jointly proportional to them. It is important to recognize that Descartes does not say this explicitly, but 
it isn't too much to infer that the forces in question are measured by the product 'size times speed'. This 
seems to be what he has in mind in R7 as well..." Also see, for example, John Roche, Mathematics of 
Measurement: A Critical History (London: Athlone Press, 1998) 106. "In calculations on collisions 
Descartes makes the sum of the products of notionally assigned integers representing quantity of matter and 
velocity respectively, of two colliding bodies equal before and after a collision. It is clear, therefore, that he 
thought of quantity of motion as proportional to the product of the numbers representing quantity of matter 
(or weight) and velocity. However, I have been unable to find a passage in which he states this formally, 
nor does he use algebra in this context. This is not surprising since Descartes is not presenting an argument 
in a rigorous mathematical manner here, preferring a more descriptive approach." 
266 Gabbey, “Force and Inertia,” 244. 
267 See chapter 5. 
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 The standard response to this difficulty has followed E. J. Aiton, who maintained 
that the force of resistance is similar to the algebraic expression of the "quantity of 
motion" (i.e. the product of body and its speed). And the force of resistance in a body at 
rest is measured by the product of the body and the speed of the body approaching. This 
view of the force of resistance in a body at rest has been widely accepted. It has also 
informed several other important theses, such as Gabbey's argument that Descartes's 
notion of force is an intermediary between the traditional "contest view" and a 
"Newtonian view" of force.268 It is also key to Garber's presentation of the development 
of Descartes's rules of collision from the Latin edition of the Principles, to Descartes's 
explanations in the letter to Clerselier, to the French edition of the Principles. However, 
such a view of the force of resistance relies on an unwarranted expression of force (the 
product mv) that historians such as Aiton likely developed through an overreliance on an 
algebraic expression of Descartes's ideas that Descartes himself never used. The received 
view of the force of resistance in a body at rest will be investigated and criticized more 
thoroughly below in section 5.6.   
 An additional problem noted by previous historians, such as Aiton, Gabbey, and 
Garber, is the relationship between the impact law and the rules involving equal forces. 
According to these historians, rules 1, 6, and 7c (all of which involve an equal balance of 
forces, if the forces are understood as the above mentioned products) are not necessary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 Gabbey, "Force and Inertia," 244-5. Descartes maintained, contra Hobbes et al. that “a body at rest 
reacts against any attempt to set it in motion, thus giving rise to a contest between opposing forces. 
However, it was Newton who fully realised that the opposing forces must be reinterpreted (as vis impressa 
and vis inertiae) so that they are always and necessarily equal, and consequently that each force does not 
depend on the (whole) initial speed of the striking body, but only on the difference between it and the final 
speed. ... In other words, Newton saw that the opposing forces actually involved in an interaction do not 
determine the exchanges of motion, as is the case according to the traditional view, but are the dynamical 
expression of these exchanges. As I shall show, in this respect Descartes is partly (though mainly) 
traditional, and partly Newtonian: he occupies an especially peculiar position in this revolutionary 
developmentin the functional role ascribed to force in the seventeenth century.”   
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consequences of the general impact law, a law which relies on a contest between 
forces.269 Aiton attempted to resolve this by claiming that 7c may be an interpolation 
between 7a and 7b, just as 1 is a limiting case between 2 and 3. Others, such as Gabbey 
and Garber, have suggested that Descartes must be relying on an implicit symmetry 
principle.270    
 
5.4 – Underlying organization: outcomes of the impact law  
 A different picture of Descartes's theory of collision emerges when we focus on 
the structural similarities of the rules, rather than the initial conditions. Doing so, we 
uncover a pattern that is indicative of the likely manner that Descartes originally thought 
of the problem of collision, before he organized the rules into the presentation found in 
the Principles of Philosophy. Seeing the rules in this new light also resolves several of the 
interpretive difficulties related to the traditional organization.   
 The new order is congruent with the main features of Descartes's impact law—
whether the force of resistance is overcome resulting in a transfer of motion, or if it is not 
overcome resulting in rebound. In Descartes's introduction (section 45) to the rules of 
collision (sections 46-52), he himself places emphasis on the contesting forces involved 
in his impact law:  
In order to determine, from the preceding laws, how individual bodies increase or 
decrease their movements [i.e. the effects of a transfer of motion] or turn aside in 
different directions [i.e. rebound] because of encounters with other bodies; it is 
only necessary to calculate how much force to move or to resist movement there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 Aiton, "Vortex Theory," 252. Garber, Descartes' metaphysical physics, 241, 5. Gabbey, "Force and 
Inertia," 264.  Aiton has argued that rules 1 and 7c are not necessary consequences of the general law.   
270 Gabbey and Garber discuss this specifically regarding rule 6 in the context of the so-called principle of 
least modal mutation (PLMM) or change (PLMC) as found in the 1645 letter to Clerselier. This letter will 
be discussed below.  
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is in each body; and to accept as a certainty that the one which is the stronger will 
always produce its effect.271  
 
To determine whether a transfer of motion or rebound occurs, one only needs to calculate 
the moving force and the force of resistance. The rules can thus be organized according to 
the outcomes: rebound, transfer, or both (in the case of equal forces). It is notable that 
Descartes maintained this emphasis while introducing the rules in both the Latin edition 
(1644) as well as the French edition (1647). Moreover, when he was called upon by his 
friend Clerselier in 1645 to further explain himself, particularly the rules wherein one 
body is at rest, Descartes began by citing the impact law: "it is a law of nature that a body 
that moves another must have more force to move it than the other has to resist it." Then, 
later in the letter, he reiterated the outcomes—rebound, transfer, or both—which 
correspond to the sizes of the forces: 
{W}e must notice that they {body B in motion and body C at rest} can become 
compatible in two ways, namely, if B changes the entire determination of its 
motion {i.e. rebound}, or, if it changes body C's rest, transferring to it such part 
of its motion as will enable it [B] to push C in front of it as fast as it will itself go 
{i.e. transfer of motion}. And I have said nothing in these three rules {4, 5, and 6} 
but this, that when C is larger than B, it is the first of these two ways which takes 
place, and when it is smaller, it is the second, and finally, when they are equal, 
this change is made half in the one way and half in the other.272  
 
 We should take Descartes by his own words and consider his rules according to 
the outcomes of collision (i.e. rebound, transfer of motion, or both), as well as the 
conditions of the impact law (i.e. the contest between the force of moving and the force 
of resistance). Organizing the rules according to outcome provides insight into 
Descartes's understanding of the forces involved in collision.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 AT VIII 67. Principia II 45. Translation by Miller, Principles, 64. Additions in brackets included by me. 
272 AT IV 186. Descartes to Clerselier, 17 February 1645. Translation by Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical 
Physics, 261-2. Square brackets are in Garber's translation. Curly brackets indicate clarifying additions by 
me. Italics from the AT. 
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 In the new organization, the first set of rules includes those scenarios (rules 4, 2, 
and 7b) in which the force of resistance is not overcome, resulting in rebound. The 
second set of rules (5, 3, 7a) includes those in which the force of resistance is overcome 
and motion is transferred between the bodies. The third set includes scenarios in which 
there are degrees of symmetry, resulting in both rebound and transfer, as is the case in 
rules 6, 7c, and 1.   
 
5.4.1 – Set 1: Rebound, the force of resistance is not overcome – rules 4, 2, 7b 
 
 Rule 4 clearly stipulates a condition in which the force of resistance is not 
overcome by the moving force: 
The fourth [rule] is that if body C were just a bit larger than B, and were entirely 
at rest, that is, not only is there no apparent motion, but also it is not surrounded 
by air nor by any other fluid bodies, which as I shall discuss below [in Pr II 59] 
dispose the hard bodies they surround to be more easily moved, then whatever the 
speed with which B could go toward it [C], it would never have the force to move 
it, but it would be forced to rebound in the same direction from which it had 
come, since seeing that B could not push C without making it go as fast as it itself 
would go afterwards, it is certain that C should resist more the faster B goes 
toward it, and its resistance ought to prevail over the action of B because it is 
larger than it.273 
 
 As has been discussed in section 4 above, in Descartes's early view smaller bodies 
in motion overcome the force of resistance of a larger body at rest, transferring motion to 
the larger bodies at rest. After the impact, both move together. In rule 4 Descartes 
explains, using several examples, that if motion were to be transferred when a smaller 
body meets a larger at rest, it would transfer motion in a particular manner. This is 
precisely the manner described in his early view, and that which was described by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 AT IX 90-1. Principes (French) II 49. Translation by Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 257. 
Italics in Garber's translation indicate additions to the rule in the French edition, which are absent in the 
Latin edition.   
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Beeckman before him. The numerical examples Descartes uses in rule 4 to illustrate this 
possibility are identical in form to the examples he used in his letter to Mersenne in 1639. 
The following are from rule 4: 
Thus for example, if C is twice as large as B, and B has three degrees of motion, it 
cannot push C, which is at rest, without transferring to it two degrees (namely, 
one for each of its halves) and without retaining only the third for itself, because 
it is not greater than each of the halves of C and afterwards, it cannot go faster 
than they go.  
 
example 1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the same way, if B has thirty degrees of speed, it must communicate twenty of 
them to C;  
example 2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
if it has three hundred, it must communicate two hundred; 
example 3  
 
 
 
 
 
  
and so [it] always [communicates]twice what it retains for itself.274 
 
In the third example, for B to push C, B would have to transfer 200 degrees of motion. In 
other words, the initial speed of B was 300, and after they meet, the quantity of motion is 
conserved, so they move together at a speed of 100. Since 300 – 100 = 200, two hundred 
degrees of speed was transferred. This is precisely what would have had to be transferred 
according to Descartes's early view.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 AT IX 90-1. Principes (French) II 49. Translation by Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 257-8. 
B  C 3 
B  C 3/3=1 
B  C 30 
B  C 30/3=10 
B  C 300 
B  C 300/3=100 
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 But motion is not actually transferred in the scenario in rule 4, because Descartes 
has stipulated this as a condition in which the force of resistance is not overcome:  
But since C is at rest, it resists the reception of twenty degrees ten times more 
than it resists the reception of two, and it resists the reception of two hundred one 
hundred times more, so that the more speed B has, the more resistance it finds in 
C. And since each half of C has as much force to remain in its rest as B has to 
push it, and since both resist at the same time, it is evident that they ought to 
succeed in forcing it [i.e., B] to rebound. Consequently, whatever the speed with 
which B goes toward C, at rest and larger than it, it will never have the force to 
move it.275 
 
This condition is merely size. Contrary to the received view, the force of resistance in a 
body at rest is not the product of the size and the speed of the body approaching.  
 Rule 2 is structurally similar to rule 4 in both the outcome of the collision, and the 
manner in which that outcome is produced. In rule 2, body B is larger than body C.276 
The speed of B and the speed of C are equal (although in opposite directions). As is the 
case in rule 4, when the smaller body C meets the larger body B, no motion is 
transferred. Body C rebounds retaining all of its motion. As in rule 4, the larger body is 
unchanged. Since both bodies have equal speeds, and since the smaller body now moves 
in the same direction as the larger, after the collision they move together, each retaining 
their original speeds.277  
  In the French edition of the Principles, Descartes divides rule 7 into three parts. 
Rule 7b is again structurally similar to rules 4 and 2. In the scenario described in this rule, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 AT IX 90-1. Principes (French) II 49. Translation by Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 258. 
276 AT IX 90. Principes (French) II 47. "The second [rule] is that, if B were the slightest bit larger than C, 
and they encountered one another with the same speed, then only C would be reflected in the direction from 
which it came, and afterward both would continue their motion together in the same direction. For B, 
having more force than C, could not be forced to rebound by it." Translation by Garber, Descartes' 
Metaphysical Physics, 256. 
277 Compare this to Garber's account of the second rule. Although Descartes does not mention any transfer 
of motion, and although Descartes does in fact describe the smaller body reflecting after meeting the larger, 
Garber interprets this rule as similar to rules 3 and 7a. Perhaps this is because both bodies move together 
after impact. However, this is only because they initially had the same speed and both retain their speeds 
after impact because no motion had been transferred. See Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 238-9.  
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bodies B and C move in the same direction. Body C precedes body B, but the speed of B 
is greater than C such that B will overtake C. If C is larger than B, and if the amount that 
C is larger than B is greater than the amount that the speed of B is greater than the speed 
of C, then B will rebound and retain all of its motion.278 The force of resistance is not 
overcome and no motion is transferred.  
 In each case (4, 2, and 7b), a transfer of motion would take place, if not for the 
force of resistance prevailing in the contest. The key condition in each of these scenarios 
is size. Because the resting body is larger in rule 4, no motion is transferred and the 
smaller rebounds. Because body B is larger in rule 2, body C rebounds and no motion is 
transferred. Body B remains in its original state and continues to move with its original 
speed (and body C, having the same speed, moves together with it). In rule 7b, body C is 
not only larger than body B (in which B moves in the same direction as C and will 
eventually catch up to it), the amount C is larger than B is greater than the amount the 
speed of B is larger than speed of C. In this scenario, no motion is transferred and body B 
rebounds retaining all of its motion.    
 Rule 4 is the key scenario. It stipulates precisely the condition when the force of 
resistance is greater than the moving force, which results in no transfer of motion but 
rather rebound. Rules 2 and 7b are variations of rule 4, with added degrees of complexity. 
Rule 2 is identical to rule 4, except that the larger body is now also in motion, and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 AT IX 92-3. Principes (French) II 52. "The seventh and last rule is that if B and C go in the same 
direction, and C precedes but goes more slowly than B, so that at length, [B] would hit it [C], then it could 
happen that B would transfer a part of its speed to C in order to push it [C] in front of it [B], and it could 
also happen that it could transfer none at all, but rebound with all of its motion in the direction from which 
it came. Indeed, [these outcomes can happen] not only when C is smaller than B, but also when it is larger; 
[...] when that with which the size of C surpasses that of B is greater than that with which the speed of B 
surpasses that of C, B must rebound, without communicating any of its motion to C. [...] This can be 
calculated as follows. If C were exactly twice as large as B, and B did not move twice as fast as C, but 
lacked something of it, then B should rebound without increasing the speed of C..." Translation by Garber, 
Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 260. 
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speeds of both bodies are equal. In rule 7b, not only are both bodies in motion, they move 
in the same direction, and the speeds are not identical.   
Rebound  
Force of resistance is not overcome  
No transfer of motion 
Before impact After impact 
4. 
B < C     C at rest 
 
 
 
 
 
VB before = VB after 
2. 
C < B     VC = VB 
 
 
 
 
 
VC+B = VC = VB 
7b. 
B < C     VC < VB 
 
 
 
 
VB before = VB after     VC before = VC after 
If                  the excess  of C > excess of VB  
Then: 
 
 
 
 
5.4.2 – Set 2: Transfer, the force of resistance is overcome – rules 5, 3, 7a 
 
 As previously mentioned, all of Descartes's examples of collision in his early 
view involved the transfer of motion with no rebound. In his later view, in the fourth rule 
in the French edition of the Principles, as we just saw, he provides several quantitative 
examples to illustrate his line of thinking. Three of them describe the amount of motion 
that would be transferred when a small body collides with a larger at rest, if the small 
body could overcome the force of resistance. A straightforward transfer of motion, of the 
kind that we see in Descartes's early view, as well as Beeckman's writings on collision, is 
what would take place. It does not, because he has chosen the scenario in rule 4 to 
B  C B  C 
C  B C  B 
B  C B  C 
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stipulate the condition when the force of resistance cannot be overcome. Rule 5, on the 
other hand, is a straightforward transfer of motion. The body at rest, C, is the smaller 
body. As such, its force of resistance can be overcome by any larger moving body, B. 
When the larger moving body, B, meets the smaller body at rest, C, the larger pushes the 
smaller. Specifically it transfers however much of "its motion [is] necessary to bring it 
about that they would afterwards go at the same speed."279   
 Descartes provides two numerical examples, which he describes extensively to 
illustrate this rule. His reasoning does not rely on a symbolic expression of the quantity of 
motion as the product mv (in which case the quantity of motion of the body at rest would 
be zero), nor does he use symbolic algebra to derive the outcome. Rather, his reasoning is 
strikingly similar to that of Beeckman, which we have encountered in chapter 2:  
Namely, if B were twice as large as C, it would only transfer to it a third of its 
motion, since that one third would move C as fast as the two remaining ones 
would move B, since it is assumed to be twice as large. And so, after B 
encountered C, it would go slower by one third than it went before, that is, in the 
time that it could have traversed three spaces, it could only traverse two. In the 
same way, if B were three times larger than C, it would only transfer to it a fourth 
of its motion, and so on.  
The speeds before and after collision are balanced by the size of the moving body before 
and after collision. In other words, there is an inverse proportion of the size of the 
initially moving body to the larger size of the body after the collision (since they move 
together), and the speed of the initially moving body to the speed of the moving body 
after collision.  
 Rule 3 is similar to rule 5 in that the outcome of the transfer of motion is such that 
the two bodies move together after collision. Similar to the relationship of increased 
complexity between rules 4 and 2 in the previously described set, rule 3 introduces added 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 PR II 50. Translation by Garber, Descartes' metaphysical physics, 258. 
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complexity to rule 5. Just as one body is at rest in rule 4, whereas both are in motion in 
rule 2, so too is one body at rest in rule 5 and both are in motion in rule 3. In addition, 
Descartes describes the operation of the collision in rule 3 in two parts. Although the 
ultimate outcome of the collision is the transfer of motion, the first part of the rule 
involves rebound. Bodies B and C are equal in size. B and C move in opposite directions 
toward each other, and the speed of B is larger than the speed of C. In the first part of rule 
3, body C does not overcome the force of resistance of body B, which moves faster than 
C. Thus, C rebounds. It would retain its motion, and no motion would be transferred. 
However, since the speed of C is less than the speed B, and after rebounding C precedes 
B, body B will push body C. This is the second part. Body B moving faster than body C 
(and in the same direction) will transfer however much motion is required so that they 
move together.280   
 The second part of 3 is similar to rule 7a. They share the following characteristics. 
Both bodies move in the same direction, body C preceding body B. When body B 
overtakes C, it pushes body C. In other words, body B transfers enough motion that they 
move together after the collision. In the second part of rule 3, bodies B and C are the 
same size. In 7a, body C is larger than body B. "As long as that with which the size of C 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 AT IX 90. Principes (French) II 48. "The third [rule] is that if these two bodies were of the same size, 
but B had the slihgtest bit more speed than C, then not only would it happen that after the encounter, C 
alone would rebound and both would move off together, as before [i.e., in Rule 2], but also it would be 
necessary for B to transfer to C half of the speed by which the one exceeded the other, because [C] being in 
front of it, it could not go any faster than it [C]. That is, if before their encounter, B had had, for example, 
six degrees of speed and C had had only four, it [B] would transfer one of its excess degrees of speed to it 
[C], and thus afterwards both would go [iroient] with five degrees of speed, since it is easier for B to 
communicate one of its degrees of speed to C than it is for C to change the entire course [cours] of the 
motion B has." Translation by Garber, Descartes' metaphysical physics, 256-7. 
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surpasses that of B is less than that with which the speed of B surpasses that of C, B 
should never rebound, but push C, transferring into it one part of its speed."281  
Transfer of motion 
Force of resistance is overcome  
Before impact After impact 
5. 
C < B     C at rest 
 
 
 
 
 
3. 
C = B     VC < VB 
 
 
 
 
 
7a. 
B < C     VC < VB 
 
 
 
 
 
If                  the excess  of C < excess of VB  
Then: 
 
 
 5.4.3 – Set 3: Degrees of symmetry – 6, 7c, 1 
 
 Rules 6, 7c, and 1 are unique. The previous sets of rules have described scenarios 
in which the force of resistance is not overcome and no motion is transferred (set 1), or 
the force of resistance is overcome and motion is transferred (set 2). In the scenarios 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 AT IX 92-3. Principes (French) II 52. "The seventh and last rule is that if B and C go in the same 
direction, and C precedes but goes more slowly than B, so that at length, [B] would hit it [C], then it could 
happen that B would transfer a part of its speed to C in order to push it [C] in front of it [B], and it could 
also happen that it could transfer none at all, but rebound with all of its motion in the direction from which 
it came. Indeed, [these outcomes can happen] not only when C is smaller than B, but also when it is larger; 
as long as that with which the size of C surpasses that of B is less than that with which the speed of B 
surpasses that of C, B should never rebound, but push C, transferring into it one part of its speed. [...] This 
can be calculated as follows. If C were exactly twice as large as B, [...] and if B moved more than twice as 
fast as C, then it should not rebound, but should transfer as much of its motion to C as is needed to bring it 
about that they move together afterwards with the same speed. For example, if C had only two degrees of 
speed, and B had five (which is more than double), then it should communicate two of the fice, which two 
being in C would bring about only one [degree of motion] since C is twice as big as B, and thus, afterwards 
they would both go with three degrees of speed." Translation by Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 
259-60.  
C  B 
C  B 
C B C B 
B  C B  C 
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described by rules 6, 7c, and 1, there is a balance between resistance and the moving 
force. Like the previous sets, it involves a scenario in which one body is at rest and the 
other is in motion, a scenario in which both are in motion toward each other, and a 
scenario in which both are in motion in the same direction. Whereas I have organized the 
previous sets according to increasing complexity, this set is organized according to 
increasing degrees of symmetry. In rule 6 there is symmetry in body, in rule 7c there is 
symmetry in the quantity of motion, and in rule 1 there is symmetry in both body and 
quantity of motion.   
 All three rules are like those in the first set (4, 2, and 7b), in at least one respect: 
Descartes implies what would take place if motion were merely transferred. In addition, 
he indicates what would take place if motion were not transferred and the bodies merely 
rebounded. After surveying the possibilities (rebound or transfer), he explains which 
options conflict with previously established principles, and then presents the remaining 
outcome.  
 Because of the equality in rule 6, he claims that there is no reason why one or the 
other of rebound/transfer should occur. In other words, there is no winner in the contest 
between the force of resistance and the moving force. So, Descartes "splits the 
difference" between the two hypothetical options of transfer and rebound, and both 
occur.282 Descartes follows the same reasoning in rule 7c. Rule 1 is similar except that a 
conflict with a previously established principle decides between the options of rebound 
and transfer.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282 AT IX 92. Principes (French) II 51. "It is thus evident that since they are equal, and thus there is no 
more reason why it should rebound than push C, these two outcomes should be divided equally." 
Translation by Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 259. 
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 The numerical examples that Descartes provides for the rules in this set are worth 
examining in more detail to see Descartes's thought process at work. Rule 6 describes the 
scenario in which bodies B and C are equal in size. C is at rest and B approaches it. 
Contrary to other investigations of collision, such as those of Marci and Harriot before 
Descartes, and Huygens and Wren after him, the bodies do not exchange speeds, with B 
coming to rest and C moving with the previous speed of B.283 Rather, for Descartes, B in 
part transfers motion to C, and in part rebounds from C: 
The sixth [rule] is that if the body C were at rest, and exactly equal in size to body 
B, which was moving toward it, then it would be necessary that it would in part be 
impelled by B, and in part it will make it rebound, so that if B went toward C with 
four degrees of speed, it would be necessary that it transfer one to it, and with the 
three remaining [degrees] would return in the direction from which it had come.   
 
In order to explain the reasoning of this rule, and to explicate his numerical example 
(which was merely stated without explanation in the Latin edition of the Principles), 
Descartes goes on to present three possible outcomes complete with numerical examples 
in the French edition of the Principles.  
Since it is necessary that either B push C without rebounding and thus that it [B] 
transfer two degrees of its motion;  
C = B     C at rest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
or that it [B] rebound without pushing it, and consequently, that it retain these 
two degrees of speed along with the other two degrees of speed which cannot be 
taken from it;  
C = B     C at rest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 Aiton, "Marci," 157. Sørensen, "Study, part 2," 263." Also see chapters 2, 4, and 5.   
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C B C B 4 2 
C B 4 2+2=4 
	   156 
or finally, that it rebound and retain one part of these two degrees and push it [C] 
by transferring to it the other part:  
C = B     C at rest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first possible outcome numerically describes what would take place if motion was 
transferred. The second describes what would take place if there was no transfer and only 
rebound. The third divides evenly between the two options. Since there are two degrees 
of speed that could either be transferred or retained, an even division implies that one 
degree is retained and the other is transferred. He concludes with his selection among 
these options:  
it is thus evident that since they are equal, and thus there is no more reason why it 
should rebound than push C, these two outcomes should be divided equally. That 
is, B should transfer to C one of these two degrees of speed, and rebound with the 
other.284   
 
Because the bodies are equal, there is no winner in the contest between the force of 
resistance and the moving force. Thus, the first two options can be eliminated. 
 Rule 7c, like 7a and 7b, describes a scenario in which both bodies (which need 
not be equal in size) move in the same direction, wherein "C precedes but goes more 
slowly than B." 7a describes the conditions in which the impact will result in a transfer of 
motion. This occurs when the excess of the speed in B (compared to the speed in C) is 
greater than the excess of the size in C (compared to the size in B). 7b describes the 
conditions in which the impact will result in rebound with no transfer of motion. This 
occurs when the excess of the speed in B is less than the excess of the size of C. 
Descartes provides numerical examples that illustrated how 7a and 7b can be calculated. 
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Rule 7c is the scenario in which the excess of the speed in B is equal to the excess of the 
size of C. Unlike rules 7a and 7b, Descartes did not provide a numerical example to 
illustrate how the outcome of such a scenario could be calculated.285 However, it is 
striking that the rule operates in the same way as rule 6: one part of motion is transferred 
and the impacting body rebounds with the rest. The text of rule 7c is the following:   
And finally, when the excess of size which C has is perfectly equal to the excess of 
speed which B has, the latter ought to transfer one part of its motion to the other, 
and rebound with the rest.286 
 
Descartes does not provide a numerical example, but if he had, it would likely be as 
follows: 
B = 2          C = 4      
VB = 4          VC = 2 
 
 
 
B = 2              C = 4 
VB = 3          VC = 2 ½ 
 
 Rule 1, which involves two equal bodies moving in opposite directions towards 
each other with equal speeds, has the same general structure as 6 and 7c. It too involves 
an important equality. And he alludes to the various options that are possible—transfer or 
rebound. However, in rule 1, unlike rule 6 and 7c, Descartes has a means of choosing 
between the options. Fundamental to his system, and governing each of his rules, is his 
notion of the conservation of the quantity of motion. In rule 1 the bodies must rebound 
because the alternative, a transfer of motion, is not possible, given the conservation 
principle:  
...when they encountered one another, they would both equally well be reflected, 
and each would return in the direction from which it had come, without losing any 
part of its speed, since in this circumstance there is no cause that can take it [i.e. 
speed] away, but there is a very evident cause that should force them to rebound; 
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and because the cause would be the same for both, they would both rebound in 
the same way. 
 
Because of the symmetry, if there were a transfer of motion, some part of the speed 
would be lost (remember, for Descartes, there is no such thing as a negative quantity of 
motion; motion and the quantity of motion are scalar quantities). If both bodies could 
transfer their motion to the other in this scenario, they would cease to move. All the speed 
would be taken away, defying the conservation of quantity of motion.287 "There is no 
cause that can take it [i.e. speed] away."  
Degrees of Symmetry  
Before impact After impact 
6. 
C = B     C at rest 
 
 
 
 
 
7c. 
B < C     VC < VB 
 
 
 
      
If                  the excess  of C = excess of VB  
Then: 
1.      
C = B     VC = VB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
5.5 – Analytic method 
 A pattern of thought running through Descartes's rules of collision is strikingly 
similar to the classical analytic method, particularly in those rules which stipulate the 
conditions for rebound, which is the very feature that distinguishes his later account of 	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cause is, it does not evidently follow from his laws of motion and conservation principle. And it is not 
evident to past commentators, who have noted that rule 1 does not follow from the contest model described 
in Descartes's impact law.   
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collision from his early view. Analysis was understood by many to be a method of 
discovery or problem solving. One assumed that which was sought, and then worked 
backward to that which was already known. If one could precede successfully back to 
established propositions, then what is sought could subsequently be demonstrated using 
the synthetic method, which works step by step through the consequences, beginning 
with what is known. If, using the analytic method, while working backward, one found a 
contradiction, the proposition in question was determined to be false.288 A classic 
statement of the analytic and synthetic methods has been recorded by Pappus of 
Alexandria (c.290 - c.350):  
That which is called the Domain of Analysis, my son Hermodorus, is, taken as a 
whole, a special resource that was prepared, after the composition of the Common 
Elements, for those who want to acquire a power in geometry that is capable of 
solving problems set to them; and it is useful for this alone. It was written by three 
men: Euclid the Elementarist, Apollonius of Perge, and Aristaeus the elder, and 
its approach is by analysis and synthesis.  
 Now, analysis is the path from what one is seeking, as if it were 
established, by way of its consequences, to something that is established by 
synthesis. That is to say, in analysis we assume what is sought as if it has been 
achieved, and look for the thing from which it follows, and again what comes 
before that, until by regressing in this way we come upon some one of the things 
that are already known, or that occupy the rank of a first principle. We call this 
kind of method 'analysis,' as if to say anapalin lysis (reduction backward). In 
synthesis, by reversal, we assume what was obtained last in the analysis to have 
been achieved already, and, setting now in natural order, as precedents, what 
before were following, and fitting them to each other, we attain the end of the 
construction of what was sought. This is what we call 'synthesis.' 
 There are two kinds of analysis: one of them seeks after truth, and is called 
'theorematic'; while the other tries to find what was demanded, and is called 
'problematic'. In the case of the theorematic kind, we assume what is sought as a 
fact and true, then, advancing through its consequences, as if they are true facts 
according to the hypothesis, to something established, if this thing that has been 
established is a truth, then that which was sought will also be true, and its proof 
the reverse of the analysis; but if we should meet something established to be 
false, then the thing that was sought too will be false. In the case of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 H. J. M. Bos, Redefining Geometrical Exactness: Descartes' transformation of the Early Modern 
Concept of Construction (New York: Springer, 2001), 96-7. Niccolò Guicciardini, Isaac Newton on 
Mathematical Certainty and Method (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 34.  
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problematic kind, we assume the proposition as something we know, then 
proceeding through its consequences, as if true, to something established; if the 
established thing is possible and obtainable, which is what the mathematicians 
call "given", the required thing will also be possible, and again the proof will be 
reverse of analysis; but should we meet with something established to be 
impossible, then the problem too will be impossible.289 
 
Descartes was familiar with the methods of analysis and synthesis. They are clearly on 
display in his early work on method—the Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii, which he 
worked on throughout the 1620s. Sasaki has argued that his thoughts on developing a 
method for establishing "the truth of things" were informed by his knowledge of the 
ancient analysts and the modern algebraists.290 The natural method he describes is akin to 
analysis. In rule V of the Regulae Descartes wrote: 
We shall be following this method exactly if we first reduce complicated and 
obscure propositions step by step to simpler ones, and then, starting with the 
intuition of the simplest ones of all, try to ascend through the same steps to a 
knowledge of all the rest.291 
 
And in rule XVII the similarity with Pappus's statement of analysis and synthesis is even 
closer: 
So the trick here is to treat the unknown ones as if they were known. This may 
enable us to adopt the easy and direct method of inquiry even in the most 
complicated of problems. There is no reason why we should not always do this, 
since from the outset of this part of the treatise [i.e. from Rule XIII, the opening 
rule of Book Two] our assumption has been that we know that the unknown terms 
in the problem are so dependent on the known ones that they are wholly 
determined by them. Accordingly, we shall be carrying out everything this Rule 
prescribes if, recognizing that the unknown is determined by the known, we 
reflect on the terms which occur to us first and count the unknown ones among 
the known, so that by reasoning soundly step by step we may deduce from these 
all the rest, even the known terms as if they are unknown.292   
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statements in the Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii and Discours de la méthod.  
291 AT X 379. Translation by Sasaki, Descartes, 183.  
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Descartes allegedly revealed his "natural method" in Paris at a meeting at the palace of 
the Papal Nuncio in 1627/8, which may have been the first public recognition of 
Descartes's philosophical ideas.293 Although Descartes abandoned the Regulae project in 
1628, he continued to refer to analysis. For example, in part II of the Discours de la 
méthod (1637) he mentioned it, although in doing so he disparaged the material to which 
the analysis of the ancients was applied and the cumbersomeness of the algebra of the 
moderns:  
[They] cover only highly abstract matters, which seem to have no use. Moreover 
the former is so closely tied to the examination of figures that it cannot exercise 
the intellect without greatly tiring the imagination; and the latter is so confined to 
certain rules and symbols that the end result is a confused and obscure art which 
encumbers the mind, rather than a science which cultivates it.294 
 
The Discours is accompanied by three essays, the Dioptrics, Meteors, and Geometry. In 
the latter, Descartes famously used his symbolic algebraic analysis to solve geometrical 
problems. The central problem that Descartes solved in the Geometry was one that had 
been proposed to him in the early 1630s by Jacobus Golius, a professor of mathematics at 
the University of Leiden.295 This was a locus problem, often referred to as "Pappus' 
Problem," since it is found in Book VII of Pappus's Collection, specifically in Pappus's 
commentary on Apollonius's Conics.296   
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 Although in the intervening years the topics about which Descartes wrote 
changed, he continued to at least allude to analysis as a general method for solving 
problems (not restricted to mathematical domains, and not restricted to algebraic analysis 
specifically). For example, in the second set of replies for the Meditations Descartes 
again describes the difference between an analytic and synthetic method, and states that 
"it is analysis which is the best and truest method of instruction, and it was this method 
alone which I employed in my Meditations."297  
 Clearly, Descartes was familiar with the analytic method. It was important for his 
early thoughts on natural method. It was also of immense importance to his analytic 
geometry, which would have a profound impact on the development of mathematics. 
However, I am not arguing that Descartes's contributions to mathematics had an impact 
on his rules of collision. It was, apparently, not obvious to express collision algebraically, 
and he kept these domains quite separate. As we will see in chapter 4, Huygens began to 
make connections between symbolic algebra and collision, and Wren would combine 
them closely. I am also not arguing anything about the extent to which Descartes 
continued to be interested in method after his so-called "metaphysical turn" in 1628.298 
Nor am I arguing that the Principles of Philosophy should be understood as a treatise on 
method. It is not. With the exception of Marcus Marci, no one prior to Descartes had 
published an account of the rules of collision. This was a new problem. As such, we see 
an expression of the analytic method being used by Descartes as a means to solve this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 René Descartes, "The Author's Replies to the Second Set of Objections," in The Philosophical Writings 
of Descartes: Volume 2, trans., John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 110-11.  
298 Sasaki, Descartes, 203.  
	   163 
new problem. This is what I'm claiming: Descartes used a problem-solving method, with 
which he was quite familiar, to solve a new problem.  
 Descartes's impact law, which can be found in both his early and later views of 
collision, described both the transfer of motion and rebound.299 Rebound occurs when the 
force of resistance is greater than the moving force, and is thus not overcome. However, 
in Descartes's early view, he never stipulates when the force of resistance is actually 
greater. In each numerical example that he provided, a transfer of motion occurs, whether 
it was regarding phenomenal bodies such as stones moving the earth, or two bodies 
described in abstraction. What is new to the rules of collision in the Principles of 
Philosophy is that he stipulates the conditions in which the force of resistance is not 
overcome. This is the new problem Descartes faces in the Principles, and it is with these 
scenarios of rebound (in rules 4, 2, and 7b, as well as rules 6, 7c, and 1) that we see the 
analytic method most clearly. He presents the various possible outcomes, and then works 
backwards from each. Those instances in which he finds a contradiction with a previously 
held principle are eliminated as a possible outcome.  
 In rules 4, 2, and 7b, a transfer of motion would take place, if not for the force of 
resistance prevailing in the contest. The key condition in each of these scenarios is size. 
In rule 4, Descartes outlines the two possible options: a transfer or motion, or no transfer 
of motion resulting in rebound. He provides several numerical examples of the transfer of 
motion, which would proceed in the same way that he described in his early view, and 
would do so in accordance with the laws of nature and conservation of quantity of 
motion. However, as we have seen above, he has selected size as the key condition that 
determines when the force of resistance is not overcome. The body at rest is larger than 	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the moving body. Thus, the force of resistance is not overcome, and transfer of motion is 
not possible.  
 In rules 6, 7c, and 1, there are balances of forces. Here again, Descartes presents 
the various possible outcomes, rebound or transfer: he implies what would take place if 
motion were merely transferred; and he indicates what would take place if motion were 
not transferred and the bodies merely rebounded. Working backward in a similar manner 
as rule 4 above, he attempts to eliminate one or the other possible outcomes. However, as 
we have seen in rules 6 and 7c, there is no way to choose between the two possible 
outcomes, and he splits the difference. In rule 1, on the other hand, one option (transfer of 
motion) results in a contradiction, since it would conflict with the established principle of 
the conservation of quantity of motion. Thus, in rule 1, both bodies rebound.  
 There are several differences between the rules of collision in the Latin and 
French editions of the Principles of Philosophy. The order of the rules, and the outcomes 
of the rules remain the same across the editions. An important change is the amount of 
explanation Descartes provides. In the Latin edition, Descartes did not present rule 4 
together with a statement of what would occur if motion were transferred—similarly, 
with rule 6. In the Latin, he merely states what would occur. In the French, the same 
outcome would occur, but he has also provided the examples of what would occur if 
motion were merely transferred or if no motion were transferred and the bodies 
rebounded, with the added explanation for why he splits the difference between the 
options. This is what one would expect with the analytic method. After he was compelled 
to explain himself more thoroughly to Clerselier upon the publication of the Latin edition, 
Descartes provided additional instruction in the French edition of the Principles. The 
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explanations reflect the analytic method. This method was understood by many of the 
moderns to have been used by the ancients to solve their problems but that the ancients 
also suppressed the method in their demonstrations. Descartes himself mentions this in 
his Regulae300 and the Replies to the Second Set of Objections to the Meditations.301 
Descartes had described the analytic method to be particularly suited to instruction, 
which is the role in which he would have found himself—instructing his readers on the 
proper understanding of his rules.  
 
5.6 – Force of resistance 
 Descartes was not clear in what he meant by the force of resistance. Most 
commentators have assumed that what Descartes meant to say, but did not say, was that 
the force of resistance is the product of the size of the body and the speed of the body. 
However, Descartes describes three scenarios in which one body is at rest, and yet the 
body at rest has a force of resistance. This seems to conflict with the presumed 
interpretation of force of resistance as the product of body and speed, since the force of 
resistance of a body at rest under this interpretation would be nil. The attempt to resolve 
this issue has been to claim that the force of resistance is the product of the body at rest 
and the speed of the body approaching, which is a variation of the force of resistance of a 
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moving body, which is akin to the quantity of motion. Proponents of this interpretation 
cite selected passages from rule 4 and Descartes's elaborations in the letter to Clerselier 
for support, primarily noting that some of Descartes's descriptions of the force of 
resistance in a body at rest lend themselves to an interpretation that the force is variable. 
Several theses have relied on this aspect of the interpretation—that the force of resistance 
in a body at rest varies in proportion to the impressed force—such as Gabbey's argument 
regarding Descartes's notion of force, and Garber's account of the development of 
Descartes's rules from the Latin edition to the Letter to Clerselier to the French edition of 
the Principles. I argue that this interpretation is not what Descartes intended. (1) 
Descartes did not say that this is what he meant. (2) If one does not impose a 
mathematical form that Descartes himself refrained from using, then there is no difficulty 
to be explained, such as the non-zero value of the force of resistance of a body at rest. In 
other words, the above interpretation is an ad hoc solution to a problem which itself is an 
artifact of rewriting Descartes's ideas in mathematics that Descartes did not use. (3) 
Using the above interpretation, which was designed to solve a specific problem that is 
produced when one relies on a symbolic algebraic reconstruction of Descartes's ideas, 
one runs into further obstacles with Descartes's statements in the letter to Clerselier in 
which Descartes attempted to explain his rules to his friend. Regarding the statements 
made by Descartes which seem to lend themselves to an understanding of the force of 
resistance in a body at rest as variable, I will show that these same passages make just as 
much sense when one interprets the force of resistance in a body at rest as absolute.  
In 1957, E. J. Aiton provided the account of the force of resistance in a resting 
body that has become the received view. Aiton’s interpretation, or at least interpretations 
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quite similar to his, can be found in most subsequent commentators on the topic including 
Gabbey and Garber. The role of “the approaching speed” has been reaffirmed by many, 
some of whom use different mathematical expressions. The kernel of the interpretation 
has then persisted in subsequent accounts. The following is Aiton’s argument reproduced 
in full: 
An answer to the question of the nature of the “force” of a body to resist the 
action of another is suggested by the secondary rules. For a body in motion, this 
“force” is the quantity of motion (mv), as is evident from 7(a) and 7(b), where the 
“force” to resist of m2 is greater or less than the “force” of m1 according as m2v2 is 
greater or less than m1v1. For a body at rest, however, as is evident from rule 4, 
the “force” to resist is equal to the quantity of motion the body would need to 
acquire in order to move with the original speed of the body which strikes it. Thus 
the “force” to resist is m2v and this is greater than m1v provided m2 is greater than 
m1. An interesting point is that the “force” to resist is not constant but depends on 
the impressed force. Descartes’s conception of the “force” of a body at rest to 
resist motion, increasing in direct proportion to the impressed force up to a certain 
limit, after which motion takes place, indicates a sound intuition of the situation 
involved in moving heavy objects. Uncritical reliance on common experience, 
however, led him to locate this resistance in the body itself instead of finding it in 
the friction between the body and the others in contact with it.302 
 
In those scenarios in which both bodies are in motion (such as 7a and 7b) the forces of 
resistance are interpreted as the quantities of motion, which Aiton expresses as the 
products of body m and speed v,  m1v1 and m2v2 respectively. The force of resistance in a 
resting body is then expressed analogously to the quantity of motion represented as an 
algebraic project. For example, if m2 was the resting body, the body would obviously 
have no speed. But Aiton seems to assume that the force of resistance in a resting body 
must be similar to the quantity of motion, which for Aiton is a product of body and speed. 
So he uses the speed of the body approaching. The force of resistance in the resting body 
becomes m2v1.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 Aiton, "Vortex Theory," 253-4. 
	   168 
One very nice feature of Aiton’s interpretation is that it is consistent with rule 4. 
Garber, who holds an interpretation akin to Aiton’s, explains the situation. The force of 
resistance in a resting body (C) is proportional to the speed of the body approaching it. In 
rule 4, recall, if C > B, no matter how fast B approaches C, B will rebound and will not 
move C. According to Garber:  
on Descartes’ conception, the force of resisting in C is to be measured by the 
product of m (C) and v (B). And so, however quickly B were to move, it would 
always be reflected by a larger C, and, conversely, however slowly B might 
move, it would always be able to set a smaller C into motion.303 
 
This idea may have seemed initially plausible because of the similarity to the algebraic 
expression Aiton used for quantity of motion, and the assumption that Descartes's notion 
of force must unify the quantity of motion, the moving force, the force of resistance of a 
moving body, and the force of resistance of a body at rest. Descartes never used an 
algebraic expression for the quantity of motion (and therefore did not subsequently 
presume that the same algebraic expression would be used for the force of resistance in a 
body at rest). Descartes's notions of force are famously unclear and problematic, as noted 
in section 2.3 as well as in appendix 1. I disagree with Aiton’s interpretation. I think it is 
probable that Aiton’s interpretation was due to his over-reliance on a form of 
mathematical expression that Descartes never used to represent quantity of motion, mv. 
Alan Gabbey has also supported a variation of this interpretation, prior to Garber. 
The existence of a force of resistance in a resting body shows, according to his argument, 
that “the forces involved in collisions do not arise exclusively from motions or from 
determinations,”304 in other words, the ontology of force is not reducible to matter and 
motion. Rule four, according to Gabbey is not a “Cartesian aberration,” but rather “the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 240.  
304 Gabbey, "Force and Inertia," 266. 
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most seminally valuable of the seven [rules].”305 It reveals the ontological status of force, 
and is a major component in Gabbey’s argument of the place of Descartes’s thought as 
midway between Newton’s conception of force in Newton’s third law and the 
“traditional” understanding of force rooted in the “contest view.”306 Gabbey presents the 
measure of this force “in terms of the motion that the striking body ‘tries’ to impart to 
it.”307 He claims that “Descartes quantifies the resisting force by setting it equal to the 
total change in motion (or equivalently determination) that it would receive...”308 Gabbey 
provides an algebraic reconstruction of rule four under this interpretation.309 As proof 
texts for this view, Gabbey quotes the fourth rule and the lengthy (expanded) explanation 
Descartes provided in the French edition of the Principles in their entirety, as well as a 
large portion of the 1645 letter to Clerselier in which Descartes further explains himself 
on this topic to his correspondent. Presumably, Gabbey thought his position was evident 
given these texts.310   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 Ibid., 269. 
306 Ibid., 244-5. 
307 Ibid., 268. 
308 Ibid. 
309 Ibid., 268-9. “In the case of Rule Four, the bodies B and C, being perfectly hard and therefore perfectly 
inelastic, would move with the same final speed (B x VB)/(B + C) and quantities of motion (B2 x VB)/(B + 
C) and (C x B x VB)/(B + C) (respectively) if B were to move C. But C at rest resists the reception of the 
quantity of motion (C x B x VB)/(B + C) with a force of equal size, and this force is contested by the 
remaining motive force of B, given by (B2 x VB)/(B + C). Hence (by the Third Law), B will not move C, 
since: (C x B x VB)/(B + C) > (B2 x VB)/(B + C) given that C > B. Alternatively, since B and C would 
move with the same final speed if B were to move C, one can say that C resists with as many ‘degrees of 
resistance’ as B has degrees of speed, and therefore the excess of force will depend only on the relative 
sizes of the bodies. Hence, as before, B will not move C. Here Descartes seems to be considering the 
possibility of a measure for rest which will be analogous to the speed that measures one dimension of the 
active force of motion.”  
310 Peter McLaughlin has also followed the interpretation that the force of resistance in a resting body is 
measured by the speed of the body approaching it. However, he moves away from algebraic expressions, 
although the root of the interpretation is still present. McLaughlin uses the balance as a way to express 
Descartes’s mathematics and to support his arguments regarding Descartes’s supposed use of symmetry 
conditions to develop his rules of collision. He claims that in 17th century thinking, the best way to 
understand which force is stronger in a contest (model of force) is to “put them on a scale,” so to speak—in 
fact, “most seventeenth-century discussions of impact take their cue from statics and the law of the lever. 
[...]The application of statics to collision is fairly straight-forward when both bodies are in motion and only 
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 This interpretation, that the force of resistance in a body at rest is the product of 
the body and the speed of the body approaching, was initially designed as a solution to a 
problem that was an artifact of rewriting Descartes's ideas in mathematics that Descartes 
did not use. If one does not impose a mathematical form that Descartes himself refrained 
from using, then there is no difficulty to be explained. Descartes did not explicitly claim 
that the force of resistance was the product of body and speed. As we have seen, in his 
early view Descartes did not stipulate the force at all, and in every instance the force of 
resistance was overcome by the moving force, even though according to the early 
versions of his impact law the force of resistance in principle could be larger than the 
moving force and thus prevail in the contest. In his later view Descartes stipulated when 
the force of resistance is greater. The primary scenario in which the force of resistance is 
not overcome is rule four: a smaller moving body reflects off a larger body at rest, 
transferring no motion. As he explained to his friend Clerselier, "without this [rule 4], no 
body would ever be reflected by encountering another."311 In other words, if not for this, 
collision would proceed as he had described in his early view, and as Beeckman had 
described before him—transferring motion with every impact. As seen in section 5.4.1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the determinations are opposed, as in Descartes’ first three impact rules. In these cases he treats the size and 
speed (distance per unit time) of a body just like weight and the length of the balance arm. Difficulties with 
the statics model arise for Descartes when he moves to the opposition between motion and rest. If one body 
is at rest, how do we represent the quantity of its rest? Descartes stipulates strict symmetry between the two 
contrary modes, motion and rest: If the velocity of one body is represented by the length of a lever then the 
quantity of rest of the other body is represented by a lever of the same length. For equal bodies one has as 
much rest as the other has motion. In an opposition between rest and motion the bigger body is always the 
stronger." Mclaughlin claims that there is “strict symmetry” between motion and rest. But ultimately his 
explanation is very similar to those of Garber, Gabbey, and Aiton. The body at rest has a strength of 
resistance that is proportional to the size of the body at rest and the speed of the body approaching. 
McLaughlin calls it a “quantity of rest,” which is represented by a body situated on a balance arm, which is 
the same length as that of the balance arm representing the speed of the moving body. See Peter 
McLaughlin, "Force, determination and impact," in Descartes' Natural Philosophy, ed. Stephen Gaukroger, 
John Schuster, and John Sutton (New York: Routledge, 2000) 98-9. 
311 AT IV 184. Descartes to Clerselier, 17 February 1645. Translation by Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical 
Physics, 261. 
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rules 2 and 7b are extensions of rule 4 to increasingly complex scenarios, but in all of 
which the force of resistance is greater than the moving force. 
 The interpretation that the force of resistance in a body at rest is the product of the 
body and the speed of the body approaching conflicts with the explanations that 
Descartes provided in his letter to Clerselier. Using the received view of the force of 
resistance in a body at rest, Garber, for example, cannot make sense of an otherwise clear 
claim regarding the impact law and the importance of size for the force of resistance. As 
we will see in the following section 5.6.1, Descartes clearly articulates size as the relevant 
condition for the force of resistance in a body at rest (and not the product of body at rest 
and the speed of body approaching). He explains this in two different ways. (1) He uses 
the familiar inverse proportion of bodies and speeds before and after collision which 
Beeckman had used and Descartes had used in his early view, but expressed in terms of 
the possible transfer of up to half of the speed of the moving body. This is just an 
alternate way of stating that a body smaller than the resting body transfers no motion and 
rebounds. (2) He also uses the so-called Principle of Least Modal Change (PLMC) to 
highlight the size of the body as the determining condition in transfer and rebound.  
 Advocates of the above received view rely on a particular reading of portions of 
the Latin and French editions of the Principles and the letter to Clerselier. Namely, they 
rely on statements that seem to lend themselves to an understanding of the force of 
resistance in a body at rest as variable. For instance, Garber supports his interpretation of 
the force of resistance in a resting body by quoting from Descartes’s explanation of rule 4 
from the Latin Principles of Philosophy, which Garber himself admits is “by no means 
lucid:” 
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[A] resting body resists a greater speed more than it does a smaller one, and this 
in proportion to the excess of the one over the other. And therefore there would 
always be a greater force in C to resist, than there would be [a force] in B to 
impel.312  
 
Garber further defends his interpretation with a passage from the letter to Clerselier in 
which Descartes provides some explanation of rule 4 to his friend. “[I]f it [the body at 
rest] is moved by a body which moves twice as fast as an another, it ought to receive 
twice as much motion from it; but it resists twice as much this twice as much motion.”313 
And a similar passage appears in the French edition: 
But since C is at rest, it resists the reception of twenty degrees ten times more 
than it resists the reception of two, and it resists the reception of two hundred one 
hundred times more, so that the more speed B has, the more resistance it finds in 
C.314 
 
Some infer that the force of resistance in a body at rest must be variable because of 
statements such as these: "[a] resting body resists a greater speed more than it does a 
smaller one," and "[the body at rest] resists twice as much this twice as much motion," 
and "the more speed B has, the more resistance it finds in C."  
 It is more likely that the passages from the letter to Clerselier and the French 
edition of the Principles are illustrations of Descartes's chosen condition, as specified in 
rule 4, for rebound—size.  As Descartes explained in the French edition of the Principles: 
"its resistance [i.e. the resistance of the larger body at rest] ought to prevail over the 
action of B because it is larger than it."315 The above passages, which seem to imply that 
the force of resistance is variable, make just as much sense if we trust Descartes's words 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312 AT VIII 68. Principia (Latin) II 49. Translation by Garber, Descartes' Metphysical Physics, 240. In my 
view, here Descartes seems merely to be stressing that a larger body at rest will resist no matter what. See 
my argument below.  
313 AT IV 184. Descartes to Clerselier, 17 February 1645. Translation by Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical 
Physics, 243. 
314 AT IX 91. Principes (French) II 49. Translation by Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 257.  
315 Ibid.   
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that size is in fact the condition that is relevant. If the force of resistance, determined by 
the size of the body, is absolute, then the speed of the body approaching is irrelevant.316 It 
will resist any speed, a great speed or a small speed. Since the greater speed offers more 
moving force than a smaller speed, the body at rest, in a sense, "resists a greater speed 
more than it does a smaller one," or "the more speed B has, the more resistance it finds in 
C." But the force of resistance in the body at rest resists absolutely because it is larger in 
size than the smaller body moving toward it. Because of the size, no motion is 
transferred. No matter how much speed the moving body has, it will never overcome the 
force of resistance. The moving force will not overcome the force of resistance if it 
moves twice as fast, or twenty times as fast, or one hundred times as fast.   
 Descartes did not state that a larger resting body has a force of resistance that 
depends on the degree of speed of the body moving toward it, such as m2v1. I contend that 
this interpretation was the result of a solution to an artificial problem that was produced 
from rewriting Descartes's ideas in a mathematical form that Descartes's did not use. If 
one refrains from using this mathematical form, then there is no problem to be solved. 
The received view also conflicts with Descartes's explanations of rule 4 in his letter to 
Clerselier. Descartes repeatedly claims in a variety of ways that the force of resistance in 
a body at rest depends on the size of the bodies. Speed is irrelevant. Those passages 
regarding the force of resistance of a larger body at rest that have frequently been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316 In the letter to Clerselier Descartes explains that speed is irrelevant—that the contest between the 
moving force and the force of resistance depends only on size—by claiming that the body at rest "has as 
many degrees of resistance as the other, which is moving, has of speed," which is another way of stating 
that speed is inconsequential. See AT IV 184. Descartes to Clerselier, 17 February 1645. Translation by 
Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 261. 
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interpreted as the force as variable are consistent with an understanding of the force as 
absolute.  
  
5.6.1 – Letter to Clerselier 
 
 After Descartes published the Latin edition of the Principles of Philosophy he was 
called upon to explain himself to his friend Clerselier regarding rule 4 as well as the other 
rules involving one body at rest. Previous commentators have found principles in the 
letter that do not seem to appear in the Latin Principles, such as the so called Principle of 
Least Modal Modification (PLMM) also known as the Principle of Least Modal Change 
(PLMC). Garber has provided a detailed account of the development of Descartes's 
understanding of collision from the Latin Principles through the Letter to Clerselier to the 
French edition of the Principles. In Garber's telling, Descartes introduced several new 
principles in the letter, such as the so-called "sophisticated impact contest," the PLMC, 
and a symmetry principle, but never fully brought the project to fruition in the French 
edition. Instead the French edition was a hybrid of ideas, but ultimately the rules of 
collision remained an unfinished draft.317 Although Descartes's overall project is 
problematic, his rules are not as incomplete as Garber suggests. The root of the problem 
has been that the letter has been read through the interpretive lens of the received view of 
the force of resistance of a body at rest. When this interpretive tool is set aside, we see 
that Descartes's rules do not seem as problematic and incomplete. Descartes was not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 231, 242, 252. "Descartes' full treatment of impact was late in 
coming and, in the end, never fully worked out; the record shows him struggling with the problem, and 
never really arriving at a single satisfactory view on the problem. ... Indeed, Alan Gabbey has made a very 
convincing case for the claim that the seven rules are a late addition to the Principles, and were hastily 
added only after what is now Pr II 45 and Pr II 53 were fully drafted. ... The question of impact seems to 
remain an unsettled question up until the end of Descartes' life, work in progress that he never quite 
finished."  
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testing out multiple implicit principles in the various texts. Rather, Descartes's later ideas 
remained largely the same. By the time he wrote the Principles, his ideas had moved 
away from his "early view." He had developed and determined his rules, which remain 
the same through all the texts of his "later view," in regards to their order and outcomes 
and rationale. Descartes was not introducing new principles in the letter, and presenting a 
hybrid in the French. Rather, he was explaining the same principle in several different 
ways to try to convince his friend Clerselier. 
 The letter Clerselier sent to Descartes does not survive. However, from 
Descartes's response we see that Clerselier had likely asked why it is "that a body without 
motion would never be moved by another smaller than it, whatever the speed with which 
this smaller body could move."318 He asked about rule 4. Throughout the course of the 
letter, Descartes responds to this question in three different ways. In the first paragraph, 
he appeals to the impact law, with an emphasis on size. In the second paragraph, he uses 
a numerical example to illustrate the contest view where the determining condition is the 
size of the body at rest, but he expresses it in a slightly different way from either the Latin 
or French edition. Nevertheless, it is not substantially different. In the third paragraph, he 
says that everything relies on one principle, the "principle of least modal change," which 
he explains in the fourth paragraph. His explanation is connected to the numerical 
proportions in the second paragraph. His explanation also reveals that the PLMC is just 
another way of describing the contest between resistance and the force of moving.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 AT IV 183-4. Descartes to Clerselier, 17 February 1645. Translation by Garber, Descartes' 
Metaphysical Physics, 260-1. 
	   176 
 In the first paragraph, Descartes responds to Clerselier's question by referring him 
to the impact law, with an emphasis on size as the relevant condition for overcoming the 
force for moving, resulting in rebound with no transfer of motion:  
[I]t is a law of nature that a body that moves another must have more force to 
move it than the other has to resist it. But this greater [force for moving] can 
depend only on its size, for that which is without motion has as many degrees of 
resistance as the other, which is moving, has of speed. The reason for this is that if 
it is moved by a body which moves twice as fast as another, it ought to received 
twice as much motion from it; but it resists twice as much as this twice as much 
motion.319 
  
Note that Descartes clearly states that it "can depend only on its size."320 In the second 
paragraph, Descartes explains this very principle with some contrasting examples. He 
begins with an example in which motion is transferred to a body initially at rest, and then 
contrasts this with an example in which motion cannot be transferred to a body initially at 
rest:    
For example, body B cannot push body C without making it move as fast as it 
itself would move after having pushed it. In particular, if B is to C as 5 is to 4, 
with B having 9 degrees of motion, it must transfer 4 of them to C to make it go 
as fast as it goes. This is easy, for it has the force to transfer up to four and a half 
(that is, half of what it has) rather than reflecting its motion in the other 
direction.321  
 
C = 4          B = 5      
C at rest          VB = 9 
 
 
 
C = 4              B = 5 
VC = VB = 5 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 AT IV 184. Descartes to Clerselier, 17 February 1645. Translation by Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical 
Physics, 261. 
320 Garber claims that the above quoted passage from the letter to Clerselier is merely a restatement, 
without argument, of the notion that "the force of resisting in a resting body is proportional to the speed of 
the moving body." Garber, Descartes's Metaphysical Physics, 243. However, we clearly see the same 
pattern of thought described above. Descartes describes the possible outcomes, such as what would occur if 
motion were to be transferred: "if it is moved by a body which moves twice as fast as another, it ought to 
receive twice as much motion from it." But motion is not transferred, because the resting body is larger. 
Therefore the resting body will resist being moved, no matter what speed the moving body has.   
321 AT IV 184. Descartes to Clerselier, 17 February 1645. Translation by Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical 
Physics, 261. 
C  B C  B 
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This is exactly the same transfer of motion that we have seen in rule 5, as well as all 
throughout Descartes's early view, as well as the accounts in Beeckman's Journal before 
him. There is an inverse proportion between the size of the moving body before collision 
and the larger moving body after collision, to the speed of the initially moving body and 
the speed of the larger moving body after collision.  body  B  of  size  5body  B + C  after  collision  of  size  9 = speed  of  body  (B + C)  after  collision  𝑥speed  of  body  B  before  collision  9  59 = 𝑥9 𝑥 = 5 (speed of body B+C after collision) 
The larger body (both bodies moving together) must move 5 degrees of speed. Thus 4 
degrees of speed must have been transferred in the collision.  
 The explanation that Descartes provides in the letter appears novel (and 
arbitrary)—“it has the force to transfer up to four and a half (that is, half of what it has) 
rather than reflecting its motion in the other direction." But it is really just another way of 
stating that a body will transfer motion to another body at rest of any size up to but not 
including a body equal to itself. In other words, it is another way of stating that size is the 
relevant condition. The reasoning is as follows: 
body  B  of  size  5body  B + C  after  collision  of  size  5+ 𝑦 = speed  of  body  B + C  after  collision  up  to  4!!speed  of  body  B  before  collision  9  𝑦 = 5 (size of body B+C after collision) 
In other words, the explanation of Descartes's numerical example claims that a moving 
body will transfer motion to a body at rest as long as that body is less than equal its size. 
Descartes has merely restated the same principle mentioned in the first paragraph, the 
impact law, with emphasis on the condition of size. Using the same familiar inverse 
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proportion that he has always used in cases of the transfer of motion, he has expressed the 
principle in terms of the speeds involved rather than the bodies.  
 Descartes then contrasts this with another numerical example in which no motion 
is transferred:  
But if B is to C as 4 is to 5, B cannot move C, unless of its nine degrees of motion 
it transfers 5 to C, which is more than half of what it has, and which, as a 
consequence, C resists more than B has the force to act.322  
 
B = 4          C = 5 
VB = 9       C at rest 
 
 
 
 
B = 4          C = 5 
VB before = VB after = 9 
Descartes's explanation in this example is the same. A body can only transfer up to half 
of the motion it has to a body at rest. In other words, a body can only transfer motion to a 
resting body that is up to equal its size. In this case, it would transfer 5 degrees of motion, 
and both would move together with 4 degrees of speed. But this is impossible because 5 
degrees of motion is more than half of the 9 degrees of speed body B has. Or, in other 
words, body C is more than equal to B in size. Thus, the force of resistance is not 
overcome, and no motion is transferred.  
 Gabbey and Garber interpret this differently. They see the force of resisting in the 
body at rest to be measured by "the quantity of motion it would have if B were to succeed 
in pushing it after the collision, then the faster B goes, the more resistance C offers."323 
Garber calls this the "sophisticated impact contest model" as opposed to the "simple 
impact contest model" found in the Latin Principles. "On this view, force is not 
proportional to motion but to change of motion, the quantity of motion that a resisting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 AT IV 184-5. Descartes to Clerselier, 17 February 1645.  Translation by Garber, Descartes' 
Metaphysical Physics, 261. 
323 Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 244. Gabbey, "Force and Inertia," 269-70. 
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body would have if it were set into motion by collision."324 Gabbey has argued that "this 
conception of force of rest also looks forward to the Newtonian conception of force in 
terms of change of motion."325 Gabbey and Garber have misinterpreted this passage. The 
conditional language Descartes uses is due to his method of presenting the possible 
outcomes, and working backward to find a conflict. It is a mistake to conflate it with the 
so-called measure of the force of resisting. Descartes was not "looking forward" to 
Newton. Moreover, using the received view as an interpretive lens, Garber cannot make 
sense of the numerical examples Descartes provides in the second paragraph.326  
 Descartes closes paragraph 2 by reiterating that he has explained why the smaller 
body must rebound upon meeting a larger body at rest.327 Moreover he states: "And 
without this, no body would ever be reflected by encountering another." Rule four is of 
primary importance for an account of rebound. Without it, there would be no rebound.  
 In the third paragraph, Descartes attempts to clear away any more difficulties 
Clerselier might have with his rules. To do so, he asks Clerselier to note that all of the 
rules "depend only on a single principle, which is that 
when two bodies having incompatible modes collide, there must really be some 
change in these modes, in order to render them compatible, but that this change is 
always the least possible, that is, if they can become compatible by changing a 
certain quantity of these modes, a greater quantity of them will not be changed. 
And we must consider two different modes in motion [mouuement]: one is 
motion [motion] alone, or speed, and the other is determination of this motion 
[motion] in a certain direction, which two modes change with equal difficulty.328  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324 Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 244. 
325 Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 244. Gabbey, "Force and Inertia," 243-72. 
326 Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 244. "[T]here is still a deep arbitrariness in Descartes' 
account: I can see no argument for the claim he makes in paragraph 2 that a body in motion has force 
enough to impose only half of its motion on another; this is not obvious in itself, nor does it follow from 
anything he says either in this paragraph of the Clerselier letter or in the Latin Principles." 
327 AT IV 186. Descartes to Clerselier, 17 February 1645. "This is why B ought to rebound in the other 
direction instead of moving C." Translation by Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 261.  
328 AT IV 185. Descartes to Clerselier, 17 February 1645. Translation by Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical 
Physics, 261. 
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This principle (known as the PLMM or PLMC), taken as a new and independent 
principle, does not appear significantly in the Latin or French Principles.329 It seems to be 
a significant departure from the impact law. The PLMC has been discussed extensively 
among commentators on Descartes's physics, covering topics such as the apparent lack of 
forces in the principle, its teleological nature, its relationship to the impact law, and the 
priority of the principle in Descartes's system.330 I will not take up these discussions 
except one. Garber has claimed that the PLMC "seems to bear no connection to the 
impact contest model of law 3," nor is it closely related to the previous paragraphs in the 
letter.331 Although the PLMC may be problematic, the explanation that Descartes 
provides for it in paragraph four bears a striking resemblance to the impact law, with the 
specification that size is the relevant condition determining whether rebound, transfer of 
motion, or both occur upon impact. Moreover, we will see that the PLMC is not only 
related to the rest of the letter, but that all three explanations Descartes provided in the 
first four paragraphs of his letter are closely bound together.    
 In rules 4, 5, and 6, one body is at rest and one is in motion. In other words, their 
modes are incompatible. In a statement that resembles the impact law, Descartes claims 
that:  
they can become compatible in two ways, namely, if B changes the entire 
determination of its motion, or if it changes body C's rest, transferring to it such 
part of its motion as will enable it [B] to push C in front of it as fast as it will itself 
go.332 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 247, 251. However, Garber claims that there is a "clear 
reference to it in the explanation of R3" in the French Principles.  
330 Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 247. Gabbey, "Force and Inertia," 264-5.  
331 Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 247. 
332 AT IV 186. Descartes to Clerselier, 17 February 1645. Translation by Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical 
Physics, 262.  
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The first way is for B to change its determination/direction. The second way is if B 
transfers the requisite amount of motion such that they will move together after impact. 
These are the two options Descartes outlines in his impact law. If this were a restatement 
of the impact law, we would expect that Descartes would outline the possible outcomes 
of the contest. And, since one body is at rest, its force of resistance in the contest is 
determined by size. This is precisely what Descartes does in the next sentence: 
And I have said nothing in these three rules but this, that when C is larger than B, 
it is the first of these two ways which takes place [i.e. determination changes, e.g. 
rule 4], and when it is smaller, it is the second [i.e. the resistance is overcome and 
motion is transferred, e.g. rule 5], and finally, when they are equal, this change is 
made half in the one way and half in the other [e.g. rule 6].333    
 
Descartes then refers back to the statement of size in the numerical examples he provided 
in the second paragraph to elucidate the principle. Since he had restated size in terms of 
the amount of motion that could be transferred (up to half of speed of the moving body), 
Descartes now uses that language to illustrate the PLMC.  
For when C is the largest, B could push it ahead of itself only if it were to transfer 
to C more than half its speed, and at the same time more than half of its 
determination to go from right to left, insofar as this determination is joined to its 
speed. So instead, being reflected, without changing C, it changes only its entire 
determination, which is a lesser change than a change of more than half of this 
same determination and more than half of the speed.  
 
Descartes has established a set of equivalences. As a principle, a smaller body cannot 
move a larger body at rest. If it could move the larger body, it would transfer enough 
motion that they would move together (pushing the larger in front of itself). This would 
require transferring more than half of its motion to the body at rest. But smaller bodies 
cannot move larger bodies at rest. Consequently bodies cannot transfer more than half of 
their motion to bodies at rest. As we have seen in paragraph 2, these are equivalent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 Ibid. 
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statements. Another way to say this same thing is the following: a smaller body C 
changes its entire determination (it reflects) rather than transfer more than half its motion 
and accompanying determination of that motion. In paragraphs three and four, Descartes 
is calling Clerselier's attention to the fact that this same principle that he has been 
describing throughout the letter can also be described as the "least modal change." A 
change in the entire determination of C is smaller than a transfer of "more than half of its 
speed" in addition to the accompanying determination of this speed.  
 Descartes again contrasts the scenario in rule 4 with that in rule 5, using the same 
set of equivalences:  
On the other hand, if C were smaller than B, it should be pushed by it, for then B 
give it less than half of its own speed and less than half of the determination 
which is joined to it. This is less than changing the entire determination, which 
would be changed if it were reflected.334   
          
Descartes has already shown that when a larger body transfers motion to a smaller body 
at rest such that they both move together after impact, the larger transfers less than half of 
its motion. Another description of the same principle is that a transfer of less than half of 
the moving body's motion (together with the accompanying determination) is less than a 
change in the entire determination.  
 The explanation of the PLMC is closely connected to the impact law. It is an 
alternative statement of the same fundamental idea that size is the relevant condition for 
rebound. The PLMC is also closely connected to the previous paragraphs of the letter to 
Clerselier. The explanation of the PLMC relies on the notion from the second paragraph 
that a moving body can transfer up to half of its speed to a body at rest. This condition is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 Ibid. 
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not arbitrary. It is merely a restatement of the condition that a smaller body does not 
transfer motion to a larger body at rest.   
 
 
Section 6  
Conclusion 
 
 Descartes's view of collision changed and developed. In his early view, he 
rejected that which would become his notorious fourth rule of collision, which states that 
a smaller body cannot move a larger body at rest. In the year prior to writing the 
Principles of Philosophy, Descartes describes smaller bodies moving larger bodies at rest 
in every context in which he describes collision—whether the bodies are in a medium, 
whether they are illustrating another principle such as the conservation of quantity of 
motion, or most importantly, whether they are quantitatively described in the abstract, 
isolated from all other bodies. In every case, the smaller body transfers as much of its 
motion such that both bodies move together after meeting. Throughout his early view, he 
used the same inverse proportion that Beeckman had used: the speed of the bodies after 
collision is to the speed of the moving body before, as the size of the initially moving 
body is to the size of both bodies moving together after. In Descartes's later view, as 
found in the Latin and French editions of the Principles of Philosophy and the letter to 
Clerselier, he changed his account of collision to include rule four. 
 Descartes's impact law remains largely the same335 throughout the development. 
The significant change between his early and later view is that in the latter he stipulates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 There are small exceptions. The order in which the rule is found changes from The World, where it is the 
second law of nature, to the Principles of Philosophy, where it is the third law of nature. The conditions of 
the impact law, transfer of motion and rebound, are more clearly expressed in the later work.  
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the conditions of the impact law—specifically, he articulates when the force of resistance 
is not overcome in the contest between moving force and force of resistance. Although 
his impact law had always claimed that a failure to overcome the force of resistance 
results in rebound with no transfer of motion, it was not until the rules of collision in the 
Principles of Philosophy that Descartes specified when this would occur, i.e. when the 
force of resistance is actually greater than the moving force. In every quantitative 
example that Descartes presented in his early view, the moving force overcomes the force 
of resistance, e.g. a falling stone overcomes the resistance of the entire earth. Rule 4 
stipulates the condition in which the force of resistance is greater than the moving force. 
Contrary to the standard interpretation, I have argued that the relevant condition is the 
size of the body. 
 New light is shed on Descartes's rules of collision if we focus our attention on this 
shift, and the corresponding importance of the outcomes of collision—whether the force 
of resistance is greater resulting in rebound, or whether the moving force is greater 
resulting in a transfer of motion, or whether the force of resistance and moving force are 
equal. With this focus, together with attention to the historicity of the mathematics used 
by Descartes himself, rather than a reconstruction of Descartes's ideas with modern 
mathematics, I have uncovered a unifying pattern throughout the rules. There is a distinct 
similarity in the structure of those rules that share an outcome of the impact law—the 
force of resistance is not overcome resulting in rebound such as rules 4, 2, and 7b, the 
force of resistance is overcome resulting in a transfer of motion such as rules 5, 3, 7a, or 
there is a balance between the forces such as 6, 7c, 1.  
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 All of the rules abide by several prior principles: the conservation of quantity of 
motion, the contest of forces described by the impact law, and the condition in which the 
force of resistance is greater than the moving force. While explaining his rules, such as 
rule 4, Descartes presents the various possible outcomes. He describes what would occur 
if the force of resistance were overcome and motion were to be transferred, just as he 
describes what would happen if it was not and there was rebound instead. From the 
possible outcomes he works "backward." If a contradiction with a prior principle was 
found, the possible outcome was eliminated. Descartes was explicit while explaining rule 
4 to describe how much motion would be transferred, if the force of resistance were to be 
overcome. But it is not possible to overcome the force of resistance in the scenario 
described by rule 4. Similarly in rule 6 (in which the bodies are equal and one is at rest), 
Descartes presents the possible outcomes—rebound or transfer of motion. However, the 
force of resistance and moving force are equal. Neither option can be eliminated, so he 
evenly divided the amount of motion that would either be transferred or retained, and 
both rebound and transfer occurs. Precisely the same reasoning is used in rule 7c. He uses 
a similar explanatory strategy in rule 1. However, here one option must be eliminated, not 
because it conflicts with the condition of rebound, but rather because it conflicts with 
another prior principle, the conservation of quantity of motion. The rules of collision 
were a new problem for Descartes, and Descartes used a problem-solving strategy—the 
analytic method—to determine his rules.  
 The standard interpretation of Descartes's rules of collision has presented the 
quantity of motion as the product of body and speed. Descartes could have easily 
expressed the quantity of motion in this manner, but he never did. The forces involved in 
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the impact law, such as the moving force and the force of resistance, have likewise been 
expressed as algebraic products akin to the quantity of motion. Not only did Descartes 
not express these forces as products, three of Descartes's rules describe one body at rest. 
The above interpretation would imply that the force of resistance in the body at rest 
should be nil. This is an interpretive difficulty since the force of resistance in the body at 
rest is greater than the moving force in rule 4, and is equal to the moving force in rule 6. 
The solution to this difficulty has been to continue to express the force of resistance of a 
product, but rather than the product of the body and the speed of the body at rest, it has 
been argued to be the product of the body and the speed of the body approaching. I have 
argued that this interpretation is incorrect. I have also argued such an interpretation has 
led to several unnecessary interpretive problems with both Descartes's explanations in the 
letter to Clerselier as well as the French edition of the Principles. Using the received view 
of the force of resistance as a lens, it has been argued that there is a proliferation of new 
principles in the letter to Clerselier, with some, such as the Principle of Least Modal 
Change, bearing no connection to the impact law, and others seeming to be completely 
arbitrary with no justification at all. The subsequent French edition of the Principles 
relies on a hybrid of some of these principles in the justification of the rules of collision, 
but is ultimately a hastily composed unfinished draft.  
 If we maintain a historicist focus on the mathematics that Descartes himself used, 
and if we are attentive to Descartes's own guidance for understanding the rules of 
collision according to the outcomes of the contest between the force of resistance and 
moving force, we find that Descartes's rules of collision are much less problematic than 
has usually been alleged. There is an underlying pattern and method unifying the rules of 
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collision, which we see clearly when they are reorganized as I have suggested. This 
chapter has attempted to make sense of Descartes's practice, and has recaptured the 
method that was advocated and practiced by Descartes and others in the 17th century, the 
analytic method. I have shown that the letter to Clerselier is a well-ordered letter, in 
which Descartes explains himself in three interlocking ways. Rather than a hybrid of 
ideas in the French edition, we find Descartes revealing the analytic method to further 
explain how he attempted to solve the problem of collision.   
 Descartes's rules of collision were pivotal. They framed the topic in published 
form that was only touched upon by Beeckman in private. And Descartes tackled new 
problems such as an account of rebound using the analytic method. Descartes did not, 
however, use symbolic algebra, with which he was so familiar from his work on analytic 
geometry. As we will see in the next chapter, young Christiaan Huygens would use these 
very tools to challenge Descartes's rules of collision.    
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Chapter 4  
The formulation of Huygens’s rules of collision: Challenging Descartes with 
Cartesian tools  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Descartes had found the way to have his conjectures and fictions taken for truths. 
And to those who read his Principles of Philosophy something happened like that which 
happens to those who read novels which please and make the same impression as true 
stories. The novelty of the images of his little particles and vortices are most agreeable. 
When I read the book of Principles the first time, it seemed to me that everything 
proceeded perfectly; and when I found some difficulty, I believed it was my fault in not 
fully understanding his thought. I was only fifteen or sixteen years old. But since then, 
having discovered in it from time to time things that are obviously false and others that 
are very improbable, I have rid myself entirely of the prepossession I had conceived and I 
now find almost nothing in all his physics that I can accept as true, nor in his 
metaphysics and his meteorology.336 
 
 
Mr. Descartes, who seemed to me to be jealous of the fame of Galileo, had a great desire 
to be regarded as the author of a new philosophy. It appears from his hopes and efforts 
that he wished to have it taught in the academies in place of Aristotle so that he wished 
that the Jesuits would embrace it; but in the pursuit of this goal, he maintained positions 
inconsistently which he had at one time brought forward, although they were often very 
false. ... He was assured of certain things without demonstration, such as the laws of 
motion in collision which he thought to make accepted as true in permitting it to be 
believed that his entire physics would be false if his laws were. It is almost as though he 
wished to prove them by taking an oath. However, there is only one of his laws which is 
true and it will be easy for me to prove it.337  
 
     —Christiaan Huygens’s 1693 annotations on Baillet’s La vie de monsieur Des-Cartes (1691) 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 HOC 10: 403. Translated by Richard Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics: The Science of Dynamics in 
the Seventeenth Century (New York: American Elsevier, 1971) 185. 
337 HOC 10: 405. Translation by Robert S. Westman, "Huygens and the problem of Cartesianism," in 
Studies on Christiaan Huygens, ed. H. J. M. Bos et al. (Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger B. V., 1980) 98. 
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Section 1  
Introduction   
 
 In April of 1661, Christiaan Huygens met with Christopher Wren, Lawrence 
Rooke, John Wallis, and other members of the newly formed Royal Society in London to 
discuss problems concerning impact. Together they observed experiments such as the 
collision of two equal-length pendulums. When a one-pound bob was raised 40 degrees 
from the equilibrium position, for example, they were to predict what would happen after 
it hit a half-pound bob at rest.338 While at the meeting, Huygens quickly made a few 
calculations and correctly predicted this and several other related problems that the 
president of the Royal Society, William Brouncker, had proposed.339 No one else, 
including Wren and Rooke, could produce satisfactory rules for accurate prediction. At 
the time Huygens only reported his findings, preferring to blot out his calculations and 
kept his rules of impact to himself. In Sir Robert Moray’s recollection of the event, 
Moray explicitly described the process that Huygens used as an “algebraicall 
computation,” and noted that he was so successful that “every body wondered & 
concluded after 2 or 3 such tryalls, his rules were good.”340 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338 HOC 5: 547. H. Oldenburg to B. de Spinoza, 18 December 1665. The particulars of this experiment 
have been recorded in a letter from Henry Oldenburg, the Royal Society’s Secretary and the first editor of 
the Philosophical Transactions, to Baruch Spinoza. "Praesens non sui, quando Dominus Hugenius 
Experimenta, Hypothesin suam comprobantia, hic Londini fecit. Intelligo interim, quendam inter alia pilam 
unius librae, penduli in modum suspendisse, quae delapsa percusserit aliam, eodem modo suspensam, sed 
librae dimidiae, ex angulo quadraginta graduum, et Hugenium praedixisse, paucula facta Computatione 
Algebraica, quis foret effectus, et hunc ipsum praedictioni ad amussim respondisse." Also see Domenico 
Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 233-4. 
339 HOC 16: 172-3. Diederik Korteweg, the editor of this portion of volume 16, specifically notes that 
Huygens used “un petit calcul algèbrique.” 340	  OCH	  2:	  624-­‐5.	  Moray	  to	  Oldenburg,	  27	  November	  1665.	  In	  the	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  Moray	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  a	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  description	  of	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  should	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  concluded	  after	  2.	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  3	  such	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  his	  rules	  were	  good."	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A number of Huygens’s early works use algebraic techniques that are presumably 
of the same type as those he used in London. Key manuscripts from the early 1650s 
contain many of Huygens’s early thoughts on collision. These would later be refined and 
expressed in his draft De motu corporum ex percussione.341 On the documents from the 
early 50s, however, and notably not on the later draft of De motu corporum ex 
percussione, are algebraic expressions of collision. The symbolic algebra contained in 
this document may well be among the first equations to represent physical relations in the 
history of science.342 Their significance is that different kinds of quantity, such as the 
speed of bodies and the size of bodies are included in a single equation. Previously 
algebra had been used to study curves and space; it had also been used to investigate a 
single kind of physical quantity in a given equation. Huygens’s equations contain 
relations of different kinds of physical quantities. Despite their deceptive simplicity, these 
equations marked a change in the way mathematics was used to study nature and opened 
up new avenues of research in mechanics. Huygens clearly relied on Cartesian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 HOC 16: 30-91. Alan Gabbey, "Huygens and mechanics," in Studies on Christiaan Huygens, ed. H. J. 
M. Bos et al. (Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger B. V., 1980) 168-70. De motu corporum ex percussione was 
written by 1656, but was not published until 1703, after Huygens’s death. This does not mean that his 
theory of collision was unknown. He had shared several theorems with his correspondents between 1656 
and 1661, defended his collision theory at the Académie des Sciences in early 1668, published 7 
propositions (without proofs) with the Journal des Sçavans, and published a Latin version of the 
propositions with the Royal Society’s Philosophical Transactions in April 1669, which was meant to 
appear with the contributions of Wren and Wallis in the previous issue of the Philosophical Transactions. 
342 C. D. Andriesse, Huygens: The Man Behind the Principle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 103. Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 232. John Roche, Mathematics of Measurement: A 
Critical History (London: Athlone Press, 1998), 90-1, 106. Andriesse states clearly that these might have 
been the first physical formulas ever to be written. Bertoloni Meli does not mention that they were the first 
equations. He does, however, remark upon the new algebraic methods of solving equations, notes the use of 
the now familiar conventional symbols x and y, and claims that along with experiments involving the 
pendulum and other devices, Huygens’s algebraic equations were part of the “heuristic path” leading to the 
“masterful axiomatic theory” found in De motu corporum ex percussione. Roche claims that Huygens’s 
1652 manuscript was the first to represent quantity of motion as the algebraic product of mass and velocity. 
He presents several examples of early algebraic representations of physical phenomena, e.g. Tartaglia’s 
verbal algebra in 1546 to describe a balance, John Dee’s symbolic algebra to calculate intermediate 
temperatures in 1570, and Marinus Ghetaldi’s 1630 posthumous publication in which algebra determines 
the amounts of gold and silver in a crown. 
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mathematical tools, which he had learned from his teacher, Frans van Schooten, but he 
developed them in novel ways. In fact, Huygens’s well-known corrections of Descartes’s 
physics—the rules of collision as well as the conservation of the quantity of motion—are 
presented in this early document. In other words, in 1652 Huygens challenged 
Descartes’s physics with Cartesian mathematical weapons.  
In addition to a critical conceptual analysis, Huygens’s algebraic equations were 
likely significant in the scaffolding of a new principle, the conservation of Cartesian 
quantity of motion with direction, which combines subtraction with the direction of 
motion. Corresponding to Huygens's algebraic investigations of collision are his 
influential studies of the pendulum. The pendulum proved to be important to collision, 
not only in Huygens empirical studies, but also for the formation of several of his 
fundamental principles, such as his variation of the Torricelli principle, the reversibility 
of impact, and the conservation of body times speed squared.   
With Huygens, we again see the importance of understanding the historicity of the 
mathematics of collision. Although the algebra in Huygens's manuscripts was innovative, 
it is not identical to modern symbolic equations. It holds, rather, a status "in-between" the 
flexibility of a formal system and the traditional requirements on quantities. Likely 
through his struggles with negative quantities, which he sought to avoid in his algebraic 
equations for collision, Huygens developed the new principle of conservation of 
Cartesian quantity of motion with direction. Although Huygens's algebraic calculations, 
which accurately predicted the motions of colliding pendulum bobs, were influential 
(Wren and Wallis would publish their own studies of collision with algebra), Huygens's 
did not publish them. Rather, in the works prepared for publication, Huygens formulated 
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his theory in the axiomatic tradition of Archimedes and Galileo, using geometric 
diagrams to represent physical quantities as continuous magnitudes, rigorously 
employing the theory of proportions. Here his axioms relied on principles of symmetry.   
Huygens was deeply influenced by Descartes’s theory of collision and 
mathematics, and shared Descartes's vision that all natural phenomena can be explained 
by the motion of particles. However, he challenged the Cartesian rules of collision at the 
foundation of this vision, using Descartes's symbolic algebra. With algebra as a heuristic 
and the pendulum as a key object in the formation of his principles, Huygens presented 
and justified his theory in an axiomatic formulation. Using Descartes's first rule, which 
describes a symmetrical collision, and the relativity of motion as a principle of 
invariance, he established his theory of collision and challenged Descartes, re-
conceptualizing the fundamental concepts of matter and motion in the process.   
 
 
Section 2  
Algebraic collisions   
 
Huygens learned Cartesian algebra from an early age. He became adept and used 
the new mathematics in novel ways, expressing physical quantities relating to collision in 
equations, such as the conservation of Cartesian quantity of motion and Huygens’s 
principle of the conservation of “body times speed squared.” He used the equations to 
analyze Descartes’s rules of collision, specifically rules 4 and 5. Huygens’s algebraic 
equations of collision hold an in-between-status between the flexibility of modern 
algebra, and traditional requirements on quantity. They are not indicative of a formal 
system; the symbols refer to specific quantities, and are bound by the restraints such 
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quantities impose. For example, Huygens takes steps to avoid the “negative quantities” 
that are almost inevitably produced when calculating the acquired speed (after impact) of 
an initially moving body. But the equations are not representations of geometrical objects 
(such as steps of a construction as was the case with Harriot in chapter 2, or of curves as 
in Descartes's analytic geometry), nor do they adhere to the rules on the relations of kinds 
of quantities in the theory of proportions (as does the mathematics in Huygens's 
published Horologium oscillatorium). In addition to its predictive role in calculating the 
experimental outcomes of colliding pendulum bobs, and the heuristic role in clarifying 
Huygens's position against Descartes, the algebra may have also been instrumental in the 
formation of Huygens’s principle of the conservation of (“Cartesian”) quantity of motion 
with direction. 
 
2.1 – Education in Cartesian Mathematics  
Descartes had recommended Frans van Schooten (1615-1660) to Christiaan’s 
father, Constantijn, as a tutor for his children, writing that “perhaps you [Constantijn] 
could quite easily afford yourself the opportunity to introduce Algebra to any of your 
children who might have some inclination in that direction; for I know of no one in this 
country and I know scarcely anyone anywhere who is as capable as he [Van Schooten] 
is.”343 Van Schooten did give private lessons to Christiaan and his brother,344 and taught 
mathematics at Leiden University while Christiaan studied law and mathematics there 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343 HOC 22: 50. Descartes to Constantijn Huygens, 21 December 1644. Translation by Westman, "Huygens 
and Cartesianism," 86. The letter is also collected in Leon Roth, ed., Correspondence of Descartes and 
Constantyn Huygens, 1635-1647 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1926), 234-5. Also see Nicole 
Christine Howard, "Christiaan Huygens: The Construction of Texts and Audiences" (PhD diss., Indiana 
University, 2003), 38.   
344 J. A. van Maanen, Facets of Seventeenth Century Mathematics in the Netherlands (Utrecht: Drukkerij 
Elinkwijk B. V., 1987), 21. 
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from 1645-1647.345 At this time Van Schooten had taught the teenage Huygens Cartesian 
analytic geometry.346 The algebraic-analytic method is apparent, for example, in 
Huygens’s “homework” papers on a series of geometrical problems as early as 1645.347 
In addition to advocating Cartesian natural philosophy and promoting Descartes’s 
analytical mathematical methods to his students and an international audience, Van 
Schooten was also involved with “Duytsche mathematique” at the engineering school 
affiliated with Leiden University.348 The school, established in 1600, taught practical 
mathematics349 in the vernacular. Frans van Schooten’s father was chair of “Dutch 
mathematics” starting in 1615, and was succeeded by his son, and later Frans’s brother 
Petrus. When Petrus died, the school closed. Huygens’s later works, particularly those on 
lenses and pendulum clocks, display a unique balance of the practical and abstract, which 
may have been cultivated at least in part from Van Schooten’s instruction.350 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 H. J. M. Bos, "Huygens and mathematics," in Studies on Christiaan Huygens, ed. H. J. M. Bos et al. 
(Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger B. V., 1980) 126-46. Bos has conceptually divided Huygens’s mathematical 
career into several periods: 1645-1655 is his “formative period;” 1655-1660 is his “creative period;” 1660-
1680 is a period dominated primarily by transcendental curves and inverse calculus problems.  
346 Andriesse, Huygens, 73. H. J. M. Bos, "Christiaan Huygens: a biographical sketch," Studies on 
Christiaan Huygens, ed. H. J. M. Bos et al. (Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger B. V., 1980). Dirk Struik, The Land 
of Stevin and Huygens (Boston: Reidel, 1981), 90. Westman, "Huygens and Cartesianism," 86.  
347 HOC 1: 5-10. Stampioen de Jonge to [Christiaan Huygens], [1645]. Stampioen de Jonge was 
Christiaan’s teacher at Leiden prior to van Schooten. The letter includes a long list of mathematical works 
that Huygens was to study. The first title on the list is Hondert Geometrische questien met hare solutien by 
Sybrandt Hansz Cardinael. Huygens produced solutions to these problems using algebraic techniques. They 
date to the time that Frans van Schooten replaced de Jonge as Huygens’s teacher. See HOC 11: 23-7.  
348 Struik, Land of Stevin and Huygens, 85. Maanen, Facets, 5-8. 
349 Maanen, Facets, 8. The school would have attracted professionals such as surveyors, navigators, 
astronomers, architects, designers of fortification, teachers of arithmetic (“rekenmeesters”), university 
professors of mathematics, and compilers of mathematical tables.   
350 Maanen, Facets, 18-20. There were significant economic changes in the Netherlands around the 
midcentury, namely the level of affluence substantially increased. Van Maanen has argued that with this 
economic change came a new category of student who came from a more wealthy background. Van 
Maanen mentions Huygens among his examples. The new economic growth also brought a shift in 
emphasis in teaching, and subsequently in research, to “non-practical” fields of study. Mathematics 
particularly benefited from this shift. There is a correlated increase in the number of students and the 
number of institutions for higher education with the economic changes. Van Maanen mentions that Frans 
van Schooten profited from these circumstances and gathered several young mathematicians around him 
and stimulated interest in Descartes's La Géométrie. Huygens's later pursuits and publications demonstrate 
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 Huygens not only studied and learned the new Cartesian mathematical methods 
from Van Schooten, but also quickly became proficient enough to contribute to both the 
first351 and second352 editions of Van Schooten’s Latin translation and systematization of 
Descartes’s La Géométrie.353 
Huygens continued to apply these new methods to other areas of his study of 
nature. Among the first of these are the equations at the bottom of a large manuscript 
sheet354 dating to 1652,355 and his notes and examples of particular collisions from 
1654.356 See figures 1 and 2. These manuscripts are important because (1) they are among 
his earliest writings on collision, and (2) the writing of the 1652 document corresponds to 
Huygens’s first announcements of his criticism of Descartes.  
The 1652 document may have begun as a draft of a letter to Van Schooten357 in 
which Huygens requested a book on plane loci and discussed an exchange with Gregory 
of St. Vincent, whose quadrature of the circle Huygens had recently refuted in his first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that he was not exclusively interested in abstract problems. Perhaps Van Schooten's “Duytsche 
Mathematique” was an influence along with La Géométrie.  
351 HOC 14: 410-5, 416-7. 
352 HOC 14: 417-27. 
353 Maanen, Facets, 20-1.  
354 HOC 16: 6-10. Korteweg, the editor of volume 16, provides a general description of this manuscript in 
his avertissement.    
355 HOC 16: 94-9. 
356 HOC 16: 132-6. Some time later in Huygens’s life, possibly when he was arranging his papers to be 
given to a library, he had collected and numbered the 1652 manuscript sheet together with those dating to 
1654. These are compiled as Appendice I to De motu corporum ex percussione in HOC 16. The editors 
have divided Appendice I into eleven parts, which ideally correspond to the themes and pagination of 
Huygens’s work and numbering system. Parts two and three, for example, correspond to the 1652 
manuscript (HOC 16: 94-9). However, as Joella Yoder has indicated, although Huygens had willed his 
manuscripts directly to a library, their history is quite complex. His original arrangement, particularly of 
loose manuscripts, has been all but obliterated. Thus, this portion of Huygens’s manuscripts is fragmentary 
and disorderly which makes my attempts to analyze and draw inferences from them especially challenging. 
See Joella Yoder, “The Archive of Christiaan Huygens and his Editors,” in Archives of the Scientific 
Revolution, ed. Michael Hunter (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1998), 91-108. 
357 HOC 16: 6-7. Korteweg identifies the manuscript as a draft of a letter to which Van Schooten responded 
on 28 July 1652. See HOC 1: 183 for Van Schooten’s response.   
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publication, Theoremata de quadratura hyperboles, ellipsis et circuli (1651).358 But the 
manuscript came to be used as a penetrating investigation into the collision of bodies, and 
no shred of the paper was wasted: it has been entirely filed with symbols, diagrams, and 
propositions, with script running in at least three different directions. Some propositions 
have been struck out with bold lines, others circled repeatedly, and the numbering of 
several axioms have been scribbled out and rewritten. Diagrams are drawn in almost 
every available space in many orientations, and most look like they refer to collisions. 
Several appear to represent pendulums, and one may refer to a collision occurring on a 
circular track. The pictures of pendulums are particularly significant, given Huygens’s 
longstanding interest in their principles, and because they were beginning to be used as 
experimental devices for collision. The height of the bob could be used to measure 
speed—thus, colliding pendulums provided access to the speeds of bodies before and 
after impact. Algebraic equations are written on the “bottom” of the manuscript 
(depending on which way the page is oriented). See figure 1.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358 HOC 16: 99. 
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Figure 1. Equations from the 1652 manuscript. The manuscript can be found in the Codices 
Hugeniorum 26A, fol. 9r, henceforth abbreviated as HUG 26 fol. 9r. The image has been cropped 
to include only the lower half of the page. 
 
 
Figure 2. Naming convention and equations from the 1654 notes. The image, which also comes 
from HUG26A, is cropped from the inside ro of a large folded manuscript, which has been labeled 
26 in pencil in the upper left corner and 33 in ink in the upper right corner, presumably by 
Huygens. The image is cropped to the upper half of this page. 
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2.2 – Physical Equations: algebraic expressions of Cartesian collisions 
 The top most set of equations359 on the 1652 manuscript can be found in figure 3. 
The equations on the left of figure 3 are listed as 1 – 2. The equations on the right of 
figure 3 are listed as 3 – 5.  
 
  Figure 3 
bx + ay = ac     (1) 
y = c – bx / a     (2) 
 
acc - 2bcx + bbxx/a + bxx = acc  (3) 
2ca = bx + ax     (4) 
2ca/(b+a) =x     (5) 
To the left and down from these equations, on the original manuscript (as can be seen in 
figure 1), is another similar set of equations.360 See figure 4. The equations on the left of 
figure 4 are listed as 6 – 7. The equations on the right of figure 4 are listed as 8 – 11. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 HOC 16: 98. The equations, as written on the manuscript, use a different sign for equality than the 
modern and familiar “=.” The significance of the original equality sign is remarked upon in a footnote 
below. Departing from the manuscript, I have used the modern sign “=.” There are also several marks on 
the manuscript, which indicate simple algebraic simplifications, such as the crossed a in what would be 
equation (2) and the crossed acc in what would be equation (3). For ease of reading and formatting, I have 
presented the equations without these marks in the text below. All of this can, however, be found in the 
figures, which are reproduced from the original manuscripts.   
360 HOC 16: 98. 
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Figure 4 
ax + by = bc     (6) 
y = c - ax/b     (7) 
 
axx + bcc – 2bacx/b + aaxxb/bb = ccb (8) 
abxx + aaxx = 2acbx    (9) 
bx +ax = 2cb     (10) 
x= 2cb/(b+a)     (11) 
Notice that the left equations are simpler, first-order equations. The right, quadratic 
equations, are more largely and boldly written. The equations on the left solve for y, 
whereas the equations on the right solve for x. Note too that those solved for y (eq. 2 and 
7) are in terms of x, while those solved for x (eq. 5 and 11) are not in terms of y. A third 
set of equations361 was written below and to the right of the previous set. See figure 5. 
The equations in figure 5 are listed as 12 – 13.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 HOC 16. 98. 
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Figure 5 
axx +byy = bcc     (12) 
yy = (bcc – axx)/b     (13) 
The doubled letters refer to multiplication. So, xx is xx, or x2. This and other notation 
conventions (e.g. letters from the end of the alphabet for unknowns, letters from the 
beginning of the alphabet for known constants, and the equality symbol) are in the 
tradition of Descartes.362 So too is the “key” that Huygens provided to his algebraic 
notation:363 
a corpus maj. 
b minus. 
AC = c denotat veloc. A. 
CB = d veloc. B. 
Sit CE = x acquisita veloc. B post occursum in C 
 
Lines AC, CB, and CE refer to a diagram, which depicts the motion of bodies in collision. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 Florian Cajori, A History of Mathematical Notations (La Salle: Open Court, 1928), 302. Huygens did 
not se the “=” sign to represent equality. Instead he adopted Descartes’s sign, which when typed resembles 
a backward “e” connected to an “o.” According to Cajori, “Descartes’ symbol for equality, as it appears in 
his Géométrie of 1637, is simply the astronomical symbol for Taurus, placed sideways, with the opening 
turned to the left... [A]s Descartes lived in Holland several years...it is not surprising that Dutch writers 
should be the first to adopt widely the new notation. ... [I]nfluential was Christiaan Huygens who used [the 
symbol] as early as 1646 and in his subsequent writings. In the 1652 manuscript, of course, the symbol, 
which resembles the “proportionality sign,” had been written rather than set in type.    
363 HOC 16: 132-6.  
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Figure 6. Diagram and key from the 1654 notes 
Huygens consistently used this type of diagram—a horizontal line, whose segments 
represent speeds, with circles near each end of the line representing the bodies involved 
in collision—in his first works on collision from the early 1650s through his completed 
De motu corporum ex percussione. The above key is strikingly similar to what Descartes 
prescribed in the opening pages of La Géométrie:  
So that we may be sure to remember the names of these lines, a separate list 
should always be made as often as names are assigned or changed. For example, 
we may write,  
AB = 1, that is AB is equal to 1;  
GH = a,   
BD = b,  and so on.364  
 
 In Huygens’s early work he relied on, as Descartes did, three methods of 
representation—the diagram, the language of geometry, and the algebraic symbol. The 
relationship between the diagrams and equations is quite complex. The physical situation 
of bodies and speeds is represented through the diagram. Using algebra, the relations 
among the physical quantities are subsequently analyzed. This marks an important 
distinction with both Descartes, whose algebra (in La Géométrie) was used to solve 
classical problems in geometry, with equations referring to lines and curves, and Harriot, 
who used symbolic equations in his De reflexione corporum rotundorum to represent the 
steps of the construction of a geometric diagram. Huygens represents bodies (which for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
364 AT VI 372. La Géométrie I. Translation by David Eugene Smith and Marcia L. Latham, The Geometry 
of René Descartes with a facsimile of the first edition (New York: Dover, 1954), 8.  
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Huygens were not identical to extension, as they were for Descartes) and, as we shall see, 
speed with direction. Although Huygens used diagrams throughout his study of collision, 
in his first works on collision from 1652, which were not intended for publication, 
algebra plays an important role.   
 Equation 1 is an algebraic expression of the conservation of Cartesian quantity of 
motion. Here is why—Huygens’s Cartesian symbols depicted on the left in figure 3 (eq. 1 
and 2) are defined as follows: 
 a = body365 A c =speed of A before impact  y =speed of A after impact 
 b =body B       x =speed of B after impact 
Understandably, the speeds after impact are depicted as “unknowns.” And the speed 
before impact is a “known quantity.” Equation 1, bx + ay = ac, describes the following 
scenario. There are two bodies A and B.  A is moving with speed c, and B is at rest. They 
collide. After impact, body B moves with speed x, while body A moves with speed y. The 
“Cartesian quantity of motion,” (body times scalar speed) on the left side of the equation 
is equal to that on the right; in other words, it is the same before and after impact. The 
quantity of motion is “conserved.”   
 The second set of equations, shown in figure 4, is nearly identical to the first set 
(found in figure 3). Equation 6 from the second set (ax+by=bc) and equation 1 from the 
first set (bx+ay=ac) are alike except that the as and bs have switched places with each 
other. This slight change has significant implications. The symbols in this second set of 
equations shown in figure 4 are defined as follows:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
365 “body A” refers to the “bulk,” “weight,” or “size” of A. This rather general expression of the quantity of 
an object is not identical to “mass.” I have used the word “body” to be consistent with Huygens’s term 
corpus.   
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 a = body A      x =speed of A after impact 
 b =body B c =speed of B before impact  y =speed of B after impact 
In the first set of equations (1 – 5) found in figure 3, body A is initially in motion and B is 
initially at rest. In the second set of equations (6 – 11) found in figure 4, body B is 
initially in motion and A is initially at rest. Unlike most modern algebraic reconstructions 
of Huygens’s work on collision,366 the symbols for speed in Huygens’s manuscripts 
change their referent across the sets of equations (although they remain consistent within 
a set of equations). They take their meaning in the context of the known value to which 
they are multiplied. As we will see below, this peculiarity will have more significant 
consequences for our interpretation of Huygens’s use of these equations.   
 The quadratic equations in the two sets of equations (3) and (8) are also nearly 
identical to each other. These equations, which are notably only in terms of x (whose 
referents are distinct to their specific “set of equations”), can be found if the above 
corresponding linear equation (the expression of Cartesian conservation of quantity of 
motion, solved for y, i.e. eq. 2 and eq. 7) is squared and substituted into the value of y in 
the third group of equations, which are shown in figure 5, i.e. equations 12 and 13 
above.367  
Equation 12 (axx+byy=bcc) has been called le principe de la conservation des 
forces vives by the editors of the Oeurvres complètes de Christiaan Huygens. The force 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366 HOC 16: 22-7. Andriesse, Huygens, 105-12. A. E. Bell, Christian Huygens and the Development of 
Science in the Seventeenth Century (London: St. Ann's Press, 1947), 111-2.  Gabbey, "Huygens and 
mechanics," 197n.    
367 Consider the set of equations from figure 4. Solving for y, equation 6 (ax+by=bc) becomes equation 7 
(y=c-ax/b). Both sides of the equations are squared: yy=(c-ax/b)(c-ax/b) to obtain yy=cc-
(2acx/b)+(aaxx/bb). This is substituted into the conservation of “body times speed squared” equation, i.e. 
equation 12 (axx+byy=bcc) to obtain axx+b(cc-(2acx/b)+(aaxx/bb)=bcc, which becomes: axx+bcc–
2bacx/b+aaxxb/bb=ccb or equation 8. Thus, equation 8 is the conservation of “body times speed squared” 
expressed in terms of x, which was achieved by a substitution of y derived from the conservation of 
quantity of motion. This can then be solved for x. 
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vive, or “living force,” would become a significant concept in mechanics and natural 
philosophy of the late 17th century. Although the quantity originates with Huygens, he did 
not name it "living force." The conservation of this quantity in “elastic collisions” is one 
of Huygens’s most famous results in his developed theory of collision, specifically as 
proposition XI in De motu corporum ex percussione. In the early 1652 manuscript, it 
appears just after a proposition declaring that the Cartesian quantity of motion is not 
conserved. We will return to the propositions concerning this quantity to discuss its 
probable connection to Huygens’s understanding of the pendulum.   
The two sets of quadratic equations on the 1652 manuscript thus bear a close 
relationship to the “body times speed squared” equation. For example, equation 8 is 
essentially the conservation of “body times speed squared” expressed in terms of x, which 
was achieved by a substitution for the value of y, which was found by squaring an 
equation derived from the conservation of quantity of motion. Equation 8 is then solved 
for x to produce equation 11 (x= 2cb/(b+a)).368 Note that evidence of some of the 
algebraic operations is still apparent in the equations. For example, the terms “bcc” and 
“ccb” on both the left and right side of equation 8 (as seen in figure 4) have slash marks 
through them indicating that they “cancel.” 
The algebraic expression of the new conservation principle (equation 12) links the 
linear Cartesian expression (equation 6) to the more elaborate quadratic equation 
(equation 8) and thus to the equation solved for x (equation 11). The quadratic equations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368 The term bcc is cancelled on both the left and right side of equation 8 to become axx-2acx+aaxx/b=0, 
and then axx+aaxx/b=2acx. he used similar marks to cross out the bs in the numerator and denominator as 
those used to “cancel” bcc above. To further simplify and remove the remaining b from the denominator, 
Huygens multiplied both sides of the equation by b. This results in equation 9 (abxx+aaxx=2acbx). 
Factoring out ax from both sides of the equation, ax can be “cancelled.” Thus equation 10 is obtained 
(bx+ax=2cb). Solving the equation for x, one obtains equation 11: x=2cb/(b+a)  
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(5 and 11) are both solved for x. And they are both solely in terms known before the 
collision. They differ from each other only in the position of a and b. As noted above, the 
referent of the symbols depend on context and are specific to each set of equations. When 
body A is initially in motion, as it is in the first set of equations (1-5) displayed in figure 
3, x refers to the speed of B after impact. Equation 5 (x=2ca/(b+a)) is the speed of B after 
impact in the scenario in which A is initially in motion and B is initially at rest. When 
body B is initially in motion, as it is in the second set of equations (6-11) displayed in 
figure 4, x refers to the speed of A after impact. Equation 11 (x= 2cb/(b+a)) is the speed 
of A after impact in the scenario in which B is initially in motion and A is initially at rest. 
Note that x always refers to the acquired speed of the body initially at rest. See the table 
below. 
More precisely, throughout Huygens’s equations, a does not just refer to “body A” 
as distinct from “body B.” Whenever the bodies are of different sizes, a refers to the 
larger of the two. His convention is consistent in the diagrams and propositions on the 
1652 manuscript,369 the algebraic notes from 1654,370 as well as his treatise De motu 
corporum ex percussione.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  369	  	  Although	  there	  are	  several	  diagrams	  with	  A	  and	  B	  roughly	  the	  same	  size,	  there	  are	  no	  cases	  where	  body	  B	  is	  depicted	  greater	  in	  magnitude.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  propositions	  written	  on	  the	  1652	  sheet	  describe	  a	  collision	  of	  unequally	  sized	  bodies.	  For	  example	  see	  HOC	  16:	  96.	  “If	  the	  larger	  body	  A	  should	  strike	  the	  smaller	  B,	  and	  what	  is	  more,	  the	  speed	  of	  B	  is	  the	  speed	  of	  A	  reciprocally	  as	  the	  magnitude	  A	  to	  B,	  then	  each	  would	  rebound	  with	  the	  same	  speed	  as	  each	  comes”	  Si	  corpus	  A	  majus	  
occurrat	  B	  minori,	  sed	  velocitas	  in	  B	  sit	  ad	  velocitatem	  in	  A	  reciproce	  ut	  magnitudo	  A	  ad	  B,	  tum	  
utrumque	  cum	  eadem	  qua	  venit	  celeritate	  resiliet.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  in	  this	  proposition	  Huygens	  used	  the	  theory	  of	  proportions	  to	  articulate	  the	  point.	  The	  relation,	  speed	  B	  :	  speed	  A	  ::	  magnitude	  A	  :	  magnitude	  B,	  is	  a	  comparison	  of	  two	  different	  homogeneous	  ratios.	  Compare	  this	  to	  proposition	  VIII	  of	  De	  motu	  corporum	  ex	  percussione.	  HOC	  16:	  53.	  “If	  two	  bodies	  whose	  speeds	  are	  inversely	  proportional	  to	  their	  magnitudes	  collide	  with	  each	  other,	  then	  each	  rebounds	  with	  the	  same	  speed	  which	  it	  had	  before	  the	  collision."	  Translation	  by	  Richard	  J.	  Blackwell,	  "Christiaan	  Huygens'	  The	  Motion	  of	  Colliding	  Bodies,"	  Isis	  68	  (1977):	  583.	  It	  would	  appear	  that	  in	  1652	  Huygens	  has	  mistakenly	  expressed	  this	  proposition	  rather	  redundantly.	  The	  relation	  is	  already	  stated	  as	  an	  inverse	  proportion,	  “speed	  in	  b	  :	  speed	  in	  a	  ::	  magnitude	  a	  :	  magnitude	  b.”	  The	  word,	  reciproce	  would	  then	  reverse	  the	  second	  ratio.	  Not	  only	  would	  this	  be	  an	  unnecessarily	  convoluted	  way	  to	  express	  a	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Figure 7. Diagrams of the collision of unequal bodies in the 1652 manuscript 
 
 
Figure 8. Diagram of collision of unequal bodies in the 1654 notes. See the key in figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 9. Diagram of collision of unequal bodies from De motu corporum ex percussione 
 
Attaching the reference of a and b to specific kinds of bodies (the larger and smaller), 
means that the equations are not completely abstract relations of arbitrary symbols, which 
can be operated upon with complete disregard for the referent of the symbols. The 
symbols are also not entirely dependent upon the geometric diagrams; the equations 
themselves are meaningful objects of study. The quantities are related by equality rather 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  direct	  proportion,	  but	  elsewhere	  in	  Huygens’s	  writing	  he	  has	  expressed	  this	  proposition	  more	  clearly.	  In	  fact,	  this	  proposition	  functions	  as	  evidence	  for	  Huygens	  in	  his	  letter	  to	  Van	  Schooten	  on	  29	  October	  1652	  in	  which	  he	  reports	  that	  he	  is	  certain	  that	  Descartes'	  rules	  are	  in	  error.	  See	  HOC	  1:	  185.	  It	  is	  also	  noteworthy	  that	  the	  literal	  translation	  of	  the	  preposition	  used	  in	  this	  proposition	  is	  “in,”	  
Velocitas	  in	  B	  sit	  ad	  velocitatem	  in	  A.	  Although	  subtle,	  the	  difference	  between	  “in”	  and	  “of”	  may	  not	  be	  insignificant,	  particularly	  in	  light	  of	  the	  different	  kinds	  of	  quantity.	  
370 HOC 16: 132. Huygens’s exclusive use of A for the larger body is also corroborated in the 1654 
manuscripts, mentioned above, where he explicitly defines body A and body B as “a corpus maj.” and “b 
minus.” 
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than proportion, and numerical quotients have taken the place of homogeneous relations 
of quantities in ratios.  
 This is a significant contrast with Huygens’s finished works. Widely regarded as a 
brilliant geometer, Huygens strictly adhered to classical approaches to relate physical 
quantities in his publications.371 For example, the Horologium oscillatorium (1673), often 
called a “geometrical physics,” is organized in a strict axiomatic style and employs the 
theory of proportions with such rigor that, with almost no exceptions, no multiplication of 
dimensionally different magnitudes occurs in the whole work.372 In this context, then, the 
symbols in the 1650s are surprising (1) for their very existence, but more interestingly (2) 
for their in-between-status. On the one hand, they do not adhere to traditional geometric 
rules of relations, nor are they representations of geometrical objects in the tradition of 
analytic geometry. On the other hand, they are not abstract species or symbols.373 
Huygens’s equations strike a middle ground, as we shall see more clearly below.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371 Bell, Huygens and the Development of Science, 25. Bos, "Huygens and mathematics," 132. Yoder, 
Unrolling Time, 172. Many in the secondary literature have rightly commented upon his strength and 
preference for geometry. According to Bell, “He was hailed as the reborn Vieta and compared with Pappus 
and Apollonius, two giants of Greek geometry.” Bos has claimed that Huygens must have thought 
geometrically. And Yoder has claimed that Huygens “regarded nature fundamentally as a geometric 
realm.” To support her claim she cites the following: “in the Cosmotheoros he argues that people on other 
worlds would still develop Euclidean geometry because the same mathematical principles abide throughout 
the universe. In other words, mathematics is not an abstract construct of our earthly minds but informs 
nature.” Yoder goes on to say that “he simply saw the physical world with the eyes of a geometer.”  
372 H. J. M. Bos, "Introduction," in Christiaan Huygens' The Pendulum Clock, trans. Richard J. Blackwell 
(Ames: Iowa State university Press, 1986). Niccolò Guicciardini, Reading the Principia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 128. Guicciardini has argued that Newton used Huygens’s Horologium 
oscillatorium as a model for the Principia, but even so, Huygens was at times critical of Newton’s non-
classical use of the theory of proportions. See Guicciardini, Reading the Principia, 119.   
373 "Species" or "speciosæ" was a technical term used by Viète in the context of his analytic art. According 
to Mahoney, “unlike numerical logistic, Viète pointed out in Chapter IV of the Introduction, the analytic art 
constituted a logistic of species, an arithmetic ‘set forth in terms of the species or forms of things, such as 
the letters of the alphabet.’ The species Viète had in mind was the species of quantity [...] In the 
Introduction to the Analytic Art [...] algebra was transformed from a sophisticated sort of arithmetical 
problem-solving into the art of mathematical reasoning itself, insofar as that reasoning was based on 
combinatory operations.” See Michael Mahoney, The Mathematical Career of Pierre Fermat 1601-1665, 
2nd edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 36.   
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Given the specific physical referents of these symbols, the two duplicate sets of 
equations—instead of being redundant derivations—correspond to two different kinds of 
physical events. The symbol a always refers to the larger body, and the symbol c always 
refers to the speed of the body to which it is multiplied before impact. Thus, the first set 
of equations, displayed in figure 3, describe the event where the larger body is initially in 
motion and the smaller body is initially at rest. And the second set of equations, 
displayed in figure 4, describe the event where the larger body is initially at rest and the 
smaller body is initially in motion. It is not coincidental that these collision-events 
correspond to the initial scenarios in Descartes’s rules 5 and 4. Specifically, the first set 
of equations (1-5) corresponds to Cartesian rule 5 and the second set of equations (6-11) 
corresponds to Cartesian rule 4. See the table below: 
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First set of equations, displayed in figure 3 
Larger body A initially in motion, smaller body B initially at rest.    Similar to Cartesian rule 5. 
a = body A  c =speed of A before impact   y =speed of A after impact 
b =body B        x =speed of B after impact 
bx + ay = ac  (1) acc - 2bcx + bbxx/a + bxx = acc (3) 
y = c - bx/a   (2) 2ca = bx + ax    (4) 
 2ca/(b+a) =x    (5) 
 
Second set of equations, displayed in figure 4 
Smaller body B initially in motion, larger body A initially at rest.   Similar to Cartesian rule 4. 
a = body A         x =speed of A after impact 
b = body B  c = speed of B before impact   y =speed of B after impact 
ax + by = bc   (6) axx + bcc – 2bacx/b + aaxxb/bb = ccb (8) 
y = c - ax/b   (7) abxx + aaxx = 2acbx   (9) 
 bx +ax = 2cb    (10) 
 x= 2cb/(b+a)     (11) 
 
 In a letter to Gerard van Gutschoven in January 1652, Huygens mentioned that he 
suspected that all but Descartes’s first rule of collision were untrue, particularly singling 
out rule 4.374 Over that summer, Huygens wrote up the notes that I have been calling the 
1652 manuscript on what was likely a draft of a letter to Van Schooten.375 In October of 
that year (1652), Huygens sent news of these first results to Van Schooten, announcing 
his certainty of Descartes’s error.376 The central example includes an initial scenario 
similar to the Cartesian rule 4. It is no surprise that his equations reflect his attention to 
the rules of collision. Recall that Descartes’s rule 4 states:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374 HOC 1: 166. 
375 Andriesse, Huygens, 104. See note above. 
376 HOC 1: 185-6. Christiaan Huygens to Fr. van Schooten, 29 October 1652. Andriesse, Huygens, 185.  
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[I]f body C were entirely at rest, and were just a bit larger than B, then whatever 
the speed with which B moved toward C, it would never move C, but would be 
repelled by it in the opposite direction [...]377   
 
Huygens, of course, proposed a number of arguments against Descartes’s collision rules, 
and rule 4 in particular, in the works he published and prepared for publication, such as 
the Regulae de motu corporum ex mutuo impulsu and De motu corporum ex percussione. 
The arguments in these axiomatic Archimedean presentations rely on symmetry and the 
relativity of motion, and not symbolic algebra. These later ideas will be discussed in 
section 4. Let us now consider his early algebraic investigations.  
 Since the equations solved for x provide the acquired speed of the body initially at 
rest in terms of quantities known prior to the collision, Huygens could easily determine, 
according to his equations, if the speed of the large body initially at rest will continue to 
be at rest after the collision. In this case, the acquired speed of the larger body initially at 
rest is equation 11 (x= 2cb/(b+a)). Thus, by Huygens’s equation, rule 4 cannot be true: x, 
the acquired speed of the larger body initially at rest, will have a magnitude in every 
situation, except when either c or b is zero, but this would only occur in very trivial 
events.378 This corresponds to a proposition on the 1652 manuscript, which asserts that a 
larger body at rest can be moved by a smaller body.379  The algebraic mathematics that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 AT VIII 68. Principia II 49. Translation by Daniel Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), 257.    
378 Since b is the symbol for body B, it can only be a positive magnitude. c is the initial speed of the smaller 
body B, and granted that speed is a continuous magnitude, it too is positive. Even if c could be negative, x 
would still not be zero. If both b and c are merely non-zero, then x cannot equal zero. The only way x can 
be zero is if c and/or b is zero. If the initial speed is c=0 then there will be no impact and the body initially 
at rest remains at rest. If the smaller body B has no magnitude then presumably it does not exist, and no 
collision occurs; the body initially at rest remains at rest. Obviously, these cases are not what Descartes had 
in mind.  
379 HOC 16: 95. Majus corpus quiescens ab eodem corpore eadem celeritate impulsum minorem 
celeritatem acquirit quam corpus minus. The proposition contains a stipulation that the acquired speed of 
the larger will be less than the initial speed of the smaller. The mathematics confirms this. If x= 2cb/(b+a) 
and if x is the acquired speed of body A and c is the initial speed of the smaller body B, then 2cb/(b+a) > c. 
This becomes 2cb < cb+ca. Given that a is greater than b, this is true.   
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Huygens learned from Descartes was used to express Descartes’s conservation principles 
(which Descartes justified by appealing to the immutability of God). This was then 
substituted into an equation of a new conservation principle (body times speed squared), 
which shows that rule 4 must be false. Although striking for the correspondence with the 
first announcements of Huygens’s rejection of Descartes’s rule 4, Huygens did not rely 
on this argument in his polished and published work. Nevertheless the algebra on the 
early manuscripts was a significant tool in the formulation of Huygens’s ideas on 
collision.  
 
2.3 – Colliding Interpretations: changing directions and avoiding negative quantities 
The equations that are solved for x (eq. 5 and 11) determine the acquired speed of 
the body initially at rest. Algebraically determining the acquired speed of the body 
initially in motion is a more complicated matter in Huygens's manuscripts. The root of the 
problem resides in the physical and mathematical interpretations of the change of 
direction of the speed of a body. When the larger body is initially at rest, the value of the 
acquired speed of the body initially in motion would be negative, but Huygens appears to 
shun this as a legitimate quantity. Although the acquired speed of the larger body initially 
at rest (eq. 11) will always be positive, x= 2cb/(b+a), when this value is algebraically 
substituted back into equation 7 (y =c - ax/b) to find the acquired speed of the body 
initially in motion, negative values will always be produced.380 Complicating matters are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 The reason why it is impossible to have a positive value of y when the found value of x is substituted 
back into equation 7 (y =c - ax/b) can be demonstrated with a few simple algebraic steps as follows: Given, 
y =c - ax/b, a value for x can be found by squaring y and substituting it into equation 12 (axx +byy = bcc). 
This yields equation 11 (x= 2cb/(b+a). We then substitute this value of x into equation 7 (y =c - ax/b), 
which yields y =c – a(2cb/(b+a))/b. Since we want y to be positive, let us assume that y > 0.  So, 0 < (c – 
(2abc/(bb+ab))). This becomes, c > 2abc/(bb+ab), which simplifies to c(bb + ab) > 2abc;  bb + ab > 2ab;  
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the overlapping and competing geometric and algebraic representations of speed. 
Geometric diagrams, such as those in figure 1 for example, represent speeds as line 
segments. Represented as such, speed in any direction is a positive magnitude. 
The calculations on the manuscripts suggest that Huygens had a reluctance to 
speculate about the existence of negative speeds. Despite the expanded domain of 
mathematical possibilities with the use of algebra, the specific equations that he 
repeatedly derived and utilized appear to be tailored to avoid negative results. In addition, 
Huygens’s treatment and criticism of the Cartesian conservation of quantity of motion in 
the early manuscripts from the 1650s use only positive values. At this time he did not 
amend it by including negative numbers; rather he introduced an entirely new 
conservation principle; “body times speed squared.” Whereas in 1669, when Huygens 
published some of his thoughts on collision in the Journal des sçavans, he would take 
direction into account. Huygens could show as early as 1652 that Descartes’s “quantity of 
motion” can increase or decrease in collisions, and therefore is not conserved. In the 
Journal des sçavans, Huygens presented a new proposition, which may well stem from 
his considerations of positive and negative signs and direction, that states that “quantity 
of motion” taken toward one side (i.e. with direction) is conserved.381  
On the 1652 manuscript, Huygens twice derived an equation for the acquired 
speed of the body initially at rest—namely equation 5 (2ca/(b+a) =x) and equation 11 
(x= 2cb/(b+a))—rather than derive the corresponding equation for the acquired speed of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
bb – ab > 0;  b(b – a) > 0;  b > 0;  and b > a. This contradicts our previous definition of a as the larger 
body. Our assumption that y > 0 must therefore be false.  
381 HOC 16: 180. La quantitié du mouvement qu’ont deux corps, se peut augmenter ou diminuer par leur 
rencontre; mais il y reste toûjours la mesme quantité vers le mesme costé, en soustrayant la quantité du 
mouvement contraire   
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the body initially in motion. Equations 5 and 11 do not produce negative results, whereas 
the other corresponding equation would.   
The equations on the 1652 manuscript, namely eq. 1): bx + ay = ac, and eq. 6): ax 
+ by = bc, are surprisingly similar to the modern expression of the conservation of 
momentum (eq. 14). And Huygens's equation for the conservation of "body times speed 
squared," eq. 12): axx +byy = bcc from the 1652 manuscript, is similar to modern 
expression of the conservation of kinetic energy (eq. 15): 
m1v1i + m2v2i = m1v1f + m2v2f     (14) 
½m1v1i2 + ½m2v2i2 = ½m1v1f2 + ½m2v2f2      (15) 
More surprising is the nearly identical use of them to determine the final velocities of 
masses in what we call elastic collisions. Equations 14 and 15 are solved simultaneously 
to determine the final velocities of both objects: 
v1f  = ( (m1 – m2)/( m1+ m2) ) v1i + ( 2m1/( m1 + m2) ) v2i  (16) 
v2f  = ( 2m1/( m1 + m2) ) v1i +( (m2 – m1)/( m1+ m2) ) v2i (17) 
 
When v2i=0, the initial velocity of the second body is zero:  
v1f  = ( (m1 – m2)/( m1+ m2) ) v1i       (18) 
v2f  = ( 2m1/( m1 + m2) ) v1i      (19) 
 
Compare equation 19 with the equations solved for x, such as equation 11 (x=2cb/(b+a)). 
 Nowhere on the 1652 manuscript does Huygens write or derive anything that 
corresponds to equation 18, an equation with potentially negative results. Notice that in 
equation 18, whenever m2 is greater than m1, v1f is negative. Instead, he derives an 
equation similar to 19 twice, namely equation 5 in the first set and equation 11 in the 
second set of equations. And notice that in 19, as long as the body initially in motion is 
positive, v2f will never be negative. Recall from section 2.2 that the duplicate sets of 
	   215 
equations—instead of being entirely redundant derivations—correspond to two different 
kinds of physical events due to the referents of the symbols.  
 A similar tendency to avoid negative results is on display in his manuscript notes 
from 1654 as well.382 Using the principle that the relative speed of approach is the same 
as the relative speed of separation, which appears verbally at the top of the 1652 
manuscript and is later proven in proposition IV of De motu corporum ex percussione, 
the equations in the 1654 notes reveal an avoidance of negative algebraic results. See 
figure 2. Here both bodies are initially in motion, instead of one at rest. He represents y, 
the acquired speed of the larger body, as c+dx. This is derived from the principle that 
c+d=x+y. First, note the relationship between this algebraic expression, and the diagram 
of collision (see figure 10).  
 
Figure 10 
Let AC=c, BC=d, and CA=x, and CB=y.383 Although c and d are in different directions—
as are x and y—they are both depicted as positive magnitudes in the algebraic relation. 
(The sum c+d represents the relative speed of approach, and the sum x+y represents the 
relative speed of separation). Second, note what Huygens does to this value of y (the 
acquired speed of A), which of course, in the realm of possibilities could be negative. To 
find x he first squares the term for y, (c + d – x), and multiplies it by a, which essentially 
removes the possibility of a negative. The value is then substituted into the equation acc 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382 HOC 16: 132-6. 
383 HOC 16: 132. 
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+ bdd = ayy +bxx for the term ayy.384 He then solves for x to achieve the result, x = (2ac 
– bd + ad) / (a + b).385 The squaring of a potentially negative result and substitution of it 
into the “body times speed squared” equation, you will recall, was Huygens’s algebraic 
approach in 1652 as well. Although these examples reveal continuity in an attitude 
toward negative results, they also reveal larger trends in the two sets of notes. In 1652 the 
equations depict the Cartesian conservation of quantity of motion, whereas in 1654 
Huygens has moved away from Cartesian relations and algebraically presents his own 
propositions and principles.  
 
 It is not entirely clear, given the evidence, how Huygens calculated the acquired 
speed of the body initially in motion. Given the steps he took to avoid negative results, it 
is unlikely that he would have used equations that would produce negative quantities for 
the speed. It is possible that he may have used his principle that the relative speed of 
approach is equal to the relative speed of separation, which is expressed algebraically in 
the manuscripts from 1654. Or Huygens may have drawn on his principle of relativity.  If 
so, this would fit well with the notation he used in his doubly derived set of equations, 
both of which are solved for x (equations 5 and 11).  
 Beginning with his first investigation of collision in 1652, Huygens had claimed 
that motion is relative.386 It is defined in relation to other bodies. Even the space in which 
a body moves can be considered to be in motion. In his first investigations in 1652, while 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 Interestingly, Huygens appears to have attempted to use the principle that the speed of approach equals 
the speed of separation on the 1652 sheet as well. The equations are oriented upside-down from those 
described above, and are less orderly. Here he used c-x as the value for y. Since only one of the bodies is 
initially moving, c=x+y represents the principle that the speed of approach is equal to the speed of 
separation. However, instead of squaring c-x, it has been substituted into the quantity of motion equation, 
which does not appear to be fruitful.   
385 Note that x = (2ac – bd + ad) / (a + b) reduces to equation 5 (x=2ac/(a+b), when d=0.  
386 HOC 16: 93. 
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discussing the relativity of motion, he crossed out the word "space" and wrote "boat" to 
describe a moving space.387 And in De motu corporum ex percussione Huygens would 
describe the collision of bodies as observed by a person on the shore, and as observed by 
a person on a boat, which could move at the same speed as one of colliding bodies. With 
this heuristic, and the principle of relativity, he could transform one scenario of colliding 
bodies into another.388  In Huygens's equations in the 1652 manuscript, the symbol x in 
either equation refers to the acquired speed of the body initially at rest. In equation 5, x is 
the acquired speed of the smaller body initially at rest. In equation 11, x is the acquired 
speed of the larger body is initially at rest. Used in conjunction with a changing frame of 
reference, the two equations for x could solve for both bodies after collision.  
 
 In section 2.2, we saw that Huygens used symbolic equations to critically 
investigate Descartes's rules 4 and 5. His equations may well have served in private as an 
early argument against rule 4. The equations may have also been used to critically 
investigate Descartes's conservation principle. Descartes never algebraically presented his 
principle of the conservation of quantity of motion. Huygens did, and at least two 
problems would have immediately presented themselves. When values for x are 
substituted into an algebraic expression of the conservation of quantity of motion (e.g., 
eq. 1: bx + ay = ac), negative numbers are produced whenever bx/a > c. In addition, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
387 HOC 16: 93. "But [let us also imagine] that the space itself is borne meanwhile to the left with the same 
said half-speed of the body B, thereby causing hose who are standing outside the space CDEF, say at H, to 
see A at rest and B moving, as was the case for both of them initially. Accordingly, after the collision those 
who are carried along with the space [spatio, above which Huygens wrote in the manuscript navi] CDEF 
will see B reflected to the right and A to the left, each of them with half the speed we attributed to B from 
the standpoint at H. But because the ship [navis] was assumed to move to the left with the same half speed, 
it will seem, viewed from H, that B is at rest, with A now moving to the left with the speed with which B 
moved initially." Translation by Gabbey, "Huygens and mechanics," 178. 
388 HOC 16: 32-33. 
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more damaging, the algebraic expression clearly shows that, given scalar values, the 
Cartesian quantity of motion could remain the same, decrease, or increase in collisions. 
Huygens provided a set of numerical examples in the 1652 manuscript that, when 
substituted into the algebraic expressions of Cartesian conservation of quantity of motion, 
numerically show that it is not conserved.389  
By the late 1660s, Huygens had published summary accounts of his rules of 
motion with the Royal Academy of Sciences in France and the Royal Society in 
England.390 In both he had become more explicit regarding change of direction. 
Descartes's conservation law, he maintained, was still not valid. But, if revised to focus 
on direction to one side, where the contrary direction was subtracted from the former, 
Cartesian quantity of motion was conserved. In the fifth proposition he wrote:  
The quantity of motion that two bodies have can be increased or decreased by 
their impact, but there will always remain the same quantity toward the same side 
by subtracting the contrary quantity of motion.391 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389 HOC 16: 96. 
390 The former, recorded on 18 March 1669, was published in the Journal des sçavans 2 (1667-71): 531-6. 
It has also been collected in HOC 16: 179-81, (also see HOC 6: 383-5, Huygens to Gallois, 18 March 
1669). The title in the Journal des sçavans is "Extrait d'une Lettre... " However, Huygens appears to have 
given the document the following title: "Regles du mouvement dans la rencontre des Corps."  The latter 
summary of the treatise, recorded as 12 April 1669, was published in the Philosophical Transactions 4 
(1669): 925-8. It has also been collected in HOC 6: 429-33. The title in the Philosophical Transactions is 
"A Summary Account of the Laws of Motion..." However, Huygens appears to have given the document 
the following title: "Regulæ de Motu Corporum ex mutuo impulsu." Note that Huygens consistently 
referred to the document "rules of motion," rather than "laws of motion," as the editor of the Philosophical 
Transactions did. The version printed in the Journal des sçavans is slightly different from the paper 
originally submitted to the Royal Society. See A. Rupert Hall, "Mechanics and the Royal Society, 1668-
70," The British Journal for the History of Science 3 (1966): 33-5. Huygens also sent demonstrations for 
several of his proposition to the Royal Society on 5 January 1668/9, which were not published in the 
Philosophical Transactions. See HOC 6: 336-43.  
391 HOC 16: 180. Translation by Iltis, "The Controversy over Living Force: Leibniz to D'Alembert" (PhD 
diss., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1967), 48-50. Curtis Wilson provides an English translation of the 
Latin paper (which Oldenburg had translated from the original French paper) published in the 
Philosophical Transactions, "Regulæ de motu corporum ex mutuo impulsu." Gemma Murray, William 
Harper, and Curtis Wilson, "Huygens, Wren, Wallis, and Newton on Rules of Impact and Reflection," in 
Vanishing Matter and the Laws of Motion: Descartes and Beyond, ed. Dana Jalobeanu and Peter R. Anstey 
(New York: Routledge, 2011) 154-7. 
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It is plausible that the origin of this new principle emerged out of Huygens's struggles 
with negative values, which began in the early 1650s as sophisticated attempts to avoid 
negative results. Quantities less than zero were suspect generally among many 
mathematicians of the time. For Huygens, they may have conflicted with the notion of 
"positive" magnitudes depicted by the line segments of diagrams, and the physical 
quantities they represented. Although not a full acceptance of "negative speeds," the rule 
mentioned above does utilize the notion of subtraction to indicate contrary direction: 
"there will always remain the same quantity toward the same side by subtracting the 
contrary quantity of motion."  
 
 
Section 3  
Huygens's pendulum and collision   
 
The pendulum played an important role in Huygens’s early work on collision. It 
served as an opportunity and means for Huygens to make successful predictions, which 
persuaded his English colleagues that his theory was correct, although empirical 
adequacy alone was not a satisfactory justification, as we will see in more detail in the 
following chapter on collision in the Royal Society. The pendulum was a tool for both 
empirical investigation and for conceptual analysis. Several of Huygens’s principles 
likely originated from his principles of pendular motion. These include his variant of the 
“Torricelli’s principle,” which Huygens’s used extensively throughout his work, the 
principle of the reversibility of impact, and his principle of the conservation of “body 
times speed squared.”   
Corresponding in time to Huygens’s critical investigation of collision is his early 
work on the pendulum. In 1646 Mersenne had posed a question – to determine of the 
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center of oscillation of the compound pendulum – to several of his correspondents which 
included the then young Huygens as well as Cavalieri, Torricelli, Baliani, Descartes, and 
Roberval.392 Although the 17 year-old Huygens did not solve the problem immediately, 
he would include a solution and proof to the problem in the fourth section of what has 
been called “one of the masterpieces of seventeenth-century scientific literature,” the 
Horologium Oscillatorium, which had been started at least by 1659, but was not 
published until 1673.393 Throughout his life Huygens concerned himself with the 
principles of the pendulum and its applications, extending and amending Galileo's work 
on isochronous pendulums. By 1657 Huygens had already invented his first mechanical 
pendulum clock, and by 1661 he had “discovered the tautochrony of the cycloidal 
pendulum, the cycloidal cheeks that make a pendulum cycloidal, the conical pendulum, 
the center of oscillation of a compound pendulum, and the sliding weight to vary the 
pendulum’s period.”394 He had determined the mechanical and geometrical properties of 
the cycloid, which is the ideal shape for the metal cheeks that he made to regulate the 
swing of the pendulum. Constraining the oscillations in this way makes the period 
independent of the amplitude, and thus isochronous. He also investigated the 
mathematical theory of evolutes more generally. Huygens produced theorems of uniform 
circular motion and centrifugal force through his work on the circular pendulum, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392 Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 117. A simple pendulum is an ideal machine in which the entire 
mass is concentrated at one point in the bob and the mass of the material suspending the bob is disregarded. 
A compound pendulum, on the other hand, is a swinging rigid mass, such as a metal rod, suspended from 
some point. “The center of oscillation is that point on the line from the suspension point to the center of 
gravity, whose distance from the suspension point is equal to the length of a simple pendulum with the 
same period.”   
393 Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 116-117. Gabbey, "Huygens and mechanics," 173. Joella Yoder, 
Unrolling Time: Christiaan Huygens and the mathematization of nature (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 2-3. 
394 Michael Mahoney, "Christiaan Huygens: The measurement of time and longitude at sea," in Studies on 
Christiaan Huygens, ed. H. J. M. Bos et al. (Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger B. V., 1980), 236. 
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proposed using the seconds pendulum as a universal measure of length, and determined 
the acceleration of gravity by pendulum observations.395 
 Several images of pendulums can be found accompanying the algebraic 
equations, diagrams of collision, and preliminary propositions on the 1652 manuscript. 
For instance, a small drawing in the upper left of figure 1, reproduced in figure 11, 
depicts what appears to be two pendulums with unequally sized bobs either just 
approaching or just separating from a collision.  
 
Figure 11 
 
In the lower right and upside down in figure 1, reproduced in figure 12, is what appears 
to be the arc swept out by a pendulum with various indications of heights along a vertical 
line. The heights of the pendulum bobs before and after collision could be used as an 
empirical measure of speed.  Just to the left, but oriented orthogonally to the pendulum is 
a diagram of a larger body A colliding with smaller body B. Just above is what appears to 
be two unequal bodies on a circular track, possibly representing “the reversibility of 
collisions” or perhaps experiments with a circular pendulum.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
395 Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 205-18. Mach, The Science of Mechanics, 155-87. Mahoney, 
"Measurement of time and longitude," 234-70. Yoder, Unrolling Time.  
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Figure 12 
 
 The "Torricelli principle"396 states that two connected bodies cannot move by 
themselves unless their common center of gravity descends.397 According to some 
commentators, the Torricelli principle is “arguably the most important single axiom in 
[Huygens] entire mechanics” and is used throughout his work in various formulations and 
transformations.398 Dijksterhuis—who in addition to writing the classic The 
Mechanization of the World Picture in which Huygens features prominently, also served 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396 Pierre Duhem, Les Origines de la statique, vol. 2 (Paris: Librairie Scientifique A. Hermann, 1906), 6. 
Also see Gabbey, "Huygens and mechanics," 168. Both Gabbey and Duhem state that the principle was of 
ancient lineage and is referred to as “Torricelli’s Principle” simply for convenience. For Huygens's uses of 
the Torricelli principle see the editor's introduction to HOC 16: 21-5. Also see Dijksterhuis, Mechanization 
(IV: 141-2), 370-3, and Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 232-3. 397	  Evangelista	  Torricelli,	  De	  motu	  gravium	  naturaliter	  descendentium	  et	  projectorum	  (Florence,	  1644),	  in	  Opere	  de	  Evangelista	  Torricelli,	  vol.	  2,	  ed.	  Gino	  Loria	  and	  Giuseppe	  Vassura	  (Faenza:	  G.	  Montanavi,	  1919-­‐1944)	  105,	  108-­‐9.	  Bertoloni	  Meli,	  Thining	  with	  Objects,	  119.	  Also	  see	  Christiane	  Vilain,	  "Christiaan	  Huygens'	  Galilean	  Mechanics,"	  in	  The	  Reception	  of	  the	  Galilean	  Science	  of	  Motion	  in	  
Seventeenth-­‐century	  Europe,	  ed.	  Carla	  Rita	  Palmerino	  and	  Thijssen	  (Boston:	  Kluwer	  Academic	  Publishers,	  2004),	  195.	  
398 Gabbey, "Huygens and mechanics," 168. 
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as an editor of the Oeuvres Complètes De Christiaan Huygens—describes one of 
Huygens’s "generalizations" and applications of the Torricelli principle. The axiom, 
which was originally static and formulated for equilibrium, was “transform[ed] into an 
extremely fundamental dynamical principle,”399 and was applied to the problem of the 
center of oscillation of a compound pendulum.400 He describes Huygens’s transformed 
Torricelli principle as follows:  
We first imagine a particle, which is kept in a state of rest at a height h [...] when 
released, it will begin to move. Its height h1 after a given time will be less than in 
the initial position, but it has now acquired a certain velocity. Let us suppose that 
it can use this velocity to rise vertically and that in consequence it will rise over a 
distance of h2. It will then be at a height h1+h2. Now Huygens states it as an 
axiom that this height cannot be greater than h. If one assumes that the motion in 
question can also take place in the reverse direction, h in turn cannot be greater 
than h1+h2, so we have h=h1+h2. [...] If we now have a system of interconnected 
particles and if in this system at a given instant all the particles, independently of 
each other (i.e. the connexions  [sic] being broken), are made to perform the 
upward motion just described, their common centre of gravity will always return 
to its original height.401 
 
In the context of his theory of collision, Huygens uses a variant of the Torricelli principle 
similar to that mentioned above—one which is particularly suited to the use of pendulum 
bobs.  In the original Torricelli principle, the two bodies are connected, and do not move 
unless their common center of gravity descends. Huygens’s key modification is to 
“disconnect” the bodies and to consider them in motion. He claims that if the line along 
which the colliding bodies move is converted from the horizontal to the vertical, then the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 Dijksterhuis, Mechanization (IV: 141), 370. Also see HOC 16: 21, the editor's Advertissement for the De 
motu corporum ex percussione treatise and associated manuscripts. 
400 Dijksterhuis, Mechanization (IV: 142), 371-3. Also see HOC 16: 421, Travaux divers de Statique & de 
Dynamique de 1659 à 1661. Gabbey cites another of Huygens’s formulations and applications of the 
Torricelli principle. De iis quae liquido supernatant, Libri 3 was written in 1650, but never published (at 
least until 1908 in the OC). Here Huygens applied “Torricelli’s Principle to prove firstly Archimedes’ Law 
of floating bodies, and then to prove the general theorem that for a floating body in equilibrium the distance 
between the centres of gravity of the body and of its submerged portion is a minimum.” See Gabbey, 
"Huygens and mechanics," 168. 
401 Dijksterhuis, Mechanization (IV: 141), 370-1. 
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center of gravity of the system of disconnected, but colliding, bodies cannot rise after 
impact. In colliding pendulums horizontal motion is converted to vertical motion.402     
 The principle of the reversibility of motions states that “if two bodies collide 
again with the speeds they have acquired after the first impact, they will acquire the same 
speeds they had before the first impact.”403 After two pendulum bobs collide they will 
rebound with their respective acquired speeds to their respective heights. Unless the 
observer intervenes in some way, the bobs will descend after reaching the heights 
corresponding to the acquired speeds, and collide again.     
 The principle of the conservation of “body times speed squared” appears on 
Huygens’s 1652 manuscripts. Ernst Mach referred to this principle—however not in the 
context of collision but rather in the context of the compound pendulum—by the name it 
would later acquire, the principle of vis viva. Mach claimed that the principle Huygens 
used in his solution to the center of oscillation of a compound pendulum, is identical with 
the principle of vis viva.404 Mersenne had posed the problem of the compound 
pendulum405 in 1646, and Huygens provided his solution and proof in his Horologium 
oscillatorium.406 Mach calls the principle used to solve the problem,  “Huygens’s 
crowning achievement.”407 However, Mach’s point seems to be that “Huygens’s 
principle”—which is the variant of the Torricelli principle found in the Dijksterhuis quote 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
402 HOC 16: 21-5, 95n. Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 233. Vilain, "Huygens' Galilean 
Mechanics," 195. 
403 Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 232. Also see HOC 16: 46-7. 
404 Mach, The Science of Mechanics, 178. 
405 An example of a compound pendulum is a swinging metal rod. The bulk (or mass) is distributed along 
its length rather than isolated only in the bob.  
406 Yoder, Unrolling Time, 156-7. Huygens had started and abandoned the problem in 1659 as well as 1661, 
before taking it on again in 1664. 
407 Mach, The Science of Mechanics, 187. 
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above408—can be shown to be equivalent to the conservation of kinetic energy of a 
system of masses.409 Mach neglected to mention that the principle Huygens used to solve 
the center of oscillation problem is the same as the principle of “body times speed 
squared” which Huygens explicitly used even in his earliest works on collision such as 
the manuscript from 1652.  
  The origins of Huygens’s conservation principle of “body times speed squared” 
likely stem from a creative synthesis of Huygens’s variant of the Torricelli principle for 
colliding pendulum bobs, the reversibility of collisions, and the extensions of Galileo’s 
law of fall to fall along a circular curve. According to Huygens’s variant of the Torricelli 
principle, if the line along which the colliding bodies move is converted from the 
horizontal to the vertical, then the center of gravity of the system of disconnected bodies 
cannot rise after impact. Using this and the reversibility of collisions, it can be shown that 
when two hard pendulum bobs collide, the center of gravity of the system will neither 
ascend to a greater height, nor to a height lower than it initially was. That it cannot 
ascend higher follows immediately from the Torricelli principle. It will not go to a lower 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408 Mach, The Science of Mechanics, 174-5. “The new idea from which Huygens set out, and which is more 
important by far than the whole problem, is this. In whatsoever manner the material particles of a pendulum 
may by mutual interaction modify each other’s motions, in every case the velocities acquired in the descent 
of the pendulum can be such only that by virtue of them the centre of gravity of the particles, whether still 
in connection or with their connections dissolved, is able to rise just as high as the point from which it fell. 
Huygens found himself compelled, by the doubts of his contemporaries as to the correctness of this 
principle, to remark, that the only assumption implied in the principle is, that heavy bodies of themselves 
do not move upwards. If it were possible for the centre of gravity of a connected system of falling material 
particles to rise higher after the dissolution of its connections than the point from which it had fallen, then 
by repeating the process heavy bodies could, by virtue of their own weights, be made to rise to any height 
we wished. If after the dissolution of the connections the centre of gravity should rise to a height less than 
that from which it had fallen, we should only have to reverse the motion to produce the same result. What 
Huygens asserted, therefore, no one had ever really doubted; on the contrary, every one had instinctively 
perceived it. Huygens, however, gave this instinctive perception an abstract, conceptual form.”  
409 Mach, The Science of Mechanics, 178. “We see without difficulty in the Huygenian principle the 
recognition of work as the condition determinative of velocity, or, more exactly, the condition determinative 
of the so-called vis viva. By the vis viva or living force of a system of masses m, m,, m,,,..., affected with the 
velocities v, v,, v,,,.... we understand the sum mv2/2+m,v,2/2+m,,v,,2/2+... The fundamental principle of 
Huygens is identical with the principle of vis viva."  
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height for the following reason. Imagine that it was possible for the center of gravity of to 
go to a lower height after collision. By the reversibility of collisions, the bodies moving 
again after impact, now with their acquired speeds, would subsequently acquire the same 
speeds they had before impact. This means that they would ascend to their original 
(higher) height, but this would make the center of gravity ascend higher, which is 
impossible. So, the height to which the bobs return must be the same. According to 
Galileo’s law of fall, the height is proportional to speed squared. Thus we can see how 
one may arrive at the relation that the speed squared of the pendulum bob neither 
increases nor decreases. It is conserved.  
 
 
Section 4  
Huygens's axiomatic formulation: "hypotheses" and symmetry 
 
 In Huygens's earliest work on collision from 1652 he made innovative use of 
symbolic algebra in an exploratory analysis and criticism of Descartes's rules of collision. 
His work with algebra may have also contributed to the development of a new principle, 
the conservation of Cartesian quantity of motion with direction. Huygens ideas on the 
pendulum were also important to the development of his theory of collision, namely his 
variant of the Torricelli principle, the reversibility of impact, and the conservation of 
"body times speed squared." Huygens's investigation of collision was initially inspired by 
Descartes's rules of collision, and even his early challenges of Descartes's rules relied on 
Descartes's symbolic algebra. However, the model for Huygens's treatise, De motu 
corporum ex percussione was Galileo's Discorsi.410 Huygens formulated his argument in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  410	  Westfall,	  Force	  in	  Newton's	  Physics,	  153.	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the axiomatic tradition of Archimedes and Galileo, relying on principles of symmetry, as 
well as concepts of motion and rebound that were foreign to Descartes's system.   
 Huygens's Regulæ de motu corporum ex mutuo impulsu was published in the 
Philosophical Transactions in 1669.411 It was a Latin translation of his Regles du 
mouvement dans la rencontre des corps, which was published in the Journal de Sçavans 
a few months earlier.412 These papers were a summary of the more extensive theory of 
collision that Huygens had been developing since 1652, culminating in 1656 as De motu 
corporum ex percussione,413 but which would not be published until 1703 (8 years after 
Huygens died), possibly because Huygens was continually refining the treatise and 
searching for a better axiomatic presentation.414  
 The first two propositions in the Regles du mouvement dans la rencontre des 
corps are essentially the same as the first two propositions in the more extensive De motu 
corporum ex percussione. (1) "When a hard body directly encounters another hard body 
equal to it and at rest, it gives all its motion to it, itself remaining motionless after 
collision." (2) "But if this other equal body is also in motion and when it moves in the 
same straight line, they reciprocally exchange their motions."415 However, in De motu 
corporum ex percussione they are demonstrated from other more fundamental axioms (or 
as Huygens's calls them "hypotheses"). The third proposition in both texts directly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
411 Christiaan Huygens, "Regulæ de Motu Corporum ex mutuo impulsu," Philosophical Transactions 4 
(1669): 925-8. It is also collected in HOC 6: 429-33. 
412 Christiaan Huygens, "Regles du mouuement dans la rencontre des corps," Journal des sçavans 2 (1667-
71): 531-6. It is also collected in HOC 16: 179-81 (also see HOC 6: 383-5, Huygens to Gallois, 18 March 
1669). The version in the Journal des sçavans was slightly different from the paper submitted to the Royal 
Society. See Hall, "Mechanics and the Royal Society," 33-35. 
413 HOC 16: 30-91. 
414 Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics, 146-58. Westfall provides an account of the development of 
Huygens's work on collision from 1652 to its final form in De motu corporum ex percussione 1656. 
415 HOC 16: 179. Translation by Iltis, "Controversy over Living Force," 48. Also see Murray et al., 
"Huygens, Wren, Wallis, and Newton," 154-7. 
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contradicts Descartes's fourth rule. In the Regles it is stated as follows: (3) "A body 
somewhat smaller than it and having somewhat less velocity, in encountering another 
greater and at rest will give some of its motion to it." 416 De motu provides a 
demonstration. The fourth proposition in the Regles is a "general rule for determining the 
motion which hard bodies acquire by direct impact."417 And the fifth proposition in the 
Regles directly contradicts the fundamental Cartesian principle, the conservation of 
Cartesian quantity of motion.  
(5) The quantity of motion that two bodies have can be increased or decreased by 
their impact, but there will always remain the same quantity toward the same side 
by subtracting the contrary quantity of motion.418 
  
The first part of this statement (excluding the comment regarding subtraction) 
corresponds to Proposition VI in De motu corporum ex percussione, and, like the other 
propositions in this treatise, are demonstrated from prior propositions and hypotheses. 
The sixth proposition in the summary is the conservation principle with which Huygens 
replaces the Cartesian principle, the conservation of body times speed squared. (6) "The 
sum of the products of the size of each hard body multiplied by the square of its velocity 
is always the same before and after impact." The seventh proposition involves increasing 
the motion a body at rest will receive by interposing a third body in between the two. And 
lastly there is an unnumbered proposition which states that "the common center of gravity 
of two or three (or such as one wishes) bodies, always advances equally toward the same 
side in a straight line before and after impact."419     
 I would like to highlight the first three hypotheses (axioms), which Huygens used 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416 HOC 16: 180. Translation by Iltis, "Controversy over Living Force," 48.   
417 The fourth corresponds to Proposition IX in De motu corporum ex percussione. See HOC 16: 65. 
418 HOC 16: 180. Translation by Iltis, "Controversy over Living Force," 48-50. 
419 HOC 16: 180. Translation by Iltis, "Controversy over Living Force," 50. 
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in his demonstrations of the propositions regarding the collision of two equal bodies (i.e. 
the first two propositions mentioned above). Huygens was working in the axiomatic 
tradition of Archimedes's On the equilibrium of planes and Galileo's Two New Sciences. 
As such, the hypotheses are "principles to which the mind naturally consents."420 The first 
hypothesis has been called the "principle of inertia."421 It states that "any body once 
moved continues to move, if nothing prevents it, at the same constant speed and along a 
straight line."422 The second two hypotheses are instrumental in using the concept of 
symmetry to establish Huygens's theory of collision.  
 The second hypothesis states that "when two equal bodies with equal speed 
collide directly with one another from opposite directions each rebounds with the same 
speed with which it approached."423 It has often been remarked, whether when discussing 
Descartes's version of this rule or Huygens's, that this scenario describes a "symmetric" 
case of collision.424 There are a variety of apparent "symmetries" in the hypothesis. There 
is a spatial bilateral symmetry if the point of impact is taken as the axis. This echoes the 
equilibrium of the balance when the weights and arms are the same, as enunciated by 
Archimedes. If the collision itself is taken to be the transformation, the relative speed of 
approach is the same as the relative speed of separation, i.e. the relative speed is 
invariant. Unlike other various instances of collision, it seems immediately apparent in 
the case described in hypothesis two—equal hard bodies colliding with equal speeds and 
rebounding with the same speed—that the relative speed is invariant. Huygens would go 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
420 Domenico Bertoloni Meli, "The Axiomatic Tradition in 17th-Century Mechanics," in Synthesis  
and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. M. Dickson and M. Domski (Chicago: Open Court, 2010) 23, 33-35. 
Also see Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 66, 96, 232-3. Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics, 153. 
421 Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics, 153. 
422 HOC 16: 31. Translation by Mahoney, "On the motion of bodies resulting from impact." 
423 HOC 16: 31. Translation by Mahoney, "On the motion of bodies resulting from impact." 
424 Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics, 148, 153.  
	   230 
on to prove that the relative speed of approach is equal to that of separation in general as 
well. 425  
 The third hypothesis is "the principle of relativity:"  
The motion of bodies and their equal and unequal speeds are to be understood 
respectively, in relation to other bodies which are considered as at rest, even 
though perhaps both the former and the latter are involved in another common 
motion. And accordingly, when two bodies collide with one another, even if both 
together are further subject to another uniform motion, they will move each other 
with respect to a body that is carried by the same common motion no differently 
than if this motion extraneous to all were absent. 
 Thus, if someone conveyed on a boat that is moving with a uniform 
motion were to cause equal balls to strike one another at equal speeds with respect 
to himself and the parts of the boat, we say that both should rebound also at equal 
speeds with respect to the same passenger, just as would clearly happen if he were 
to cause the same balls to collide at equal speeds in a boat at rest or while 
standing on the ground.426 
 
Collision is not affected by the principle of relativity. The structure of collision remains 
invariant when the frame of reference changes between the "passenger on the boat" and 
the person on the shore. Using the "symmetric" case described in hypothesis two of equal 
bodies with equal speeds colliding and separating with the same speed, and the principle 
of relativity, Huygens derives any case of collision of equal bodies. For example, a 
person on a boat holds pendulum bobs in each hand. If he were to bring his hands 
together at a constant and equal speed, the bodies after collision would move with the 
same equal speeds in opposite directions (hypothesis 2). If the boat were to move at a 
constant speed equal to that with which the man on the boat moves one of the pendulum 
bobs, to a person on the shore, the pendulum bob would appear to be at rest. And if the 
two men were to touch hands as the man on the boat brought the pendulum bobs together 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
425 HOC 16: 43-5. That "the relative speed of approach is equal to the relative speed of separation" is 
demonstrated generally for any collision of hard bodies in Proposition IV of De motu corporum ex 
percussione.  
426 HOC 16: 33. Translation by Mahoney, "On the motion of bodies resulting from impact." 
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in accordance with hypothesis 2, the person on the shore would affectively hold one bob 
at rest and move the other bob toward it.  
 
 Figure 13. HOC 16: 29 
 
 A distinction can be noted between the "symmetrical" case of collision 
(hypothesis 2), and the role of "symmetry" in Huygens's use of the principle of relativity 
in conjunction with his axiomatic case of collision in his demonstrations. The former 
symmetry is a property of an entity; the latter symmetry is a relation. Hypothesis 2 
describes "a whole whose parts are in agreeable proportion." The use of hypothesis 2 
along with 3 (the relativity principle) to establish other cases of collision is an 
operation—a transformation in which something remains invariant.427 The latter notion of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
427 The roles of symmetry in the rules of collision will be discussed in greater length in chapter 6. Also see 
Giora Hon and Bernard R. Goldstein, From Summetria to Symmetry: The making of a revolutionary 
scientific concept, in Archimedes: New Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, 
vol. 20, ed. Jed Buchwald (New York: Springer, 2008). And see György Darvas, Symmetry: Cultural-
historical and ontological aspects of science-arts relations; the natural and man-made world in an 
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symmetry is of primary importance in Huygens's theory. And, as we will see in chapter 5, 
it is the former notion of symmetry that plays a significant role in Wren's theory of 
collision.428  
 
4.1 – Challenging Descartes without Cartesian concepts: relativity and rebound 
From the beginning of Huygens’s studies of collision in the early 1650s, he was 
committed to refuting Descartes’s rules. Huygens persisted in this despite the disapproval 
of his teacher, the Cartesian, Frans van Schooten, who encouraged him to abandon the 
project.429 Descartes’s rules conflicted with experience. Huygens’s did not, as Huygens 
pointed out to his correspondents, and as he would show through his successful 
predictions in 1661 in London. However, Huygens’s criticisms were not merely that 
Descartes’s rules did not match experience. Descartes had acknowledged this much 
himself in the Principles of Philosophy, as we saw in the previous chapter, and Huygens 
was cautious about relying too heavily on experience, which can be uncertain, or in his 
words, “slippery.”430 Huygens’s arguments were mathematical and "rational" rather than 
empirical. The arguments were at least in part from a position internal to Descartes's 
system of ideas. Huygens used Descartes’s mathematics against Descartes’s physical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
interdisciplinary approach, trans. David Robert Evans (Boston: Birkhäuser, 2007). Hon and Goldstein had 
drawn a distinction between symmetry as a property of an entity and symmetry as a relation. The forcefully 
argue that the latter did not emerge until 1794 with Legendre's "revolutionary definition" of symmetry in 
his Élements de géometrie. Darvas distinguishes between symmetry as a phenomenon, concept, and 
operation. However, he does not share Hon and Goldstein's view, and argues that symmetry is a rich and 
fundamental concept that bridges times, cultures, and disciplines. Both recognize the differing historical 
place of symmetry in an aesthetic context and a "group theoretic" context.   
428 It can be found in the notion of a balance in equilibrium in his theory as well as the diagrammatic 
presentation of his theory which is organized symmetrically, and which is meant to be read both in the 
"Latin way" (from left to right) as well as the "Hebraic" (from right to left). Symmetry in Wren's theory 
works in tandem with the values put on brevity, unity, and the economy of the algebraic symbol.  
429 Richard Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics (New York: American Elsevier, 1971), 147.  
430 HOC 2: 79-80, 114-5. Christiaan Huygens to R. F. de Sluse, 2 November 1657. Also see Bertoloni Meli, 
Thinking with Objects, 233.   
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rules of collision, as we have seen above in section 2.1. And, in the treatise prepared for 
publication, Huygens used Descartes’s first rule—that two equal bodies moving toward 
each other with the same speed will reflect and move away from each other with the same 
speed431—and the principle of the relativity of motion (which at least seems to be similar 
to Descartes's notion of motion) to argue that the Cartesian rules are inconsistent and that 
the Cartesian “quantity of motion” is not actually conserved.432 However, Huygens 
disregarded fundamental components of Descartes's system. Huygens's understanding of 
motion, particularly his notion of relative motion, was not Cartesian, but was likely an 
"extension" of Galilean relativity.433 And Huygens's understanding of bodies, particularly 
their relationship to rebound, is in sharp contrast to Descartes's understanding of bodies 
as well as Descartes's efforts to explain the conditions of rebound and the transfer of 
motion.   
 In the Principles of Philosophy Descartes had described a "vulgar" and a "proper" 
conception of motion. The vulgar conception "is nothing other than the action by which 
some body travels from one place to another."434 Under this conception, Descartes shows 
that the same thing can be said "to move and not to move." 
Thus a man, seated in a ship which is sailing out of port, thinks that he is moving 
if he turns his attention to the shores, which he considers to be at rest. But he does 
not think so if he turns his attention to the parts of the ship, in relation to which he 
constantly maintains the same situation.435 
 
But this is only motion "as commonly interpreted." Descartes's "proper" conception of 
motion, which is "in accordance with the truth of the matter," attributes to motion some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
431 AT VIII 68. Principia II 46. 
432 Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics, 148-58. Compare this to Dijksterhuis's rather anachronistic and 
abbreviated account of Huygens’s use of relativity in De motu corporum ex percussione. See Dijksterhuis, 
Mechanization (IV: 143-4), 374-5.     
433 Vilain, "Huygens' Galilean Mechanics," 194-7. Gabbey, "Huygens and mechanics," 179. 
434 AT VIII 53. Principia II 24. Translation by Miller, Principles, 50.  
435 Ibid.  
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"determinate nature." By shifting the focus from a "change of place" to the "transference 
with respect to the immediate neighborhood," Descartes's "proper" conception was 
intended to limit the arbitrariness of whether a thing is in motion or not.436   
[Motion] is the transference [translatio] of one part of matter or of one body from 
the neighborhood [vicinia] of those bodies that immediately touch it and are 
regarded as being at rest, and into the neighborhood of others.437 
  
However, Descartes's also acknowledged that it is impossible to know whether the 
neighborhood moves with respect to the body or the body moves with respect to the 
neighborhood. Transference is reciprocal.438 Some commentators have claimed that this 
is evidence that Descartes's proper conception of motion is ultimately relative. Garber, on 
the other hand, has argued that even with the "reciprocity of transfer" Descartes provided 
a non-arbitrary distinction between motion and rest. Motion is the mutual separation of a 
body and its neighborhood.439  
 Whether or not the "reciprocity of transfer" entails some form of relative motion, 
Descartes's conception of motion is clearly different from Huygens's. Rather than the 
"vulgar" notion of motion in which the observer's perception determines whether a body 
is in motion, Descartes defined a "proper" conception of motion, which privileged the 
reciprocal transfer of a body and its neighborhood. Huygens, on the other hand "believed 
from the beginning of his career not only that the position of the observer influenced the 
perception of motion, but also that there was no privileged point of view, for all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436 Garber, Descartes' metaphysical physics, 162-72. 
437 AT VIII 53. Principia II 25. Translation by Garber, Descartes' metaphysical physics, 159-60. 
438 AT VIII 55-6. Principia II 29. "Finally, I added that the transference thake place from the neighborhood 
not only of any contiguous bodies, but only from the neighborhood of those regarded as being at rest. For 
that transference is reciprocal, and we cannot understand body AB transferred from the neighborhood of 
body CD unless at the same time body CD is also transferred from the neighborhood of body AB." 
Translation by Garber, Descartes' metaphysical physics, 166-7. 
439 Garber, Descartes' metaphysical physics, 168. 
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viewpoints were equivalent."440 Huygens's relativity principle may have been inspired by 
Galileo, whom Huygens greatly admired, more so than Descartes.441 But even so, 
Huygens's principle of relativity was far more radical.442 
Huygens's position on collision relies on a concept of motion that Descartes did 
not share. In addition, Huygens's understanding of the bodies involved in impact differs 
from those of Descartes, as does Huygens's account of rebound. Descartes had identified 
body with extension and maintained that the world was a plenum, whereas Huygens 
accepted inter-particle vacua, and noted that bodies with the same volume have different 
densities, thus their size is different from their bulk.443 While Descartes and Huygens 
both described the bodies involved in collision as perfectly “hard” or “solid,” their 
notions of a “hard body” differ significantly. Descartes notion of hardness was defined as 
the mutual rest of the "parts" of a body.444 However, I contend that whether or not the 
bodies in Descartes's rules of collision rebound is not determined by the nature of the 
body as hard or soft, solid or fluid. In his rules of collision, Descartes explained rebound 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
440 Vilain, "Huygens' Galilean Mechanics," 196. Also see Christiane Vilain, "Huygens and Relative 
Motion," in Relativity in General: Proceedings of the Relativity Meeting ‘93, ed. Diaz Alonzo and M 
Lorente Paramo (Gif-sur-Yvette Cedex: Atlantica Seguier Frontieres, 1995), 161-9. 
441 Gabbey, "Huygens and mechanics," 175-81. Alan Gabbey has suggested that Huygens’s relativity 
principle did not originate with Descartes, but rather with Galileo. According to Gabbey, Galilean relativity 
involved “dynamic considerations” which Huygens too had used in his earliest work on collision. Huygens 
initially appealed to a force, the vis collisionis, in his 1654 notes on collision, and used the invariance of 
forces with respect to frames of reference in his early collision theory. Huygens would later abandon the vis 
collisionis, but it was present in his first arguments using relativity. Compare this with Westfall, Force in 
Newton's Physics, 150-1. In his chapter, “Christiaan Huygens’ Kinematics,” Westfall also argues that 
Huygens’s work on collision began with a notion of force that was later abandoned. However, unlike 
Gabbey, Westfall claims that Huygens used Descartes’s relativity principle against Descartes: “Here, of 
course, was the principle of the relativity of motion, Descartes’ own principle turned against his own 
conclusions.” 
442 Vilain, "Huygens' Galilean Mechanics," 196. Dijksterhuis, Mechanization (IV: 149), 378. HOC 16: 222. 
"True motion is relative motion." 
443 Gabbey, "Huygens and mechanics," 176. H. A. M. Snelders, "Christiaan Huygens and the concept of 
matter," in Studies on Christiaan Huygens, ed. H. J. M. Bos et al. (Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger B. V., 1980) 
110. Murray et al., "Huygens, Wren, Wallis, and Newton," 160.   
444 The word “parts” is in quotes, because if the so-called parts were at rest with respect to each other, the 
parts would be indistinguishable, since motion is what individuates bodies in Descartes’s plenum.  
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by his contest view of force: a body rebounds if it does not overcome to the force of 
resistance.  For Huygens, rebound is not explained in terms of a contest between the 
moving force and the force of resistance. And hardness, at least the hardness of particles 
of matter, is an absolute and independent property.445 The bodies described in Huygens's 
account of collision are not only perfectly hard, but they behave as (what we would call) 
a perfectly elastic body would.  
Throughout Le Monde Descartes uses the terms “solid bodies” corps solide and 
“hard bodies” corps durs interchangeably,446 just as “liquid bodies” corps liquides and 
“fluids” liqueurs are used interchangeably.447 In the Principles of Philosophy, Descartes 
also uses both binaries, hard/liquid and solid/fluid.448 However, his notion of a perfectly 
hard body is somewhat complicated by his notion of “solidity,” which he defines as “the 
quantity of the matter of the third element...in proportion to its [the body’s] volume and 
surface area”449 (e.g. gold and lead have more solidity than wood or rocks).450 However, 
immediately after the rules of collision are presented in the Principles of Philosophy, and 
as if to clarify what he meant by the "perfectly hard bodies" (perfecte dura) that are 
featured in his rules,451 Descartes draws a fundamental distinction between a hard body 
and a fluid body and defines them respectively (Quæ sint corpora dura, quæ fluida). The 
parts of a perfectly solid body are at rest with respect to each other, and it is “rest” that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
445 Snelders, "Huygens and the concept of matter," 118. 
446 AT XI 12, 17. For “hard bodies,” see chapter 3 of Le Monde. For “solid bodies” see chapter 4.   
447 AT XI 24. For the former see chapter 3, for the latter see chapter 5.  
448 AT VIII 70. Principia II 54. “Solid/Fluid” is a basic distinction between different qualities of bodies, 
defined by the motions of their parts. AT VIII 211. Principia IV 19. When Descartes discusses “liquids,” 
he specifically describes the effects of terrestrial “actions” that produce various phenomena such as the 
roundness of drops of water. Thus, in the Principles of Philosophy “fluid” may refer to a basic quality of 
matter explained in terms of its parts, whereas “liquid” may refer specifically to a terrestrial phenomenon. 
See AT VIII 26, Principia I 56, for Descartes’s definitions of modes, qualities, and attributes. 
449 AT VIII 170-2. Principia III 121. Translation by Miller, Principles, 151-2. For a discussion of solidity 
see Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 158-9.  
450 AT VIII 172. Principia III 122.  
451 AT VIII 67. Principia II 45. 
	   237 
binds them together to resist being divided. The parts of a fluid body are not at rest with 
respect to each other.452  
What Descartes did not mean by "perfectly hard" was "perfectly elastic."453 He 
clearly did not mean they were elastic in the historical sense that the body compressed 
and expanded like a spring, nor did he mean that they were perfectly elastic in the 
modern sense wherein the total kinetic energy is the same before and after the bodies 
meet. The "historical" notion of elasticity originated in the mid 17th century from the 
accounts of phenomena encountered initially in barometric experiments, such as those 
involving Torricellian tubes, as well as Mersenne and Jean Pecquet’s later experiments 
and debates which described what would come to be known as the "spring of the air." 
Particularly influential was Jean Pecquet’s Experimenta nova anatomica (1651). It used 
the terms elasticus and elater, which when the work was translated into English in 1653, 
were rendered as "elastick" and "spring."454 Complicating matters, however, is the fact 
that Descartes's first rule of collision describes a scenario in which (if modern concepts of 
mass, velocity, and energy are used) kinetic energy would be conserved. After two equal 
masses with equal and opposite velocities meet in an elastic collision, they both 
subsequently move with velocities of the same magnitude but in opposite directions. This 
might lead one to assume that Descartes meant "elastic" by the term durus.455 However, 
as we saw in chapter 3, Descartes's first rule is fairly unusual when compared to the other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
452 AT VIII 70-1. Principia II 54, 55. "[T]hose bodies which are divided into very small parts which are 
agitated by a diversity of movements, are fluid; while those bodies whose particles are all contiguous and at 
rest, are solid." "[T]he parts of solid bodies are not joined by any other bond than their own rest." 
Translation by Miller, Principles, 70.   
453 Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 229.  
454 Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 225.   
455 This appears to be precisely what Valentine and Reese Miller did in their English translation of the 
Principles of Philosophy. They conflate the modern notion of perfectly elastic with Descartes notion of 
perfectly hard. See Miller, Principles, 64n.  
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six. Moreover, it is clear that the conservation of energy did not guide his first rule, nor 
was his notion of perfectly hard bodies equivalent to perfectly elastic bodies. Descartes’s 
rules 5, 3 and 7a all describe hard bodies that move together and do not rebound after 
they meet, which conflicts with both historical and modern notions of elastic bodies. As 
has been shown in chapter 3, the key difference between Descartes's early and later view 
of collision is that in the latter (found in the Principles) Descartes stipulates the 
conditions in which the force of resistance is larger than the moving force, resulting in 
rebound rather than a transfer of motion.    
In Beeckman’s Journal,456 in Descartes’s early work on collision,457 and in 
Borelli’s rules of collision in De vi percussionis (1667),458 all of which describe perfectly 
hard bodies, the bodies do not rebound after collision. Both Borelli and Beeckman 
realized that experience contradicted their mathematical accounts of the collision of 
perfectly hard bodies. Although Beeckman noted that atoms (perfectly hard bodies) do 
not rebound, at times he suggested that perhaps collections of atoms might somehow 
rebound, but he provided no rules for such collections.459 Borelli seems to have 
considered the flexible and compressible nature of bodies from experience to be akin to 
other complicating factors, such as being irregular in shape, and did not provide 
mathematical rules of collision to accommodate such complications. Despite focusing his 
mathematical rules on hard bodies that do not rebound, Borelli also attempted an account 
of reflection, but was “at pains to explain whence reflection arises.”460         
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
456 See chapter 2 
457 See chapter 3 
458 Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 229-31. 
459 See chapter 2. 
460 Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 231. 
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The significant change between Descartes’s early and late view is that in his later 
work, Descartes had provided a mathematical account of the conditions of rebound – 
namely when the force of resistance in a resting body cannot be overcome by a moving 
body. This he stipulated in rule 4: when a smaller body meets a larger body at rest, the 
smaller body does not move the larger and is repelled in the opposite direction. Although 
in Descartes’s early view, he provided numerous quantitative examples in which smaller 
bodies move larger bodies at rest, Descartes changed his position to include rule 4 to 
explain whence reflection arises.461 As Descartes explained to Clerselier, "without this 
[that which is described in rule 4], no body would ever be reflected by encountering 
another."462 
Huygens did not rely on a Cartesian definition of hard bodies. Rather, hardness 
was an independent property.463 And Huygens's hard bodies behaved differently from 
Descartes's (as well as Beeckman's and Borelli's). They behaved in a manner that others 
were at pains to explain (Beeckman and Borelli failed to explain rebound quantitatively, 
and Descartes appealed to the contest with the force of resistance). Nor did Huygens 
explain rebound as Descartes did from prior notions (or as Beeckman and Borelli did 
qualitatively). For Huygens, hard bodies rebound of their own nature.464 He did not 
attempt to reconcile perfect hardness as an original quality of matter with (what would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
461 See chapter 3 
462 AT IV 184. Descartes to Clerselier, 17 February 1645. Translation by Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical 
Physics, 261. Also see Gabbey, "Force and inertia," 269. Gabbey provides a slightly different translation: 
“And unless that happens no body will ever be reflected by collision with another.” 
463 Snelders, "Huygens and the concept of matter," 108, 110, 115, 121. In Huygens’s Discours sur la cause 
de la pesanteur, which was appended to his Traité de la Lumière (1690), he claimed that hardness is an 
essential property of matter. Parts of the Discourse had been explained at the Académie Royale des 
Sciences in 1669. For the text of the Discours sur la cause de la pesanteur see HOC 21: 443-488.    
464 In a late manuscript dated to 1689, Huygens claims that hard nonelastic bodies rebound similarly to 
elastic bodies. But in a perfectly hard body, such as an atom, impact is instantaneous, whereas in an elastic 
body (which is not perfectly hard) impact occurs in a finite amount of time. See HOC 16: 210. Also see 
Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 235. 
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come to be called) perfect elasticity, even while explicitly disagreeing with Leibniz on 
the relationship between absolute hardness and elasticity.465 Although speculative, it is 
plausible that Huygens's link between hard bodies and rebound may have originated from 
his experiments with physically hard pendulum bobs and other experimental devices.  
 Even though Huygens used different notions of motion and body, he still worked 
within the general structure Descartes had proposed, and criticized Descartes’s rules of 
collision non-empirically. Huygens’s also seems to have been sympathetic to the 
prospects of  “Cartesian” natural philosophical explanations in terms of the collision of 
moving particles.466 In a manuscript from 1656 relating to his early work on collision he 
wrote:   
For if the whole of nature consists of certain particles, from the motion of which 
all the diversity of things arises, and by the extremely rapid impulse of which 
light is propagated and spreads through the immense spaces of the heavens in a 
moment of time, as many philosophers deem probable, this examination [of 
nature] will seem to be helped no small amount if the true laws by which motion 
is transferred from body to body be made known.467   
 
However, Huygens did not seem to start by supposing absolutely hard atoms or particles, 
and to then develop a system of natural philosophy. Rather, Huygens seems to have 
initially approached the topic of collision as a problem in mechanics, which he 
investigated with physical objects such as pendulums. Huygens’s tendency to avoid 
philosophical speculation and system building in preference for rigorous solutions to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465 Snelders, "Huygens and the concept of matter." 115-121. Also see the set of letters between Huygens 
and Leibniz from 1692-94, which includes HOC 10: 296-304, Huygens to Leibniz, 11 July 1692, and HOC 
10: 383-9, Huygens to Leibniz, 12 January 1693.   
466 Westman, "Huygens and the problem of Cartesianism," 83-103, 94. Westman provides an overview of 
various historiographical discussions of Huygens relationship to “Cartesianism.” He also reproduces 
extensive passages from the notes Huygens made on a copy of Adrien Baillet’s Life of Descartes (1691), 
which provide “Huygens’ most direct comments on Descartes to be found anywhere in his extant writings.”   
467 HOC 16: 150. Translation by Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics, 147. 
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particular problems has been noted by many. For example, Gabbey points this out, but 
with some additional criticism:  
Huygens’ mechanical theory...lacks a serious examination of some of the critical 
problems caused by his partial adoption of the Cartesian mechanical model of the 
world. [Namely, he omits] a causal account of how one particle acts on another. 
Huygens does not tell us what force is, he provides no ontological account of 
what it is that causes one particle to change the speed or direction of another.468 
 
Huygens did not over look these questions. He just did not consider them to be "critical 
problems," as is evidenced in letters with Henry Oldenburg. At the Royal Society 
William Neile had been engaging John Wallis with concerns regarding the determination 
of a causal account of how one body acts on another (i.e. discovering the physical cause 
of the communication of motion). Huygens addressed the topic directly:  
The question of whether motion is communicated to bodies by the elasticity of the 
parts, or by that of the air or of some other substance squeezed between them, or 
by hardness alone has not yet been resolved. But in the demonstration of my rules 
it does not matter at all which of the three one assumes.469  
 
And a few months later in another letter: “As for Mr. Neile’s question, what is the reason 
why a body puts another which it meets into motion, I do not think that this can be found 
out by any better known principles.”470Although Mach also noted the “deficiency” in 
Huygens’s “philosophical endowments,” he ranked him as Galileo’s peer, who continued 
the research that Galileo had begun, in a manner much like Galileo’s.471 And Mahoney 
has highlighted those in the 17th century who referred to him as an "Archimedes"—the 
genius who established mathematical principles to solve physical problems.472  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
468 Gabby, "Huygens and mechanics," 175-6.  
469 OCH 6:161-5. Huygens to Oldenburg, 31 July 1669. 
470 OCH 6: 289-92. Huygens to Oldenburg, 20 October 1669. 
471 Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics: a critical and historical account of its development (Chicago: 
Open Court, 1893), 155-7. The first edition was published in 1883. 
472 Mahoney, "Measurement of time and longitude," 234. 
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 Once Huygens had formulated general principles and organized them into an 
axiomatic treatise (De motu corporum ex percussione), the heuristic paths, such as the 
algebraic equations and the experiments, become secondary or completely absent in the 
formal axiomatic presentation.473 Then, with general principles in hand or at least in 
sight, acquired through the solution of specific problems, Huygens seems to have 
suggested, as he did in the passage quoted above that, “the laws by which motion is 
transferred from body to body” may help examinations of nature which suppose that 
nature consists of particles in motion. In addition to Huygens's non-Cartesian 
understanding of matter and motion, Huygens Galilean/Archimedean axiomatic 
formulation is in sharp contrast to that of Descartes.   
 
Section 5  
Conclusion   
 
 Huygens's ideas on collision were first developed with his innovative use of 
symbolic algebra and his expert understanding of the pendulum. They were then 
presented and justified in the axiomatic tradition of Archimedes and Galileo.  
 Huygens used Cartesian symbolic algebra as a tool for conceptual analysis. He 
not only represented Descartes’s principle of the conservation of quantity of motion and 
his rules of collision algebraically, but in doing so Huygens criticized rules 4 and 5 and 
could show that Cartesian quantity of motion is not conserved. This heuristic work 
corresponds to Huygens's first announcements of his rejection of Descartes's rules of 
collision.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
473 Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 233. I have slightly modified what Bertoloni Meli calls a 
“Huygensian style,” which was “inspired by Archimedes, in which the search for general principles and 
axioms takes center stage and experience plays a secondary role as part of the scaffolding rather than part 
of the formal presentation.” 
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 Huygens's use of algebra—the representation of multiple kinds of physical 
quantities in a single equation—was new. Thomas Harriot had previously and 
independently used symbolic equations in De reflexione corporum rotundorum, but as we 
saw in chapter 2, they were symbolic representations of the steps of a geometric 
construction. Huygens's innovative algebraic study of collision remained in his private 
manuscripts. In the treatises prepared for publication Huygens quantified motion in the 
tradition of Galileo, and in publications such as the Horologium oscilatorium, he 
rigorously used the classical theory of proportions. The algebra in the manuscripts bears 
some historical peculiarities. It is not a purely formal system. The symbols refer to 
specific quantities and are bound by the restraints such quantities impose, and Huygens 
actively avoided producing negative results. His investigations of collision with 
equations, particularly his engagement with negatives and algebraic operations, may have 
also served as scaffolding for a new principle, the conservation of Cartesian quantity of 
motion with direction—quantity of motion is conserved if motion in a contrary direction 
is subtracted.  
 In addition to the critical conceptual analysis of Descartes's theory of collision, 
and the scaffolding for a new principle, Huygens algebraic equations successfully 
predicted the outcomes of experiments with colliding pendulum bobs at the Royal 
Society. Huygens had worked extensively on the properties of the pendulum. It was not 
only important for the empirical investigation of collision, but the pendulum was also key 
for the formation of several principles of his theory of collision, such as his variant of the 
Torricelli principle, the reversibility of impact, and perhaps even the conservation of 
"body times speed squared."   
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 Although Huygens's interest in collision was inspired by Descartes, he presented 
and justified his theory of collision with an axiomatic formulation in the tradition of 
Archimedes and Galileo. Three of Descartes's rules (6, 7c, and 1) had been guided by 
implicit notions of symmetry, as we saw in chapter 3 section 5.4.3. Huygens's axioms 
("hypotheses"), and the key to his argument, relied on principles of symmetry: he used 
the symmetrical case of collision (similar to Descartes's first rule), in conjunction with 
the relativity of motion, to show the equivalence between different scenarios of collision.  
 Huygens appears to mount his criticisms from within Descartes's system, however 
in doing so he re-conceptualized the two fundamental components of the system, matter 
and motion. With Huygens's accurate predictions of colliding pendulum bobs, Huygens 
could have criticized Descartes's rules for conflicting with experience. Instead, in his 
early manuscripts Huygens used Descartes's own symbolic algebra against Descartes's 
rules of collision. And, throughout his work, Huygens used Descartes's 1st rule and 
relative motion (which bears some resemblance to Descartes's notion of motion) against 
the Cartesian rules. Huygens's shared in Descartes's hope that all natural phenomena 
could be explained in terms of matter and motion. However, in his reformulation, 
Huygens did not share a Cartesian understanding of those concepts. Huygens espoused a 
radical notion of relative motion in which no perspective is privileged, rather than 
Descartes's notion of motion, which in its "proper" conception defines true motion to be 
the transference of a body with respect to its immediate neighborhood. Huygens's 
perfectly hard bodies rebound perfectly, unlike Descartes's hard bodies, for which 
Descartes provided a mathematical explanation of the conditions of rebound rooted in the 
contest between the moving force and the force of resistance.  
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 With these new notions, and Descartes’s mathematical tools, Huygens opened 
new horizons in the algebraic study of nature, and challenged the basic rules of 
Descartes’s physics.  Two of the individuals present when Huygens performed his 
predictions for the Royal Society in 1661, John Wallis and Christopher Wren, went on to 
publish their own rules of motion in terms of algebraic equations in 1669. As we will see 
in the next chapter, the work of Wallis and Wren shows the legacy of Huygens's 
pendulum in the experiments at the Royal Society, as well as the importance of 
symmetry, and the continued transformation of the mathematics of nature, particularly in 
the critical role of positive and negative signs.  
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Chapter 5  
The mathematics of collision in the Royal Society: 
Experiments, the balance, and the algebraic language of nature 
 
  
 
 
 
Dr. Wren produc'd before the Society, an Instrument to represent the effects of all sorts of 
Impulses, made between two globous Bodies, either of equal, or of different bigness, and 
swiftness, following or meeting each other, or the one moving, the other at rest. From 
these varieties arose many unexpected effects of all which he demonstrated the Theories, 
after they had been confirm'd by many hundreds of Experiments in that Instrument. These 
he propos'd as the Principles of all Demonstrations in Natural Philosophy: Nor can it 
seem strange, that these Elements should be of such Universal use; if we consider that 
Generation, Corruption, Alteration, and all the Vicissitudes of Nature, are nothing else 
but the effects arising from the meeting of little Bodies, of differing Figures, Magnitudes, 
and Velocities.  
 —from Thomas Sprat's History of the Royal-Society of London (1667)  
 
...to know a thing barely by experiment is good for use but it is not science or 
philosophye. 
—William Neile to Henry Oldenburg, 7 May 1669 
 
Now what is admitted in Lines, must on the same Reason, be allowed in Plains also. 
 As for instance: Supposing that in one Place, we Gain from the Sea, 30 Acres, but 
Lose in another Place, 20 Acres: If it be now asked, How many Acres we have gained 
upon the whole: The Answer is, 10 Acres, or +10. (Because of 30− 20 = 10). Or, 
which is all one 1600 Square Perches. [...] Which if it lye in a Square Form, the Side of 
that Square will be 40 Perches in length [...] 
 But if then in a Third place, we lose 20 Acres more, and the same Question be 
again asked, How much we have gained in the whole; the Answer must be −10 Acres. 
(Because 30− 20− 20 = −10.) That is to say The Gain is 10  Acres less than nothing. 
Which is the same as to say, there is a Loss of 10 Acres: or of 1600  Square Perches.  
 And hitherto, there is no new Difficulty arising, nor any other Impossibility than 
what we met with before, (in supposing a Negative Quantity, or somewhat Less than 
nothing:) Save only that 1600 is ambiguous; and may be +40, or −40. 
 We cannot say it is 40, nor that it is −40. (Because either of these Multiplyed into 
itself, will make +1600; not −1600.) 
But thus rather, that it is −1600, (the Supposed Root of a Negative Square;) or (which 
is Equivalent thereunto) 10 −16, or 20 −4, or 40 −1. 
 —from John Wallis's Treatise of Algebra (1685)  
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Section 1  
Introduction  
 
 On a Thursday meeting of the Royal Society in October of 1668, "it was proposed 
by some [including Robert Hooke474], that475 there might be made some experiments to 
discover the nature & laws of motion, as the foundation of Philosophie and all 
Philosophical discourse."476 Other items discussed at the October meeting included an 
eye witness account of a unicorn,477 Regnier de Graaf's De virorum organis generationi 
inservientibus de clysteribus et de usu siphonis in anatomia (1668),478 and the earl of 
Sandwich's observations of a comet and lunar eclipse while in Spain and Portugal. 
Discussion of John Wilkins's newly published work, An Essay towards a Real Character 
and a Philosophical Language, was put off until the next meeting.479 
 On that Thursday in October, members of the Royal Society recalled that 
Christopher Wren and Christiaan Huygens had already "considered that subject [the 
nature & laws of motion] more than many others, & probably found out a Theory to 
explicate all sorts of experiments to be made of that nature."480  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
474 Thomas Birch, The History of the Royal Society of London, vol. 2 (London, A. Millar in the Strand, 
1756) 315.  Robert Hooke had proposed that these experiments should be prosecuted. "... it being proposed 
by Mr. Hooke, that the experiments of motion might be prosecuted, thereby to state at last the nature and 
laws of motion..."  
475 I have expanded the contractions "yt" (that), "ye" (the), and "yn" (than) in the 17th century English texts, 
which have been reproduced in the OCH.     
476 OCH 5: 117. Oldenburg to Wren, 29 October 1668.  
477 Birch, History 2: 315. "Mr. Oldenburg produced the papers brought by Sir Robert Southwell from 
Portugal, written by Father Jerom Lobo, a Jesuit, and an eye-witness of most of the particulars contained 
therein, which were, 1. a relation of the river Nile, its source, current, and inundation. 2. An account of the 
real existence and the place of abode of the unicorn. 3. Of the Abyssine emperor, vulgarly called Prester 
John. 4. Of the Red-Sea and the cause of its denomination. 5. A discourse of palm-trees, their variety, fruit, 
usefulness, proper soil, &c." Jerome Lobo's account of his travels would later be translated into French by 
Abbe Legrand in 1728, and from French into English by Samuel Johnson in 1735. See Father Jerome Lobo, 
A Voyage to Abyssinia, trans. Samuel Johnson, ed. Henry Morley (London: Cassell & Co., 1887).   
478 Birch, History 2: 315. 
479 Ibid. 
480 OCH 5: 118. Oldenburg to Wren, 29 October 1668. Birch, History 2: 315. According to Birch's History 
the president of the Royal Society may have thought it redundant to prosecute such experiments: "After this 
[the proposal that experiments on motion might be prosecuted to determine the nature and laws of motion] 
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 Huygens had by that time already made a name for himself in the international 
scholarly community,481 and had visited London in 1661 where—using algebraic 
calculations—he correctly predicted the results of experiments concerning impact, as we 
have seen in the previous chapter.482 His work on collision dates to 1652.483 By 1656 
Huygens had essentially completed his treatise, De motu corporum ex percussione, which 
would not be published until 1703, after his death.484 A summary of this treatise would be 
published in the Journal des Sçavans as well as the Philosophical Transactions in 
1669.485 Christopher Wren had been active in the meetings at Gresham College in 
London prior to the existence of the Royal Society. In fact, beginning about 1658 
meetings were held after Wren's Wednesday or Thursday lectures as Professor of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
... the president desired, that it might be considered, whether it were so proper or necessary to try this sort 
of experiments, since Monsr. Huygens and Dr. Christopher Wren had already taken great pains to examine 
that subject, and were thought to have also found a theory to explicate all the phœnomena of motion."  
481 H. J. M. Bos, "Christiaan Huygens: a biographical sketch," Studies on Christiaan Huygens, ed. H. J. M. 
Bos et al. (Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger B. V., 1980), 7. Bos calls 1656 "a turning-point in Huygens' career." 
Huygens invented the pendulum clock, obtained a patent and published a short book on it. He published on 
the ring of Saturn in 1659. "By 1660 he was famous." 
482 When Huygens responded to the Royal Society's request to share his work on motion, Huygens first 
asked a clarifying question: "I beg you therefore, Sir, to let me know what part of motion they wish me to 
treat first, for there are several sorts, as you know, most of which I think I have considered: that is, the ratio 
of the fall of heavy bodies, both with and without the resistance of air; the motion of pendulums; centers of 
oscillation; circular and conical motion, and centrifugal force; the communication of motion by impact..." 
Concerning the latter he recalled the 1661 visit and experiments in London: "...I remember Mr Wren and 
Mr. Rooke showed me their experiments when I was in England, and they agreed very well with what I 
determined on the spot should be the case according to my hypotheses." See OCH 5: 127. Huygens to 
Oldenburg, 3 November 1668. Translation by Hall & Hall. 
483 HOC 16: 92. 
484 HOC 16: 30-91. 
485 The former, recorded on 18 March 1669, was published in the Journal des sçavans 2 (1667-71): 531-6. 
It has also been collected in HOC 16: 179-81, (also see HOC 6: 383-5, Huygens to Gallois, 18 March 
1669). The title in the Journal des sçavans is "Extrait d'une Lettre... " However, Huygens appears to have 
given the document the following title: "Regles du mouvement dans la rencontre des Corps."  The latter 
summary of the treatise, recorded as 12 April 1669, was published in the Philosophical Transactions 4 
(1669): 925-8. It has also been collected in HOC 6: 429-33. The title in the Philosophical Transactions is 
"A Summary Account of the Laws of Motion..." However, Huygens appears to have given the document 
the following title: "Regulæ de Motu Corporum ex mutuo impulsu." Note that Huygens consistently 
referred to the document "rules of motion," rather than "laws of motion," as the editor of the Philosophical 
Transactions did. The version printed in the Journal des sçavans is slightly different from the paper 
originally submitted to the Royal Society. See A. Rupert Hall, "Mechanics and the Royal Society, 1668-
70," The British Journal for the History of Science 3 (1966): 33-5. Huygens also sent demonstrations for 
several of his proposition to the Royal Society on 5 January 1668/9, which were not published in the 
Philosophical Transactions. See HOC 6: 336-43.  
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Astronomy at Gresham.486 Wren was present when Huygens visited London in 1661 to 
predict the motion of pendulum bobs upon impact using his private algebraic 
calculations. Prior to this, in the years just after the civil war, while studying at Wadham 
College, Oxford, Wren met with the "virtuous and learned Men, of Philosophical Minds" 
who gathered at John Wilkins's lodging at Wadham-College.487 These men—Royalists 
and Parliamentarians alike—would go on to meet at Gresham and subsequently form the 
Royal Society after the "restoration of the monarchy." Wren had joined Wadham the 
same year that Charles I was executed and the monarchy was abolished. After the "return 
of Charles II," Wren was instrumental in the official formation of the Royal Society—
writing the preamble, for example, for the charter of incorporation, which marked its 
official formation.488  
 After the meeting in October 1668, Henry Oldenburg, the secretary of the Society, 
was directed to ask Wren, "as well as Monsr Hugens, in the name of the Society, [if they] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
486 Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal Society of London (London: T. R. for J. Martyn and J. Allestry, 
1667) 57-8. Also see Christopher Wren, Parentalia (London: T. Osborn and R. Dodsley, 1750), 196. The 
following is quoted from the Parentalia, which differs slightly from the original passage in Sprat's History. 
"...being called away to several Parts of the Nation, and the greatest Number of them coming to London, 
they usually met at Gresham-College, at the Wednesday's and Thursday's Lectures of Dr. Wren (Professor 
of Astronomy) and Mr. Rook, (Professor of Geometry.) This Custom was observed once if not twice a 
Week, in Term-Time; 'till they were scattered by the miserable Distractions of that fatal Year, when the 
Continuance of their Meetings there might have made them run the Hazard of the Fate of Archimedes: For 
then the Place of their Meetings was made a Quarter for Soldiers."   
487 Sprat, History, 53. Also see Wren, Parentalia, 196. The following is quoted from the Parentalia, which 
differs slightly from the original passage in Sprat's History. "Some Space after the Conclusion of the Civil 
Wars, Dr. Wilkins's Lodging at Wadham-College in Oxford, was made the Place of Resort for virtuous and 
learned Men, of Philosophical Minds, where the first Meetings were held which laid the Foundation of the 
Royal Society for improving of natural Knowledge: The principal and most constant at the Assemblies were 
Dr. Seth Ward, the Bishop of Exeter, Mr. Boyle, Dr. Wilkins, Dr. Wallis, Dr. Willis, Sir William Petty, Mr. 
Matthew Wren, Dr. Godard, Dr. Bathurst, Dr. Christopher Wren, and Mr. Rook. Here they continued 
without any great Intermissions, till about the Year 1658..."   
488 J. F. Scott, "Wren, Christopher," DSB 14: 509-11. "The charter of incorporation passed the great seal on 
15 July 1662 (which thus is the date of the formation of the Royal Society); Wren is said to have prepared 
is preamble." For the text of the preamble, see Wren, Parentalia, 196-7. Sprat, however, set 1660 as the 
date the Royal Society began: "But upon the Restoration of the King, Philosophy had its Share in the 
Benefits of that glorious Action: For the Royal Society had its Beginning in the wonderful pacifick Year 
1660, and as it began in that Time, when the Kingdom was freed from Confusion and Slavery; so in its 
Progress, its chief Aim hath been to redeem the Minds of Men from Obscurity, Uncertainty, and Bondage." 
See Sprat, History, 58. Quoted from Wren, Parentalia, 196.   
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would pleas to impart unto them what [they] had meditated & tryed on the said 
argument," assuring them that whatever they communicated would be registered by the 
Society and "stand in their booke as one of the best monuments of [their] Philosophicall 
Genius."489 Wren presented his theory two months later at the 17 December meeting of 
the Royal Society.490 The next month it was printed in the Philosophical Transactions 
with the title, Lex naturae de collisione corporum ["The Law of Nature in the Collision 
of Bodies"].491 "A Summary Account by Dr. John Wallis, of the General Laws of 
Motion," which was communicated to the Society in November, was published with 
Wren's account in the same volume of the Philosophical Transactions.492 Huygens's 
Regles du mouuement dans la rencontre des corps was printed in the Journal des Sçavans 
in March of 1669,493 and a Latin translation, Regulae de motu corporum ex mutuo 
impulsu, was printed in the Philosophical Transactions in April of 1669.494  
 These texts were many years in the making and were the product of several 
experiments prosecuted by members of the Royal Society on instruments contrived for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
489 OCH 5: 118. Oldenburg to Wren, 29 October 1668.  
490 OCH 5: 321n. "Wren himself produced his theory at the Society's meeting on 17 December 1668."   
491 Christopher Wren, "Lex naturae de collisione corporum," Philosophical Transactions 3 (1669): 867-8. It 
has also been collected in OCH 5: 319-20, with an English translation by Hall, OCH 5: 320-1. The title the 
editor of the Philosophical Transactions gave to the document is the following: "Dr. Christopher Wrens 
Theory concerning the same subject; imparted to the R. Society Decemb. 17 last, though entertain'd by the 
Author divers years ago, and verifie'd by many Experiments, made by Himself and that other excellent 
Mathematician M. Rook before the said Society, as is attested by many Worthy Members of that Illustrious 
Body." 
492 John Wallis, "A Summary Account of the General Laws of Motion," Philosophical Transactions 3 
(1669): 864-6. It has also been collected in OCH 5: 164-7. Wallis to Oldenburg, 15 November 1668. Hall 
provided an English translation, OCH 5: 167-70.  The title the editor of the Philosophical Transactions 
gave to the document is the following: "A Summary Account given by Dr. John Wallis, of the General 
Laws of Motion, by way of Letter written by him to the Publisher, and communicated to the R. Society, 
November 26, 1668." 
493 Christiaan Huygens, "Regles du mouuement dans la rencontre des corps," Journal des sçavans 2 (1667-
71): 531-6. It is also collected in HOC 16: 179-81 (also see HOC 6: 383-5, Huygens to Gallois, 18 March 
1669). The version in the Journal des sçavans was slightly different from the paper submitted to the Royal 
Society. See footnote above as well as Hall, "Mechanics and the Royal Society," 33-35. 
494 Christiaan Huygens, "Regulæ de Motu Corporum ex mutuo impulsu," Philosophical Transactions 4 
(1669): 925-8. It is also collected in HOC 6: 429-33. 
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the purpose of studying collision. They are also the products of distinctive traditions of 
mathematics. Huygens's heuristic algebraic work (found in his manuscripts from the early 
1650s) was derived from Descartes's La Géométrie, and Huygens's finished work on 
collision was in the classical mode of Archimedes and Galileo's Discorsi. Wallis's and 
especially Wren's theories, as will be argued below, stem from the English traditions of 
practical mathematics as well as the tradition of symbolic algebra derived in part from 
William Oughtred's Clavis mathematicae. The exchange between Huygens and Wren, 
who had different visions of the proper mathematical expression of theories, as well as 
differing attitudes regarding the relationship between mathematics and experiment, marks 
a transition in the mathematization of nature. Unlike Huygens's and Wren's predecessor's 
theories of collision, theirs were quantitative in ways that admitted of predictions and 
measurements. In addition to this new quantitative relationship to experiments, the 
theories themselves are structured mathematically, relying on notions of symmetry. Wren 
and Wallis expressed their theories in symbolic algebra, using positive and negative signs 
to indicate the directionality of motion. Wren's theory relies on notions of brevity and the 
economy of the symbolic algebra. As we will see, the algebraic equations were not 
merely a practical calculating device, but was meant to lay bare, "at a glance," the 
mysteries of the book of nature.   
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Section 2  
Experiments on Collision 
 
 Hooke's proposal in 1668 was not the first time that someone in the Royal Society 
had suggested (or performed) experiments to determine the "laws of motion."495 
Experiments were performed in 1661 as well as 1666. The result of the activity in 1666 
culminated in much the same way as Hooke's proposal in 1668—a decision to consult 
what had already been done on the topic, particularly Wren's prior work.  However, it is 
apparent that the results of the experiments prosecuted in 1666 may well have been 
interpreted as a challenge to the Cartesian rules of collision, and almost certainly 
provoked questions regarding the nature of motion, and principles of conservation.  
 "The Great Fire of London" (September 2-5, 1666) had burned hundreds of acres 
of the city and destroyed, on some estimates, 13,200 houses and 84 churches, including 
St. Paul's Cathedral,496 which Wren would later be responsible for rebuilding, as well as 
perhaps 52 other churches.497 A month after the fire, "an experiment was tried of the 
propagation of motion by a contrivance,  
whereby two balls of the same wood, and of equal bigness, were so suspended, 
that one of them being let fall from a certain hight [sic] against the other, the other 
was impelled upwards to near the same hight, from which the first was let fall, the 
first becoming then almost quiescent, and the other returning, impelled the first 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
495 Hall, "Mechanics and the Royal Society," 27. "There can be no doubt that when the 'laws of motion' are 
spoken of at this time the words were used in a wholly Cartesian sense to signify the law of inertia as the 
foundation of all, then the laws of the distribution of motion among colliding bodies." Also see instances in 
the records of the Royal Society (reported by Birch) in which references to the experiments regarding the 
propagation or communication of motion in collision and "laws of motion" are used interchangeably: Birch, 
History 2: 140 (January 16, 1666/7), 315 (October 22, 1668), 320 (November 12, 1668), 328 (November 
26, 1668), 344-345 (February 4, 1668/9), 347 (February 18, 1668/9), and 392 (July 1, 1669). Steinle also 
notes that "the discussion of the collision of bodies was the first in which the talk of laws was broadly used, 
first in England, but soon all over Europe. See Friedrich Steinle, "From Principles to Regularities: Tracing 
'Laws of Nature' in Early Modern France and England," in Natural Law and Laws of Nature in Early 
Modern Europe, ed. Lorraine Daston and Michael Stolleis (Burlington: Ashgate, 2008), 221.  
496 Bruce Robinson, "London's Burning: The Great Fire," last modified March 29, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/civil_war_revolution/great_fire_01.shtml. 
497 Wren, Parentalia, 263. J. F. Scott, The Mathematical Work of John Wallis, D.D., F.R.S. (1616-1703) 
(London: Taylor and Francis, LTD., 1938), 216. 
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upwards again to almost the same hight it had fallen from before, itself becoming 
then in a manner motionless, till after some returns they both vibrated together. It 
was ordered, that this experiment be prosecuted, and others of that kind thought 
upon.498  
 
This experiment seems to conflict with Descartes's 6th rule, at least when the Cartesian 
rule is loosely interpreted. Remember that Descartes's rules of collision were not designed 
to directly explain the impact of wooden pendulum bobs, and Descartes himself 
acknowledged that his rules conflicted with objects from experience. Nevertheless, there 
seems to have been some confusion regarding the domain of Descartes's rules. Thomas 
Sprat in his History of the Royal Society (1667), for example, appears to have thought of 
(or at least presented) Descartes's rules as based upon crude experiments with tennis and 
billiard balls.499 Descartes's 6th rule stated that  
"if body C were at rest, and exactly equal in size to body B, which was moving 
toward it, then it would be necessary that it would in part be impelled by B, and in 
part it will make it rebound, so that if B went toward C with four degrees of 
speed, it would be necessary that it transfer one to it, and with the three remaining 
[degrees] would return in the direction from which it had come."500    
 
Descartes, of course, had well-formed reasons for thinking this, which have to do with 
the contest between the moving force and the force of resistance.501  
 In addition to "thinking upon" the results of these experiments, during the 
following week's meeting "the experiment about propagating [sic] of motion was 
prosecuted with three balls."502 This was an expansion of the previous experiment on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
498 Birch, History 2: 116-7. October 17, 1666. 
499 Sprat, History, 312.  
500 AT IX 92. Principes II 51. Translation by Daniel Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1992), 259.  
501 See chapter 3. 
502 Concerning the Society's "directing" of experiments, Sprat wrote in his History that "it has been their 
usual course, when they themselves appointed the Trial, to propose one week, some particular Experiments, 
to be prosecuted the next; and to debate beforehand, concerning all things that might conduce to the better 
carrying them on." See Sprat, History, 95. Birch is very consistent in his History to distinguish between 
"trying" and "prosecuting" an experiment.    
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contrivance with only two wooden balls. The middle ball in the new experiment remained 
at rest even upon being "struck by either of the lateral ones, which impelled each other 
upwards."503 One of the topics that members of the Society "thought upon" while 
prosecuting these experiments was whether or not motion could be created and destroyed. 
Members seem to have thought that the experiments, such as those described above, 
make it apparent that motion does not "die." When prosecuted again in 1668, the 
members of the Royal Society continued to consider the best means to determine whether 
or not motion decreases or remains constant. In fact in November of 1668, "Mr. Hooke 
was ordered to think upon other experiments for the making out this hypothesis about 
motion, which is, that no motion dies, nor is any motion produced anew."504  
 The hypothesis would be debated with enthusiasm among members of the Royal 
Society, as evidenced, for example, in the lively correspondence between William Neile 
and John Wallis (the latter arguing that motion can be destroyed),505 as well as 
Willughby's and Croone's criticisms of both Wren's and Huygens's published theories of 
motion in the Philosophical Transactions.506 Huygens, for instance, consistently wrote 
that when two equal bodies meet moving at the same speed, they rebound with the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
503 Birch, History 2: 117. October 24, 1666. Nearly the same experiment was prosecuted again two years 
later on 12 November 1668. In 1668 the relationship between hardness, "springiness," and rebound were 
specifically investigated using this contrivance. See Birch, History 2: 320. November 12, 1668. Such 
phenomena are familiar to most modern readers who have encountered "Newton's Cradle" (also known as 
an "Executive Ball Clicker")—a toy usually made of five metal balls suspended in line with each other by 
wires. 
504 Birch, History 2: 320. November 12, 1668. 
505 OCH 5: 263-5 (Neile to Oldenburg, 18 December 1668), 272-5 (Wallis to Oldenburgh, 21 December 
1668), 286-7 (Neile to Oldenburg, 28 December 1668), 302-4 (Wallis to Oldenburg, 2 January 1668/9), 
312-4 (Neile to Oldenburg, 2 January 1668/9), 336-8 (Wallis to Oldenburg, 12 January 1668/9), 346-7 
(Neile to Oldenburg, 22 January 1668/9), 363-4 (Neile to Oldenburg late January 1668/9), 517-8 (Neile to 
Oldenburg, 7 May 1669), 540-2 (Wallis to Oldenburg 10 May 1669), 550-1 (Wallis to Oldenburg, 17 May 
1669), 558-9 (Neile to Oldenburg, 20 May 1669), 573-4 (Wallis to Oldenburg, 29 May 1669).  
506 Hall, "Mechanics and the Royal Society," 35-37. Hall provides an overview of the concerns of Croone, 
Willughby, and Neile. Also see Dana Jalobeanu, "The Cartesians of the Royal Society," in Vanishing 
Matter and the Laws of Motion: Descartes and Beyond, eds. Dana Jalobeanu and Peter R. Anstey (New 
York: Routledge, 2011), 103-129, as well as Scott, Mathematical Work of Wallis, 104-6. 
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speed with which they approached. He does not write that they rebound with speeds 
equal in magnitude to their original speeds. He writes that it is the same speed. Impact is 
instantaneous. Motion is not interrupted. The direction merely changes. And, according 
to Huygens, a change of direction did not mean a change in speed.507 The topic becomes 
complex when collision is understood algebraically rather than geometrically.  
 As we have seen in the previous chapters, there was widespread disagreement on 
not only the answers given to the question of whether motion remains constant, but there 
was disagreement on what phenomenon or "physical quantity" was even under 
investigation with the question. Isaac Beeckman had been compelled by his mathematical 
investigations of collision to conclude that motion itself must in fact decrease and die, but 
God—operating contrary to what Beeckman's mathematical argument showed—
continually "enlivens" motion. Descartes, on the other hand, set as a fundamental 
principle that the quantity of motion (which was proportional to both body and motion) is 
conserved. Contrary to Descartes, Huygens argued that the Cartesian quantity of motion 
can increase or decrease, and, relying on the notion of the relativity of motion (which 
Descartes would not have accepted in this form508), he persuasively demonstrated this.509 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507 HOC 16: 30-1. "Hypothesis II: Whatever may be the cause of hard bodies rebounding from mutual 
contact when they collide with one another, let us suppose that when two bodies, equal to each other and 
having equal speed, directly collide with one another, each rebounds with the same speed which it had 
before the collision." Translation by Richard J. Blackwell, "Christiaan Huygens' The Motion of Colliding 
Bodies," Isis 68 (1977): 574. Also see Richard Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics: The Science of 
Dynamics in the Seventeenth Century (New York: American Elsevier, 1971), 156. 
508 Although there has been continued disagreement on the correct interpretation of Descartes's conceptions 
of motion, most commentators would agree that Descartes's account of "relative motion" is not the same as 
Huygens's. See chapter 4. Nevertheless, Huygens's contemporary, John Wallis, seems to have conflated the 
two. OCH 6: 189. Wallis to Oldenburg, 15 August 1669: "'Tis very little I have to say in answere to yours 
of Aug. 4 [...] nor to the note inclosed concerning M. Huygens, with whom I do for the most part concur, 
though not in all. For I am not yet satisfyed in that notion of Descartes, which hee seems to imbrace, that 
Motion is onely relative; & , of the two bodies separated, it is indifferent whether of the two be sayd to 
move." 
509 HOC 16: 49. In Proposition 6 of De motu corporum ex percussione Huygens demonstrates the 
following: "When two bodies collide with one another, the same quantity of motion in both taken together 
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This appears to have been the quantity that concerned Willughby. He seems to have 
thought that the notion that it could be destroyed or "created from nothing" defied 
common sense—it was "absurd" and "incredible."510 However, as Huygens would also 
claim, if direction is considered (i.e. if motion in a contrary direction is subtracted), then 
the "quantity of motion" would be conserved.511 Adding more complexity to the topic, 
Huygens also introduced a new principle—the conservation of the product of body and 
the square of its speed (later known as the vis viva), but this principle was not valid for 
every kind of body. In other words, although the Royal Society was in the midst of 
considering whether or not motion dies and is created anew, it was not clear to all which 
quantity should be investigated as being conserved. Instead of motion, it may be the 
Cartesian quantity of motion, the quantity of motion with direction, or the product of 
body and the square of its speed.   
 Upon the proposal of Robert Moray, in the months following the trial and 
prosecution of these experiments in the autumn of 1666, the Society discussed "how the 
experiments at the public meetings of the society might be best carried on; whether by a 
continued series of experiments, taking in collateral ones, as they were offered, or by 
going on in that promiscuous way, which had hitherto obtained."512 Of particular concern 
was whether or not the society should continue prosecuting "the experiments for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
does not always remain after impulse what it was before, but can be either increased or decreased." 
Translation by Michael Mahoney, "Christiaan Huygens: On the motion of bodies resulting from impact," 
accessed January 25, 2015, http://www.princeton.edu/~hos/Mahoney/texts/huygens/impact/huyimpct.html. 
510 Hall, "Mechanics and the Royal Society," 35. 
511 HOC 6: 429-33. Huygens, "Regulæ de Motu Corporum ex mutuo impulsu," 925-8. Huygens includes 
this claim of the conservation of quantity of motion with direction in the paper published with the 
Philosophical Transactions, which also states that the Cartesian quantity of motion can increase, decrease, 
or remain the same. Quantitas motus duorum Corporum augeri minuive potest per eorum occursum; at 
semper ibi remanet eadem quantitas versus eandem partem, ablata inde quantitate motus contrarii. "The 
quantity of motion which two hard bodies have may be increased or diminished by their collision, but when 
the quantity of motion in the opposite direction has been subtracted there remains always the same quantity 
in the same direction." Translation by Hall, "Mechanics and the Royal Society, " 34.   
512 Birch, History 2: 131-2. December 4, 1666. Italicized emphasis added. 
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propagating motion, and the magnetic ones," since Huygens and Balle respectively had 
already "engaged themselves particularly" on these topics.513 Oldenburg was directed to 
consult the Journal, and in a meeting in the following month, it was decided by the 
council that the experiments "for making out a theory of the laws of motion formerly 
begun by Wren, Dr. Croune, and Mr. Hooke...should be prosecuted." The Society also 
asked Wren "to give in those experiments of motion devised by himself." However, at the 
time Wren alleged that the account of his experiments had been left at Oxford.514 
However, the variety of experiments at the meetings presumably continued "going on in 
that promiscuous way" (as Moray had put it), and the experiments on the propagation of 
motion would not be mentioned again until Hooke's proposal at a meeting almost two 
years later (October 1668). 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
513 Ibid.   
514 Birch, History 2: 140. January 16, 1666/7. 
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2.1 – Wren's authority: 
The Doctrine of Motion "confirm'd by many hundreds of experiments"  
  
 A decision was made to consult Christopher Wren's prior work on collision after 
both the Royal Society's sets of experiments with the contrivance of suspended wooden 
balls in 1666 and Hooke's 1668 proposal that "there might be made some experiments to 
discover the nature & laws of motion, as the foundation of Philosophie and all 
Philosophical discourse."515 Wren's authority on the topic was also emphasized in the 
History of the Royal Society (1667). In the History Sprat attributed to Wren—as Wren's 
"primary achievement" "to which he may lay peculiar claim"—"the Doctrine of Motion, 
which is the most considerable of all others, for establishing the first Principles of 
Philosophy."516 In doing this Sprat broke with the general plan in his History, which 
refrained from discussing particular individuals in the Society.517 Sprat appears to have 
thought that Wren's achievements had not been sufficiently recognized, and so he singled 
him out to undo this injustice. According to Sprat, they had been "casually omitted" from 
the register of the society,518 and in addition, perhaps, had not been recognized previously 
because of Wren's own modesty.519  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
515 OCH 5: 117. Oldenburg to Wren, 29 October 1668. Birch, History 2: 315. 
516 Sprat, History, 312. 
517 Ibid., 311. "In the whole progress of this Narration, I have been cautious to forbear commending the 
labours of any Private Fellow of the Society. [...] But now I must break this Law, in the particular case of 
Dr. Christopher Wren." 
518 Ibid., 311. "But I only do it on the meer consideration of Justice: For in turning over the Registers of the 
Society, I perceived that many excellent things, whose first Invention ought to be ascrib'd to him, were 
casually ommitted: This moves me to do him right by himself, and to give this separate Account of his 
indeavours, in promoting the Design of the Royal Society, in the small time wherein he has had the 
opportunity of attending it." 
519 Ibid., 317-8. "This is a short account of the principal Discoveries which Dr. Wren has presented or 
suggested to this Assembly. [...] [I]t is reasonable, that the original Invention should be ascrib'd to the true 
Author, rather than the Finishers. Nor do I fear that this will be thought too much, which I have said 
concerning him: For there is a peculiar reverence due to so much excellence, cover'd with so much 
modesty. And it is not Flattery but Honesty, to give him his just praise; who is so far from usurping the 
fame of other men, that he endeavours with all care to conceal his own."  
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 Sprat placed particular emphasis on the role of instruments and experiments to 
establish the Doctrine of Motion: 
This Des Cartes had before begun, having taken up some Experiments of this kind 
upon Conjecture, and made them the first Foundation of his whole System of 
Nature: But some of his Conclusions seeming very questionable, because they 
were only deriv'd from the gross Trials of Balls meeting one another at Tennis, 
and Billiards: Dr. Wren produc'd before the Society, an Instrument to represent 
the effects of all sorts of Impulses, made between two globous Bodies, either of 
equal, or of different bigness, and swiftness, following or meeting each other, or 
the one moving, the other at rest. From these varieties arose many unexpected 
effects of all which he demonstrated the Theories, after they had been confirm'd 
by many hundreds of Experiments in that Instrument. These he propos'd as the 
Principles of all Demonstrations in Natural Philosophy: Nor can it seem strange, 
that these Elements should be of such Universal use; if we consider that 
Generation, Corruption, Alteration, and all the Vicissitudes of Nature, are 
nothing else but the effects arising from the meeting of little Bodies, of differing 
Figures, Magnitudes, and Velocities."520  
 
Even Descartes's rules are presented in terms of experiments, albeit unsatisfactory 
experiments: "gross Trials of Balls meeting one another at Tennis, and Billiards." As we 
have seen in chapter three, Descartes did perform experiments, or at least referred to 
experiences in his correspondence with Mersenne to justify what has been called his 
"contest model of impact" (e.g. flattening lead bullets with hammers on cushions). 
However, there is no evidence that Descartes's rules themselves were directly derived 
from or supported by "Trials of Balls meeting one another" as Sprat claims. Nevertheless, 
Sprat described them as if they were. Moreover, according to Sprat, Descartes's 
conclusions were questionable because of the low quality of his experiments (merely 
using common tennis and billiard balls). In this passage Descartes serves as Wren's foil. 
For both the "doctrine of motion" is important for establishing the first principles of 
philosophy, and both attempted to do so through experiments. But, contrary to Descartes, 
Wren produced and used an instrument, which had the capacity to represent the effects of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
520 Ibid., 312. 
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a large variety of collisions. Wren's instrument reportedly produced "unexpected effects." 
And Wren was able to bring all the effects from the various collisions and unexpected 
results under a theory, which he in turn "confirm'd by many hundreds of Experiments" 
using his instrument. In other words, according to Sprat's account, the Doctrine of Motion 
is (or, ought to be) established through the proper use of experimental instruments. 
Descartes's conclusions are questionable—not because they were derived and supported 
in the wrong way (i.e. because they were "rationalist" as opposed to "empirical")—but 
because of the low quality of the experiments. An alternative type of study, such as that 
which is described in chapter three of this dissertation, was not even considered as a 
possibility by Sprat.   
 Sprat's emphasis on Wren's use of instruments, however, is quite right. As is well 
documented, Wren had a keen interest in designing and building models, mechanical 
devices, and instruments.  There is, for example, a large catalogue of Wren's "Inventions, 
Experiments, and Mechanick Improvements" which he exhibited "at the first Assemblies 
at Wadham-College in Oxford for the Advancement of Natural and Experimental 
Knowledge."521 He made models of planets522 and artificial eyes.523 He designed new 
engines for various activities such as raising water and piercing rock in mining. He 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
521 Wren, Parentalia, 198-9. 
522 Ibid., 210-11. His solid model of the moon attracted particular attention, and the King himself 
commanded Wren to perfect it and present it to him at Whitehall. This is mentioned in letters from both Sir 
Robert Moray and Sir Paul Neile sent in 1661. The model is described as follows: "He has essay'd to make 
a true Selenography by Measure; the World having nothing yet but Pictures, rather than Surveys or Maps of 
the Moon. [...] He has composed a Lunar Globe, representing not only the Spots and various Degrees of 
Whiteness upon the Surface, but the Hills, Eminences and Cavities, moulded in solid Work. The Globe thus 
fasioned into a true Model of the Moon, as you turn it to the Light represents all the menstrual Phases, with 
the Variety of Appearances that happen from the Shadow of the Mountains and Vallies."  
523 Ibid., 209. "He contrived an artificial Eye, truly and dioptrically made (as large as a Tennis-Ball) 
representing the Picture as Nature makes it: The Cornea, and Crystalline were Glass, the other Humours, 
Water. He took an exact Survey of an Horse's Eye, measuing what the Spheres of the Crystalline and 
Cornea were, and what the Proportions of the Distances of the Centers of every Sphere were upon the Axis: 
the Projection in triple the Magnitude, was presented to Sir Paul Neile, and the Experiment occasionally 
reiterated."   
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created instruments for surveying, drafting, recording the weather, and making music. 
Several devices in the catalogue are summarized under the heading, "New facile exact 
Ways of Observation." This heading captures two of the important properties for which 
Wren's devices were praised by his contemporaries. They made difficult things easier by 
reducing the dependence on skill,524 and his instruments were praised as being exact and 
even infallible.525  
 Wren's interest in instruments can be explained in part by the tradition of 
mathematics to which he was exposed, namely the English tradition of "practical 
mathematics." This had been developing primarily outside of the universities by 
practitioners such as Robert Recorde, John Dee, and Thomas Diggs, through the second 
half of the 16th century in response to a demand for improved techniques of navigation, 
fortification, surveying, and cartography.526 It can be summarized succinctly in two 
tenets: mathematics is certain and mathematics is useful.527 Almost no emphasis was 
placed on demonstrations, theoretical mathematics, or metaphysical foundations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
524 Two famous examples of Wren's devices that made difficult things easier are the following: Wren's 
"Instrument for drawing any Object in Perspective," which reduced the need for skilled practice of drawing 
free-hand. This is described in detail in Christopher Wren, "The Description of an Instrument Invented 
Divers Years Ago by Dr. Christopher Wren, for Drawing the Out-Lines of Any Object in Perspective," 
Philosophical Transactions, 4 (1669): 893-9. The other of Wren's famous devices is his "weather-clock," 
which recorded, by itself, temperature, barametric pressure, rainfall, and wind direction over time. Skilled 
observation of meteorological phenomena was not just reduced, but the observer was eliminated altogether. 
See Wren, Parentalia, 198, 207-10.  
525 Wren, Parentalia, 209, 198. For example, Wren is described as having converted "a thirty-six Foot 
Glass...Tube" into an "Astronomical Instrument" which was used to produce exact pictures and surveys of 
Saturn and the Moon. A description that captures both the alleged "ease" and "exactitude" (and even 
infallibility) of Wren's instruments is the following: "[Wren] has invented many Ways to make 
astronomical Observations more accurate and easy: he has fitted and hung Quadrants, Sectants, and Radii, 
more commodiously than formerly: He has made two Telescopes, to open with a Joint like a Sector, by 
which Observers may infallibly take a Distance to half Minutes, and find no Difference in the same 
Observation reiterated several Times; nor can any warping or luxation of the Instrument hinder the Truth of 
it."  
526 E. G. R. Taylor, The Mathematical Practitioners of Tudor & Stuart England (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1954), 9-10, 26-48. 
527 J. A. Bennett, The mathematical science of Christopher Wren (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), 7. 
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Understandably, this rather instrumental mathematical tradition arose in tandem with the 
development of instruments, such as those used in astronomy, navigation, and surveying. 
Although Wren's interest in models and mechanical devices may date to his childhood, 
one explicit source of Wren's familiarity with the English tradition of "practical 
mathematics" is John Wilkins, who was the Warden of Wadham College Oxford while 
Wren was studying there,528 and who had a significant impact on Wren both socially and 
intellectually, by including him in the natural philosophical meetings at Wadham, and by 
working with him directly.529 Wilkins's Mathematicall magick (1648), published the year 
before Wren entered Wadham, argued to scholars (rather than practitioners) that 
"practical mathematics" was worthy of intellectual study.530 It was written in two books. 
The first, called Archimedes, was on mechanics. The second, called Daedelus, was on 
contrivances, inventions, and "divers kinds of autonoma." 
 Wren's authority on the topic of collision, for members of the Royal Society, 
stems from his early experiments and theory, which date to 1661. Although Wren's early 
experiments with his instrument are referred to effusively in Sprat's History of the Royal 
Society,531 alluded to by Birch and the register of the Society,532 and recalled in the pages 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
528 Wren entered Wadham in 1649, earned his BA in 1651 and his MA in 1654. 
529 Bennett, Mathematical science of Wren, 12, 18. 
530 John Wilkins, Mathematicall Magick: or, the wonders that may be performed by mechanical geometry, 
in two books, concerning mechanical powers and motions, being one of the most easy, pleasant, useful (and 
yet most neglected Part) of the Mathematics, not before treated of in this language, in The Mathematical 
and Philosophical Works of the Right Rev. John Wilkins, late Lord Bishop of Chester. To which is prefixed 
the author's life, and an account of his works, vol. 2 (London: C. Whittingham, 1802), 89-246.     
531 Sprat, History, 311-2. 
532 Birch, History 2: 335. December 17, 1668. "Dr. Wren produced his theory of the collision of bodies, 
together with some papers containing the various trials made long before to verify that theory. It was read, 
and ordered to be registered, the author affirming, that he had this hypothesis several years before, when 
the society began to be formed; and that Mr. Rooke and himself made divers experiments before the society 
to verify the same: which affirmation of his was seconded and confirmed by several of the members, who 
were eye-witnesses of those experiments, as the president, Sir Paul Neile, Mr. Balle, and Mr. Hill."   
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of Oldenburg's correspondence533 as well as Huygens's diary534 and correspondence,535 
the actual records of Wren's experiments and early theory do not seem to have been 
preserved. However, there is considerable evidence that Wren had developed a theory536 
and had used an instrument or a contrivance of colliding pendulum bobs to investigate 
collision. Our knowledge of Wren's work comes from secondhand reports and 
recollections of the 1661 meeting with Huygens. Some of these accounts are recorded 
many years later. Nevertheless, there is agreement about certain factors such as the use of 
pendulum bobs, the material of the bobs, that the pendulums were raised to a specific 
number of degrees, that the size of the bobs were assigned weights measured in 
numerical values rather than described according to their relative size, and that the 
apparatus was designed not just to investigate collision but to also confirm or disconfirm 
predictions. And, in the case of Huygens's involvement, algebra was used to make these 
predictions. Huygens's use of algebra is significant. Wren too was well versed in algebra 
and would use symbolic equations in a novel way in his paper on the theory of collision 
for the Royal Society, Lex naturae de collisione corporum. This is a point to which we 
will return below.   
 
2.2 – Wren and Huygens: Experimental verifications and mathematical demonstrations 
 Once Wren's theory was published in 1669, it was readily recognized as correct 
and in agreement with Huygens's theory—just as Huygens's was thought to be correct 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
533 OCH 2: 561 (Moray's account elicited from Oldenburg in October 1665). OCH 2: 624 (another account 
from Moray, 27 November 1665). HOC 5: 547 (Oldenburg to Spinoza, 18 December 1665). OCH 5: 126-7 
(Huygens to Oldenburg, 3 November, 1668). 
534 HOC 22: 573. 
535 HOC 6: 383, 386 (Huygens to Gallois, 18 March 1669). HOC 16: 204 (Huygens to Gallois, 18 March 
1669, appendice to previous letter).  
536 Using various letters and Rooke's death (Wren's friend colleague), Bennett claims that Wren's theory of 
collision dates to 1661.   
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and in agreement with Wren's. Writing to Oldenburg from Paris before the publication of 
the papers on collision, Huygens himself acknowledged that Wren's theory was true and 
consistent with his own:   
The laws of motion [written by Wren] which you did me the favor of sending in 
exchange for my own are, as you will have doubtless observed, in entire 
agreement with mine, and these are certainly the correct ones.537   
 
However, Huygens immediately went on to question the manner in which Wren justified 
his laws: 
I very much hope to learn whether Mr. Wren has also looked for some 
demonstration of them and to see what method he has made use of for that end, or 
else whether he has only established the law of nature which he proposes in this 
subject on the basis of experiment.538 
 
Wren's lack of demonstrations was seen as a weakness by not just Huygens, but William 
Neile and Gottfried Leibniz as well.539  
 Wren and Huygens held quite different views on the role of experiment in 
establishing truths. Huygens seems to have been content to have his theories tested by 
experiments and he made successful predictions of the behavior of the colliding 
pendulum bob contrivance in London. However, his rules were to be justified not by 
experiment, but by demonstrations from previous theorems and axioms, as we have seen 
in the previous chapter. This is even indicated in the language Huygens used to describe 
the roles of demonstrations and experiments. For example, in a letter included with his 
Regles du mouuement dans la rencontre des corps for the Journal des sçavans, Huygens 
wrote that his "theory accords perfectly with experiments," but it is "founded on good 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
537 OCH 5: 360. Huygens to Oldenburg, 27 January 1668/9. Translation by Hall OCH 5: 362.  
538 Ibid.   
539 OCH 5: 263, 344, 347, 360-2, 363. OCH 6: 270. OCH 7: 65-6, 162-6. 
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demonstrations."540 Wren, on the other hand, seems to rely on the collective experiments 
with his instrument, and he does not appear to have provided any demonstrations of his 
theory as Huygens had.541 Proponents of Wren's work, such as his colleague Sprat, 
consistently wrote that Wren's theories were "established" and "confirm'd" by the 
experiments with the instrument. Some historians, such as Bennett, have suggested that 
Wren's theory is nothing more than "a mere synthesis of experimental results, constrained 
in its expression by certain unspoken regulative principles of simplicity and symmetry" 
and emphasize the tradition of "practical mathematics" which was thought to be certain 
and useful even without demonstrations or foundations.542 As we will see in a later 
section, Wren's theory is more than a synthesis of experimental results, and the 
mathematics and principles contained therein are more than "regulative principles" to 
organize and constrain the experimental results. But he did not employ demonstrations in 
the manner of Huygens, he used symbolic algebra, and experiments with instruments 
seem to have been an important way to establish truths for Wren.  
 Wren himself responded to Huygens's question regarding whether demonstrations 
or experiments are the basis of his laws. Oldenburg forwarded Wren's response in the 
post script of the letter Oldenburg sent to Huygens confirming the receipt of Huygens's 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
540 HOC 16: 179. Mais je vous diray seulement que ma Theorie s'accorde parfaitement avec l'experience, & 
que je la crois fondée en bonne demonstrations, comme j'espere de faire voir bien-tost en la donnant au 
public.   
541 Huygens papers published with the Journal des sçavans and the Philosophical Transactions were 
summaries of his theory and did not include demonstrations of any of his claims. Huygens did, however, 
provide the Royal Society with some demonstrations of his propositions. See HOC 6: 336-43. Huygens to 
Oldenburg, 5 January 1668/9. Huygens's unpublished De motu corporum ex percussione (written in 1656, 
but posthumously published in 1703) provides extensive demonstrations of his propositions. See HOC 16: 
30-91. 
542 Bennett, Mathematical science of Wren, 72, 118. Hall was notably in opposition to such a view. He 
wrote: "[f]or what it is worth, it seems to me highly unlikely that this formulation could have been derived 
from experiment alone, thought it may have been facilitated by some experiments [...]. At least the title of 
the paper in Phil. Trans. speaking of "Dr. Wren's thoery . . . verified by many Experiments . . . " is 
unambiguous." See Hall, "Mechanics and the Royal Society," 32. 
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theorems on motion. The letter also confirmed that many in the Royal Society thought 
that Huygens's theory was correct and in agreement with Wren's.543   
Mr. Wren says that, in his opinion, there is no demonstration of what he has 
proposed in his writings on motion, unless one assumes a large number of other 
postulates which would perhaps require other demonstrations. However several of 
our Fellows, and especially our President, Lord Brouncker, very much approve of 
your method of throwing light on your theorems.544  
 
Wren does not directly answer Huygens's question, but rather responds to Huygens's 
query with a challenge of his own. He notes that any demonstration would require 
principles that themselves would require demonstration, and presumably this pursuit of 
more fundamental principles and demonstrations may continue without end.  
 On the same day that Oldenburg sent the letter containing Wren's reply to 
Huygens, "two experiments were made with balls to verify Dr. Wren's laws of motion" at 
the 4 February meeting of the Royal Society:545 
1. Two equal balls, whereof one was let fall from the degree of 12, the other from 
that of 6, after the impulse moved with contrary velocities, vis. that of 12 with 6, 
and that of 6 with 12 ferè. 
2. Two unequal bells [sic], which were in weight to one another as eight to one, 
after the impulse moved with a proportionate velocity. Falling both from the same 
hight 12 and 12, the bigger returned to 2 1/2, and the smaller 11 1/2. 
Falling both from 4 1/2 the bigger returned to 3 1/2, the smaller to 12 1/2. 
 
 Bennett explains Wren's disagreement with Huygens on the importance of 
demonstrations by emphasizing the influence on Wren of the English tradition of 
"practical mathematics." In this tradition, mathematics is certain, and is perhaps the only 
means to attain certain knowledge. This is a view that Wren himself explicitly held.546 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
543 OCH 5: 371. Oldenburg to Huygens, 4 February 1668/9. "[I]t was first decided that they are equally 
effective and several among us [the Society] are pretty well persuaded of their truth." Translation by Hall, 
OCH 5: 373.   
544 OCH 5: 373. Oldenburg to Huygens, 4 February 1668/9. Translation by Hall, OCH 5: 375.   
545 Birch, History 2: 344-5. 
546 Wren, Parentalia, 200-1. When Wren was elected to the chair of Astronomy at Gresham-College in 
1657, his inauguration speech contained the following claim: "Mathematical Demonstrations being built 
	   268 
The certainty and usefulness of mathematics did not require metaphysical or theoretical 
principles.547 The role of instruments and experiments, and the tradition of practical 
mathematics in England are important factors in Wren's work on collision. However, 
there is much more of importance in the mathematics of Wren's theory than merely a 
useful tool working in conjunction with an experimental instrument. As we will see, his 
theory is rooted in principles of economy and symmetry. His brief paper also marks a 
transition to a symbolic algebraic (rather than geometric) understanding of nature and 
motion.  
 
 
Section 3  
Mathematics of Collision: The Laws of Motion and the Law of Nature 
 
 Christopher Wren, Christiaan Huygens, John Wallis, and all those present at the 
meetings in London, incorporated the use of instruments into the development and 
verification of their rules of collision, at least more so than predecessors such as René 
Descartes and Isaac Beeckman. As we have seen, there were disagreements on the 
manner by which theories were best supported—whether through demonstration or 
experiment, as exemplified by Wren and Huygens. We should be careful not to 
oversimplify the activity of the Royal Society on the topic of collision as being driven 
purely by experiments, or for the sole purpose of better understanding mechanics. Some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
upon the impregnable Foundations of Geometry and Arithmetick, are the only Truths, that can sink into the 
Mind of Man, void of all Uncertainty; and all other Discourses participate more or less of Truth, according 
as their Subjects are more or less capable of Mathematical Demonstration."  
547 Bennett, Mathematical science of Wren, 119. "[T]ypical of the mathematical sciences in England—
'Vitruvian' in character rather than 'Platonic' ... [m]athematics was more a tool to be applied than a 
privileged source of special enlightenment."  
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members were deeply interested in the very nature of body and motion,548 and several 
others, including both Huygens and Wren, expressed that an understanding of collision 
could provide insight into the fundamental constituents of nature.549 The papers presented 
to and published by the Royal Society were not simply lists of experimental data. None of 
the papers makes any mention of the experimental set-up or the results of experiments 
with the instruments. The papers do, however, each have their own internal mathematical 
justifications.  
 The balance provides the quantitative relations in both Wallis's and Wren's 
mathematical justifications of their theories of collision. Wallis focuses on the forces that 
are required to move bodies on the model of the lever. Wren emphasizes the equilibrium 
and symmetry of the balance. Wallis's theory is not governed by conservation principles, 
and although it describes a contest between impetus and impedimentum (similar to the 
Cartesian contest between moving force and force of resistance), the contest does not 
provide the conditions of rebound as it does for Descartes. "Springyness" (and the 
proposed force of restitution, which explains this spring) is the source of rebound. Unlike 
Wren and Huygens, Wallis categorizes different kinds of bodies. Absolute hardness and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
548 Jalobeanu, "Cartesians of the Royal Society," 103-29. Also see the above quoted correspondence 
between Neile and Wallis. 
549 In the preface Huygens planned for De motu corporum ex percussione (1656) he wrote: "For if the 
whole of nature consists of certain particles, from the motion of which all the diversity of things arises, and 
by the extremely rapid impulse of which light is propagated and spreads through the immense spaces of the 
heavens in a moment of time, as many philosophers deem probably, this examination [of nature] will seem 
to be helped no small amount it the true laws by which motion is transferred from body to body be made 
known." HOC 16: 150. Translation by Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics, 147. In 1657 Wren gave his 
inauguration speech at Gresham College upon becoming Professor of Astronomy. In the speech he drew a 
connection between the microscope and the motion of the parts of nature: "For natural Philosophy having 
of late been order'd into a geometrical Way of reasoning from ocular Experiment, that it might prove a real 
Science of Nature, not an Hypothesis of what Nature might be, the Perfection of Telescopes, and 
Microscopes, by which our Sense is so infinitely advanc'd, seems to be the only Way to penetrate into the 
most hidden Parts of Nature, and to make the most of the Creation." Wren, Parentalia, 204-5. For more on 
the relationship between microscopes and mechanics for Wren see Bennett, Mathematical science of Wren, 
71-6. And, as has been quoted above, it is notable that in 1667 Sprat explicitly linked Wren's work on "the 
doctrine of motion" to the "first Principles of Philosophy." Sprat, History, 312.    
	   270 
absolute elasticity are mutually exclusive. Also, unlike Wren and Huygens, Wallis 
engages directly with the problem of transdiction between colliding pendulum bobs and 
the collision of minute bodies. 
 Both Wallis and Wren express their mathematical theory of collision with algebra.   
In keeping with the previous chapters of this dissertation, I focus attention on the 
contemporary mathematics and show that the technicalities of the mathematics shaped 
fundamental concepts. Wallis and Wren's theories are of particular interest, since they are 
among the first published algebraic expressions of fundamental physical relationships.  
This is in contrast to Huygens's classical mathematical demonstrations in the tradition of 
Archimedes, and in contrast to Descartes's virtual lack of mathematical expressions and 
demonstrations of any kind in his account of collision. Wallis presents the directionality 
of motion and impetus with + and − signs. In so doing he provided a legitimation of an 
otherwise "impossible" quantity by an appeal to physical applications, and presented a 
new quantitative expression of contrary motion. Wren not only uses the algebraic rules of 
addition and subtraction to express contrary motion, but also places an epistemological 
value on the economy of the symbol, and embraces the brevity and unity of expression 
made possible by algebraic mathematics. Common among both Huygens's and Wren's 
theories of collision, although in different forms, is the importance of symmetry.  As we 
will see, the theories of collision, developed and discussed in the Royal Society at the end 
of the 1660s, mark a transition in "the mathematization of nature."  
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3.1 – John Wallis: the specious arithmetic of the forces of collision 
 On 22 October 1668 members of the Royal Society proposed that the laws of 
motion should be determined.550 The following week Oldenburg requested Wren and 
Huygens to share their work on collision. At the 12 November meeting, spurred by this 
renewed interest, more "experiments of the communication of motion [were] tried by a 
contrivance." Hooke was interested in the hypothesis that "no motion dies, nor is any 
motion produced anew," which he was ordered to think upon to devise new experiments 
that could test the hypothesis. At the same meeting Moray suggested a relationship 
between hardness, "springiness," and rebound. And Collins was asked to review "all 
authors who had written on that subject ["the nature, principles, and laws of motion"]... 
particularly DesCartes, Borelli, and Marcus Marci: and Mr. Oldenburg was desired to 
write to Dr. Wallis, that he would take a share of this work."551  
 Two weeks later "Mr. Oldenburg produced a paper of Dr. Wallis, written by him 
Nov. 15, 1668, at Oxford, concerning the general laws of motion; which was ordered to 
be registered." This paper was Wallis's "Summary of the Laws of Motion,"552 which 
would be published along side Wren's Lex naturae de collisione corporum in the 
Philosophical Transactions. The paper was an abbreviated version of a more extensive 
account of motion in Mechanica sive de motu tractatus geometricus (1670), which would 
be published in the following year.553 At this same meeting, Hooke reported on 
experiments conducted on the collision of both "springy and not springy bodies," and 
suggested that "the reflection of motion depends upon the springiness of bodies; so that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
550 Birch, History 2: 315.  
551 Birch, History 2: 320. 
552 Philosophical Transactions 3 (1668): 864-5. OCH 5: 164-7, 167-70. 
553 John Wallis, Mechanica, sive, de motu, tractatus geometricus, pars prima (Londini: Pitt, 1670). 
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where there is no spring, there can be no reflection." This is a point on which Wallis 
agreed, although he would dispute Hooke's priority. Dr. Croune, on the other hand, 
"suggested, that it might be considered, whether the business of motion might not be 
made out without taking in the notion of the springiness of bodies"554—this seems to 
have been the strategy taken by both Huygens and Wren. The following week, 5 
December, William Neile anonymously posed a set of Queries regarding the rules of 
collision, which would spark a lively correspondence between him and Wallis—covering 
topics such as conservation, the nature of hardness and elasticity, the problem of 
transdiction,555 and the force of resistance in a resting body. These three texts—
"Summary of the Laws of Motion," Mechanica, and Wallis's correspondence (primarily 
with Neile via Oldenburg)—serve as my primary sources on Wallis's theory of collision.  
 Wallis's work on collision is similar to Huygens's and Wren's only in so far as it 
was published together with theirs. Like Wren's, it used symbolic algebra, which is 
significant. However, it does not rest on the same mathematical ideals of symmetry and 
brevity. Rather, it places emphasis on the forces that cause motion, and the "springy" (or 
non-springy) nature of bodies involved in collision. Unlike Huygens and Wren, Wallis 
displays in his texts a willingness to engage in natural philosophical questions regarding 
motions and bodies, similar to those considered by Descartes. Perhaps as a consequence 
of these reflections, Wallis held a contrary attitude regarding "conservation." He fully 
supported the notion that motion can "perish."  Although Huygens acknowledged that his 
own theory and Wren's coincide, when asked about Wallis's theory of collision, he wrote: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
554 Birch, History 2: 328. 
555 Maurice Mandelbaum, Philosophy, Science and Sense Perception: Historical and Critical Studies 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), 88-112. Of course, neither Wallis nor Neile use the word 
"transdiction." 
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"I do not know if Mr. Wallis will have been able to reduce his rules to the same meaning 
as ours, because I do not see much of a connection."556    
 Wallis had very little formal mathematical education.557 He did, however, have a 
proclivity for languages and cryptanalysis. He acquired proficiency in Latin, Greek, and 
Hebrew at a young age,558 but his primary interest was in Divinity. In addition to earning 
his degrees at Cambridge, he was ordained in 1640 at age 24.559 While a private chaplain 
to Lady Vere,560 he was casually shown, "between jeast and earnest," a cipher, which had 
been acquired after the Parliamentarian victory at the siege of Chichester in December 
1642—the first months of the English Civil War.561 Wallis deciphered the message "in 
about 2 hours time."562 After this unexpected success he decoded many Royalist ciphers 
for the Parliamentarians.563  
 In the midst of the disruptions of the war, Wallis lived in London. Beginning in 
1645, he met with Wilkins, Goddard, Glisson, Merret, Foster, and Hank at Gresham 
College and sometimes at Goddard's lodging to discuss "The New Philosophy or 
Experimental Philosophy."564 In 1647 Wallis read Oughtred's Clavis mathematicae—the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
556 OCH 5: 556. Huygens to Oldenburg, 19 May 1669.   
557 Christoph J. Scriba, "The Autobiography of John Wallis, F. R. S.," Notes and Records 25 (1970): 29-30. 
Also see Scott, Mathematical Work of Wallis, 3-4. 
558 Scott, Mathematical Work of Wallis, 3. 
559 Ibid., 6. 
560 Lady Vere was the widow of Lord Horatio Vere (1565-1635). 
561 Scriba, "Autobiography of Wallis," 37. 
562 Ibid., 37.  
563 Ibid., 38. 
564 Ibid., 39-40. "Our business was (precluding matters of Theology and State Affairs) to disco{urs} and 
consider of Philosophical Enquiries, and such as related thereunto; as Physi{ck}, Anatomy, Geometry, 
Astronomy, Navigation, Staticks, Magneticks, Chymicks, Mechanicks, and Natural Experiments; with the 
State of these Studies, as then cultivated, at home and abroad. We there discoursed of the Circulation of the 
Bl{ood}, the Valves in the Veins, <the Venae Lacteae, the Lymphatick vessels,> (28) the Copernican 
Hypothesis, the Nature of Comets, and New Stars, the Satellites of Jupiter, the Oval Shape (as it then 
appeared) of Saturn, {the} spots in the Sun, and its Turning on its own Axis, the Inequalities and 
Selenograp{hy} of the Moon, the several Phases of Venus and Mercury, the Improvement of Telescopes, 
and grinding of Glasses for that purposes, the Weight of Air, the Possibility or ||p. 48|| Impossibility of 
Vacuities, and Natures Abhorrence thereof; the Torricellian Experiment in Quicksilver, the Descent of 
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same text with which Wren became familiar through his mentors, and the analytical 
contents of which Wren had applied to Galileo's work and then his own work on 
collision, as we will see in section 3.2. After Wallis's encounter with the Clavis 
mathematicae, came an outpouring of mathematical activity. Around 1648/49 Wallis, 
Wilkins, and Goddard moved to Oxford and continued to meet, while those left in 
London also continued their meetings regarding the Experimental Philosophy.565 In 1649 
Wallis was appointed Savilian Professor of Geometry at Oxford, a post he would keep for 
over 50 years.566  
 The mathematical work of John Wallis was distinctive, and plays an important 
role in his theory of collision. Among his many contributions, and the many features of 
his mathematics, Wallis argued for an arithmetic understanding of algebra (a specious 
arithmetic), which was supposed to be more fundamental than geometry—a universal 
mathematics. More than many of his contemporaries, he made a concerted effort to 
legitimize both negative quantities and the roots of negative quantities. This was done, in 
part, by an appeal to their usefulness in physical applications. His specious arithmetic, 
including its negative quantities, was the system in which Wallis presented his theory of 
collision and thus his "laws of motion." 
 In what follows, I first focus on Wallis's account of force, which is rooted in his 
understanding of simple machines. He presents this using his distinctive interpretation of 
algebra. Before addressing his theory of collision, which is intended to be founded on this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
heavy Bodies, and the degrees of Acceleration therein; and divers other things of like nature. Some of 
which were then but New Discoveries, and others not so generally known and imbraced, as now they are; 
With other things appertaining to what hath been called The New Philosophy; which, from the times of 
Galileo at Florence, and Sr. Francis Bacon (Lord Verulam) in England, hath been much cultivated in Italy, 
France, Germany, and other Parts abroad, as well as with us in England."    
565 Ibid., 40. 
566 Scott, Mathematical Work of Wallis, 13-14. 
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notion of force, I examine Wallis's discussion of the nature of bodies. In doing so, the 
"hard" bodies described by Wallis are contrasted with competing notions of hardness as 
well as "springyness" found in both the ideas of his contemporaries and predecessors. 
Wallis's account of collision is not governed by prior commitments to the conservation of 
motion, or the Cartesian quantity of motion, or any other conserved quantity, as 
Descartes's is. Wallis's clear rejection of the conservation of motion is closely connected 
to the contrary relationship between absolute hardness and the "force of elasticity." The 
third section discusses Wallis's theory of the collision of absolutely hard bodies, which is 
described in terms of a contest between two forces: impetus and impedimentum. This 
returns the discussion to the topics from the third chapter of the dissertation, such as the 
contest model of force, the force of resistance in a body at rest, and the distinction 
between motion and rest. Wallis's "contest" is significantly different from Descartes's. 
Wallis was not committed the conservation of the moving force, nor was his explanation 
of rebound rooted to the failure of the moving force to overcome the force of resistance 
as it was for Descartes. Rather, motion stops when it fails to overcome the force of 
resistance, and "springyness," i.e. the force of restitution, was the source of rebound for 
Wallis. The correspondence between Neile and Wallis indicates that the problem of 
"transdiction" was at the heart of the debate on the force of resistance of a body at rest. 
The fourth section returns to Wallis's "Summary of the Laws of Motion," published with 
the Philosophical Transactions, to examine the intertwined relationship between Wallis's 
specious arithmetic and his theory of collision—particularly the directionality of impetus 
and speed. We will find that Wallis's "Summary" presents a thoroughly algebraic theory 
of collision.   
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3.1.1 – The Foundation of all Machines for Facilitating Motion  
 
 The "Summary of the Laws of Motion" in the Philosophical Transactions 
encapsulates Wallis's thoughts on collision in 14 enumerated sections. In the first eight, 
Wallis develops what he called the "foundation of all machines for facilitating motion:" 
For in whatever ratio the weight is increased, the speed is diminished in the same 
ratio; whence it is that the product of the weight and the speed for any moving 
force is the same.567 
 
"Moving force" is slightly ambiguous here. Wallis is not precise in his meanings of force, 
and Wallis uses several words sometimes interchangeably for what appear to be his 
notions of force, including vis, momentum, and impetus.568  Nevertheless, in the context 
of the first 8 sections of his paper for the Philosophical Transactions, force (vis) is 
identified with the agent that causes a weight (pondus) to move. At this point he does not 
claim that a moving weight has a force equal to the product of its weight and degree of 
speed (roughly similar to the Cartesian quantity of motion, or the modern notion of 
momentum), although later in his paper, without explanation, he will. 
 In the sections subsequent to the first eight, Wallis uses this "foundation of all 
machines for facilitating motion" to describe collision. The laws of motion are to be 
found in the collision of bodies; and the principles governing collision are the same as the 
principles governing all machines. Collision is thus presented as and presumed to operate 
as a kind of machine. Wren, who also had a keen interest in machines and other 
contrivances, notably makes no mention of forces. Wren's account of collision is founded 
on the underlying principles of the balance, focusing on symmetry and equilibrium. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
567 Wallis, "Summary Account of the General Laws of Motion," 864-5. Translation by Hall, OCH 5: 168. 
568 Scott, Mathematical Work of Wallis, 104, 108-109; Also see Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics, 236-
9. 
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Wallis's account, on the other hand, relies on the moving powers in simple machines such 
as the lever.569  
 "The foundation of all machines for facilitating motion" is expressed in the 
following proportion, which Wallis derived in sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. First note the 
following: V (vis), force; P (pondus), weight; C (celeritas), speed; m, "any rational 
exponent"570 𝑉.𝑃𝐶 ∷ 𝑉.𝑚𝑃× !!𝐶 = 𝑃𝐶 
 
This proportion can be read as follows: V is to PC as V is to the product of mP and !!𝐶. 
And that product is equivalent to PC.  
 The germ of this idea is in Wallis's second section, which relates force, weight, 
distance, and time: 
2. Therefore, if a force V moves a weight P, a force mV will move mP, caeteris 
paribus, that is through the same distance in the same time, or with the same 
speed.571  
 
It is likely that Wallis had simple machines in mind, such as the lever, when he wrote 
this. Consider that a force (sometimes referred to as a power) is required to move a 
weight sitting at the end of a lever. The force will move the weight some distance in some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
569 Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics, 234-6. 
570 Wallis, "Summary Account of the General Laws of Motion," 865. Translation by Hall, OCH 5: 168. I 
have cited the algebraic symbols as they appear in the original Latin transcriptions as found in the Phil. 
Trans., and the OCH, rather than Hall's edited "translations" of the algebraic symbols found in Hall's 
English translations in the OCH. I follow this convention each time I cite the algebra found in the OCH. 
For instance, I reproduce "." to indicate a ratio, rather than the more familiar ":" symbol. Wallis appears to 
be using the word "exponent" to indicate the "exponent of the ratio." According to Phillips's New World of 
Words, 6th edition (1706), the term is defined as follows: "Exponent of the Ratio or Proportion between 
two Numbers or Quantities, is the Quotient arising, when the Antecedent is divided by the Consequent. 
Thus 6 is the Exponent of the Ratio that 30 has to 5." I have not found the term in prior editions of either 
Edward Phillip's New World of English Words (1st ed., 1658) or Thomas Blount's Glossographia (1st ed., 
1656). 
571 Wallis, "Summary Account of the General Laws of Motion," 864. Translation by Hall, OCH 5: 168, 
with slight changes drawn from the original by me. After Hall's translation of this statement, he provided a 
footnote to exclaim: "A perfectly Aristotelian principle!" See OCH 5: 170n.  
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time, depending on the constraints of the machine. A proportionally larger force will be 
required in order to move a larger weight. If the machine itself is not modified, i.e. if the 
fulcrum of the lever is not moved, the larger force will move the larger weight through 
the same distance in the same time as the previous weight and force. This appears to be 
the root of Wallis's notion of force: it is the power required to move a weight by a 
machine, such as a weight at the end of a lever. 
 Presumably 2 rests on his first statement, which asserts that any effect is 
proportional to its cause. This also clarifies Wallis's machine notion of force, weight, and 
distance/time.  
1. If the agent is as A, and the effect as E; with the agent as 2A the effect is as 2E, 
with 3A as 3E, all things being equal; and universally with mA as mE, m being any 
rational exponent.572 
 
Thus the force is the agent and the effect is the motion of the weight. In his larger work 
Mechanica, Wallis makes this explicit: I call a power that produces motion [potentiam 
efficiendi motum] motive force or simply force..." just as he calls "a power that is 
contrary to motion or resists motion Resistance or Force that resists [vim resistendi]."573 
Prior to these definitions, Wallis also similarly defined momentum and impedimentum: "I 
call that which aids in producing motion Momentum, and that which prevents motion or 
impedes it Impedimentum."574  
 Note Wallis's expression of proportionality using a symbolic variable. Although 
seemingly simple, the transition between proportions and algebraic products was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572 Wallis, "Summary Account of the General Laws of Motion," 864. Translation by Hall, OCH 5: 167-8. 
573 Wallis, Mechanica, 3. Translation by Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics, 231. 
574 Wallis, Mechanica, 2. Translation by Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics, 231. 
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contentious, and is a distinctive feature of Wallis's mathematics of collision.575 Wallis, 
following Aristotle, argued that arithmetic was more universal and abstract than 
geometry, since a unit, unlike a geometric point, has no position.576 However, Wallis 
parted with Aristotle and many others in identifying arithmetic with algebra. This may 
seem innovative and modern, but Wallis himself, who was among the first to write a 
history of algebra, was convinced that algebra was ancient.577 As Savilian Professor of 
Geometry at Oxford (1649) Wallis gave a series of lectures, which in 1657 would be 
published as Mathesis universalis: sive Arithmeticum opus integrum. According to these 
lectures, algebra (the arithmetica speciosa) had nearly universal application. It could be 
applied to geometry ("reduc[ing] the procedures of geometrical constructions to algebraic 
operations"), it could better express Eudoxus's theory of proportions in book V of 
Euclid's Elements, and he thought it could be used to investigate the relationships 
between continuous physical magnitudes.578   
 In section 3 of the "Summary of the Laws of Motion", Wallis states that "if 
something moves through a distance L in time T, in time nT it will move through a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  575 Chikara Sasaki, "The Acceptance of the Theory of Proportions in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Centuries," Historia Scientiarum 29 (1985): 83-116.  
576 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I-27, 87a 33-38. "Knoweldge at the same time of the fact and of the 
reasoned fact, as contrasted with knowledge of the former without the latter, is more accurate and prior. So 
again is knowledge of objects which do not inhere in a substrate as contrasted with that of objects which do 
so inhere (e.g., arithmetic and harmonics) and that which depends upon fewer factors as contrasted with 
that which uses additional factors (e.g., arithmetic and geometry). What I mean by additional factors is this: 
a unit is a substance without position, but a point is a substance with position: I regard the latter as 
containing an additional factor." Translation by Hugh Tredennick, E. S. Forster, Posterior Analytics, 
Topica, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harbard University Press, 1960), 152-5. Also see Sasaki, 
"Theory of Proportions," 93-4.  
577 Wallis, Treatise of Algebra, 3. Wallis begins Chapter 2, which is entitled, "Of Algebra in Euclid, 
Pappus, Diophantus, and in the Arabic Writers," with the following claim: "It is to me a thing 
unquestionable, That the Ancients had somewhat of like nature with our Algebra; from whence many of 
their prolix and intricate Demonstrations were derived. And I find other modern Writers of the same 
opinion with me therein." He goes on to provide an extensive argument. Also see Jacqueline A. Stedall, A 
Discourse Concerning Algebra: English Algebra to 1685, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
578 Sasaki, "Theory of Proportions," 93-4. 
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distance nL."579 Later in 5 he defines "degrees of speed" C as "proportional to the 
distances passed over in the same time...  !!  .𝐶 ∷ !!   !!  .!!𝐶  That is, the degree of [speed] is 
as the distances directly and the times reciprocally."580 
 Using these relations for (constant) motion in 3 and force from 2, Wallis sets up a 
proportion between force, time, weight, and distance (longitudinem): 
4. And so, if the force V, in time T, moves the weight P though the distance L, the 
force mV in the time nT will move mP thought a distance nL.581  
 
Relying on his particular algebraic interpretation of proportions, the proportion in 4 is 
then converted into a product: 
And moreover as VT (the product of the force and the time) is to PL (the product 
of the weight and the length) so is mnVT to mnPL.582 
 
Thus, we have the expression 𝑉𝑇.𝑃𝐿 ∷ 𝑚𝑛𝑉𝑇.𝑚𝑛𝑃𝐿. In section 6 Wallis presents a 
purely algebraic manipulation to show that force is equal to the product of weight and 
degree of speed:583 
6. Accordingly, because 𝑉𝑇.𝑃𝐿 ∷ 𝑚𝑛𝑉𝑇.𝑚𝑛𝑃𝐿 ,   𝑉. !"! ∷ 𝑚𝑉. !"#$!"  ;   that is, 𝑉.𝑃𝐶 ∷ 𝑚𝑉.𝑚𝑃𝐶 
 = 𝑚𝑃×𝐶 
 = 𝑃×𝑚𝐶. 
 
Section 7 provides a gloss on this expression. (1) If a force F can move a weight P with 
some speed C, then a force mV will move the same weight with a proportional velocity 
mC,584 (2) or it will move a proportionally larger/smaller weight mP with the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
579 Wallis, "Summary Account of the General Laws of Motion," 864. Translation by Hall, OCH 5: 168. 
580 Ibid. 
581 Ibid. 
582 Ibid. 
583 Ibid. 
584 𝑉.𝑃𝐶 ∷ 𝑚𝑉.𝑃×𝑚𝐶 
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velocity C.585 (3) Or it will move "any weight with such a velocity that the product of 
weight and velocity is mPC."586  
 And to these two variations (and general statement) of force and the product of 
weight and degree of speed, can be added the expression, which Wallis takes to be the 
foundation of all machines: 
 𝑉.𝑃𝐶 ∷ 𝑚𝑉.𝑚𝑃𝐶 
 = 𝑉.𝑚𝑃× !!𝐶 
 
In whatever ratio the weight is increased, the speed is diminished in the same 
ratio; whence it is that the product of the weight and the speed for any moving 
force is the same. 
 
 Force is a fundamental concept in Wallis's account of collision. This distinguishes 
Wallis's theory from the other two famous papers by Wren and Huygens on the topic 
published nearly simultaneously in the Philosophical Transactions. For Wallis force (vis) 
is the agent that causes a weight (pondus) to move through a distance in some time. This 
agent is akin to the power that causes a machine, such as a lever, to lift a weight.  Using 
his distinctive interpretation of algebra, Wallis derives his "foundation of all machines" 
with this notion of force at its core. It is on this foundation that Wallis builds his account 
of collision.   
 
 
3.1.2 – The Nature of Bodies and "Whether no Motion in the World perish"  
 
 Beeckman, Descartes, Huygens, and Wren all focused their attention on specific 
kinds of bodies in their theories of collision. Most called their bodies "hard," however 
what constituted a "hard" body for each investigator differed significantly. Beeckman's 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
585 𝑉.𝑃𝐶 ∷ 𝑚𝑉.𝑚𝑃×𝐶 
586 𝑉.𝑃𝐶 ∷ 𝑚𝑉.𝑚𝑃𝐶 
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bodies were perfectly hard atoms, but they could not rebound. Descartes's hard bodies, 
described in his rules of collision, did rebound in some instances; absolute "hardness" 
was defined by all the parts (parts which are indefinitely divisible) being at rest with 
respect to each other. Unlike Beeckman, some instances of the collision of these hard 
bodies involved rebound. This was explained not by a force of elasticity, but rather by the 
conservation of quantity of motion and the contest model of force. If the force of 
resistance is greater than the force of motion, the body in motion retains its motion but 
changes its direction. Huygens's bodies were also hard, but they bore almost no 
resemblance to either those of Descartes or Beeckman. Huygens treated his hard bodies 
as if they were (what we would call) perfectly elastic. However, he provided no 
explanation for how this could be, nor did he investigate the nature of bodies in this 
context. Wren too left the topic untouched. He did not even specify whether his bodies 
were "hard."  However, like Huygens, Wren treated his bodies as if they were (what we 
would call) perfectly elastic. And in subsequent experiments prosecuted at the Royal 
Society, it would be recorded that Wren's rules were best confirmed by experiments with 
"the most springy bodies."587  With the exception of brief statements made in passing by 
Descartes and Beeckman, all of these individuals built their theories around one kind of 
body, or more precisely, around one understanding of one kind of body, which differed 
from person to person.  
 Wallis, on the other hand, classified different kinds of bodies, and developed his 
ideas on the collision of different kinds of bodies. Similar to Beeckman, Wallis thought 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
587 Birch, History 2: 347. 18 February 1668/9. "The experiments of motion were prosecuted with springy 
bodies, by which it appeared to some of the members, that the laws of motion, established by Dr. Wren, 
were best verified by the motion of the most springy bodies. These experiments were ordered to be 
continued at the next meeting."  
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that a perfectly hard body must be perfectly inelastic. If a body is not perfectly hard, 
Wallis explained that it would be either elastic or soft. As he mentioned briefly in the 
"Summary of the Laws of Motion:" 
If the bodies that thus collide are taken to be not absolutely hard...but as yielding 
to the shock although able to restore themselves by an elastic force, it will come 
about that such bodies may rebound from each other which otherwise would 
move along together (and indeed rebound more or less, as this restoring force is 
greater or less)....588  
 
"Springy" bodies change shape upon impact, but return to their shape and separate after 
impact due to an elastic force.589 Soft bodies, on the other hand, also change shape. In 
these, however, some motion is absorbed upon deformation and there is no force to cause 
them to separate.590 The mathematical theory developed in Wallis's "Summary of the 
Laws of Motion" in the Philosophical Transactions involves perfectly hard bodies. 
Wallis discusses the collision of bodies, wherein an elastic force restores their shape and 
causes rebound, in the Mechanica, chapters De percussione and De elatere et resilitione 
seu reflexione.591  
 In correspondence with Oldenburg, Wallis maintained that he had precedence 
over others (e.g. Hooke) on the matter of elasticity or "springyness" as the cause of 
rebound.592 As we have seen, Hooke was in the midst of prosecuting several experiments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
588 Wallis, "Summary Account of the General Laws of Motion," 866. Translation by Hall, OCH 5: 170. 
589 Wallis, Mechanica, 686. "I call that by which a body deformed by force strives to restore its original 
figure Elastic Force." Translation by Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics, 242. 
590 Wallis,  Mechanica, 661-2. Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics, 240.   
591 In what follows I emphasize Wallis's work on hard bodies in the "Summary of the Laws of Collision" 
rather than his propositions on "springy bodies" in Mechanica. For an overview of Wallis's proposition in 
his chapter De elatere et resilitione seu reflexione, see Scott, Mathematical Work of Wallis, 121-3. 
592 OCH 5: 265n. Hooke had stated his view at the 29 October 1668 meeting: "if there were to be had a 
body absolutely hard, and destitute of all springiness, if would not rebound at all..." Also see Birch, History 
2: 216. "Mr Hooke moved, that experiments might be made to see, whether all hard bodies, that rebound, 
do not so upon the account of having springy particles in them; and that it might be inquired into, whether 
there be any body springy upon any other score, than that it has air in it.  He conceiving, that if there were 
to be had a body absolutely hard, and destitute of all springiness, it would not rebound at all, and it being 
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to investigate the role of "springyness" in collision.  On 5 December 1668 Wallis wrote to 
Oldenburg: 
What you say was stated in the Society (but not, by whom,) That the springyness 
of Bodies is the Onely cause of their rebounding. My opinion is, (& hath been a 
good while, & oft declared,) that (beside Repercussion which I suppose was not 
intended to be excluded, being one manifest cause; as when a Racket returns the 
Ball;) there is no other cause (that I know of) of Rebounding, but Springyness. 
And therefore, you see, in my Hypothesis sent you, I assign no other.593 
 
Perhaps Wallis's slightly irritated tone is connected to the fact that he had clearly 
reminded Oldenburg of this very position only two days before.594 Moreover, three days 
after Sir Robert Moray suggested at the 12 November meeting of the Royal Society that a 
connection might be found through experiment between hardness and rebound595—a 
meeting in which others suggested that bodies with no springiness should be 
experimented upon to see "how much that quality [springiness] contributed to the 
rebounding"596—Wallis sent his "Summary of the Laws of Motion" to Oldenburg in 
which the connection between elastic force and rebound is clearly stated, as well as 
absolute hardness and absolute inelasticity.  
 Again, on 21 December, Wallis even more forcefully defended his claim to 
priority on this notion against Hooke, and explained how he himself was "forced" to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
said, that such a body would not be easily found for making the experiment, he answered, that it might be 
tried comparatively."  
593 OCH 5: 220. Wallis to Oldenburg, 5 December 1668.    
594 OCH 5: 218. Wallis to Oldenburg, 3 December 1668. "That all rebounding comes from Springynesse, is 
my opinion; & therefore you see mee express that as the onely reason in my short Hypothesis which you 
lately had."   
595 Birch, History 2: 320. "Sir Robert Moray moved, that bodies might be provided of several degrees of 
hardness, and of the same matter and weight, as steel bodies, and the like, to see whether the harder they 
are, the more they will rebound". 
596 Birch, History 2: 320. 
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accept the notion "that springyness is the cause of rebounding" as a consequence of the 
principles of his mechanics.597 
I was forced to it by the necessity of a consequence from those principles which I 
layd down in my first & second chapter (allready printed) where is couched the 
foundations of those demonstrations (or calculations rather) which are to bee 
deduced in some following chapters, De Percussione, et Motuum Acceleratione, 
&c. in their due places. The reason which forced mee to bee of that opinion, you 
have breefly, in the Hypothesis I sent: For if the force prorsum (supposing bodies 
perfectly hard) do (as is here argued) require that both it, & the body it directly 
strikes, should moove the same way (that way which the greater force determines) 
and both at the same swiftness; I found, that, upon this account, there could be no 
rebounding: and therefore was necessitated (as you see in my hypothesis) to have 
recourse, to that of Elasticity, in one or both of the bodies. And, if the rest of the 
hypothesis bee admitted; this, seemes to mee unavoidable. [...] [I]t is a notion 
which, I think, I have well digested; & am very confident it must hold.598 
 
As will be discussed more completely below, Wallis, using his "foundation of all 
machines," shows that after a hard body strikes another, both move together with the 
same speed. Although Wallis's mathematics is more sophisticated, this account of 
collision of hard bodies is essentially the same as Beeckman's and Descartes's early view.  
 Contrary to Hooke and Wallis, and perhaps in agreement with Moray, William 
Neile supposed that "the harder [a body] is the more spring it has and for my part I 
[Neile] think a diamond (or what ever body is the hardest in nature) has a stronger spring 
then [sic] other bodies and a greater quantity of motion in it."599 The latter clause 
regarding "quantity of motion" refers to Neile's position that "a body cant be made hard 
without motion in its particles" and that "the more [internal] motion it has the more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  597 OCH 5: 274-5. Wallis to Oldenburg, 21 December 1668. "The other suggestion of Mr H[ooke]; that 
springyness is the cause of rebounding; is (as I sayd before ) not new to mee; & I think you are my witness 
that you had it in my hypothesis of motion, before he started it in the Society; I am sure, before you 
signified any such thing to mee: so that I suppose he doth not think mee to have robbed him of his motion. 
How hee came by it (whether by a conjecture or a certainty) hee knows best."  
598 OCH 5: 274-5. 
599 OCH 5: 264. Neile to Oldenburg, 18 December 1668.   
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spring it has."600 However, for Neile the important task is to determine the fundamental 
motions of particles that compose hard bodies. He thought this was a task best suited for 
"reason" rather than "experiment," since one cannot perceive "minute particles" and one 
cannot be sure that they behave in the same manner as the bodies that can be 
perceived."601   
 Neile suggested that hardness, and thus the cause of rebound, could be explained 
by the motion of the minute particles composing a body. Hooke and Wallis, who thought 
that absolutely hard bodies were not springy, explained rebound by positing an additional 
force—elasticity—that also accounted for the restitution of bodies that had been 
deformed by impact. The motion of minute particles could not be observed, and Wallis 
acknowledged that he did not have an explanation for how an elastic force worked (just 
as he accepted that gravity existed, but had no explanation of it).602 Neither Wallis nor 
Hooke seems to have come to accept the relationship between hardness and elasticity 
empirically. Hooke realized the difficulty, or perhaps impossibility, of finding an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
600 Ibid. 
601 OCH 5: 518, 542. Neile to Oldenburg, 7 May 1669 and 13 May 1669. "if the motion of small particles 
be too obscure and too uselesse a thing I am not much concerned perchance all philosophye is so too it is 
the more likely to be so if there can be not certaintye found in the principles of it. I desire to know the 
nature of motion and the nature of quiet I desire not only to know that if here be two bodies of considerable 
magnitude moving against one another they shall reflect with such a swiftnesse for that they may doe and 
yet motion may not reflect from motion when it moves with it and to know a thing barely by experiment is 
good for use but it is not science or philosophye." And the following week Neile wrote: "...you know my 
desire is if I could only find some firmenesse in the foundations the Superstructures I confesse it will passe 
my Skill to carry much further than the very beginnings... ...the foundations themselves I think are to be 
grounded upon reason for I doubt experiment will hardly ever cleare the nature of motion in minute 
particles... ...for very probably there is no quantity of matter liable to sense but does farre exceed the 
magnitude of those divisions and subdivisions which are made by motion in minute particles... ...sense may 
tell us that a whole considerable quantity of matter is moved out of its place but sense will not tell us after 
what fashion the motion is performed in the minute particles of that matter or whether it were with 
intervalls of rest or no" (italics added).   
602 OCH 5: 287-8. Wallis to Oldenburg, 31 December 1668. "What that is which wee call springynesse; & 
what, Gravity: I do not determine: but from those things, what ever they are, & from what ever causes they 
do proceed, I am to give account of the effects, I ascribe to them. The one (from what-ever cause) is the 
principle of the motion of restitution; & the other, of tendency downward. I know Des-Cartes & others do 
attempt to assign causes of both; but I have not yet seen any hypothesis that doth fully satisfy my 
apprehensions; & therefore I do not, as to that, determine anything."   
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example of an absolutely hard body to experimentally test the relationship between 
hardness and springyness, and suggested that it might be done "comparatively."603 And as 
mentioned, Wallis reported that he was "forced" to the positions that springyness was the 
cause of rebound and that an absolutely hard body would not rebound, by the principles 
of his mechanics.  
 Wallis's particular position on the nature of the bodies involved in his 
mathematical rules of collision is closely connected to his position on the lack of 
conservation of motion. The topic of the conservation of motion was explicitly discussed 
in letters between Neile and Wallis. On December 5th Wallis provided a preliminary 
response to four queries that had been sent to him anonymously by way of Oldenburg.   
1. Whether Quiescent Matter have [sic] any resistance to motion ...  
2. Whether Motion may pass out of one Subject into another ...  
3. Whether no Motion in the World perish, nor new motion be generated ...  
4. Whether different motions meeting, destroy one another. ...604  
 
The queries originated from William Neile, who had sent them before encountering either 
Wallis's or Wren's theories of collision. Wren produced his theory of collision (as well as 
several old papers "containing the various trials made long before to verify that theory") 
at the 17 December meeting of the Royal Society. At the same meeting additional 
experiments were tried on collision and springyness.605 In a letter Neile sent to Oldenburg 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
603 Birch, History 2: 216. 
604 OCH 5: 220-1. Wallis to Oldenbrug, 5 December 1668. 
605 Birch History 2: 335. "An experiment was made in prosecution of the motion, that springiness is the 
cause of rebounding; vis. a wooden globe was let fall against wood, a gut-string, and a brass-wire. In the 
first case the rebounding was languid, and of a very short duration; in the second, it was much stronger, and 
more durable; in the last, strongest and most durable of all. Which was conceived to proceed from the 
different degrees of force of the spring in the several bodies employed. Mr. Hooke took occasion to 
mention, that he thought, that air, next to quicksilver, gave the quickest and most forcible reflexion; and 
that the sparkling of diamonds in rings proceed from the air left behind the stones. Dr. Wren produced his 
theory of the collision of bodies, together with some papers containing the various trials made long before 
to verify that theory. It was read, and ordered to be registered, the author affirming, that he had this 
hypothesis several years before, when the society began to be formed; and that Mr. Rooke and himself 
made divers experiments before the society to verify the same: which affirmation of his was seconded and 
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the day after the meeting, Neile mentioned that he had not yet seen Wallis's paper on 
collision, and criticized Wren's theory.606 In the same letter, Neile also revealed his own 
positions regarding the queries.  
 Three days later, Wallis replied through Oldenburg to clarify and elaborate his 
response, specifically his response to the third question, which regarded conservation. 
Upon reading Neile's own position on the topic, Wallis restated the question as follows: 
Whether no Motion in the World perish, &c; that is, (as you now explain it,) 
whether any of that motion, that was first (or at any time since) impressed in 
matter be lost, or (onely) communicated from one parcell of the matter to 
another; so that though this or that body do cease to be moved, that the motion 
itself ceaseth or perisheth not.607 
Wallis's response was, in short, that "motion may be extinguished." He acknowledged 
that others have been uncomfortable with this answer:  
[It] is a question, which I find Mathematicians, as well as Naturalists, sparing to 
determine positively; and, you know, I am sparing and wary in asserting 
Universall Negatives. Yet you have, to this, my answer, full inough, (if it be 
observed,) in my answere to the fourth. For I there intimate my judgement, that 
motion may be extinguished, & I shew you how; that is, a Motion compounded of 
two contrary forces, may be extinguished by each other, & become equivalent 
with Rest.608  
The cause of rebound is elasticity. Hard bodies are not elastic. When two equal hard 
bodies moving with the same speed in contrary directions collide, motion is extinguished. 
In other words, it is the case that the motion, which was first impressed in matter, can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
confirmed by several of the members, who were eye-witnesses of those experiments, as the president, Sir 
Paul Neile, Mr. Balle, and Mr. Hill. Mr. Hooke was ordered to take care, that the experiments be made 
before the society, to verify the several cases relating to the theory produced. He was desired to bring in 
what he had considered of the cause of springiness."  
606 OCH 5: 263-4. W. Neile to Oldenburg, 18 December 1668. "I wish Dr. Wren would explain his 
principles a litle [sic] more fully but he is against finding a reason for the experiments of motion (for ought 
I see) and says that the appearances carrie reason enough in themselves as being the law of nature. I think it 
is the Law of nature that they should apear but not without some causes.  [...] I am sorry I doe not at present 
know Dr Wallises hypothesis of motion." 
607 OCH 5: 274. Wallis to Oldenburg, 21 December 1668.   
608 Ibid.   
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lost. It is not the case that it is only communicated from one parcel of matter to another. 
Wallis is quite clear. Motion in the World perishes.     
 
3.1.3 – The Contest of impetus and impedimentum 
 
 In sections 1 through 8 Wallis developed his "foundation of all machines," that is, 
that "the product of the weight and the speed for any moving force is the same," which 
means that "in whatever ratio the weight is increased, the speed is diminished in the same 
ratio." In sections 9, 10, and 11 he uses this foundation to account for three different 
kinds of collisions of hard bodies. In 9 a weight collides directly with a motionless 
weight. In 10 a weight collides directly with another weight that is traveling in the same 
direction as the first, but with a different speed. In 11 two weights collide directly from 
opposite directions. Wallis's theory involves a contest between two forces: impetus and 
impedimentum, which is significantly different from the contest of Marci and Descartes, 
namely Wallis is not committed to a prior principle of conservation, and his source of 
rebound is in "springyness" rather than the force of resistance. In Wallis's correspondence 
with Neile, we find renewed debates on the force of resistance in a body at rest. These 
reveal basic disagreements on methodology, appearance and reality, and the very purpose 
of a study of collision among members of the Royal Society.   
 10 and 11 are built from the case of a weight P colliding with a motionless weight 
mP, as described in section 9. In this chief case of collision, since hard bodies do not 
rebound, after they meet, the weight is increased to 𝑃 +𝑚𝑃 or equivalently (1+𝑚)𝑃. 
Because of the foundation of all machines: "as the same force is constrained to move a 
greater weight, the velocity will be diminished in the same proportion. Thus, 𝑉.𝑃𝐶 ∷
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𝑉. !!!! 𝑃× !!!!𝐶 = 𝑃𝐶"609 This means that after collision they will both move with a 
velocity of !!!!𝐶. Both the writings found in Isaac Beeckman's Journal, and Descartes's 
early work on collision had come to the same conclusion. However, Beeckman and 
Descartes represented this notion using only specific numerical examples. Wallis, on the 
other hand, expresses it abstractly and generally using algebraic symbols.  
 The concept of force in the "foundation of all machines" was built on the notion 
of an agent that produces the effect of putting a weight in motion. As we have already 
seen, in the context of the first eight sections culminating in this "foundation," it has been 
called the "moving force"—the force that causes a weight to move. In section 9 Wallis 
identifies "the product of the weight and the velocity" (Factum ex Pondere et Celeritate) 
with the "impetus" of the bodies after collision. This quantity is similar to the modern 
notion of momentum or the Galilean notion of impeto (or momento).610 However, Wallis 
provides no justification or explanation of the shift from force as "agent that puts a 
weight in motion" to force as the "power of a weight in motion" in his paper for the 
Philosophical Transactions.  Wallis has extended discussions of force, momentum, and 
impetus in his Mechanica. However, historians such as Westfall and Scott have noted that 
these discussions are neither the paragon of clarity nor consistency.  
 In addition to the "force of motion" which in general terms Wallis calls 
momentum (which is the force responsible for putting a weight into motion), and the 
impetus (which is the power of a weight in motion), Wallis, in his Mechanica, also 
discusses a force of resistance which in general terms he calls the impedimentum—"that 
which prevents motion or impedes it." Wallis begins chapter XI, entitled De Percussione, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
609 OCH 5: 165. Translation by Hall, OCH 5: 168. 
610 See chapter 3. 
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of his Mechanica (1670-1) with the following proposition, which stipulates the 
relationship between the impetus (i.e. the force "equal in power to the body so moved") 
and the impedimentum (i.e. "force of the obstacle resisting the motion"): 
PROP. I.  If a heavy body in motion is considered as perfectly hard, and if it 
directly strikes a firm hindrance or obstacle that is also perfectly hard; and if a 
force equal in power to the body so moved is less than the force of the obstacle 
resisting the motion, or even equal to it, the motion will be stopped.  
 But if it is greater, the obstacle will be surmounted and the motion 
continued, but retarded or diminished in that ratio which the resistance of the 
obstacle demands, which a calculation will establish.  
 That is, if the force required to overcome the obstacle is subtracted from 
the momentum (which is composed of the weight and the speed) and the 
remainder, whatever it may be, is understood to be divided by the weight, the 
degree of speed remaining will be found.611 
 
A contest between the impetus and the impedimentum determines the outcome of a body 
striking another. Wallis's analysis of the collision of hard bodies found later in his 
chapter, De Percussione, from his Mechanica, and the summary presented in sections 9-
11 of Wallis's paper for the Philosophical Transactions, are consistent with this general 
proposition. Recall that Marcus Marci's account of collision relied on a contest between 
impulse and resistance, just as Descartes's relied on a contest between moving force and 
the force of resistance. However, Wallis's contest is significantly different from either 
Marci or Descartes. For both Marci and Descartes, when the force of resistance is not 
overcome, the moving body rebounds.612 Descartes held as a prior principle that the 
quantity of motion is conserved. When the "moving force" does not overcome the force 
of resistance (of a body at rest, for example), the body in motion rebounds retaining all of 
its motion. The quantity of motion before and after impact is the same. Wallis does not 
hold as a prior principle that the "quantity of motion" (or impetus) is conserved. For 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
611 Wallis, Mechanica, 660. Translation by Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics, 239-40. Also see Wallis, 
Mechanica, 18 (chapter I, proposition XI). Translation by Scott, Mathematical Work of Wallis, 111.   
612 See chapter 5 section 5.2.1. 
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Wallis, when the moving force does not overcome the force of resistance (if the force of 
resistance is greater than the moving force or equal to it) the moving body stops. 
Descartes's conservation principle together with his contest view provided him with the 
conditions of rebound (“without this, no body would ever be reflected by encountering 
another”613). Wallis, on the other hand, explained rebound in terms of "springyness" and 
the force of restitution.  
 
3.1.3.1 – Appearance and Reality: weights, minute bodies, and the force of resistance 
 Among the queries Neile had posed to Wallis was whether or not a body at rest 
had a force of resistance.614 Notoriously, in Descartes's later view of collision, the "force 
of resistance" in a resting body could not be overcome by the force of any smaller 
moving body.615 Using different understandings of both (relative) motion as well as body 
from Descartes's, Huygens argued against the Cartesian rules of collision.616 Contrary to 
Huygens, both Wallis and Neile agreed that there was a meaningful difference between 
rest and motion.617 The question of the force of resistance in a body at rest was still a live 
issue for them.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
613 AT IV 184. Descartes to Clerselier, 17 February 1645. Translation by Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical 
Physics, 261. 
614 Birch, History 2: 333. Also see OCH 5: 218. Neile had posed the question, which was the first of his 
four queries, in the following way: "Whether Quiescent Matter have any resistance to motion." 
615 This topic, the contest between the force of motion and the force of resistance, has been examined 
previously in this dissertation, particularly in chapter 3. Also see Gabbey, "Force and inertia."   
616 See above, particularly chapter 4, and the section on Huygens in this chapter. 
617 As noted in a previous section of this chapter, Wallis seems to have incorrectly conflated Descartes's and 
Huygens's ideas on motion. In a letter (OCH 6: 189. Wallis to Oldenburg, 15 August 1669), Wallis wrote 
that he did not think motion was only relative: "'Tis very little I have to say in answere to yours of Aug. 4 
[...] nor to the note inclosed concerning M. Huygens, with whom I do for the most part concur, though not 
in all. For I am not yet satisfyed in that notion of Descartes, which hee seems to imbrace, that Motion is 
onely relative; & , of the two bodies separated, it is indifferent whether of the two be sayd to move." In the 
correspondence between Wallis and Neile, they extensively discuss both rest and motion. An example of a 
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 Explicitly following Hobbes,618 Neile claimed in his "Hypothesis of Motion," 
which was partially presented to the Royal Society at the 29 April 1669 meeting,619 and 
sent to Wallis via Oldenburg on 8 May 1669,620 that quiescent matter offers no resistance 
to motion. In his paper he was quick to clarify that "it is very obvious that all bodies 
known to us possess th[e] faculty of resisting more or less," including those bodies that 
appear to us to be at rest. According to Neile, bodies offer resistance because of the 
"internal motion of the most minute particles in every body." But truly quiescent matter, 
i.e. a minute particle at rest, offers no resistance.  
 Wallis and Neile's correspondence was extensive. It would be a mistake to assume 
that the correspondents were talking past each other, even though Wallis was concerned 
with the forces involved in the impact of "hard weights," whereas Neile was concerned 
with fundamental minute particles, which could be said to be at rest (with no internal 
motion). Wallis maintained his same position against Neile after reading Neile's 
clarifications in his "Hypothesis of Motion." Wallis's position was essentially the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
particularly fraught discussion on the distinction between rest and motion can be found in the postscript of 
letter 1064, (OCH 5: 313-4. Neile to Oldenburg, 2 January 1668/9).  
618 William Neile, "William Neile's Hypothesis of Motion," OCH 5: 521. "This part of the theory I gladly 
acknowledge taking from the books of Mr. Hobbes. Since it may be gathered from what has gone before 
that wherever there is resistance, or a body's reaction, there motion is to be found, for that is the unique 
cause able to produce such an effect naturally because of the incapacity of matter at rest to impede motion 
in any way, since matter does assuredly yield to any body that strikes it, without any reluctance or 
repugnancy, and since it is very obvious that all bodies known to us possess this faculty of resisting more or 
less, it is on that account quite fitting that we attribute motion to them. And since this resistance is opposed 
in all directions to any external impetus whatever, that internal motion of the most minute particles in every 
body must exist in an almost endless variety, by which they resist any external impulse.." Translation by 
Hall, OCH 5: 525. 
619 Birch, Hypothesis 2: 361, 2. "Mr. William Neile was desired to produce his theory of motion; which 
being done, it was read, and ordered to be registered. After some discourse upon this theory, the author was 
desired to complete it, and to consider how to verify his principles by experiments, and to accommodate 
them to the rules of Dr. Wren and Monsr. Huygens; which he promised he would endeavour to do." At the 
6 May 1669 meeting, Neile was called upon again to complete his "theory concerning the principles of 
motion, and [apply] them to the rules given by Dr. Wren and Monsr. Huygens for experiments." Neile 
replied that he had not yet finished.   
620 OCH 5: 519-524. "William Neile's Hypothesis of Motion" was written in Latin. English translation by 
Hall, OCH 5: 524-8.   
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analysis found in section 9 of his Summary for the Philosophical Transactions,621 
wherein a hard body at rest does offer resistance. Recall that after a weight P moving at 
speed C collides with a body mP at rest, they both move together with the reduced speed  
!!!!𝐶. Moreover, although Wallis's "hard weights" may not be identical to the "minute 
particles" of Neile, they were also not the same as the mundane weights from experience. 
Neither Wallis's nor Neile's objects of collision were observable.    
 Throughout his correspondence with Wallis via Oldenburg, Neile is concerned 
with what has since come to be known as the problem of transdiction. According to Neile 
both the nature of bodies (whether they are hard, soft, or elastic), as well as the ability of 
a body to offer resistance to another, are apparent in phenomenal bodies, but those 
qualities are explained by the real motion of minute particles. The minute particles may 
not share the same properties of hardness/softness/elasticity or resistance, as the bodies 
observed in experiments, since those properties are explained by the motion of minute 
particles, and since the minute particles are not observable. This poses a methodological 
difficulty: how to determine the laws of motion of the fundamental components of reality, 
if one only has experimental access to the behavior of apparent bodies. Neile suggests 
that their only recourse is to investigate the unobservable minute particles by "reason" 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
621 OCH 5: 220. Wallis to Oldenburg, 5 December 1668. Initially, before Wallis read Neile's "Hypothesis of 
Motion" and had only read the then anonymous queries, Wallis responded to the question in a way that 
implies that he thought it was a question regarding inertia: "I look upon it as taken for granted by most of 
our moderns; that...it is indifferent as to rest or motion... And accordingly doth remain as it is, either in rest 
or motion, & this with the same direction & celerity, till some positive cause alter it." Later, after Wallis 
had examined Neile's "Hypothesis of Motion," he first extensively clarified his position, before referring in 
general terms to the ideas found in section 9 of his "Summary." See OCH 5: 541. Wallis to Oldenburg, 10 
May 1669.    
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rather than by "experiment." He does concede, however, that any theory of motion (based 
on reason) should be consistent with the sets of experiments performed by the society.622 
 For example, in defense of the approach he took in his "Hypothesis of Motion" 
Neile claims that if one does not take seriously the "motion of small particles" and does 
not first attempt to clarify by reason the questions "if it be not true that motion stoppes 
motion" and "if it be not true that quiescent matter has no resistance to motion," then 
"there can be no certaintye found in the principles of it."623  Neile claimed to be interested 
in the "firmenesse in the foundations," "the Superstructures." And methodologically: "the 
foundations themselves I think are to be grounded upon reason for I doubt experiment 
will hardly ever cleare the nature of motion in minute particles."624 According to Neile, 
the study of phenomenal bodies, such as wooden pendulum bobs colliding, in order to 
understand nothing more than the motion of wooden pendulum bobs, may be "good for 
use but it is not science or philosophy."625  
 A distinguishing feature of Wallis's work on collision, is his emphasis on forces 
and the causes of motion. He took into account the different natures of bodies (hard, soft, 
elastic). Notably he was the first, or among the first, to identify the much discussed 
concept of elasticity in the Royal Society as the force of restitution in bodies and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
622 OCH 5: 265, 312, 363, 542, 559. Neile extensively discusses "appearance and reality." See OCH: 286-7, 
347, 364, 518, 542, for his discussions of "reason and experiment."  
623 OCH 5: 517-8. W. Neile to Oldenburg, 7 May 1669. 
624 OCH 5: 542. W. Neile to Oldenburg, 13 May 1669. 
625 OCH 5: 518. W. Neile to Oldenburg, 7 May 1669. "if the motion of small particles be too obscure and 
too uselesse a thing I am not much concerned perchance all philosophye is so too it is the more likely to be 
so if there can be no certaintye found in the principles of it. I desire to know the nature of motion and the 
nature of quiet I desire not only to know that if here be two bodies of a considerable magnitude moving 
against one another they shall reflect with such a swiftnesse for that they may doe and yet motion may not 
reflect from motion when it moves with it and to know a thing barely by experiment is good for use but it is 
not science or philosophye."   
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cause of rebound in collision.626 This distinguishes him from Descartes's attempts at 
discussing rebound, as well as Huygens and Wren. For the latter two, bodies rebound, but 
Huygens and Wren do not explain why the bodies rebound.  Nevertheless, in the eyes of 
Wallis's correspondent Neile, Wallis's work, if it only treated "bodies of considerable 
magnitude," was neither science nor philosophy. Or, if Wallis's work was intended to 
describe the fundamental motions of reality, then his account failed to reconcile 
appearance and reality, or at least failed to justify the "Superstructures" by neglecting to 
defend an account of weight and resistance, which Neile had done by appealing to the 
motion of minute particles.   
 Clues to Wallis's intentions regarding this issue of "transdiction" can be found in 
two instances: 1.) The hard bodies described by Wallis are theoretical rather than 
observable. The hard bodies used in experiments at the Royal Society rebound, and even 
Hooke (who shared Wallis's view on hardness and elasticity) admitted the difficulty and 
perhaps impossibility of finding an absolutely hard body with which to perform the 
experiments. Thus, the as of yet unobservable, absolutely hard bodies described by 
Wallis are not the weights perceived in an experiment.  Recall too that according to 
Wallis, his positions on the "force of elasticity" as the cause of rebound, as well as the 
inelasticity of perfectly hard bodies, was not acquired through experience and 
experiment. He claimed to have been "forced" to accept them by the principles of his 
mechanics. 2.) While discussing the relationship between the physical causes of motion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
626 OCH 5: 303. Wallis to Oldenburg, 2 January 1668/9. However, Wallis mentions in a letter to Oldenburg 
regarding the priority squabble with Hooke, that he has since seen this notion suggested in several books, 
including Borelli's De vi percussionis, page 47, and "as I remember in a French writer which Mr Collins 
lent me [Wallis] when I was last in London." He had forgotten the name of the book and the French writer, 
but remembered that "he had three volumes in a broad quarto."     
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and the mathematical rules of collision, in a set of letters to Oldenburg,627 Wallis claims 
that motive force and the force of resistance are essentially fundamental. The moving 
force and the force of resistance must be postulated if motion is postulated at all:   
As to what you say of the Physical cause of motion: If it be onely, Why this way? 
& thus fast? & with thus much force? the Mathematical hypothesis satisfyes. But 
if it be Whence it comes to pass that there [is] any Motion in the World? I doubt 
wee must make that for a Postulatum; That there is Motion, as well as, That there 
is Matter. And refer both to the same Original cause. And, if we allow motion to 
begin, we must postulate that there is a vis motrix ["motive force"] even in resting 
Bodies. At lest I know not at present what to say more to it.628 
In short, according to Wallis, impetus and impedimentum are a direct consequence of the 
postulation of motion. Resistance (such as weight) is not to be explained, as Neile, 
Hobbes, and Descartes suggested, by the motion (or rest) of more fundamental particles.  
 The disagreements on the force of resistance in a body at rest reveals a web of 
issues, ranging from the very relevance of experiments (such as the collision of wooden 
pendulum bobs for the determination of the laws of motion), to the status of forces (such 
as impetus, impedimentum, and the force of restitution/elasticity), to the relationship 
between appearance and reality in the fundamental laws of motion. Unlike Neile, who 
explains springyness, hardness, and resistance by appealing to the motion of minute 
particles, which subsequently raises methodological challenges for Experimental 
Philosophy, Wallis posits the necessary existence of forces, such as that of resistance, but 
provides no explanation of the forces. Unlike Huygens and Wren, Wallis's theory of 
collision as a contest between forces, and his discussions of this theory, reveal a 
willingness to explicitly engage in foundational natural philosophical questions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  627	  OCH 5: 221. Wallis to Oldenburg, 5 December 1668.  OCH 5: 230-1. Wallis to Oldenburg, 10 
December 1668.  628 OCH 5: 230-1. Wallis to Oldenburg, 10 December 1668. I follow Hall's interpretation of vis motrix  as 
"motive force." See OCH 5: 231n. 
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3.1.4 – The Physical legitimation of impossible numbers and the new mathematics of 
direction: posito + signo Dextorsum, et − Sinistrorsum significante 
 
  The cases of collision in which both bodies are in motion, either moving in the 
same direction (as in section 10 of the "Summary of the Laws of Motion") or in opposite 
directions (as in section 11) are built from the collision of one body at rest (in section 9). 
In Westfall's study of Wallis's theory of collision, he mentions that the similar analyses in 
10 and 11 are "too obvious to require restatement."629 Admittedly, the concepts are 
simple, but section 11 is worth restating and analyzing because it is among the first 
published texts in which the direction of motion is explicitly indicated using the algebraic 
negative sign, and the directionality of motion is determined by simplified algebraic 
expressions which, in final form, do not directly correspond to particular physical 
quantities such as weight, speed, and impetus.    
 Section 11 is the longest section in Wallis's paper for the Philosophical 
Transactions. I have reproduced Hall's translation in full: 
 11) If weights moving in opposed directions collide or meet each other 
directly such as the weight P (force V, velocity C) to the right and the weight mP 
(velocity nC and so force mnV) to the left, the velocity, impetus and direction of 
both may be worked out in this way. 
 With the one weight moving to the right, if the other (mP) were at rest it 
would acquire a velocity !(!!!)! and hence an impetus of !(!!!)!"#, to the right; and 
the moving body (P) would retain this same velocity with an impetus of !(!!!)!", 
to the right (from Section 9). 
 But with the one weight moving to the left, by similar reasoning if the 
other (P) were at rest it would acquire a velocity !"(!!!)! and hence an impetus of !"(!!!)!" to the left; and the moving body (mP) would retain this same velocity with 
an impetus of !"(!!!)!"# to the left. 
 Now as there is motion in both directions, the impetus of the body which 
at first moved to the right will be the aggregate of !(!!!)!" to the right and !(!!!)!"#$ to the left, and so in fact either to the left or the right according to 
which is the greater, with the impetus that is the difference of these two. That is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
629 Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics, 240.  
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(expressing movement to the right as positive [+] and movement to the left as 
negative [−]630), the impetus will be  +    !(!!!)!" − !(!!!)!"#$ 
and the velocity will be !!!"!!! ! (to the right, or the left, as 1 or mn is the greater).  
 And similarly, the impetus of the body which at first moved to the left will 
be  +    !(!!!)!"# − !"(!!!)!"#   =    !!!"!!! !"# 
and the velocity will be !!!"!!! ! (to the right, or the left as 1 or mn is the greater).631  
 
 Wallis's strategy for "working out" the velocity, impetus, and direction of the 
weights, relies on successively treating the scenario as if one and then the other of the 
weights were at rest. In other words he works out the velocity and impetus of the collision 
twice, first treating mP as if it were at rest and P in motion to the right, and then treating 
P as if it were at rest and mP as if it were in motion to the left. This amounts to a simple 
application of the ideas established in section 9. The moving body has an impetus. The 
body at rest serves as an impedimentum. There is an impetus and impedimentum for both 
hypothetical cases—if mP is taken to be at rest and P in motion to the right, and if P is 
taken to be at rest and mP in motion to the left.  
 Wallis's innovation is to identify motion to the right by the + sign, and motion to 
the left by the − sign. He then takes the aggregate of an impetus to the right and an 
impetus to the left. Whichever impetus is greater determines the direction after collision. 
Since an impetus is calculated for each weight (P and mP), and since these impetus are 
worked out for each hypothetical case, there are four impetus to choose from in these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
630 OCH 5: 166. In Hall's editorial choices for the English translation of this passage he excluded the 
algebraic signs that Wallis used in this clause. The original Latin is as follows: "Hoc est, (posito + signo 
Dextorsum, et − Sinistrorsum significante,) Impetus erit +    !(!!!)!" − !(!!!)!"#$." Also see Philosophical 
Transactions 3 (1668): 865. 
631 Wallis, "Summary Account of the General Laws of Motion," 865-6. Translation by Hall, OCH 5: 169.   
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aggregates. The diagram below clarifies the way Wallis worked out velocity, impetus, 
and direction of the collision of weights moving in opposite directions: 
 
                                             P         C                                   nC       mP 
Hypothetical Case 1 Hypothetical Case 2 
Before collision 
 
         P         C                       mP (at rest) 
Before collision 
 
          P (at rest)            nC        mP 
After collision 
 
                                  !(!!!)! 
After collision 
 
                   !"(!!!)! 
"impetus of weight P" (initially moving) +    !(!!!)!" "impetus of weight P" (initially at rest) − !(!!!)!"#$ 
"impetus of weight mP" (initially at rest) 
 +   !(!!!)!"# 
"impetus of weight mP" (initially moving) − !"(!!!)!"# 
 
Aggregate Impetus 
"impetus of the body which at first moved to the right" +     !(!!!)!"   −  !(!!!)!"#$ 
 
impetus of weight P (initially moving) 
from Hypothetical Case 1 
impetus of weight P (initially at rest) 
from Hypothetical Case 2 
 
"impetus of the body which at first moved to the left" +     !(!!!)!"#   −  !"(!!!)!"# 
 
impetus of weight mP (initially at rest) 
from Hypothetical Case 1 
impetus of weight mP (initially moving) 
from Hypothetical Case 2 
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 The link between direction and signs was not obvious. Wallis was among the first 
to establish the connection. This simultaneously provided an elegant way of describing 
direction algebraically in a non-visual, non-geometric manner; and it provided an 
interpretation for an otherwise absurd, "impossible" quantity. 
 As we have seen above, Wallis was a proponent of the position that the 
foundations of algebra were arithmetic. He envisioned an algebra "liberated from 
geometry," and he thought that the abstractness of this "specious arithmetick" allowed for 
unbounded applications.632  As Pycior has argued, one of the main purposes of Wallis's 
Treatise of Algebra, both historical and practical, in addition to providing an overview 
and history of algebra, was to legitimize the hitherto controversial negative and 
imaginary quantities.633  
 Wallis began his 66th chapter "of  Negative Squares, and their Imaginary Roots in 
Algebra" of the Treatise of Algebra with an acknowledgement of the impossibility of 
negative numbers and the roots of negative numbers. After explaining that it was not 
possible to multiply any number into itself to produce a negative, he noted that negative 
numbers were just as impossible:  
but it is also Impossible, that any Quantity (though not Supposed Square) can be 
Negative. Since it is not possible that any Magnitude can be Less than Nothing, or 
any Number fewer than None.634  
 
Although impossible, they are nevertheless not "absurd" and are, in fact, useful. He used 
a simple example of the direction of a man moving to legitimize negative numbers by 
appealing to the usefulness of the physical interpretation. Although the concept is now 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
632 Pycior, Symbols, 118-9. 
633 Ibid., 107.  
634 Wallis, Treatise of Algebra, 264. 
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considered simple enough to be taught in primary school, the Savilian Professor of 
Geometry at Oxford invested nine paragraphs and a diagram into its explanation: 
 
 Yet is not that Supposition (of Negative Quantities,) either Unuseful or 
Absurd; when rightly understood. And though, as to the bare Algebraick Notation, 
it import a Quantity less than nothing: Yet, when it comes to a Physical 
Application, it denotes as Real a Quantity as if the Sign were +; but to be 
interpreted in a contrary sense. 
 As for instance: Supposing a man to have advanced or moved forward, 
(from A to B,) 5 Yards; and then to retreat (from B to C) 2 Yards: If it be asked 
how much he had Advanced (upon the whole march) when at C? or how many 
Yards he is now Forwarder than when he was at A? I find (by Subducting 2 from 
5,) that he is Advanced 3 Yards. (Because +5 −2 = +3.) 
 
 But if, having Advanced 5 Yards to B, he thence Retreat 8 Yards to D; and 
it be then asked, How much he is Advanced when at D, or how much Forwarder 
than when he was at A: I say −3 Yards. (Because +5 −8 = −3.) That is to say, he 
is advanced 3 Yards less than nothing.  
 Which in propriety of Speech, cannot be, (since there cannot be less than 
nothing.) And therefore as to the Line AB Forward, the case is Impossible. 
 But if (contrary to Supposition,) the Line from A, be continued Backward, 
we shall find D, 3 Yards Behind A. (Which was presumed to be Before it.) 
 And thus to say, he is Advanced −3 Yards; is but what we should say (in 
ordinary form of Speech,) he is Retreated 3 Yards; or he wants 3 Yards being so 
Forward as he was at A.  
 Which doth not only answer Negatively to the Question asked. That he is 
not (as was supposed,) Advanced at all: But tells moreover, he is so far from 
being Advanced, (as was supposed,) that he is Retreated 3 Yards; or that he is at 
D, more Backward by 3 Yards, than he was at A. 
 And consequently −3, doth as truly design the Point D; as +3 designed 
the Point C. Not Forward, as was supposed; but Backward, from A.  
 So that +3, signifies 3 Yards Forward; and −3, signifies 3 Yards 
Backward: But still in the same Streight Line. And each designs (at least in the 
same Infinite Line,) one Single Point: And but one. And thus it is in all Lateral 
Equations; as having but one Single Root.635  
  
Wallis then provided the very same reasoning to interpret the root of a negative number. 
Instead of contrariness on a line, he provides a physical example of contrariness in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
635 Ibid., 265.   
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plain—the acreage of land gained and lost to the sea. Supposing the land lost (a negative 
plain) to be in the form of a square, this negative square will have a side. And the length 
of this side can be determined. Thus, although the quantity is an "imaginary root" (which 
is "impossible") there is a physical interpretation of the root of a negative number.636   
 Wallis did not attempt to legitimize these quantities with mathematical arguments. 
Rather he appealed to their usefulness in physical applications. But Wallis was also 
among the first to suggest that contrary directions of motion (or the loss of acreage by the 
sea) could be understood with the algebraic signs of + and −.  
 The analysis of motion in section 11 of Wallis's "Summary of the Laws of 
Nature" identifies positive and negative quantities with motion to the right and left, rather 
than forward and backward. The commonality is the contrary direction of motion. In his 
"Summary" this is extended to impetus as well as motion. The impetus of each body is 
determined by the aggregate of the impetus to the right (positive) and left (negative). 
Notably, Wallis "works out" the direction of motion after collision—not by comparing 
which of the absolute values of the impetus are greater—but rather by solving the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
636 Ibid., 265-6. "Now what is admitted in Lines, must on the same Reason, be allowed in Plains also.  
 As for instance: Supposing that in one Place, we Gain from the Sea, 30 Acres, but Lose in another 
Place, 20 Acres: If it be now asked, How many Acres we have gained upon the whole: The Answer is, 10 
Acres, or +10. (Because of 30 − 20 = 10). Or, which is all one 1600 Square Perches. (For the English Acre 
being Equal to a Plain of 40 Perches in length, and 4 in breadth, whole Area is 160; 10 Acres will be 1600 
Square Perches.) Which if it lye in a Square Form, the Side of that Square will be 40 Perches in length; or 
(admitting of a Negative Root,) −40.  
 But if then in a Third place, we lose 20 Acres more, and the same Question be again asked, How much 
we have gained in the whole; the Answer must be −10 Acres. (Because 30 − 20 − 20 = −10.) That is to 
say The Gain is 10 Acres less than nothing. Which is the same as to say, there is a Loss of 10 Acres: or of 
1600 Square Perches.  
 And hitherto, there is no new Difficulty arising, nor any other Impossibility than what we met with 
before, (in supposing a Negative Quantity, or somewhat Less than nothing:) Save only that 1600 is 
ambiguous; and may be +40, or −40. 
 We cannot say it is 40, nor that it is −40. (Because either of these Multiplyed into itself, will make +1600; not −1600.) 
But thus rather, that it is −1600, (the Supposed Root of a Negative Square;) or (which is Equivalent 
thereunto) 10 −16, or 20 −4, or 40 −1."  
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equation, determining the speed from the resulting impetus, and then comparing two 
quantities within the simplified expression:  
That is (expressing movement to the right as positive [+] and movement to the 
left as negative [−]637), the impetus will be +    !(!!!)!" − !(!!!)!"#$ [=  !!!"(!!!)!"] and 
the velocity will be !!!"!!! ! (to the right, or the left, as 1 or mn is the greater).638  
 
The direction is determined by whether mn is greater or less than 1. This is significant. 
Algebra was not merely a heuristic tool for Wallis, as it was for Huygens. The latter used 
it in his manuscripts while considering and criticizing the Cartesian rules of collision, but 
he nowhere used it in his writings on collision, which were prepared for publication. 
According to Wallis, algebra was not just a heuristic. In Wallis's "Summary of the Laws 
of Motion" direction is worked out by examining a portion of a simplified algebraic 
expression, which has been abstracted away from an apparent physical quantity such as 
motion or impetus. For Wallis, the generality of symbolic algebra, i.e. "specious 
arithmetick," endows it with nearly universal applicability.  
 John Wallis attempted to found his theory of collision on a notion of force drawn 
from simple machines—the agent that puts a weight in motion.  Despite this, in a letter to 
Oldenburg from 5 December, Wallis responds to a potential criticism of his work. The 
issue that seems to have been raised is that mathematical rules of collision are merely 
descriptive; and what is needed is an account of the physical causes of motion: 
...you tell mee that the Society in their present disquisitions have rather an Eye to 
the Physical causes of Motion, & the Principles thereof, than the Mathematical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
637 OCH 5: 166. In Hall's editorial choices for the English translation of this passage he excluded the 
algebraic signs that Wallis used in this clause. The original Latin is as follows: "Hoc est, (posito + signo 
Dextorsum, et − Sinistrorsum significante,) Impetus erit +    !(!!!)!" − !(!!!)!"#$." Also see Philosophical 
Transactions 3 (1668): 865. 638 Wallis, "Summary Account of the General Laws of Motion," 866. Wallis goes on to do the same for the 
impetus to the left. "And similarly, the impetus of the body which at first moved to the left will be  +    !(!!!)!"# − !"(!!!)!"#   =    !!!"!!! !"!  and the velocity will be !!!"!!! ! (to the right, or the left as 1 or mn is the 
greater)." Translation by Hall, OCH 5: 169.  
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Rules of it. That the Hypothesis I sent, is indeed of the Physical Laws of Motion, 
but Mathematically demonstrated. For I do not take the Physical & Mathematical 
Hypothesis to contradict one another at all. But what is Physically performed, is 
Mathematically measured. And there is no other way to determine the Physical 
Laws of Motion exactly, but by applying the Mathematical measures & 
proportions to them.639 
 
According to Wallis himself, his hypothesis is not merely a mathematical description. It 
provides the physical laws of motion. His is an account of the forces of collision, where 
force is the agent that causes motion. Not only is his mathematics and physics consistent, 
there is, according to Wallis, no way to determine the causes of motion exactly, other 
than mathematics. The "mathematical measures and proportions" that Wallis "applied" 
was his distinctive specious arithmetic. He provided a fully algebraic study of the forces 
of collision.   
 
3.2 – Wren's Lex naturae: The Mathematics of Proper and Improper Motion 
 Wren's Lex naturae de collisione corporum is concise in the extreme. It includes a 
definition, a law, an incredibly economical classification of 13 kinds of collision 
represented by a handful of simple diagrams, and a set of compact algebraic equations to 
calculate the final velocities of the bodies upon collision. The main text is contained in 
five sentences: 
 The proper and most truly natural velocities of bodies are reciprocally 
proportional to the bodies.  
 The Law of Nature: Hence bodies R, S having their proper velocities 
retain them even after collision. And bodies R, S having improper velocities are 
by collision returned to equilibrium; that is, that quantity by which R exceeded 
and S fell short of their proper velocities before collision is by the collision 
subtracted from R and added to S, and vice versa.  
 For this reason the collision of bodies having their proper velocities is 
equivalent to a balance swinging about its center of gravity. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
639 OCH 5: 221. Wallis to Oldenburg, 5 December 1668.  
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 And the collision of bodies which have improper velocities is equivalent 
to a balance reciprocating upon two centers equidistant either side of the center of 
gravity: for the balance may be extended into a yoke when the need arises.640 
  
Despite its debt to extensive experimentation, there is no mention of experiments or the 
devices used to develop and verify the theory in the document. Although Wren's theory 
would receive experimental verifications at the Society's meetings, Wren's account itself 
does not present an experimental justification. It is notable, however, that when Wren 
read his theory at the 17 December 1668 meeting of the Royal Society, he also produced 
"some papers containing the various trials made long before to verify that theory."641 The 
mechanical device that is described in the document is the balance, which was not used in 
Wren's experiments on collision, rather than the pendulum, which was used. And, despite 
the on going experiments on the role of "springiness" and hardness in collision,642 he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
640 Christopher Wren, "Lex naturae de collisione corporum," Philosophical Transactions 3 (1669): 867-8. It 
has also been collected in OCH 5: 319-20, with an English translation by Hall, OCH 5: 320-1. 641 Birch, History 2: 335.  "Dr. Wren produced his theory of the collision together with some papers 
containing the various trials made long before to verify that theory.  It was read, and ordered to be 
registered [Register, vol., iv. p. 29], the author affirming, that he had this hypothesis several years before, 
when the society began to be formed."   
642 Birch, History 2: 320. 12 November 1668:  
"Sir Robert Moray moved, that bodies might be provided of several degrees of hardness, and of 
the same matter and weight, as steel bodies, and the like, to see whether the harder they are, the 
more they will rebound. Others moved, that bodies might be provided, that had no springiness, or 
but little, to see, how much that quality contributed to the rebounding."  
Birch, History 2: 328. 26 November 1668:  
"The experiment devised and made this day by Mr. Hooke was the impelling of wooden balls 
against both springy and not springy bodies, whereby he intended to evince, that the reflection of 
motion depends upon the springiness of bodies; so that where there is no spring, there can be no 
reflection. But the experiment made not being satisfactory to the society for the purpose declared, 
Mr. Hooke proposed another to be made at the next meeting, viz. with a metalline string made 
more or less true, to see what the returns of reflections of it will be, according to its several 
degrees of tension. Dr. Croune suggested, that it might be considered, whether the business of 
motion might not be made out without taking in the notion of the springiness of bodies."   
Birch, History 2: 335. 17 December 1668 meeting:  
"An experiment was made in prosecution of the motion, that springiness is the cause of 
rebounding; vis. a wooden globe was let fall against wood, a gut-string, and a brass-wire. In the 
first case the rebounding was languid, and of a very short duration; in the second, it was much 
stronger, and more durable; in the last, strongest and most durable of all. Which was conceived to 
proceed from the different degrees of force of the spring in the several bodies employed. Mr. 
Hooke took occasion to mention, that he thought, that air, next to quicksilver, gave the quickest 
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made no mention of these concepts, nor did he refer to a force of motion or a force of 
resistance.643 He does not address whether his notion of motion is relative or absolute, nor 
does he directly refer to a conservation of any quantity related to motion whatsoever. 
Wren's theory is presented in spare style.  Rather than the confusion of experimental 
results and the prolix descriptions of experimental apparatuses and methods, Wren's 
theory exhibits the mathematical ideals of elegance and the economy of both symbolic 
equations as well as the symmetries of the balance. 
  
3.2.1 – The Balance of Nature 
 
 What Wren calls the "proper" or the "most truly natural" velocities of bodies is 
actually a relation between the bodies and their respective velocities involved in impact.  
It is a relation that is literally in balance. The velocities of the bodies are reciprocally 
proportional to the size of the bodies themselves, in the same way that, when in 
equilibrium, the lengths of the arms of a balance supporting two bodies are reciprocally 
proportional to the size of the bodies.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and most forcible reflexion; and that the sparkling of diamonds in rings proceed from the air left 
behind the stones."  
It was during the 17 December 1668 meeting that Wren "produced his theory of the collision of bodies, 
together with some papers containing the various trials made long before to verify that theory." 
Experiments on collision were continued, now to verify Wren's theory (e.g. Birch, History 2: 344-5. 4 
February 1668/9), and by 18 February 1668/9 the "experiments of motion were prosecuted with springy 
bodies, by which it appear to some of the members, that the laws of motion, established by Dr. Wren, were 
best verified by the motion of the most springy bodies." See Birch, History 2: 347. 
643 Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics, 203-6. Westfall interprets Wren's Lex naturae to be a "dynamic" 
theory of "elastic bodies," and contrasts this with what he calls Huygens's "kinematic theory" of "hard 
bodies." Not only is the dynamic/kinematic distinction anachronistic when describing Wren and Huygens's 
theories, Wren never mentions the notion of "force" nor the notion of "elasticity" in his theory. After 
attributing the notion of "force" to Wren, Westfall ends his section on Wren by criticizing him for failing to 
clarify the notion of force: "Although Wren did not employ the word 'force' in his paper, the dynamics 
implicit in his theory involves serious ambiguities despite the fact that he was able to derive a correct 
solution of perfectly elastic impact. To what does 'force' refer?" 
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According to the first part of Wren's law of nature, "Bodies R, S having their proper 
velocities retain them even after collision." In other words, when the initial velocities of 
two bodies are reciprocally proportional to the size of those bodies, after the bodies meet, 
they will separate with the same speed as they approached, although in a contrary 
direction. There is a symmetry before and after collision. Wren has defined "proper" 
velocities by the same proportion that defines a balance in equilibrium. He makes the 
equivalence between this kind of collision and the balance explicit: "For this reason the 
collision of bodies having their proper velocities is equivalent to a balance swinging 
about its center of gravity." We will come back to the notion of "swinging" in a moment.  
 "Improper" velocities of bodies are just those velocities that are not reciprocally 
proportional to the size of the bodies. Here again it is the notion of the balance and 
equilibrium that is the key to the second part of his law of nature: "Bodies R, S having 
improper velocities are by collision returned to equilibrium." Wren provides some 
clarification. If it is the case that the velocities of R, S are not reciprocally proportional to 
the sizes of the bodies R, S, then however much the velocity of R exceeds, and that of S 
fell short of, what they would be if they were in the "proper" proportion before the 
collision, that much is subtracted from R and added to S by the collision. He again makes 
the equivalence between this kind of collision and the balance explicit (albeit a different 
kind of balance): "the collision of bodies which have improper velocities is equivalent to 
R 
S a 
Ra ∶ Sa ∷ S ∶ R  
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a balance reciprocating upon two centers equidistant either side of the center of gravity: 
for the balance may be extended into a yoke when the need arises."    
 A notion of a balance reciprocating on two centers or "a yoke" becomes more 
apparent with Wren's diagrams. The diagrams themselves are a concise way to present 
the 13 different kinds of collisions of bodies with improper velocities. They are separated 
into two classes: the 5 diagrams on the left represent the 10 different ways unequal 
bodies move improperly; whereas the 3 diagrams on the right represent the 3 different 
ways equal bodies move properly. He defines his terms as follows: 
R and S are equal bodies; or R is the greater and S the lesser. 
a is the center of gravity or the fulcrum of the balance. 
Z is the sum of the velocities of the two bodies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
velocities of bodies Re Se 
R 
S before collision (given) 
R 
S velocities of bodies 
OR 
OS after collision (sought) 
velocities of bodies SO RO 
S 
R before collision (given) 
S 
R velocities of bodies 
eS 
eR after collision (sought) 
or 
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 If the velocities were "proper," the bodies would meet at a, the center of gravity. 
However, since they are "improper velocities," they exceed and fall short of the proper 
proportion and meet at e or o (depending on how the diagram is read—more on this in 
moment). So, for example, in the first instance, body R initially moves with velocity Re. 
As can be seen on the diagram, Re exceeds what would otherwise be its "proper" velocity 
Ra. Body S initially moves with velocity Se, and Se falls short of what would otherwise 
be its "proper" velocity Sa. The quantity which exceeded and fell short "is by the 
collision subtracted from R and added to S and vice versa." Re exceeds Ra by the quantity 
ae, just as Se fell short of Sa by ea. Through the action of the collision, a quantity equal 
to ae (the excess) is subtracted from what was the initial velocity of R, just as a quantity 
is added to what was the initial velocity of S. Thus, the final velocity of R is OR, and the 
final velocity of S is OS.   
          
 
The first part of Wren's "Rule" makes this clear: "Re, Se becomes OR, OS." 
 The balance plays a number of roles in Wren's text: (1) "Proper" motion is defined 
as the reciprocal proportion of speeds and velocities, just like a balance in equilibrium; 
(2) the diagrams present the collision of bodies R, S as a balance, complete with a center 
of gravity and fulcrum at point a; (3) the action of collision itself (of both proper and 
improper velocities) as expressed by the law of nature is equivalent to a balance 
"swinging" about its center of gravity.  
 Wren's description of a "swinging" balance may be related to the pseudo-
Aristotelian Mechanical Problems tradition of mechanics, which we have encountered in 
Re  Se  
OR  OS  
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previous chapters (most notably that on Isaac Beeckman's mathematical work on 
collision), and which explains the reciprocal proportion between the length of the arms 
and the bodies by means of the speeds with which the bodies would move if the balance 
was rotated about its fulcrum.644 The body on the shorter arm would move slower than 
the body at the end of the longer arm. This framework was then used (by people such as 
Beeckman) to relate the speeds and sizes of bodies in collisions. If not the pseudo-
Aristotelian tradition explicitly, Wren's swinging balance may be related to the well-
known reciprocal proportion between the weights or powers on the one hand and the 
motions of those weights or powers on the other hand, in many mechanical devices. One 
of Wren's mentors, John Wilkins, explains this very relationship in his chapter, 
"Concerning the proportion of slowness and swiftness in mechanical motions," which is 
the fifteenth chapter of his Mathematical Magick. Wilkins used the balance to illustrate 
the proportion between weights and powers to the speeds of the weights and powers in 
mechanical devices.  
For it is to be observed as a general rule, that the space of time or place, in which 
the weight is moved, in comparison to that in which the power doth move, is in 
the same proportion as they themselves are unto one another. So that if there be 
any great difference betwixt the strength of the weight and the power, the same 
kind of differences will there be in the spaces of their motion.645  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
644 [pseudo] Aristotle, Mechanical Problems, in Minor Works, trans. by Walter Stanley Hett (Loeb 
Classical Library, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1936), 353. Problem 3 of the Mechanical 
Problems asks "Why is it that small forces can move big weights with a lever?" The weight which is 
moved, to the weight which moves it, is inversely proportional to the lengths of the arms of the lever. The 
reason for this, according to the author of the Mechanical Problems is due to speed. Think of two circles, a 
larger and smaller circle with the same center. Also imagine that both are drawn on the same disk. Now 
imagine a straight line drawn from the smaller circle, through the center and to the larger circle; at the 
intersections of this line and the circles are points. If one rotates the disk, the speed of the point on the 
larger circle will move faster than the speed of the point on the smaller circle. Now imagine that the center 
of the circle is a fulcrum and the radius of the smaller circle is the smaller arm of a balance, and the radius 
of the larger circle is the larger arm of a balance. The author of the Mechanical Problems claims that the 
speed of a body is inversely proportional to the weight. The longer arm of a balance will sweep out a larger 
arc of a circle than the short arm of a balance. Given the same force, a body at the end of the longer arm 
will move faster than that at the shorter arm. 
645 Wilkins, Mathematicall Magick, 147.    
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He provides a diagram and example: 
 
Let the line GAB represent a balance, or leaver; the weight being supposed at the 
point G, the fulciment at A, and the power sustaining the weight at B. Suppose the 
point G, unto which the weight is fastened, to be elevated unto F, and the opposite 
point B to be depressed unto C; it is evident that the arch, FG, or (which all one) 
DE, doth shew the space of the weight, and the arch BC the motion of the power. 
Now both these arches have the same proportion unto one another, as there is 
betwixt the weight and the power, or (which is all one) as there is betwixt their 
several distances from the fulciment. [...] And as the weight and power do thus 
differ in the spaces of their motions, so likewise in the slowness of it, the one 
moving the whole distance BC, in the same time wherein the other passes only 
GF.646  
 
Wilkins points out that this is true no matter how great the "disproportions" are, and it is 
true for the mechanical motions in other devices, e.g. "pullies, wheels, &c."647  
 Wren uses the swinging balance to describe the speeds of bodies in collisions. The 
first part of Wren's law of motion states that "Bodies R, S having their proper velocities 
retain them even after collision." For Wren, collisions with "proper" velocities (i.e. the 
velocities and bodies are reciprocally proportional) are "equivalent to a balance swinging 
about its center of gravity." If a balance in equilibrium (i.e. a balance whose fulcrum is at 
its center of gravity) is tipped so that its arms oscillate (i.e. swing about its center of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
646 Ibid., 147-8 
647 Ibid., 148. 
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gravity), then the speed of the body on one of its arms (GA in the above figure) on its 
upswing (to FA) is the same as its speed on its downswing. Although the speed of the 
body at G would be less than the speed of the body at B, the speed of each body is the 
same for the subsequent oscillation, just as each body retains its speed after collision.  
 The second part of Wren's law of nature states that "Bodies R, S having improper 
velocities are by collision returned to equilibrium." These kinds of collision are 
"equivalent to a balance reciprocating upon two centers equidistant either side of the 
center of gravity: for the balance may be extended into a yoke when the need arises." In 
the diagrams the center of gravity a has been extended to "a yoke" represented by oe. 
Imagine the balance supported initially at e. Since this is not the center of gravity, the 
balance is not in equilibrium. The balance would rotate about e. This provides R and S 
with their initial velocities. Now that the balance is out of equilibrium, imagine another 
fulcrum placed at o. The balance would then swing back in the other direction, providing 
R and S with their final velocities. These two fulcrums are essentially an extended 
fulcrum (i.e. a yoke) about the center of gravity. Thus "reciprocating upon the two 
fulcrums, the balance is "returned to equilibrium." In the same way, "by collision" the 
bodies with their improper velocities are "returned to equilibrium."  
 Almost a decade before Huygens and Wren met in London to make predictions on 
the behavior of colliding pendulum bobs in 1661, Huygens had considered using—as an 
axiom in his theory of collision—a similar principle as that which would become the first 
part of Wren's law of nature. On a manuscript dating to 1652—the same manuscript 
which contains the algebraic equations studied in the previous chapter—Huygens wrote 
the following: 
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ax. 3. If a larger body A strikes a smaller body B, but the velocity of B is to the 
velocity of A reciprocally as the magnitude A to B [sic], then each will rebound 
with the same speed with which it came. If this is granted, everything can be 
demonstrated. Descartes is forced to grant it however.648   
 
Indicative of the contrasting attitudes between Huygens and Wren on the proper 
justification of ideas (noted in a previous section of this chapter), Huygens also wrote: 
"But it must be seen whether it can be demonstrated from principles that are known 
better." Significantly, he also crossed out the name "ax. 3," and pursued other more 
fundamental principles on which to base his theory.649 Huygens would later, in De motu 
corporum ex percussione, provide a rather complex demonstration of the proposition "ax. 
3," which in the later text became "Proposition VIII."650 
 Wren, on the other hand, used the principle of the balance as the foundation of his 
law of nature. But it is important to note that Wren did not just use the notion of the 
balance as an analogy for collision. The proportions underlying the balance define his 
notions of proper and improper motion. And the relationships between bodies and speeds 
found in mechanical devices (such as the balance) provide a justification of the 
relationships between bodies and speeds in collision. In addition, the notion of 
equilibrium is at the heart of the action of collision. Moreover, the principle of a balance 
with two fulcrums proved to be a way to unify a vast array of combinations of differently 
sized bodies moving at different speeds and directions (or no speed at all). Using a single 
principle and a simple set of diagrams Wren could describe a set of combinations of two 
bodies meeting, which included several that his predecessors (notably Descartes) did not 
even consider.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
648 HOC 16: 96. Translation by Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics, 149.  
649 Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics, 150. 
650 HOC 16: 53-65.    
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 Wren's diagrams are worth considering further, both because they exemplify the 
unity and economy of his theory, but also because of the manner in which his diagrams 
present velocity as a quantity with both speed and direction.   
 As can be seen in the figure below, each of the diagrams on the left are numbered 
twice. Recall that body R is larger than body S in the five diagrams on the left. Note too 
that Wren provides two alternative definitions of his terms, in the left and right brackets 
respectively. Each of the five diagrams represents two different instances of collision. 
These have been separated in the table below.  
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Equal Bodies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Re  Se  
OR  OS  
Re  S is at rest  
OS  R at rest  
Re  
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In cases 1, 2, and 3 the larger body R and the smaller body S initially move toward each 
other. In the first, the bodies move away from each other after collision. In the third they 
move in the same direction after collision. The second provides the unique situation in 
which the larger body is left at rest after the bodies have collided and only the smaller 
body moves after the collision. In case 4 the larger body R meets the smaller body S at 
rest, after which they move in the same direction with S at a greater speed than R. And in 
case 5 both R and S initially move in the same direction, with the speed of R much 
greater than the speed of S. After the collision they continue moving in the same 
direction, but with S moving at a greater speed than R.  Case 7 is notable, since it 
involves a smaller body S meeting a larger body R at rest. Unlike Descartes's 4th rule, the 
larger body moves after the collision and the smaller body rebounds in the contrary 
direction at a speed less than R.  
 The direction of the velocity is determined by the direction the symbols are read 
on the diagram. In cases 1 through 5 "Re, Se [the velocities of R, S before collision] 
become OR, OS [the velocities of R, S after collision]." In cases 6 through 10,  RO, SO 
(the velocities of R, S before collision) become eR, eS (the velocities of R, S after 
collision). Wren provides the following "REGULA:" 
Read the syllables which are disjointed (Re, Se, OR, OS, or RO, SO, eS, eR) along 
the line for each way or type; those written in the diagram in the Hebraic way 
indicate a motion contrary to that denoted by any syllable in the Latin script. 
Joined syllables show that the body is a rest. 
 
For example, in case 3, Se is read off the diagram "in the Hebraic way," whereas Re is 
read off the diagram in the "Latin way," which indicates that the motions are contrary. 
But, in case 5, both Se and Re are read off the diagram "in the Latin way" (i.e. the initial 
motions in this case are not contrary). 
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3.2.2 – Mathematics in the education of Wren: brevity, appeal to the eye, the analytic art 
 
 Christopher Wren was initially introduced to mathematics by William Holder 
(1616-1698), who had married Christopher's sister in 1643. Holder had known Seth Ward 
and Charles Scarburgh (1615-1693) from their time together studying at Cambridge, and 
it was through Holder that Wren likely met the "famous Physician" Dr. Scarburgh, to 
whom Wren would become an assistant, patient, and eventually colleague in the scholarly 
circles orbiting Wilkins at Wadham College Oxford, as well as the group at Gresham 
College, and ultimately the Royal Society.651 In a letter to William Oughtred from the late 
1640s, while Wren resided with Scarburgh, Wren wrote that "it is to his [Charles 
Scarburgh's] Kindness and Liberality of Mind that I am indebted not alone any little skill 
that I can boast in Mathematics, but for Life itself which, when suffering from recent 
sickness, I received from him as from the Hand of God."652  
 Charles Scarburgh himself had learned from William Oughtred. While at 
Cambridge, he and Seth Ward had been studying Oughtred's Clavis mathematicae 
(1631), an influential textbook in England on symbolic algebra. Meeting a passage they 
did not understand, Ward and Scarburgh traveled to Albury to visit "the renowned 
teacher" William Oughtred in person, and they became great friends.653 Ward and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
651 Helena M. Pycior, Symbols, Impossible Numbers, and Geometric Entanglements: British Algebra 
through the Commentaries on Newton’s Universal Arithmetick (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 42.  
Mordechai Feingold, The Mathematicians’ apprenticeship: Science, universities and society in England 
1560-1640 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 115. Bennett, Mathematical Science of Wren, 
16. Lena Milman, Sir Christopher Wren (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908), 19. 
652 Milman, Wren, 21. 
653 Feingold, Mathematicians' apprencticeship, 89. Milman, Wren, 18. Florian Cajori, William Oughtred: A 
Great Seventeenth-Century Teacher of Mathematics (Chicago: Open Court, 1916), 60. Cajori quotes the 
account Anthony Wood gave of Ward and Scarborough's visit to "the country mathematician to be initiated 
into the mysteries of algebra." According to Wood: "[...] they took a journey to Mr. Will. Oughtred living 
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Scarburgh would go on to teach the symbolic "analytic art" to their own students. The 
above mentioned letter from Wren to Oughtred had been appended to a Latin translation 
that Wren had made of Oughtred's treatise on dialing, The Golden Key. Wren wrote the 
letter and translation on the urging of Scarburgh.654 Not only does Wren's later Lex 
naturae de collisione corporum use the same notation and algebraic conventions found in 
Oughtred's works, we also find several characteristics of Wren's later work (particularly 
in his theory of motion in the Lex naturae) already highlighted in the letter to Oughtred 
from the 1640s as the very features for which Wren praised Oughtred: 
Welcome indeed (most gifted of Men) was the Shining of your Key upon the 
Sphere of Mathematics in this Age of ours, so that even the most learned have 
regarded it, nor undeservedly, as a Guiding Light since, led by Thee, they have 
been able safely and surely to cross the great stormy ocean of Algebra and so 
attained to other and unexplored Regions of Mathematics, [...]  
 [Y]our words...need no adorning but sparkle by their very Brevity, that 
Brevity, I say, which to have attained is to have reached the very Summits of 
Literature; for very wisely in your Key you have rejected the Reasoning which is 
in common use among Men but which is useless in matters so abstruse; to this 
you have preferred symbols and figures which, without an Array of Words, enable 
the Reader to grasp your Meaning at a Glance.  It is a hard method but for this 
very Hardness, to my thinking only more Divine, since it is an Imitating [sic] of 
those Celestial Beings who, unimpeded by Hindrances of Human Speech, by 
laying bare the soul, reveal all Mysteries.655 
 
The "very Summits of Literature" is "Brevity." This is surely the literary ideal that Wren 
aimed for in his Lex naturae. It is through symbols and figures, and not "an array of 
words," that one can grasp "Meaning at a Glance." 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
then at Albury in Surrey, to be informed in many things in his Clavis mathematica which seemed at that 
time very obscure to them. Mr. Oughtred treated them with great humanity, being very much pleased to see 
such ingenious young men apply themselves to these studies, and in short time he sent them away well 
satisfied in their desires. When they returned to Cambridge, they afterwards read the Clav. Math. to their 
pupils, which was the first time that book was read in the said university. Mr. Laur. Rook, a disciple of 
Oughtred, I think, and Mr. Ward's friend, did admirably well read in Gresham Coll. on the sixth chap. of 
the said book, which obtained him great repute from some and greater from Mr. Ward, who ever after had 
an especial favour for him."   
654 Pycior, Symbols, 42. Bennett, Mathematical Science of Wren, 16. Milman, Wren, 19-21. 
655 Milman, Wren, 20-2. 
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 In 1647 Wren wrote to his father about his residence with Scarburgh and his 
translation of Oughtred's treatise on dialling. Scarburgh had convinced Wren that by 
making a translation of Oughtred's treatise he might win the favor of "all those Students 
of Mathematics who acknowledge Dr. Oughtred as their Father and Teacher."656 Even in 
the letter to his father, Wren's esteem for brevity and economy of presentation comes to 
the fore: 
The other day I wrote a treatise on Trigonometry which sums up as I think, by a 
new method and in a few brief rules, the whole Theory of Spherical 
Trigonometry. An Epitome of this I re-wrote on a brass Disc of about the size of 
one of King James's Gold Pieces, and having snatched the Tool from the 
Engraver, I engraved much of it with my own Hand which Disc Sir Charles had 
no sooner seen than he insisted upon having a similar one of his own.657 
 
 Both "brevity" and "an appeal to the eye" were important to Oughtred. As Cajori 
has pointed out, "as compared with other contemporary works on algebra, Oughtred's 
distinguishes itself for the amount of symbolism used."658 Indeed, another of Oughtred's 
students, John Wallis, would later write of Oughtred's methods in the fifteenth chapter of 
his Treatise of Algebra (1685) which was devoted to Oughtred's mathematical work: 
For though when Vieta first introduced this way of Specious Arithmetick, it was 
more necessary (the thing being new,) to express it in words at length: Yet when 
the thing was once received in practice, Mr. Oughtred (who affected by brevity, 
and to deliver what he taught as briefly as might be, and reduce all to a short 
view,) contented himself with single Letters instead of those words.659 
 
In the preface to the English edition of the Clavis mathematicae, Oughtred indicated that 
his treatise was "not written in the usual syntheticall manner, nor with verbous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
656 Ibid., 20. 
657 Ibid., 19-20. In the letter Wren also mentions that his "weather clock"—one of the mechanical 
inventions mentioned above—was described to Scarburgh. Upon hearing about it Scarburgh asked Wren to 
have it constructed in Brass at Scarburgh's expense.  
658 Cajori, Oughtred, 19. 
659 John Wallis, A Treatise of Algebra, Both Historical and Practical, Shewing the original, progress, and 
advancement thereof, from time to time, and by what steps it hath attained to the heighth at which now it is 
(London: John Playford for Richard Davis, 1685) 67-9. Quoted in Cajori, Oughtred, 33.   
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expreßions, but in the inventive way of Analitice, and with symboles or notes of things 
instead of words."660 Oughtred acknowledged that many of his readers had found this to 
be "very hard" in the previous edition, but this was merely due to the "newnesse of the 
delivery." He then listed the strengths of his brief and symbolic approach, which includes 
"an appeal to the eye:"  
For this specious and symbolical manner, neither racketh the memory with 
multiplicity of words, nor chargeth the phantasie with comparing and laying 
things together; but plainly presenteth to the eye the whole course and process of 
every operation and argumentation.661 
 
Or, as Wren would write in his letter to Oughtred, this manner was unhindered by human 
verbosity and was laid bare, so that the meaning could be known at a glance. 
 Oughtred wrote that his "key of mathematics" was the symbolic analytic art (a 
term by which he meant "taking the thing sought as knowne, we fine out what we 
seeke"662), which could be used to understand more easily the classics of mathematics: 
my Key was...to reach out to the ingenious lovers of these Sciences, as it were 
Ariadnes thread, to guide them through the intricate Labyrinth of these studies, 
and to direct them for the more easie and full understanding of the best and 
antientest Authors; such as are Euclides, Archimedes, Apollonius Pergaeus that 
Great Geometer, Diophantus Ptolomaeus, and the rest: That they may not only 
learn their propositions, which is the highest point of Art that most Students aime 
at; but also may perceive with what solertiousnesse, by what engines of 
aequations, Interpretations, Comparations, Reductions, and Disquisitions, those 
antient Worthies have beautified, enlarged, and first found out this most excellent 
Science.663 
 
According to Oughtred, the symbolic expression of the classic texts allowed him to 
"more cleerly behold the things themselves," and to "uncas[e] the Propositions and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
660 William Oughtred, The key of the mathematicks new forged and filed together with a treatise of the 
resolution of all kinde of affected aequations in numbers, 1st English edition, trans. Robert Woods 
(London: Tho. Harper for Rich. Witaker, 1647). The quoted passage comes from the first and second page 
of "To the Reader." The first Latin edition was published in 1631 as, "Arithmeticae in numeris et speciebys 
institvtio: qvae tvm logisticae, tvm analyticae, atqve adeo totivs mathematicae, qvasi clavis est." 
661 Oughtred, The key of the mathematicks, ii.   
662 Ibid., iv.   
663 Ibid., ii-iii. 
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Demonstrations out of their covert words, designed them in notes and species appearing 
to the very eye."664 In this form he could compare them, understand them, and "educe 
new out of them."665 Among his works, Oughtred had "translated the tenth book of Euclid 
from its ponderous rhetorical form into that of brief symbolism."666 Additionally, Cajori 
has noted that "in studying the ancient authors Oughtred is reported to have written down 
on the margin of the printed page some of the theorems and their proofs, expressed in the 
symbolic language of algebra."667 This is precisely what Christopher Wren and Seth 
Ward would do with Galileo's Discorsi e Dimostrazioni matematiche intorno à due nuove 
scienze (1638), as Renée Raphael has shown in her 2014 article: "Galileo's Discorsi as a 
tool for the analytical art"668  
 John Wallis and Christopher Wren, and many other English mathematicians and 
natural philosophers such as Charles Scarburgh and Seth Ward were clearly influenced 
by Oughtred's Clavis mathematicae. Many used Oughtred's notation and conventions, 
such as capital letters from the beginning of the alphabet for given numbers, as well as 
the notation :: for proportion, and "St. Andrew's Cross" × for multiplication, the latter for 
which Oughtred is generally recognized as having introduced. Even practices that appear 
idiosyncratic to Oughtred, such as his manner of representing composite expressions, can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
664 Ibid., iv. 
665 Ibid., ii-v. Oughtred provides a nice description of "analysis" as understood at the time: "Lastly, by 
framing like questions problematically, and in way of Analysis, as if they were already done, resolving 
them into their principles, I sought out reasons and means whereby they might be effected. And by this 
course of practices, not without long time, and much industry, I found out this way for the helpe and 
facilitation of Art."  
666 Cajori, Oughtred, 28. 
667 Ibid., 85. 
668 Renée Jennifer Raphael, "Galileo's Discorsi as a tool for the analytical art," Annals of Science (2014): 1-
25. Accessed January 25, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00033790.2014.894850. 
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be found in Wren's Lex naturae.669 Oughtred also recognized the double function of the 
signs + and − as both indicative of the "quality of numbers" as well as the operations of 
addition and subtraction.670 And most importantly, Wallis, Ward, and Wren used the 
"analytic art."671 Rather than "synthetically" demonstrate a result from prior principles, 
Wren, for example, found it "analytically." In other words, he treated what is "sought" as 
if it were known by representing it speciously with a symbol or note, and by determining 
its relationships to what is known, he could "find out what we seeke." Recall that Wren 
explicitly designated his symbols for final velocities as "sought" and initial velocities as 
"given." Raphael has shown that both Seth Ward and Christopher Wren rewrote Galileo's 
synthetic geometrical demonstrations into the language of symbolic algebra in order to 
practice and perhaps to teach the "analytic art." She argues that these annotations provide 
evidence of a pedagogical relationship between Ward and Wren. The latter seems to have 
copied the marginal symbolic algebra in which Ward had re-written Galileo's 
demonstrations. She has claimed, persuasively, that Galileo's Discorsi was a tool for 
"Ward and Wren ... to practice and teach their own analytical techniques."672  
 William Oughtred, both directly and through his students Charles Scarburgh and 
Seth Ward, had an influence on Christopher Wren's understanding and expression of 
mathematics. This can be seen directly in their shared passion for brevity of expression, 
and the symbolic presentation of mathematics which lays it bare to the eye so that it can 
be known at a glance rather than mediated through language and a taxed imagination. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
669 The sum of two quantities is represented by the last letter of the alphabet: 𝐴 + 𝐸 = 𝑍 for Oughtred. He 
uses this convention, for example, in his solution of the quadratic equation. Recall that Wren represents the 
sum of the speeds before collision by Z. See Cajori, Oughtred, 27.  
670 Cajori, Oughtred, 25. Pycior, Symbols. 
671 Technically, Wallis disconnected algebra from the analytic art, if by "analytic art" the analytic method in 
geometry is implied. For Wallis, the foundations of algebra were not to be found in geometry. In his 
understanding, algebra is more akin to an abstraction of arithmetic. See Pycior, Symbols.  
672 Raphael, "Discorsi as a tool," 4. 
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And it can be seen in the use of "the analytic art" as a means to solve problems by "taking 
the thing sought as knowne, we finde out what we seeke."  
 Wren may have been influenced by the practical mathematics tradition in London, 
as we have seen Bennett strongly suggesting in section 2 above. And Wren may well 
have been familiar with John Wilkins's Mathematical Magick which attempted to 
persuade scholars of the worthiness of practical mathematics. However, it is notable that 
Oughtred, who was clearly an important source of Wren's ideas on mathematics, 
distanced his "analytic art" from practical mathematics. Oughtred wrote in the preface of 
the first edition of his Clavis mathematicae (1631) that his symbolic analytic art reveals 
"the height and depth of mathematical science." This is in sharp contrast to the practical 
mathematicians and their tools about whom he wrote: 
I ignore the would-be mathematicians who occupy themselves only with the so-
called practice, which is in reality mere juggler's tricks with instruments, the 
surface so to speak, pursued with a disregard of the great art, a contemptible 
picture.673  
 
The symbolic analytic art is not an instrument that remains on the practical "surface" of 
mathematics, nor is it merely a tool for easy calculation according to Oughtred. Rather, it 
penetrates into the essence of mathematics, laying it bare.  
 One of the self described purposes of Oughtred's Clavis mathematicae was to 
serve as "Ariadne's thread" for students of the classics of mathematics. Oughtred himself 
was in the practice of rewriting classical demonstrations using his analytic art. This was 
not a "juggler's trick" to more easily (but superficially) solve a problem. It was meant to 
penetrate into the mathematics itself. Ward continued this method with his "analytic" 
study and rewriting of Galileo's Discorsi. Wren too, perhaps following the lead of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
673 Translation by Cajori, Oughtred, 20.    
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Oughtred and Ward, used the analytic art to reveal the height and depth of Galileo's 
mathematical science. And Wren seems to have extended this method of using 
Oughtred's "analytic art" to lay bare the meaning of mathematical expressions to another 
book written in the language of mathematics—the "book of nature" described in Galileo's 
Assayer: 
Philosophy [i.e. physics] is written in this grand book — I mean the universe — 
which stands continually open to our gaze, but it cannot be understood unless one 
first learns to comprehend the language and interpret the characters in which it is 
written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are 
triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures, without which it is humanly 
impossible to understand a single word of it; without these, one is wandering 
around in a dark labyrinth.674 
   
Christopher Wren was incredibly sparing in his use of language in his Lex naturae de 
collisione corporum. Nevertheless, after his sets of symbolic equations he closed his 
paper with a single sentence: "Nature obeys the algebraic laws of addition and 
subtraction." The thread that Theseus follows out of the Minotaur's labyrinth is the 
analytic art. Symbolic algebra lays bare the operations of nature itself.  
 
3.2.3 – Smaller than nothing: negative numbers in early English algebra   
 
 For mathematicians in the 17th century it was difficult to accept that a magnitude 
could be smaller than nothing.675 Accepting such a thing would have defied notions 
fundamental to mathematics at the time. "Nothing" was thought to be the limit for how 
small a quantity could be. Nevertheless, those working with algebra—whether it was 
understood to be the "analytic method" in geometry,676 or an abstraction of arithmetic—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
674 Galileo Galilei, Il Saggiatore (Rome, 1623). Translation by Stillman Drake, Discoveries and Opinions 
of Galileo (New York: Anchor Books, 1957), 237-8. 
675 In this section I closely follow Pycior, Symbols. Also see section 3.1.4 above. 
676 AT VI 367-485. La Géométrie. 
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found that the system produced what seemed to be negative quantities: "quantities less 
than nothing."  The response of some algebraists was to simply ignore negative roots of 
polynomials, others ambivalently called them "defective," "deficient," or "absurd," and 
several drew a compromising distinction between "species" marked by a negative sign 
such as -2A which were acceptable in mathematics, and negative numbers, such as -2 
which were thought to be impossible and absurd. In short, the system produced results 
that were outside of what seemed to be the accepted boundaries of mathematics. This 
posed a problem for the proper interpretation of algebra and its relationship to the rest of 
mathematics. There were two general strategies for resolving the problem: (1) enforce the 
boundaries of mathematics and reject those results that fall outside of the accepted canons 
of mathematics. Or (2) the seemingly impossible results (such as negative quantities) 
should be accepted and the longstanding rules of mathematics should be rewritten 
instead.  
 In hindsight, the second route is obvious, and the acceptance of negative and 
"imaginary" numbers was just the first in an ever expanding mathematical universe of 
numbers and concepts. But, for mathematicians in the 17th century, this choice was not 
obvious and there was much disagreement. The second route was, after all, the much 
more radical approach: overturn the established rules of mathematics to make room for 
anomalies that seemed to defy common sense. And those who at the time chose the 
second route did not (or could not) establish the legitimacy of "negatives" and 
"imaginaries" with arguments internal to mathematics. John Wallis in his Treatise of 
Algebra, for example, attempted to legitimize negative and complex numbers not with 
mathematical or metaphysical arguments, but rather by appealing to precedent, analogy, 
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and usefulness.677 He reinterpreted the work of previous English algebraists such as 
William Oughtred and Thomas Harriot to show that they had accepted negative 
quantities, therefore he could too. According to modern historians, it is not at all clear 
that his predecessors did. Even Wallis—17th century champion of the negative number—
acknowledged that strictly speaking it is impossible to have a quantity less than nothing 
and a number fewer than none. But, if one "supposed" that it was not impossible, one 
finds that these "fictional," "imaginary," impossible quantities were useful—particularly 
in physical applications.678 One of the foremost physical applications to which Wallis 
appealed to provide a justification of these impossible quantities was the direction of 
motion.  
 Wallis was promoting this strategy at roughly the same time that the interpretation 
of negative quantities were proving to be problematic for Huygens's heuristic use of 
algebra  to study collision (examined in the previous chapter). So, what we have is a 
coincidence between collision and algebra. Negative numbers made sense of collision 
(especially conservation principles) while at the same time, contrary motion (which is 
intrinsic to any study of collision) made sense of negative numbers.  
 
 	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
677 Pycior, Symbols, 128. 
678  John Wallis, Mathesis universalis, seu opus arithmeticum (1657), in Opera mathematica, vol. 1, 11-228 
(Oxoniae: E. Theatro Sheldoniano, 1695), 69-70. "Yet, although this is impossible, mathematicians and 
especially algebraists, look upon it as though it were not impossible. For they suppose, besides real 
quantities, certain imaginary quantities which are less than nothing. [...] Nor is this supposition absurd. For 
when they say, 5-8=-3, it is as though they said: He who supposes 8 to be subtracted from 5 supposes a 
certain third number less than 0." Translation by Scott, Mathematical Work of Wallis, 68-9. Also see 
Pycior, Symbols, 129.  
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3.2.4 – The Algebra of Nature 
 
 Wren's compact algebraic equations are presented as a "calculus" for numerically 
determining the velocities of R and S after collision. With some unpacking we will see 
that Wren's use of algebra is significantly different from that found in Huygens's 
manuscripts. Huygens must have used his algebraic equations as a calculus for predicting 
the results of the experiments in 1661, which is where Wren may well have been inspired 
to do the same. However, Huygens's algebra (in the tradition of Descartes) was used 
primarily in private and as a heuristic tool in his manuscripts, whereas Wren's algebra (in 
the tradition of Oughtred) is published and captures the essence of his law of nature. A 
particularly important difference in the algebraic physico-mathematics is the manner in 
which direction is indicated. Recall from the previous chapter that Huygens derived two 
nearly identical sets of equations to avoid producing negative quantities when 
determining the speeds of bodies after collision. Wren on the other hand provides a 
unified  system of equations that accommodates any combination of two bodies colliding, 
rather than the single set of scenarios in which one body is at rest as was the case for 
Huygens. And, significantly, Wren's equations uses the negative sign to indicate 
direction.   
Wren's algebra is presented as follows: 
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 R+S : S :: Z : Ra  Re − 2Ra = OR  SO − 2Sa = eS  
 R+S : R :: Z : Sa  2Sa ± Se = OS   2Ra + RO = eR  
 
R and S are equal bodies; or R is the greater and S the lesser. 
a is the center of gravity or the fulcrum of the balance. 
Z is the sum of the velocities of the two bodies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first set of relations is a proportion rather than equation. They are closely related to 
the reciprocal proportions in Wren's definition of "proper" motion. However, there is a 
significant difference, which will be explained below. The middle set of equations solve 
for OR and OS, which are the velocities of bodies R and S after collision in cases 1 
through 5. The right most set of equations solve for eS and eR, which are the velocities of 
bodies R and S after collision in cases 6 through 10. The middle and right sets of 
equations are closely related to the explanation of Wren's Law of Motion, namely that 
however much the velocity of R exceeds its proper velocity and S falls short, that much is 
subtracted from R and added to S and vice versa. In addition to his "Latin" and "Hebraic" 
ways of indicating the direction of motion, Wren uses the algebraic signs for addition and 
subtraction to indicate direction. However, Wren's use of signs is different from 
Huygens's. This will become more clear below.  
velocities of bodies Re Se 
R 
S before collision (given) 
R 
S velocities of bodies 
OR 
OS after collision (sought) 
velocities of bodies SO RO 
S 
R before collision (given) 
S 
R velocities of bodies 
eS 
eR after collision (sought) 
or 
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 As written, the proportions and equations are very compact. There is a symmetric 
elegance to their presentation. The latter each involve only three terms. The equations for 
the velocities after collision also appear to be solely in terms of other velocities—the 
velocity before collision and the "proper" velocity before collision. However, this is 
masking a rather more complex set of relations. As Wren himself makes clear in his 
definition of terms, the speeds before collision (Re, Se) are "given," and the speeds after 
collision (OR, OS) are "sought." The numerical values for Ra or Sa, however, are not 
immediately obvious. In an experimental setting, if the bodies and velocities are not 
reciprocally proportional, Ra and Sa would not be given. In other words, if the colliding 
bodies do not have "proper velocities," Ra and Sa would not be directly known. But they 
can be calculated. This is where the set of proportions on the left become relevant.  
 To calculate the speed of R after collision (OR for example: Re − 2Ra = OR), the 
value for Ra is needed. Just such a value can be calculated using the proportion, R+S : S 
:: Z : Ra. This puts OR in terms of both the initial speed Re as well as the bodies R, S.  
 It is worth pausing for a moment to consider the proportion: 
R+S : S :: Z : Ra   (pr. 1) 
Recall that "Z is the sum of the velocities of the two bodies." As has been mentioned, this 
proportion is very nearly the reciprocal proportion that defines "proper" velocity. Written 
in Wren's symbolic convention the reciprocal proportion defining "proper" velocity 
would be the following: 
  R : S :: Sa : Ra   (pr. 2) 
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"Pr. 2," however, would not be very helpful for calculating Ra, since Sa is also not 
given.679 
 To calculate Ra, it appears that "pr. 1" would be converted from a proportion to 
an equation of quotients. There was disagreement about the legitimacy of a numerical 
interpretation of proportions at the time of Wren's work. Isaac Barrow and Thomas 
Hobbes, for example, rejected the understanding of ratios as quotients in favor of the 
classical conception. But several of Wren's peers and predecessors were advocates of this 
operation and the numerical conception of ratios, namely John Wallis and William 
Oughtred.680 Solving for Ra: 𝑅𝑎 =   𝑍 !  !!!       (eq. 1) 
The equation for the velocity of R after collision, 
Re − 2Ra = OR      (eq. 2) 
then becomes: 𝑅𝑒 − !! !!!! = 𝑂𝑅      (eq. 3) 
With a few simple algebraic steps, this equation can be written as follows: 
!!!!!! 𝑅𝑒 + !!!!! 𝑆𝑒 = 𝑂𝑅    (eq. 4) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
679 It would appear that the reciprocal proportions provided by Wren in his "calculus" may have been 
"derived" from the "proper" velocity proportions. R:S::Sa:Ra  =>  R+S:S::Sa+Ra:Ra. And, although not 
demonstrated, it at least seems intuitively obvious that Sa+Ra = Se+Re. Thus, we have R+S:S::Z:Ra.  The 
reciprocal proportion for Sa can be "derived" similarly.   
680 Doug Jesseph, Berkeley's Philosophy of Mathematics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 
148-53. Katherine Hill, "Neither Ancient nor Modern: Wallis and Barrow on the Composition of Continua. 
Part One: Mathematical Styles and the Composition of Continua," Notes and Records of the Royal Society 
of London 50 (1996): 165-78. Katherine Hill, "Neither Ancient nor Modern: Wallis and Barrow on the 
Composition of Continua. Part Two: The Seventeenth-Century Context: The Struggle between Ancient and 
Modern," Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 51 (1997): 13-22. 
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It is notable that this equation is nearly identical in form to the modern equation for the 
final velocity of a body (eq. 7) after elastic collision, derived from the equations for the 
conservation of momentum (eq. 5) and kinetic energy (eq. 6). 𝑚!𝑣!! +𝑚!𝑣!! = 𝑚!𝑣!! +𝑚!𝑣!!    (eq.5) !!𝑚!𝑣!!! + !!𝑚!𝑣!!! = !!𝑚!𝑣!!! + !!𝑚!𝑣!!!  (eq. 6) !!!!!!!!!! 𝑣!! + !!!!!!!! 𝑣!! = 𝑣!!    (eq. 7) !!!!!!!! 𝑣!! + !!!!!!!!!! 𝑣!! = 𝑣!!   (eq. 8) 
Similarly, using the lower proportion, R+S : R :: Z : Sa (pr. 3), in the left set to solve for 
Sa,  𝑆𝑎 =   𝑍 !!!!       (eq. 9) 
and the lower equation in the middle set, which is solved for the speed of S after 
collision, 
2Sa ± Se = OS      (eq. 10) 
the following equation can be produced, which is entirely in terms known before the 
collision, and which is nearly identical in form to the modern equation for the final 
velocity of the second body (eq. 8). 
!!!!! 𝑅𝑒 + !!!!!! 𝑆𝑒 = 𝑂𝑆     (eq. 11) 
 Recall from the previous chapter, that the equations in Huygens's manuscripts 
described collisions in which one of the bodies was initially at rest. His equations were 
similar to "eq. 11" if Se=0 (or, using modern notation, "eq. 8" if v2f=0). Significantly, 
Huygens derived equations similar to "eq. 11" (when Se=0) twice, and conspicuously 
avoided deriving anything that corresponds to "eq. 4" when Se=0 (or, using modern 
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notation, "eq. 7 when v2f=0). We noticed that "eq. 4" when Se=0 ("eq. 7 when v2f=0) can 
provide negative values for the speed of the first body after collision. But "eq. 11" when 
Se=0 cannot produce negative values (as long as positive values for the sizes of the 
bodies and the initial speed). This and other evidence from Huygens's manuscripts 
strongly suggests that Huygens deliberately avoided negative quantities.   
Not only can Wren's equations accommodate two bodies initially in motion rather than 
just one, Wren appears to have had a significantly different attitude regarding negative 
quantities.  
 Wren's acceptance and use of negative quantities to indicate the direction of 
velocities is apparent even in the simple presentation of the equations in his paper, 
particularly the equation for the velocity of R after collision (eq. 2). As we have seen, if 
the velocities are proper, then Re=Ra and Se=Sa. Wren's law of nature states that bodies 
having proper velocities retain them after collision, but move in a contrary direction. This 
is just what the equations show, making use of a negative algebraic sign: Re − 2Ra = OR. 
Since the velocity is proper, Re=Ra. So, substituting Ra for Re, the equation becomes: Ra 
− 2Ra = OR, which reduces to −Ra = OR. 
 Additionally, the meaning of the term Z, which Wren defines as the sum of the 
velocities of the two bodies, relies on the use of the negative sign to indicate motion in a 
contrary direction. Rather than the equation Z = Re + Se, Wren seems to use the equation 
Z = Re + −Se, or more simply Z = Re − Se. Using the convention that positive velocity is 
in the "Latin" direction on the diagrams, then Re is a positive quantity in cases 1-5. Those 
velocities read in the "Hebraic" direction are contrary and thus negative quantities.  
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 However, Wren's formalism is not without its ambiguities. There is the potential 
to confuse the "Hebraic/Latin" convention with the algebraic convention. Complicating 
matters more, Wren appears to use the symbol ± to indicate that in some cases a quantity 
will be added and in some it will be subtracted, but in his spare style he does not specify 
when. Presumably this matter is decided in conjunction with the use of the diagrams of 
the cases to determine whether the relevant velocities are contrary or not.681  
 Nevertheless, Wren gives the equations an elegant, symmetric presentation. In 
these brief symbolic equations, the relevant relationships between the physical quantities 
involved in collision are "known at a glance." As Wren himself may have explained (if he 
did not adhere so closely to his literary style of "brevity"): the nature of collision, which 
is fundamental to an understanding of change in the natural world, is laid bare by the 
symbolic equations. And unlike Huygens's equations, which may have been his 
inspiration in 1661, Wren's equations encompass every kind of collision of two bodies 
and do so by embracing the usefulness of "impossible" negative numbers.   
 
 
Section 4  
Conclusion 
 
 The members of the Royal Society attempted to determine the laws of motion 
with their new "experimental philosophy." Wren, who was experienced in the tradition of 
practical mathematics and mathematical instruments, was responsible for producing an 
instrument, composed of colliding pendulum bobs, for the purpose of performing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
681 Making matters worse, the symbol only appears in the lower equation of the middle set of equations in 
the edition of Wren's paper printed in the Philosophical Transactions. The paper reproduced in the OCH 
also includes the symbol for the corresponding equation in the set on the right.  
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experiments on collision. The members of the society recognized him as an authority on 
the topic. It was back to Wren's ideas that they referred, upon the completion of the series 
of experiments in both 1666 and 1668. These experiments had raised several questions, 
such as the status of Descartes's rules (the 6th rule was in obvious conflict with their 
experiments), the nature of motion (the relationship between speed and direction, and 
whether motion can be created or destroyed), and the relationship between elasticity and 
rebound. Careful experimentation with mathematical instruments was a new way to 
investigate collision. The purpose of these investigations was not just to understand the 
collision of wooden pendulum bobs. The members of the Royal Society were interested 
in understanding the nature of body and motion, and the fundamental constituents of 
nature. Many held out the hope that the interaction of these small bodies would explain 
"Generation, Corruption, Alteration, and all the Vicissitudes of Nature."  
 After nearly a decade of experiments, Huygens, Wren, and Wallis published their 
rules in the Philosophical Transactions. However, the published theories were not driven 
purely by experiments. They were not simply lists of experimental data. None of the 
papers makes any mention of the experiments. Rather, the theories have their own 
internal mathematical justifications. The proportions of the balance provide the 
quantitative relations for both Wallis and Wren. Wallis focused on the powers required to 
move a body on the model of the lever, whereas Wren emphasized the equilibrium of the 
balance. Wallis expresses these proportions with his "specious arithmetic" and Wren does 
so with economical use of diagrams of balances organized according to principles of 
symmetry and a concise set of algebraic equations.   
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 Wallis's theory is not governed by prior conservation principles. It does, however, 
rely on a contest between impetus and impedimentum, similar to the Cartesian contest 
between moving force and force or resistance, or Marci's contest between impulse and 
resistance. Unlike Descartes or Marci, the contest does not explain rebound for Wallis. 
According to Descartes, if the moving force is not greater than the force of resistance, no 
motion will be transferred between bodies, and the moving body will rebound with no 
loss of motion. For Wallis, on the other hand, if the impetus does not overcome the 
impedimentum, the body stops. For Descartes, the conditions of rebound were determined 
by the contest view of force and the Cartesian conservation of quantity of motion. The 
cause of rebound for Wallis is "springyness" (and the force of restitution such springiness 
necessitates). According to Wallis, a perfectly hard body is not elastic. As we saw last 
chapter, Huygens's hard bodies behave as if they were perfectly elastic, but he does not 
provide a rationale. The bodies Wren describes also behave as if they were perfectly 
elastic, but he does not explicitly state whether they are hard, soft, or elastic. In addition 
to categorizing the nature of bodies, Wallis (unlike Wren and Huygens) also engaged the 
topic of transdiction between the colliding pendulum bobs and the interaction of minute 
bodies. 
 The equilibrium of the balance plays several roles in Wren's theory. "Proper" 
motion is defined as the reciprocal proportion of speeds and velocities, just like a balance 
in equilibrium. If the sizes of the bodies are reciprocally proportional to the speeds of the 
bodies, each will rebound with the speed with which it approached. The diagrams present 
the collision of bodies R, S as a balance, complete with a center of gravity and fulcrum at 
point a. And the action of collision itself (of both proper and improper velocities) as 
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expressed by the law of nature is equivalent to a balance "swinging" about its center of 
gravity, extended over a yoke. The principle of the balance was the foundation of Wren's 
law of nature. But it is important to note that Wren did not just use the notion of the 
balance as an analogy for collision. The proportions underlying the balance define his 
notions of proper and improper motion. The principle of a balance with two fulcrums 
proved to be a way to unify a vast array of combinations of differently sized bodies 
moving at different speeds and directions (or no speed at all). Using a single principle and 
a simple set of diagrams Wren could describe a set of combinations of two bodies 
meeting, which included several that his predecessors (notably Descartes) did not even 
consider.  
 Huygens used Cartesian symbolic algebra as a tool to criticize Descartes's rules, 
and as scaffolding for a new principle, and as a way to predict the outcomes of colliding 
pendulum bobs before Wren and Wallis, who witnessed the prediction, could not at the 
time accomplish such an achievement. Huygens's algebra remained as a heuristic tool in 
his manuscripts. Wren and Wallis, on the other hand, were the first to publish rules of 
collision expressed in algebraic mathematics.   
 Wallis argued for an arithmetic understanding of algebra (a specious arithmetic), 
and attempted to legitimize both negative quantities and the roots of negative quantities. 
This was done, in part, by an appeal to their usefulness in physical applications. Wallis 
presents the directionality of motion and impetus with + and − signs. In so doing he 
provided a legitimation of an otherwise "impossible" quantity by an appeal to physical 
applications, and presented a new quantitative expression of contrary motion.   
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 Both Wallis and Wren were influenced by the symbolic algebra of William 
Oughtred, however, Oughtred's values and style had a particular impact on Wren. The 
latter used not only his notation and terminology, but placed the same epistemological 
value on the economy of the symbol—so that meaning can be grasped at a glance. And, 
like Oughtred, he thought of the "analytic art" not as a practical mathematician's mere 
"juggler trick," but rather as a means to penetrate to the heart of mathematics. Oughtred 
used his analytic art to better understand the classical works of mathematics such as 
Euclid's Elements, and translated several of the problems into algebra. As Renée Raphael 
has shown, Oughtred's student, Seth Ward, taught Wren the analytic art by having him 
rewrite problems from Galileo's Discorsi in symbolic algebra. I have argued that Wren 
extended this tradition, and used Oughtred's symbolic algebra, which embraces brevity 
and the unity of expression made possible by a system of equations, to reveal the "height 
and depth" of the book of nature. Wallis and Wren's theories of collision mark a 
transition, previously carried forward by Huygens, in the "mathematization of nature."  
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Chapter 6  
Conclusion 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Philosophy [i.e. physics] is written in this grand book—I mean the universe—which 
stands continually open to our gaze, but it cannot be understood unless one first learns to 
comprehend the language and interpret the characters in which it is written. It is written 
in the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other 
geometrical figures, without which it is humanly impossible to understand a single word 
of it; without these, one is wandering around in a dark labyrinth. 
 
 —from Galileo's Il Saggiatore, 1623  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nature obeys the algebraic laws of addition and subtraction 
 
—from Wren's Lex naturae de collisione corporum, 1669 
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 This dissertation has been a historical narrative about development and change. 
The study of collision was of central importance in the changing explanations of nature in 
the 17th century. These explanations were part of the larger transformation, traditionally 
called the mathematization of nature. And mathematization itself was undergoing change, 
with the emergence of an algebraic physico-mathematics from a language whose 
characters were initially "circles, triangles, and geometric diagrams." Establishing the 
mathematical rules of collision was a new problem, and the views of the individuals who 
contested with it changed and developed.  As we saw in chapter 2, Beeckman repeatedly 
returned to the topic throughout his life and offered multiple strategies (within the 
framework of the pseudo-Aristotelian balance) to describe various scenarios of colliding 
bodies. Descartes's views changed significantly, which was established in chapter 3, and 
in his later view of collision we have uncovered the classical analytic method for solving 
problems underlying the rules of collision. Huygens used multiple heuristic strategies, 
including Descartes's symbolic algebra, to criticize Descartes rules of collision and to 
develop his own principles before formulating his theory in axiomatic presentations, as 
shown in chapter 4. And the members of the Royal Society returned to experiments on 
collision over the span of almost a decade before publishing the rules and laws of motion 
of Wren, Wallis, and Huygens, as shown in chapter 5. 
 A commonality amidst this change was the importance of devices such as the 
pendulum, balance, and (less materially) symbolic algebra. Through the interaction with 
these objects, the investigators conceptualized and justified their mathematical theories of 
collision, and in doing so transformed systems of knowledge. The pendulum made 
possible a sophisticated form of empirical investigation. The manner in which collision 
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could be empirically investigated transformed through the interaction with the pendulum. 
Central notions such as hardness and elasticity were reinterpreted through experiments 
with the pendulum, and several fundamental principles were likely developed on account 
of it. The balance was of key importance as both a framework for the conceptualization 
of collision and for the justification of the mathematical theories of collision. Several 
iterations of the balance—from Archimedean and pseudo-Aristotelian traditions, with 
emphases on equilibrium as well as the moving power of the lever—were significant in 
multiple facets of collision, including the epistemically privileged scenario in which the 
bodies and speeds are inversely proportional, the connection between equilibrium and 
conservation principles, as well as principles of symmetry. Algebra, although not a 
physical object that has heft when held in one's hands, was a device of sorts. Interactions 
with the apparatus of symbolic equations yielded surprising results that changed both the 
conceptualization of the directionality of motion as well as the notion of quantity. 
Symbolic algebra made possible a unified expression of collision in a system of equations 
with two unknowns, and became the mathematics of nature.   
 
 
Section 1  
Experiment 
 
1.1 – Experience 
 All of the major figures featured in this dissertation, including Harriot, Beeckman, 
and Descartes, performed experiments. Harriot experimented with light and lenses, 
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formulating the sine law of refraction as well as an explanation of the rainbow.682 He also 
performed experiments to determine the motion of fall.683 Beeckman experimented on the 
motion of fluids, as well as the speed of light.684 Descartes responded to Beeckman's 
experiments on the speed of light. He also carried out his own famous experiments on the 
rainbow.685 However, there is no evidence that any of these individuals performed 
experiments to develop or test their mathematical accounts of collision, as did Huygens, 
Wren, and Wallis. Common experience may have informed some of the principles, but in 
the cases of Beeckman and Descartes, they openly acknowledged that their theories of 
collision are in conflict with common experiences of colliding bodies. And, even in the 
Royal Society, some members were skeptical of the ability of experiments to provide 
insight on the fundamental motions of particles. 
 Beeckman advocated micro-mechanical explanations of natural phenomena. The 
causes of change in natural phenomena could be explained by the motions of corpuscles, 
which differed in size and shape, and which behaved like simple machines, i.e. according 
to the "mechanical principles of macro-phenomena."686 At root, Beeckman held an 
atomist understanding of nature. However, his explanations tended to appeal to congeries 
of atoms. The former were perfectly hard, whereas the congeries could be compressed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
682 J. A. Lohne, "Thomas Harriott (1560-1621) The Tycho Brahe of Optics," Centaurus 6 (1959): 113-121. 
J. A. Lohne, "Essays on Thomas Harriot," Archive for History of Exact Sciences 20 (1979): 189-312.  
683 Matthias Schemmel, The English Galileo: Thomas Harriot’s Work on Motion as an Example of 
Preclassical Mechanics, 2 vols. (Berlin: Springer, 2008), 97-152. 
684 Spyros Sakellariadis, "Descartes' Experimental Proof of the Infinite Velocity of Light and Huygens' 
Rejoinder," Archive for History of Exact Sciences 26 (1982): 1-4. R. Hookyaas, "Beeckman, Isaac," DSB 1: 
567. 
685 Jed Buchwald, "Descartes' Experimental Journey Past the Prism and Through the Invisible World to the 
Rainbow," Annals of Science 65 (2007): 1-46. Also see Daniel Garber, "Descartes and Experiment in the 
Discourse and Essays," in Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes, ed. by Stephen Voss 
(Oxford University Press, 1993), 288-310. 
686 Stephen Gaukroger and John Schuster, "The hydrostatic paradox and the origins of Cartesian dynamics," 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33 (2002): 551.  
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and were thought to possibly offer some degree of restitution.687 Regarding natural 
phenomena, collision was a fruitful explanans. Beeckman did not provide a mathematical 
account of the collision of congeries of atoms; his mathematical study of collision 
focuses solely on the collision of atoms. Collision as explanandum was problematic for 
Beeckman. Since atoms are perfectly hard (and do not compress) Beeckman thought they 
would not rebound. Throughout his mathematical studies of collision, to which he 
returned over several years in his Journal, Beeckman was primarily interested in 
mathematically describing the amount of motion lost with each collision of atoms. As 
Beeckman himself acknowledged, common experience clearly shows that phenomenal 
bodies do at times rebound, and motion in the world is not continually lost. Thus he 
thought that his own mathematical account of collision was in conflict with common 
experience. As a deus ex machina Beeckman suspected that God counteracts the loss of 
motion, shown by Beeckman's mathematical study of collision, by continually 
"enlivening" and thus conserving motion.688  
  Descartes fully acknowledged that the rules of collision found in his Principles of 
Philosophy conflict with common experience. He did not see this as a problem. 
Immediately after the rules are presented, the very next section of the French edition of 
the Principles begins with the words, "Indeed, experience often seems to contradict the 
rules I have just explained."689  Descartes's rules describe the fundamental motions and 
interactions of bodies that are themselves the explanation of natural phenomena such as 
hardness, fluidity, light, and magnetism. The world Descartes describes is a plenum. 
Thus, the motion of any phenomenal body takes place in a fluid. The rules, however, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
687 Beeckman, Journal 2:100-1; 3:31.   
688 See chapter 2. 
689 AT IX 93-4. Principes II 53.  
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being the simplest instances of bodies interacting, describe two hard bodies in isolation. 
Presumably, to accurately describe the motion of two phenomenal bodies colliding in the 
world, one would use the rules of collision to calculate the intervening motions of every 
body composing the fluid. But the purpose of the rules is not to accurately predict the 
outcome of experiments involving the collision of phenomenal objects such billiard balls. 
Rather, the rules provide an account of the fundamental motions and interactions of 
bodies in accordance with Descartes's conservation principle and laws of nature.690  
 Nevertheless, as we have seen in chapter 3, Descartes referred to a set of 
experiments and experiences that are connected to his theory of collision in a series of 
letters to Mersenne. In the letters Descartes refers to the comparative effect of hammers 
hitting bullets that have been positioned either on cushions or anvils. Descartes claimed 
that a hammer would immediately rebound off of the bullet placed on an anvil, whereas 
the hammer will flatten the bullet placed on a (plate, which has been placed on a) 
cushion. When met with incredulity by Mersenne, Descartes suggested how the 
experiment could be modified to produce the intended results more clearly. And he 
referred to the common experiences of chefs in the kitchens of Paris who more 
successfully break a shoulder of mutton if the mutton is held in the chef's hand or placed 
on a towel when struck, rather than placed on a hard table. Although never appearing in a 
treatise, Descartes referred to these experiments in his correspondence with Mersenne to 
provide support for a fundamental notion intrinsic to his impact law—Descartes's 
"contest view" of the force of resistance and the moving force. Unlike the experiments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
690 Descartes had made much the same point in his early view as well. In his letter to Florimond de Beaune 
in 1639, he claimed that he has "never particularly examined questions that depend on measures of speed," 
because there is so much to consider that is more fundamental, e.g. the conservation of quantity of motion, 
before speed can be addressed. AT II 544. See chapter 3. 
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described in Descartes's letters, the experiments on collision at the Royal Society, not 
only provide illustrations and support for the theories—as the bullets, anvils, cushions 
and French chefs do for Descartes's contest view—but the experiments at the Royal 
Society were designed also to make controlled predictions to test various proposed 
theories of collision. 
 However, not all the members of the Royal Society were entirely convinced that 
experimentation was a legitimate means to investigate collision, if the purpose of a theory 
of collision was to understand the motions of the "minute particles" that explain all the 
vicissitudes of nature. Throughout Neile's correspondence with Wallis via Oldenburg, 
Neile is concerned with what has since come to be known as the problem of 
transdiction.691 According to Neile both the nature of bodies (whether they are hard, soft, 
or elastic), as well as the ability of a body to offer resistance to another, are apparent in 
phenomenal bodies, but those qualities are explained by the real motion of minute 
particles. The minute particles may not share the same properties of hardness, softness, 
elasticity or resistance, as the bodies observed in experiments, since those properties are 
explained by the motion of minute particles, and since the minute particles are not 
observable. For Neile, this raised a methodological difficulty: how to determine the laws 
of motion of the fundamental components of reality, if one only has experimental access 
to the behavior of apparent bodies. Neile suggested that their only recourse was to 
investigate the unobservable minute particles by "reason" rather than by "experiment."692 
According to Neile, the study of phenomenal bodies, such as wooden pendulum bobs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
691 Maurice Mandelbaum, Philosophy, Science and Sense Perception: Historical and Critical Studies 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), 88-112. Neither Wallis nor Neile use the word "transdiction." 
692 OCH 5: 542. W. Neile to Oldenburg, 13 May 1669. "the foundations themselves I think are to be 
grounded upon reason for I doubt experiment will hardly ever cleare the nature of motion in minute 
particles." 
	   348 
colliding, in order to understand nothing more than the motion of wooden pendulum 
bobs, may be "good for use but it is not science or philosophye."693 In the course of his 
discussion with Wallis, he eventually conceded, however, that any theory of motion 
(based on reason) should be consistent with the sets of experiments performed by the 
society.694 
  
1.2 – Experiment  
 The pendulum was key to the experimental investigation of collision.  But the 
rules of collision were not an obvious or easy consequence of the experimental use of the 
pendulum. The relationship between theory and experiment in the pendulum itself proved 
to be complex. There was an obvious enthusiasm for experimentation on collision in the 
early Royal Society, but this was tempered by some. Neile was ambivalent regarding the 
legitimacy of experiment to understand the motions of "minute bodies," and Huygens did 
not rely on experiment as grounds for justification of theory. Various individuals 
balanced the role of experiments differently, and as such, experimentation played many 
roles in the study of collision. Experiments served as the foundation of a theory of 
collision, and that by which theories were confirmed. They tested theories through 
predictions, but for some, experiments were only that with which a theory accords but 
not upon which the theory is demonstrated. Experiments were a source of discoveries, 
and they shaped fundamental concepts and principles.    
 According to Huygens, experiment was that to which theory is supposed to agree. 
The rules of collision, which are demonstrated axiomatically, should predict the results of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
693 OCH 5: 518. W. Neile to Oldenburg, 7 May 1669.  
694 OCH 5: 265, 312, 363, 542, 559. Neile extensively discusses "appearance and reality." See OCH: 286-7, 
347, 364, 518, 542, for his discussions of "reason and experiment."  
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experiments. This is in contrast to Wren's mathematical theory of collision, which 
refrained from providing axiomatic demonstrations, as well as Marriotte's plan, in which 
experiments formed the foundation of his study of collision. While Huygens was 
responding to his French colleague Marriotte, whose experimental apparatus of colliding 
pendulum bobs and rules of impact were so similar to his own that Huygens accused 
Marriotte of plagiarism,695 Huygens criticized what he considered to be Marriotte's 
overreliance on experimental justification. Whereas Huygens used principles such as the 
relativity of motion, the impossibility of perpetual motion, and symmetry to justify his 
rules of impact, Marriotte set experience as the foundation of his work.696 Experiments, 
of course, had a place in Huygens's system. He showed, for example, that his rules accord 
with experiments, and he accurately predicted the results of colliding pendulum bobs in 
the first years of the Royal Society when no one else could. However, he did not think 
that experiment was a secure foundation for the rules of impact. Experiments were, in his 
words, "slippery."697 In correspondence with Henry Oldenburg, the secretary of the Royal 
Society, Huygens also questioned the justification of Wren's theory of collision (although 
both he and Wren recognized that their rules of collision were in agreement with each 
other). Wren's theory did not appear to him to be suitably grounded on demonstration.698 
Wren responded by pointing out that any demonstration of his rules of collision would 
require the assumption of several other postulates, which would themselves require 
demonstration, and so on.699 Although Wren's published theory of collision does not refer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
695 Domenico Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2006), 238.   
696 Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 239. 
697 HOC 2: 114-5. Huygens to Sluse, 2 November 1657. "Experientias me sectari ne extimes, scio enim 
lubricas esse." Also see Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 233. 
698 OCH 5: 360. Huygens to Oldenburg, 27 January 1668/9. Translation by Hall OCH 5: 362. 
699 OCH 5: 373. Oldenburg to Huygens, 4 February 1668/9. Translation by Hall, OCH 5: 375. 
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to experiments, Sprat in his History of the Royal-Society of London (1667) claimed that 
Wren's theory had been "confirm'd by many hundreds of Experiments" with the 
"instrument" that Wren had designed to study collision.700   
 In the context of the meetings of the Royal Society itself, experiments served as a 
means of testing the rules of collision through the predictions of the outcomes. 
Experiment was also a source of discoveries. Wren receives considerable credit as an 
authority in early experiments on collision. Likely, the rules of collision that would 
eventually be published in the Philosophical Transactions were developed through the 
discoveries made in the course of almost a decade of experiments.  
 Experiments and interactions with the pendulum also shaped the theoretical 
principles and concepts in the study of collision, such as Huygens's variant of the 
Torricelli principle, the principle of the reversibility of impact, and the conservation of 
"body times speed squared,"701 as well as the notion of "hardness."702 Notions of 
“hardness” and “elasticity” were, of course, prior to the study of collision, though 
reciprocally they were redefined by the reflections on collision. The notion of "hardness," 
for example, changed significantly, at times embracing both what we now call "perfectly 
inelastic" as well as "perfectly elastic bodies."703 Huygens presumably started with some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
700 Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal Society of London (London: T. R. for J. Martyn and J. Allestry, 
1667), 312. 
701 See chapter 4, section 3. 
702 See chapter 4, section 4.1. 
703 The process by which this change took place is akin to what Hasok Chang has called epistemic iteration: 
"a process in which successive stages of knowledge, each building on the preceding one, are created in 
order to enhance the achievement of certain epistemic goals.... In each step, the later stage is based on the 
earlier stage, but cannot be deduced from it in any straightforward sense. Each line is based on the principle 
of respect and the imperative of progress, and the whole chain exhibits innovative progress within a 
continuous tradition." See Hasok Chang, Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 226. Huygens's notion of hardness cannot be deduced from 
Descartes's, just as Descartes's cannot be deduced from Beeckman's. Descartes's changing understanding of 
collision from a view similar to Beeckman's to that which is expressed in the Principles of Philosophy has 
been documented in chapter 3.  It is not clear whether Huygens intended to modify Descartes's notion of 
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common notion of hardness; experiments were performed with hard bodies such as 
wooden pendulum bobs; and the behavior of these wooden pendulum bobs then informed 
how hardness itself was understood, which in turn informed the validity of variously 
defined principles of collision, such as the conservation of body times speed squared.     
   
 Shapin and Schaffer's Leviathan and the Air-Pump drew attention to the 
importance of the technical, literary, and social practices that went into the production 
and justification of "matters of fact" in the Royal Society's experiments with the air-
pump.704 Although unmentioned in Shapin and Schaffer's study, the Royal Society had 
also been performing experiments on collision just prior to and contemporaneously with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
hardness. Although Huygens used his own notion of hardness in his arguments against Descartes, he did 
not explicitly indicate that it is a different notion from that of Descartes.   
     Beeckman understood simple atoms to be perfectly hard bodies. Since they are perfectly hard, 
Beeckman thought they could not compress, and thus there would be no rebound between the atoms 
themselves. Descartes contrasted hardness with fluidity, and explained both notions in terms of relative 
motion. A body is harder than another if its constituent parts are in less motion than those of another. A 
body is perfectly hard if its constituent parts are at rest with respect to each other. This provides a plausible 
explanation for the hardness of stone, wood, and other familiar objects. Complications arise, which have 
been discussed in chapter 3, when describing the interaction of simple bodies in abstraction, such as those 
in Descartes's rules of collision. The rebound of these simple hard bodies is explained, in Descartes's 
mature works, according to the contest model of force, which is found in his impact law. If the force of 
resistance in a body is not overcome, the body approaching it will rebound. If the force of resistance is 
overcome, motion will be transferred and the bodies will move together. Closely tied to his other 
fundamental notions of motion, rest, and the force of resistance, "hardness" is saddled with the same issues 
besetting the consistency of the fundamentals of his system. At any rate, Descartes's notion of hardness 
does not easily map onto later concepts of elastic and inelastic, nor was it developed in light of these 
concepts.  
     Huygens challenged Descartes's rules of collision in several ways, including a heuristic use of symbolic 
algebra and demonstrations involving principles of relativity and symmetry, but Huygens used neither 
Descartes's notion of hardness nor his notion of motion. I have not found evidence that he justified his new 
notion of hardness, nor that he indicated it as different from Descartes's. What seems to have taken place is 
a process of "enrichment" through "epistemic iteration." Starting with some common notion of hardness, 
experiments were performed with experimentally hard bodies such as wooden pendulum bobs. The 
behavior of these wooden pendulum bobs then informed how hardness itself was understood. And the 
meaning of hardness came to be re-conceptualized.  
704 Steve Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental 
Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 25.  
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the air-pump.705 The main characters, Boyle and Hobbes, in the study of the air-pump are 
largely absent in the records of experiments on collision—although William Neile 
notably claimed that he followed Hobbes, when describing his theory of collision to John 
Wallis.706 However, several of the other members of the Royal Society (and Shapin and 
Schaffer's study), such as Huygens, Wren, and Hooke, are of central importance. Yet, the 
thorny issues involved in the production of experimental matters of fact are perspicuously 
diminished or absent in the experiments on collision. The texts on collision produced by 
members of the society in no way resemble the style of "virtual witnessing" attributed to 
Boyle's exhaustively descriptive texts. There did not seem to have been the same fraught 
issues of replication of experiments in various times and locations as there were for the 
air-pump (e.g. Huygens's air-pump at the Académie). And, although the experiments were 
carried out by individuals and were subsequently performed at meetings, there does not 
appear to have been attention paid to enforcing the boundary of witnesses (as exemplified 
in the tense relationship between Boyle and Hobbes). William Neile, for example, who 
was sympathetic to Hobbes's matter theory, was a member of the Royal Society. He 
carried on a lively correspondence with Wallis on the topics of impact and motion, and 
presented his theory of collision to the Royal Society, which appears to have been 
received without policing.707 Moreover, experiments on collision were carried on prior to 
the establishment of the Royal Society by circles of inquisitive individuals, and members 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
705 One exception is the following: "[I]n 1668, at the moment when [Huygens] presented his [air] pump to 
the Académie, he wrote a text entitled 'De gravitatione.' The presentation of this text at the Académie then 
elicited the violent debate between Huygens, Roberval, and Mariotte on impact laws and the character of 
subtle fluids that raged in the Académie during the autumn of 1669." Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan, 270-
1. 
706 OCH 5: 525. "This part of the theory I gladly acknowledge taking from the books of Mr. Hobbes."  
707 Thomas Birch, The History of the Royal Society of London, vol. 2 (London, A. Millar in the Strand, 
1756), 361-2. OCH 5: 517-24. Neile's theory was presented to the Royal Society on 29 April 1669, and 
recorded as his "Hypothesis of Motion."  
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of the Society had an interest in the efforts and texts of other unaffiliated individuals. 
Admittedly "matters of fact" are in a different epistemic category than "rules of impact" 
or "laws of motion." Nevertheless, the plurality of strategies of justification (which do not 
align with those expressed in Leviathan and the Air-Pump) for the rules of collision in the 
Royal Society is striking. This does not challenge Shapin and Shaffer's argument 
regarding the air-pump, but it does challenge the generalization of the conclusions from 
their study of experimentation with the air-pump to other areas of experimentation in the 
Royal Society. 
 Although there do not appear to have been the same issues as the construction of 
"matters of fact" through experimentation with the air-pump as described by Shapin and 
Schaffer, there are several other important issues involving experimentation. 
Experimentation required a higher level of attention than mere allusions to experiences, 
which had been reported by investigations of collision by Descartes and Beeckman. 
Everyone who studied collision wrestled with the complex relationships between 
"reason" and "experience." However, in addition to these complex relationships, and 
unlike common experience, the experiments in the Royal Society were deliberate, 
carefully planned, and were made possible by the "inventive application" of the 
properties of previously investigated objects, namely, the pendulum.  
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1.2.1 – Pendulum  
 
 Precise experimentation on collision was made possible by the pendulum. A 
weight at the end of a string was by no means a new invention in the 17th century.708 
What was new, and influential, was the explosion of interest in the properties of this 
simple object, sparked off in large part by Galileo,709 beginning in 1602 with his well 
known letter to Guidobaldo del Monte and continuing throughout his Dialogo (1632) and 
Discorsi (1638).710 Through Galileo the pendulum became linked to discussions of 
isochrony and timekeeping,711 as well as the much-debated relationship between weight 
and the motion of a descending body (or rather the lack of relationship).712 He had also 
argued that the circular arc section swept out by a descending pendulum was the 
brachistochrone—the curve by which a descending body covers the greatest distance in 
the least time.713 Building on Galileo's studies, Huygens and the other members of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
708 Jochen Büttner, "The Pendulum as a Challenging Object in Early-Modern Mechanics," in Mechanics 
and Natural Philosophy before the Scientific Revolution, ed. by Walter Roy Laird and Sophie Roux 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 224-6. 
709 Galileo's theoretical interest in the pendulum may have been a response to prior practical experiences 
with the technology. See Büttner, "The Pendulum as a Challenging Object," 226-9.  
710 Galileo Galilei, Opere, vol. 10 (Florence: G. Barbèra, 1900), 97-100. Galileo Galilei to Guidobaldo del 
Monte, 29 November 1602. See Piero E. Ariotti, "Aspects of the Conception and Development of the 
Pendulum in the 17th Century," Archive for History of Exact Sciences 8 (1972): 330-2. For a detailed 
discussion and translation of the letter see Jürgen Renn, Peter Damerow, and Simone Rieger with an 
appendix by Domenico Giulini, "Hunting the White Elephant: When and How Did Galileo Discover the 
Law of Fall?" Science in Context 14 (2001): 85-9, 133-5. 
711 Opera di Galileo 7: 475-6. "...the same pendulum makes its oscillations with the same frequency, or 
very little different—almost imperceptibly—whether these are made through large arcs or very small ones 
along a given circumference." Stillman Drake, trans., Dialogue concerning the two chief world systems 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1962) 450. Also see Ariotti, "Aspects of the Conception and 
Development of the Pendulum," 352.    
712 Opera di Galileo 8: 139. What has come to be known as the "law of length"—that the period of a 
pendulum is dependent on the length and not the weight—is presented in the Discorsi: "As to the times of 
vibration of bodies suspended by threads of different lengths, they bear to each other the same proportion 
as the square roots of the lengths of the thread." Henry Crew and Alfonso de Salvio, trans., Dialogues 
Concerning Two New Sciences (New York: Dover, 1914), 96. Also see Stillman Drake, trans., Two New 
Sciences: Including Centers of Gravity & Force of Percussion (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1974), 97. Also see Ariotti, "Aspects of the Conception and Development of the Pendulum," 352. 
713 Opera di Galileo 8: 138-9. Galileo's claims regarding the "law of chords" and the brachistochrone are in 
the Discorsi: "...He has clearly shown that the time of descent is the same along all chords, whatever the 
arcs which subtend them... It is understood, of course, that these arcs all terminate at the lowest point of the 
	   355 
Royal Society used the pendulum as a means to measure the speed of a body at impact. 
Prior to this, the measurements of speed, especially the speeds involved in collision, were 
difficult to access. For instance, consider the task of measuring the speeds of the balls in a 
game of billiards. Without some rather sophisticated technology, it is unfeasible to 
provide anything more precise than general comparative statements such as this ball 
appears to move more quickly or slowly than that ball. And there are a host of 
complicating factors such as the effect of rolling along a table, and the impracticality of 
bodies of unequal size impacting directly along their centers of gravity. Using a system of 
pendulums, the speed of the initially moving body at impact can be related to the height 
(or more specifically to the angle from the vertical) from which the pendulum bob was 
allowed to drop. The resulting speed of a body initially at rest can be related to the height 
to which it swings after being struck by the initially dropped pendulum bob.   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
circle, where it touches the horizontal plane. If now we consider descent along arcs instead of their chords 
then, provided these do not exceed 90°, experiment shows that they are all traversed in equal times; but 
these times are greater for the chord than for the arc, an effect which is all the more remarkable because at 
first glance one would think just the opposite to be true. For since the terminal points of the two motions 
are the same and since the straight line included between these two points is the shortest distance between 
them, it would seem reasonable that motion along this line should be executed in the shortest time, but this 
is not the case, for the shortest time - and therefore the most rapid motion - is that employed along the arc 
of which this straight line is the chord." Crew and Salvio, Two New Sciences, 95-6.  
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Figure 1. From Edme Marriotte's 1673 Traitte de la percussion ou chocq des corps dans lequel 
les principales Regles du mouvement, sont expliquée & demonstrées par leur veritables causes 
 
 
Figure 2. From Christiaan Huygens's 1652 manuscript. Codices Hugeniorum 26A, fol. 9r. 
 
 In the years after Galileo's work, the pendulum had become an object of much 
inquiry, debate, and application. It was studied by almost all the major figures in this 
dissertation, including Beeckman, Descartes, Huygens (most notably), and Wren.714 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
714 For example, Descartes objected to Galileo's claim of isochrony in letters to Mersenne, arguing that air 
resistance and various environmental factors would interfere, likely making smaller oscillations slower than 
larger ones. AT I 73-4, 96. Letters to Mersenne, 8 October, 13 November, and 18 December 1629. 
Beeckman too had been interested in the effect of air resistance on the pendulum (which he thought would 
affect small oscillations more than the large), and surmised that a pendulum is only isochronous in a 
vacuum. Beeckman, Journal 1:260. "If you can imagine this [oscillatory motion] as taking place in a 
vacuum, when only the tendency toward the center of the earth operates, it will perhaps correspond more 
exactly to what has been said [i.e., perfect isochrony]; for the slowness of the motion [at the extremities of 
a large oscillation or in small oscillations] is greatly affected by the air with the result that the motion turns 
out to be even much slower." Quoted and translated in Ariotti, "Aspects of the Conception and 
Development of the Pendulum," 375. Descartes also claimed that Galileo's "demonstrations" of the circle as 
the brachistochrone were not sound—they only succeeded in showing that a body descends more quickly 
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Gradually, several of the factors that complicated the experimental investigation of the 
pendulum were identified. For example, the period is dependent upon whether or not the 
line to which the pendulum bob is attached is rigid. If a flexible string is used, the tension 
is variable through the swing, which affects the amplitude. Also, it matters whether or not 
the line (regardless of it being flexible or rigid) itself is taken to have weight. Factors 
such as these, particularly before they were identified, made it difficult to determine 
which properties should be taken to be essential or nonessential. It was quite possible for 
an otherwise careful individual, such as Galileo, to believe that a circular pendulum, for 
example, is isochronous and was shown to be isochronous through experiment, even 
though the periods of large and small oscillations may or may not be observed to be 
exactly the same in the given physical pendulum.715    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
along an arc of a circle than along the chord of the same arc. AT II 379-405. Letter to Mersenne on 11 
October 1638. Mersenne too disagreed with Galileo's claim of isochrony, but in the reverse of Descartes: 
smaller oscillations are faster than large ones. Later, Huygens, corresponding with Mersenne, also argued 
that the circular pendulum is not isochronous. Like Mersenne he contended that smaller oscillations are 
faster than large ones, but the periods of large and small oscillations can be made equal if the path of the 
pendulum is modified. He famously accomplished this by including "cheeks" to restrict the swing, which 
has the effect of gradually shortening the path of the pendulum bob. This shortened the period for larger 
amplitudes. Later Huygens, who led the way in the design of workable mechanical pendulum clocks, would 
show that a pendulum whose bob swept out the path of a cycloid rather than a circle is isochronous.  715 Paolo Palmieri, "Experimental History," Endeavour 33 (2009): 88-93; and Paolo Palmieri, "A 
phenomenology of Galileo's experiments with pendulums," The British Journal of the History of Science 42 
(2009): 479-513. The debates, complicating factors, and illusiveness are indicative of an important quality 
of experimentation, and experiments in the 17th century particularly, which Paolo Palmieri has highlighted: 
there was no definite boundary between theory and experiment. For example, Palmieri has replicated 
Galileo's pendulum experiments to show that it would have been quite reasonable for Galileo to believe that 
his experiments established the independence of the period and amplitude, even though we now know that 
the pendulum is not isochronous. This marks a distinctly different attitude toward experimentation from 
that held by Koyré (who alleged that Galileo performed no physical experiments—they were all thought-
experiments). Since the pendulum is not actually isochronous, Galileo must have been either incompetent 
experimentally or never performed experiments. Galileo was not incompetent. So, Galileo's must not have 
actually performed his experiments on the pendulum. This has also been called the matching problem: "the 
question of whether Galileo's reports about his experiments really match the outcome of his experiments, 
whether Galileo's reported outcome or that of our replications." Such a view implies that modern physical 
theory easily and obviously emerges from experiments. It also assumes that the best way to "understand 
Galileo's reports [is] from a perspective internal to the texts without considering their meaning in the light 
of the outcome of the experiments" (Palmieri, "Phenomenology of Galileo," 481). Palmieri, on the other 
hand, has taken what he calls a "phenomenological stance" and suspends judgment on the meaning of the 
reports in the texts until he "lives" through the reconstructed experiments. He encounters first-hand the 
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 It should come as no surprise that it was not until Huygens's work and that of the 
Royal Society that the pendulum was used in the investigation of collision. The properties 
of the pendulum had gone from a matter of speculation and debate to being described 
precisely and mathematically by Huygens.716 And perhaps just as important, the 
pendulum had captured the imaginations of many in the Society's network as a means of 
providing universal standards in both time and length.717 It had come to be an object 
whose properties were thought to fix other (much sought after) quantities, both 
practically (the measurement of tempo and pitch in music, the beats of the pulse in 
medicine, and potentially longitude in navigation) as well as theoretically (e.g. universal 
standard of length).  In 1661 Huygens met with Wren, Rooke, Wallis, and other members 
of the Royal Society, and together they observed experiments involving the collision of 
two equal-length pendulums. Using a set of algebraic equations, Huygens quickly made a 
few calculations, and correctly predicted the outcomes of several different trials that the 
president of the Society, William Brounker, had proposed. No one but Huygens could 
produce satisfactory rules for accurate prediction, and he scribbled out his equations after 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
complexity of experiment. Through his reconstructions, which make it possible to attempt to observe what 
Galileo would have observed, Palmieri reveals some of the interesting and not so immediately evident 
difficulties one faces, which blur the lines between theory and experiment. As Palmieri puts it: "In sum, the 
question is to what extent an experiment has well-defined borderlines that demarcate its confines with 
theoretical speculation. ... Experience shows things in their dynamic aspect. Theory is a continuation of 
experiment with cognitive means in order to see the conclusions to which things tend with the mind's eye. 
An experiment can be cognitively expanded, in other words" (Palmieri, "Experimental History," 89-90). 
The controversies surrounding Galileo's pendulum point the way for future areas of investigation in which 
historical studies of collision could be expanded. Namely, future studies would profit from the 
reconstruction of the Royal Society's experiments with colliding pendulum bobs.  
716 Huygens began to study the pendulum at least as early as age 17, when in 1646 Mersenne posed a 
challenge to several of his correspondents—determine the center of oscillation of the compound pendulum. 
Huygens included a proof of this and many other problems in the Horologium Oscillatorium, which he 
started at least by 1659 (but which would not be published until 1673). By 1657 he had invented his first 
mechanical pendulum clock, and by 1661 he had discovered the tautochrony of the cycloidal pendulum.  
717 Beeckman, Wren, and Huygens had proposed using the pendulum as a standard unit of length. In 1664 
the Royal Society carried out experiments on Huygens's universal measure. Journal 3:192-3. Sprat, 
History, 314. Birch, History 1: 495, 500, 505, 509. Ariotti, "Aspects of the Conception and Development of 
the Pendulum," 375.   
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successfully using them.718 For several months at the end of 1666 more experiments on 
colliding pendulum bobs were prosecuted at meetings of the Royal Society.719 Particular 
attention was given to the hypothesis whether or not motion "dies" or is produced anew. 
The records show that Wren's documents regarding his experimental work on collision 
were requested, and a decision was made to continue prosecuting the experiments that he, 
Croune and Hooke had formerly begun, in order to begin developing "a theory of the 
laws of motion."720 In 1667 Sprat's History of the Royal Society was published, which 
singles Wren out and refers to the instrument he used to experiment on collision (and to 
develop his "doctrine of motion.")721 The next year the Royal Society returned to 
prosecuting experiments on collision, with renewed interest in whether or not any motion 
"dies," and with new interest in investigating the role of hardness and elasticity.722 At the 
end of 1668 Oldenburg requested the theories of motion from Wren, Huygens, and 
Wallis. Later, in 1669 William Neile was asked to present his "Hypothesis of Motion" as 
well.723  
 Many of the theoretical hopes for the properties of the pendulum proved to be 
illusive. Galileo thought he had experimentally shown that his pendulum is isochronous, 
but we now know that it is not. Similarly, he did not successfully demonstrate that the 
circular arc is the brachistochrone. Moreover, due to gravitational variations, the 
pendulum cannot be used to provide a universal standard of length, as Beeckman and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
718 HOC 5: 547. Oldenburg to Spinoza, 18 December 1665. Also see OCH 2: 624-5. Moray to Oldenburg, 
27 November 1665.    
719 Birch, History 2: 116-7 (17 October 1666). Ibid., 117 (24 October 24 1666). Ibid., 131-2 (4 December 
1666). 
720 Birch, History 2: 140 (16 January 1666/7). 
721 Sprat, History, 312.  
722 Birch, History 2: 320 (12 November 1668). Also see the extensive correspondence on this topic between 
Wallis and Neile. See chapter 5.  
723 Ibid., 361-2. See OCH 5: 517-524 for the text of "William Neile's Hypothesis of Motion" and OCH 5: 
524-528 for Hall's English translation.  
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Huygens had hoped.724 Nevertheless the intellectual excitement regarding the pendulum 
was key for the study of collision in the Royal Society. 
 
 
Section 2  
Principles  
 
 Experiments on collision increased in number and sophistication upon the 
introduction of the pendulum. In addition to experimental investigation, the rules of 
collision were formulated with principles. These principles were conceptualized through 
the interaction with objects such as the pendulum and the balance. Bertoloni Meli has 
described several patterns of transformation in seventeenth-century mechanics, in which 
objects were used by mathematicians and natural philosophers, proving to be key in 
conceptualizing problems.725 A process described as "dematerialization" was particularly 
important to the study of collision. It refers to "transformations involving the removal of 
material constraints through a process of mental abstraction ... the same proportions or 
relations valid for the constrained case were supposed to remain valid also in the 
unconstrained one."726 For example, Huygens's famous variant of the Torricelli 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
724 Ariotti, "Aspects of the Conception and Development of the Pendulum," 407-9. 725 Domenico Bertoloni Meli, "Patterns of Transformation in Seventeenth-Century Mechanics." The Monist 
93 (2010): 578-95. These include "unmasking," "morphing," and "dematerialization." The first involves 
"the recognition that apparently complex and elaborate objects or devices can be shown to consist of 
simple, known ones in disguise, as in a metaphorical removal of a veil or a mask. In these cases simple 
visual inspection—at times with minimalist interventions—enabled the reduction of several seemingly 
intractable cases to established ones. The term "unmasking" captures the minimal intervention required in 
these cases."  "Morphing" on the other hand, "required some degree of intervention and elaboration: the 
issue was not simply to point to a different way of looking at an object by metaphorically removing a veil 
or a mask, but to perform a series of operations—in line with my characterization of thinking with objects, 
either mentally or experimentally, with thought and real experiments—leading from one object or device to 
another. [...] the term 'morphing' [...] capture[s] these creative transformations."  
726 Bertoloni Meli, "Patterns," 579, 588-9. As examples, Bertoloni Meli cites the transformation from the 
constrained case of the (pseudo-Aristotelian Quaestiones mechanicae account of the) balance in 
equilibrium to the unconstrained case of "moments of speeds" by Galileo; the transformation of the balance 
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principle—which he likely used in connection with his principle of the reversibility of 
impact and Galileo's law of fall, to determine the conservation of body times speed 
squared727—was formulated by a transformation involving the removal of material 
constraints. The original principle states, "two connected heavy bodies cannot move by 
themselves unless their common center of gravity descends." Huygens’s key modification 
is to “disconnect” the bodies and to consider them in motion, but maintains the relation 
between the bodies. He claims that if the line along which the colliding bodies move is 
converted from the horizontal to the vertical, then the center of gravity of the system of 
disconnected, but colliding, bodies cannot rise after impact. It is no coincidence that in 
colliding pendulums horizontal motion is converted to vertical motion.728 
 Similarly, the relations of quantities of a balance in equilibrium—speed, weight, 
and inverse proportion—were "dematerialized" in Beeckman's Journal, Descartes's early 
and later accounts of collision, as well as the theories of Huygens, Wallis, and Wren. 
Although many drew from the same source, the abstracted relations of quantities in a 
balance were used to conceptualize different facets of collision. The speeds and bodies 
before and after impact are "balanced" (the dematerialization of the pseudo-Aristotelian 
balance). And a particular scenario of collision—when the respective speeds of each 
body are inversely proportional to the sizes—is recognized as having a privileged status, 
namely the speeds before and after impact are the same. The notion of equilibrium has an 
important relationship with other fundamental concepts in the theories of collision, such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to the unconstrained case of collision by Beeckman, as well as the visual representation of collision by both 
Wren and Huygens. He also cites the transformation of the Torricelli principle to the unconstrained case of 
Huygens's variant of the principle.  
727 See chapter 4, section 3. 
728 HOC 16: 21-5, 95n. Bertoloni Meli, "Patterns," 589. Bertoloni Meli, Thinking with Objects, 233. 
Christiane Vilain, "Christiaan Huygens' Galilean Mechanics," in The Reception of the Galilean Science of 
Motion in Seventeenth-century Europe, ed. by Carla Rita Palmerino and Thijssen (Boston: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2004), 195.  
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as the principles of conservation, the contest view of collision, as well as principles of 
symmetry and relative motion.  
 
2.1 – Inverse proportion of bodies and speeds 
 Isaac Beeckman used the relations of quantities in a balance from the pseudo-
Aristotelian Mechanical Problems to conceptualize collision. Recall that, according to 
this tradition, the equilibrium of the balance is explained by the inverse proportion 
between the weights and speeds of the weights. A heavier weight closer to the fulcrum 
moves slower than the lighter weight farther from the fulcrum, when the balance rotates 
about the fulcrum in a circle. Operating under the presumption of equilibrium, the 
initially moving body is the "lighter weight." After collision the bodies move together as 
an aggregate, which is due to Beeckman's understanding of the hardness of atoms. The 
aggregate is the "heavier weight." Since the speeds of the lighter weight and heavier 
weight are inversely proportional to the weights, the speed of the aggregate can be 
determined. The weights and motions of the balance are abstracted to include the body 
and aggregate body before and after collision. Even in those scenarios in which the 
bodies are both initially in motion, Beeckman first (attempted) to transform the scenario 
into one in which one of the bodies is initially at rest. Beeckman employed multiple 
strategies to accomplish such transformations. 
 Although Descartes's notions of both bodies and "conservation" are different from 
Beeckman's (Beeckman was interested in atoms, Descartes was not; Beeckman was 
interested in the destruction of motion, Descartes asserted that the "quantity of motion" 
remains always the same in the world), Descartes's early work on collision appears to be 
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conceptualized according to the pseudo-Aristotelian balance in a remarkably similar 
manner.729 In Descartes's later view of collision, in which he stipulates both the transfer 
of motion and rebound, he retains this framework for those scenarios of collision in 
which the force of resistance is overcome and motion is transferred upon impact (i.e. 
rules 5, 3, and 7a).  
 As discussed in chapter 5, Wallis's "Foundation for all Machines for Facilitating 
Motion" was likely developed from the lever:730 
For in whatever ratio the weight is increased, the speed is diminished in the same 
ratio, whence it is that the product of the weight and the speed for any moving 
force is the same.731  
 
On this foundation Wallis built his theory of collision. Being based on the proportions of 
"all machines," specifically the lever, which is designed to cause weights to be moved, 
his rules of collision focuses on the forces that cause motion. This is one of many 
significant differences between his theory of collision and those of his contemporaries 
and predecessors. Nevertheless, in part because the bodies, which are the focus of his 
theory, do not rebound after collision, his manner of determining the consequences of 
various collisions is nearly identical to those of Beeckman and the early Descartes (even 
though Wallis used a dramatically different form of mathematics).  Like Beeckman and 
Descartes's early work, the inverse proportion is among the body in motion before 
collision and the aggregate in motion after collision. 
 In contrast to Beeckman and Descartes, Wren used the same inverse proportion of 
the sizes of bodies to their speeds, drawn from a balance in equilibrium, but he employed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
729 See chapter 3, section 4.1. 
730 See chapter 5, section 3.1.1. 
731 John Wallis, "Summary Account of the General Laws of Motion," Philosophical Transactions 3 (1669): 
864-5. Translation by Hall, OCH 5: 168. 
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it to distinguish between what he called "proper" and "improper" velocity. Rather than 
describe the speed of a body before impact and the speed of the aggregate after impact, 
"proper" velocity refers to those scenarios in which the initial velocities of bodies are 
inversely proportional to the sizes of the bodies themselves. "Improper" velocities are just 
those velocities that are not inversely proportional to the sizes of the bodies. Wren's law 
of nature states that bodies having proper velocities retain them after collision, although 
they move in a contrary direction. As we have seen in chapter 5, the equivalence between 
collision and the balance is explicit for Wren. Even in his extremely spare prose, he 
expends a sentence to make the connection: "For this reason the collision of bodies 
having their proper velocities is equivalent to a balance swinging about its center of 
gravity," just as "the collision of bodies which have improper velocities is equivalent to a 
balance reciprocating upon two centers equidistant either side of the center of gravity: for 
the balance may be extended into a yoke when the need arises."732   
 Huygens had considered using the relation described by Wren's proper velocity 
(and subsequent first half of Wren's law of nature) as an axiom in his theory of collision. 
Ultimately Huygens decided against it, in favor of a proposition that he considered to be 
even more apparent. But the balance remained important for Huygens, particularly the 
notion of center of gravity.733 The importance of the balance for Wren and Huygens can 
be seen not just in the principles of their theories, but also in the manner in which they 
visually represented collision in their texts. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
732 Christopher Wren, "Lex naturae de collisione corporum," Philosophical Transactions 3 (1669): 867-8. It 
has also been collected in OCH 5: 319-20, with an English translation by Hall, OCH 5: 320-1. 
733 Christiaan Huygens, "Regles du mouuement dans la rencontre des corps," Journal des sçavans 2 (1667-
71): 531-6. It is also collected in HOC 16: 179-81 (also see HOC 6: 383-5, Huygens to Gallois, 18 March 
1669). For example, the Regles culminates in an 8th (unnumbered) proposition which states that, "the 
common center of gravity of two or three (or such as one wishes) bodies, always advances equally toward 
the same side in a straight line before and after impact." Translation by Iltis, "Controversy over Living 
Force," 50. 
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Figure 3. De motu corporum ex percussione 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Lex naturae de collisione corporum 
 
2.2 – Equilibrium and conservation   
 Equilibrium has a complicated relationship with notions of conservation. Some 
historians have pointed to Beeckman's work as a source of the conservation of quantity of 
motion.734 Since Beeckman uses the inverse proportion of speeds and bodies before and 
after collision, and since this proportion describes a balance in equilibrium, the 
presumption has been that he must have assumed that the product of speed and body 
remains the same before and after collision. However, nowhere does Beeckman assert 
such a claim. Rather, as I have shown in chapter 2, Beeckman was particularly 
concerned, not with conservation, but rather with what he called the destruction of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
734 Richard Arthur, "Beeckman, Descartes and the Force of Motion," Journal of the History of Philosophy 
45 (2007): 3.  
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motion. Each of his mathematical studies of collision throughout his Journal is in the 
context of his interest in the loss of motion with each impact.735 Beeckman uses the word 
"conserve" in his Journal, but it is in his description of God continually counteracting 
what Beeckman's mathematics show. For Beeckman, God must be continually enlivening 
and conserving motion, otherwise, motion in the world would continually (and fairly 
rapidly) decrease and cease. A similar issue arises with Wallis, who uses a similar inverse 
proportion to conceptualize collision. He too is explicit in his rejection of the 
conservation of motion. When asked the question directly by William Neile, "Whether no 
Motion in the World perish," he responded that motion may be extinguished and become 
equivalent with rest.736 However, an important distinction should be made between the 
historical actors explicit interests and the historians' retrospective analysis. A "conserved 
quantity" may be implicit in the theories of Beeckman and Wallis, but their explicit 
position was that the quantity that was of interest to them was not preserved in collisions. 
 The question whether or not motion remained constant or is destroyed was 
debated with enthusiasm among members of the Royal Society as evidenced, for 
example, in the lively correspondence between William Neile and John Wallis (the latter 
arguing that motion can be destroyed),737 as well as Willughby's and Croone's criticisms 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
735 Beeckman, Journal 1:265-7; 2:45-7; 3:128-9; 3:363-4.   
736 OCH 5: 274. Wallis to Oldenburg, 21 December 1668. "Whether no Motion in the World perish, &c; 
that is, (as you now explain it,) whether any of that motion, that was first (or at any time since) impressed 
in matter be lost, or (onely) communicated from one parcell of the matter to another; so that though this or 
that body do cease to be moved, that the motion itself ceaseth or perisheth not. [...] [It] is a question, which 
I find Mathematicians, as well as Naturalists, sparing to determine positively; and, you know, I am sparing 
and wary in asserting Universall Negatives. Yet you have, to this, my answer, full inough, (if it be 
observed,) in my answere to ye fourth. For I there intimate my judgement, that motion may be extinguished, 
& I shew you how; that is, a Motion compounded of two contrary forces, may be extinguished by each 
other, & become equivalent with Rest." 
737 OCH 5: 263-5 (Neile to Oldenburg, 18 December 1668), 272-5 (Wallis to Oldenburg, 21 December 
1668), 286-7 (Neile to Oldenburg, 28 December 1668), 302-4 (Wallis to Oldenburg, 2 January 1668/9), 
312-4 (Neile to Oldenburg, 2 January 1668/9), 336-8 (Wallis to Oldenburg, 12 January 1668/9), 346-7 
(Neile to Oldenburg, 22 January 1668/9), 363-4 (Neile to Oldenburg late January 1668/9), 517-8 (Neile to 
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of both Wren's and Huygens's published theories of motion in the Philosophical 
Transactions.738 Huygens, for instance, consistently wrote that when two equal bodies 
meet moving at the same speed, they rebound with the same speed with which they 
approached. He does not write that they rebound with speeds equal in magnitude to their 
original speeds. He writes that it is the same speed. Impact is instantaneous. Motion is not 
interrupted. The direction merely changes. And, according to Huygens, a change of 
direction did not mean a change in speed.739 The topic becomes complex when collision 
is understood algebraically rather than geometrically.  
 There was widespread disagreement on not only the answers given to the question 
of whether motion remains constant, but there was disagreement on what phenomenon or 
"physical quantity" was even under investigation with the question. Isaac Beeckman had 
been compelled by his mathematical investigations of collision to conclude that motion 
itself must in fact decrease and die, but God—operating contrary to what Beeckman's 
mathematical argument showed—continually "enlivens" motion. Whether or not 
Descartes was influenced by his colleague on this topic, Descartes maintains the 
connection between God and motion. However, rather than a God who must continually 
intercede to revive and conserve motion, Descartes's God is immutable (as a consequence 
of Descartes's God's perfection). Therefore, God, always acting the same way, maintains 
the same quantity of motion. In other words, Descartes set as a fundamental principle that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Oldenburg, 7 May 1669), 540-2 (Wallis to Oldenburg 10 May 1669), 550-1 (Wallis to Oldenburg, 17 May 
1669), 558-9 (Neile to Oldenburg, 20 May 1669), 573-4 (Wallis to Oldenburg, 29 May 1669).  
738 A. Rupert Hall, "Mechanics and the Royal Society, 1668-70," The British Journal for the History of 
Science 3 (1966): 35-37. Hall provides an overview of the concerns of Croone, Willughby, and Neile. Also 
see Dana Jalobeanu, "The Cartesians of the Royal Society," in Vanishing Matter and the Laws of Motion: 
Descartes and Beyond, eds. Dana Jalobeanu and Peter R. Anstey (New York: Routledge, 2011), 103-129, 
as well as J. F. Scott, The Mathematical Work of John Wallis, D.D., F.R.S. (1616-1703) (London: Taylor 
and Francis, LTD., 1938), 104-6. 
739 Richard Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics: The Science of Dynamics in the Seventeenth Century 
(New York: American Elsevier, 1971), 156. 
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the quantity of motion (which was proportional to both body and motion) is conserved. 
The impact law describes how the same quantity of motion is maintained when bodies 
interact, and the rules of collision provide further specification for the interaction of 
bodies of different sizes and speeds. Contrary to Descartes, Huygens argued that the 
Cartesian quantity of motion can increase or decrease, and, relying on the notion of the 
relativity of motion (which Descartes would not have accepted in this form), he 
persuasively demonstrated this.740 This appears to have been the quantity that concerned 
Willughby. He seems to have thought that the notion that it could be destroyed or 
"created from nothing" defied common sense—it was "absurd" and "incredible."741 
However, as Huygens would also claim, if direction were considered (i.e. if motion in a 
contrary direction is subtracted), then the "quantity of motion" would be conserved.742 
Although not immediately grasped by his contemporaries, the universality of this 
principle must have been astounding. Regardless of other complicating factors such as 
the kind of body, whether it is hard, soft, or elastic, this principle remains valid. Adding 
more complexity to the topic, Huygens also introduced a new principle—the conservation 
of the product of body and the square of its speed (later known as the vis viva), however 
this principle was only valid for perfectly hard bodies (i.e. perfectly elastic bodies).   
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
740 HOC 16: 49. In Proposition 6 of De motu corporum ex percussione Huygens demonstrates the 
following: "When two bodies collide with one another, the same quantity of motion in both taken together 
does not always remain after impulse what it was before, but can be either increased or decreased." 
Translation by Mahoney.   
741 Hall, "Mechanics and the Royal Society," 35. 
742 HOC 6: 429-33. Huygens, "Regulae de Motu Corporum ex mutuo impulsu," 925-8. Huygens includes 
this claim of the conservation of quantity of motion with direction in the paper published with the 
Philosophical Transactions, which also states that the Cartesian quantity of motion can increase, decrease, 
or remain the same. Quantitas motus duorum Corporum augeri minuive potest per eorum occursum; at 
semper ibi remanet eadem quantitas versus eandem partem, ablata inde quantitate motus contrarii. "The 
quantity of motion which two hard bodies have may be increased or diminished by their collision, but when 
the quantity of motion in the opposite direction has been subtracted there remains always the same quantity 
in the same direction." Translation by Hall, "Mechanics and the Royal Society, " 34.   
	   369 
2.3 – Equilibrium and the "contest view" 
 Several of the theories of collision employ the notion of a contest between 
opposing forces. Descartes's impact law describes a contest between the moving force 
and the force of resistance. Marcus Marci described collision in terms of a contest 
between impulse and resistance, and John Wallis did so in terms of impetus and 
impedimentum. This particular manner of conceptualizing collision as a contest between 
forces did not arise from the balance. Rather, it likely stems from commentaries on 
Aristotle's Physics (book VII) and De caelo, in which the relationships between motive 
force, motion, and the force of resistance are discussed. Because of its central role in 
Descartes's impact law and rules of collision, the contest view has an important place in 
the development of the theory of collision. In the context of collision, it bears a 
relationship with the concepts of equilibrium, and in Descartes's rules of collision it 
combines to produce a theory that is strikingly different from most of his peers and 
successors.    
 Throughout Descartes's early and later views of collision, impact is governed by a 
contest between the force of motion and the force of resistance. If the force of resistance 
is greater than the force of motion, impact results in rebound. If the force of motion is 
greater than the force of resistance, impact results in a transfer of motion between the 
bodies. Unlike other common notions such as the unity of opposites,743 this contest is not 
in equilibrium. The outcome depends on whether one or the other of the forces is greater.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  743 In the opening pages of the pseudo-Aristotelian Mechanical Problems, the author directly connects 
mechanical movement to the lever, the lever to the balance, the balance to the circle, and the circle to the 
"marvelous" unity of opposites: "Everything about the balance is resolved in the circle; everything about 
the lever is resolved in the balance, and practically everything about mechanical movement is resolved in 
the lever." [pseudo] Aristotle, Mechanical Problems, in Minor Works, trans. by Walter Stanley Hett (Loeb 
Classical Library, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1936), 334. Translation by Winter, "Mechanical 
Problems," 2. According to the author, the marvel of mechanical advantage stems from something even 
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 In his early writings on collision, Descartes focuses solely on cases in which the 
force of motion is greater than the force of resistance, and motion is transferred. His early 
examples of the transfer of motion are the same as those of his older colleague 
Beeckman, who described collision only in terms of the transfer of motion, and did not 
advocate a contest view. Unlike his colleague, Descartes indicates that it is possible that 
the force of motion may not overcome the force of resistance in some situations, but in 
his early view he does not stipulate when the force of resistance is greater than the 
moving force. The outcome (i.e. the transfer of motion) of the contests that Descartes 
does present (many of which include smaller bodies transferring motion to larger bodies 
at rest) is governed by the principle of equilibrium that was described in the previous 
section.     
 In Descartes's later view on collision, specifically in the rules of collision in the 
Principles of Philosophy, Descartes stipulates when the force of resistance is greater than 
the moving force. This is at the center of the change in Descartes's view of collision. 
According to rule 4, the force of resistance of a larger body at rest cannot be overcome by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
more marvelous—the unity of opposites in the circle—which, according to the text, is as it should be. "The 
circle contains the first principle of all such matters. This falls out quite logically: it is nothing absurd for a 
marvel to stem from something more marvelous still, and most remarkable is for there to be opposites 
inherent in each other, and the circle is made of opposites" (ibid.). The opposites to which the author refers 
include the following: the circle "derives from the moving and the standing, whose nature is opposite each 
the other;" "the perimeter...generates opposites: the hollow and the curved;" and "it moves backwards and 
forwards at the same time" (ibid.). While discussing equilibrium in the context of the Mechanical Problems 
and Bernardino Baldi's translation, commentary, and criticism of the text, Beeckman argued, contrary to 
Baldi, that a balance in equilibrium could be understood in relation to motions: "The cause of equilibrium 
therefore can be motion, even if the bodies in equilibrium are not moved. For the cause of equilibrium is 
past and future motion. During the present, to be sure, the body is at rest because past and future motions 
occasion rest." Beeckman, Journal 3:134. Translation quoted in Schuster, "Descartes and the Scientific 
Revolution (dissertation)," 68. According to Paolo Palmieri, "Bernardino Baldi debunked the miraculous 
nature the circle, trying, as he saw it, to correct the errors of the pseudo-Aristotle by means of Archimedes 
and Guido Ubaldo." See Paolo Palmieri, "Breaking the circle: the emergence of Archimedean mechanics in 
the late Renaissance" Archive for History of Exact Sciences 62 (2008): 306-7, 325-9. In the context of 
collision, Beeckman claimed that when both bodies are initially in motion with speeds that are inversely 
proportional to the sizes of the bodies, after they meet, the bodies will come to rest: "Sic etiam 
ratiocinandum de bilance." Beeckman, Journal 3:133. Also see Bertoloni Meli, "Patterns," 589.  
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the moving force of a smaller body. In this scenario, and those described by rules 2 and 
7b, which as I have argued are extensions of this rule, no motion is transferred and the 
smaller body rebounds retaining all of its motion.744 Both the transfer of motion and 
rebound are governed by Descartes's prior principle of the conservation of "quantity of 
motion."  
 Descartes's rules of collision also include scenarios, which he had not expressed 
in his early view, in which there is no obvious "winner" in the contest between the force 
of resistance and the moving force. The contest is balanced. Since there is no way to 
decide between rebound or transfer in rules 6 and 7c, for example, Descartes splits the 
difference. He determines how much motion would be transferred or retained, if either 
outcome occurred, and divides that amount between the two options.745 The outcomes 
that he describes for these scenarios are idiosyncratic. For instance, upon the impact of 
equal bodies, in which one body is at rest, as described by rule 6, the initially moving 
body transfers part of its motion and retains part of its motion. This is due to the balance 
between forces. And this is unlike most other accounts of collision which claim that 
either both bodies move together after impact with half the speed of the initially moving 
body (which was also Descartes's early view), or the initially moving body stops and the 
body initially at rest moves with the speed of the initially moving body. Descartes uses 
the same reasoning for rule 1, in which equal bodies collide with equal speeds. However, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
744 The received view claims that the force of resistance in a body at rest is equal to the product of the size 
of the body and the speed of the body approaching it. As I have argued in chapter 3, this is incorrect. It may 
have seemed plausible those who proposed it, due to an algebraic reconstruction of Descartes's rules of 
collision, but this places too little attention on the particularities of the mathematics in which Descartes 
conceptualized collision—a topic to which we will return below. 
745 See chapter 5, section 5.4.3 
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a transfer of motion in this scenario would conflict with his prior principle of the 
conservation of quantity of motion. So, both bodies rebound retaining all of their motion.   
 
2.4 – Symmetry: equilibrium and relativity  
 The concept of symmetry was an important notion in the conceptualization of 
collision. The symmetries from the balance determined epistemically privileged scenarios 
of collision, and the notion of a quantity remaining the same through some change was 
fundamental, particularly to Huygens's theory of collision. There have been multiple 
meanings of the word symmetry, such as the aesthetic Vitruvian notion of an agreeable 
correspondence of parts to the whole, or the abstract mathematical notion of invariance in 
a transformation. In what follows two poles of a disagreement regarding the historical 
emergence of the mathematical concept of symmetry are distinguished, and I clarify the 
position I have taken in this dissertation. We then review the fundamental importance of 
symmetry as a property as well as a relation in the theories of Wren and Huygens.  
 
2.4.1 – Historical emergence of symmetry vs. Universality of symmetry   
 
 No one in the seventeenth century, featured in this dissertation, used any form of 
the word "symmetry" in his theory of collision. Nevertheless, I have used this word to 
describe aspects of the theories. Some historians, such as Bernard Goldstein and Giora 
Hon have forcefully argued746 that what they call "scientific symmetry" (defined as "a 
relation [...] which under certain classes of transformations, such as rotation, reflection, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
746 Giora Hon and Bernard R. Goldstein, From Summetria to Symmetry: The making of a revolutionary 
scientific concept (New York: Springer, 2008).   
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inversion, or other abstract operations, leaves something unchanged—invariant"747) did 
not begin to emerge until 1794 with Legendre's "revolutionary definition" of symmetry in 
his Élements de géometrie.748 They argue that all instances of the term up to 1794 refer to 
a radically different set of concepts. Prior to 1794 "symmetry" primarily referred to a 
property or a single entity. In an aesthetic evaluative context, for example, it referred to 
an entity being "well proportioned."749 Legendre's definition, on the other hand, "severed" 
the term from its "traditional roots and endowed it with a novel meaning, equality by 
symmetry of two nonsuperposable solids—a relation which is based on inverse 
ordering."750 After 1794, symmetry began to refer to a relation between entities. Hon and 
Goldstein argue that the revolution in the concept of symmetry shows that, contrary to the 
presumptions of notable thinkers such as Eugene Wigner, Hermann Weyl, and George 
Sarton (and many other historians),751 symmetry "is not an innate concept that has been 
with us, so to speak, from the dawn of humanity."752 Hon and Goldstein's argument 
implies that it would be entirely inappropriate to use the term "symmetry" to describe 
aspects of the work of Huygens and Wren, since the concept in question did not yet exist.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
747 Hon & Goldstein, Summetria to Symmetry, 2. 748 The definition in Book V, Proposition 23: "Two equal solid angles which are formed (by the same plane 
angles) but in the inverse order will be called angles equal by symmetry, or simply symmetrical angles." 
Quoted in Hon & Goldstein, Summetria to Symmetry, 2. According to Hon and Goldstein this "marks the 
watershed in the history of the scientific concept of symmetry." 
749 Hon & Goldstein, Summetria to Symmetry, 2. 
750 Ibid., 49. 
751 According to Wigner: "Symmetry and invariance considerations, and even conservation laws, 
undoubtedly played an important role in the thinking of physicists, such as Galileo and Newton, and 
probably even before them. However, these considerations were not thought to be particularly important 
and were articulated only rarely." Quoted in Hon & Goldstein, Summetria to Symmetry, 3. And Sarton had 
challenged other historians: "It would be fascinating to retrace the development of the idea of symmetry 
from the Pythagorean days down to our time. Such a study would enable us to make a master section 
through the whole history of scientific thought and would provide us with an excellent touchstone to 
appreciate the relations of science and art at various times. This examination would be very comprehensive, 
for it would take us into almost every department of knowledge; it would attract us into the workshops of 
the craftsmen as well as into the laboratories of the scientists; it would oblige us even to make a pleasant 
excursion in the realm of Chinese philosophy and aesthetics. Professor Jaeger himself might be tempted to 
carry on these investigations." Quoted in ibid.   
752 Hon & Goldstein, Summetria to Symmetry,  49. 
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 However, the methodology of Hon and Goldstein's extensive work suffers from a 
flaw. To defend their argument, they track, with great care, many instances of the term 
"symmetry" throughout the historical record. In each case they show that the term in its 
historical context did not refer to the modern abstract concept of symmetry (or even the 
less abstract 18th century notion of "bilateral symmetry"). They then conclude that the 
modern concept of symmetry did not exist prior to 1794. This is the wrong conclusion. 
Their work provides evidence for the conclusion that the meaning of the term 
"symmetry" changed. It does not show that the concept now associated with the term 
symmetry came into existence at the end of the 18th century. It is possible that the 
concept—a transformation in which something remains unchanged—predates its 
association with the term "symmetry." It may have existed under a different name, or 
under no articulated name at all.  
 Physicist György Darvas is on the other side of the spectrum from Hon and 
Goldstein regarding symmetry.753 Darvas, inspired by Hermann Weyl's lectures on 
symmetry, refers to it as both a phenomenon deeply fundamental to nature and a concept 
widely shared by people throughout diverse cultures. He sees symmetry as a bridge 
connecting the arts and the sciences, and implicitly the past and present. According to 
Darvas, "one of [his] book's goals is to present the unity and interdisciplinary nature of 
human culture,"754 and symmetry is the key. Unlike Hon and Goldstein, who focus their 
attention on the historical meaning of a term (and perhaps a concept), Darvas makes a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
753 György Darvas, Symmetry: Cultural-historical and ontological aspects of science-arts relations; the 
natural and man-made world in an interdisciplinary approach, trans. David Robert Evans (Boston: 
Birkhäuser, 2007). Darvas has been the director of the Symmetrion (an institute dedicated to the 
interdisciplinary study of symmetry, which publishes the journal Symmetry: Culture and Science) since 
1991, and is the Honorary CEO of the "International Symmetry Association," which formed in 2003.  
754 Darvas, Symmetry, x.  
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tripartite distinction in the notion of symmetry: a phenomenon, a concept, and an 
operation. "The phenomenon is what we consider to be symmetrical on the basis of our 
experience or of knowledge we have learned. The concept is what circumscribes all such 
phenomena. The operation is what gives rise to the phenomenon or makes it possible."755  
 Unlike Hon and Goldstein who restrict their attention to the historical actors' 
categories, Darvas presumes that symmetry is timeless. Unlike Hon and Goldstein who 
trace instances of the word, Darvas documents instances of a very general notion of 
symmetry: "in the course of any kind of [...] transformation (operation) at least one [...] 
characteristic of the affected (arbitrary and not necessarily geometrical) object remains 
invariant (unchanged)."756 He claims that this notion can be found in physics, the earth 
sciences, astronomy, crystallography, chemistry, biology, psychology, music,757 
literature,758 dance, fine art,759 applied art, architecture, ethics,760 logic and philosophy, 
and economics,761 to name a few. Aspects of Huygens's and Wren's theories would 
certainly be accepted in this broad notion of symmetry as sameness amid change.762 
 I would like to chart a middle path between Hon and Goldstein, and Darvas. 
Huygens and Wren would not have understood aspects of their work as instances of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
755 Ibid., 1. 
756 Ibid., 20. 
757 Ibid., 34. Examples include "the rules of rhythm, melody, and the architecture of the musical work."  
758 Ibid. Examples include "rhyme, meter, the structure of the literary work." 
759 Ibid. Examples include "proportions, perspective, and harmony of proportion and colour." 
760 Ibid. Examples include "virtuous behaviour, finding moderation, the middle way." 
761 Ibid. Examples include "balance, asymmetric decision-making in game theory, simulation."  
762 Ibid., 56, 7. Darvas notes as an example in his historical survey that the seventeenth century "was when 
Galilei expounded his relativity principle in which he proclaimed the equivalence of the various inertia 
systems." Darvas also claims that there is a similarity between "natural laws" and symmetry in the 
following way: "the road to their discovery presuppose[s] the repeatability and reproducibility of the 
experiments (events), irrespective of their time and place. Furthermore, they declare the natural laws thus 
found and stated to be independent of time and place. If we recall the generalized definition of the concept 
of symmetry, do we not see a similarity?" The same experiment conducted in different times and places 
(ideally) produces the same results. "To this day it is this symmetry that is the highest criterion of scientific 
endeavour."  
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concept referred to by 17th century usages of the term "symmetry." The word at the time 
would have referred to Vitruvius's "aesthetic" meaning of the term, "a due proportion of 
each part in respect of the whole," or possibly Euclid's "mathematical" meaning of the 
term, "commensurability," but not the modern notion of invariance in a transformation.763 
Nevertheless, there are identifiable patterns of thought throughout history and particularly 
among Huygens and Wren, which include recognition of those things that remain the 
same throughout changes—and the application of this recognition in their theories of 
motion and collision. While I recognize that the historical actors did not use the term 
"symmetry," and that the publication of Wren's and Huygens's theories of collision did 
not contribute to changes in the meaning of the term "symmetry," throughout chapter 5 I 
have referred to aspects of their theories using the term symmetry as a short hand for the 
general notions of transformations in which a characteristic of the affected object remains 
unchanged. The concept of symmetry, in this sense, played an important role as a non-
empirical principle in Huygens's and Wren's theories of collision. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
763 The first edition of Thomas Blount's Glossographia, or A dictionary, interpreting all such hard words, 
whether Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Italian, Spanish, French, Teutonick, Belgick, British, or Saxon, as are now 
used in our refined English tongue (1656) defines the word as follows: "Symmetry (symmetria) due 
proportion of each thing to other, in respect of the whole. The convenience that runs between the parts and 
the whole." Edward Phillips's The New world of English words, or A general dictionary containing the 
interpretations of such hard words as are derived from other languages (1658) defines the word in a 
similar manner: "Symmetry, (Greek) a due proportion of each part in respect of the whole." In the 7th 
edition of Phillips's dictionary (1720), the definition is much the same, but expanded to include the arts and 
medicine: "Symmetry, (in Architecture, Painting, &c.) Uniformity, a due Proportion requisite according to 
the respective Rules of those Arts, to make all the Parts of the Work to agree to and with the Whole: 
Among Physicians, it is sometimes taken for a good Temper of body." Hon and Goldstein provide a 
translation of Vitruvius's definition of symmetry: "the appropriate agreement of the elements of the work 
itself, a correspondence [responsus], in any given part, of the separate parts to the entire figure as a whole. 
Just as in the human body there is a symmetric quality of eurhythmies [symmetros est eurythmiae qualitas] 
expressed in terms of the cubit, foot, palm, digit, and other small units, so it is in perfect works [of 
architecture]." Quoted in Hon & Goldstein, Summetria to Symmetry, 5. Regarding Euclid's Elements, book 
10, definition 1: σύµµετρα µεγέθη λέγεται τὰ τῷ αὐτῷ µέτρῳ µετρούµενα, ἀσύµµετρα δέ, ὧν µηδὲν 
ἐνδέχεται κοινὸν µέτρον γενέσθαι. "Those magnitudes are said to be commensurable which are measured 
by the same measure, and those incommensurable which cannot have any common measure." Translation 
by T. L. Heath, The thirteen books of Euclid's Elements, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1908), 10.  
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2.4.2 – Symmetrical collisions 
 
 We have referred to symmetry as a property of an entity (a whole whose parts are 
in agreeable proportion) and as a relation (a transformation in which something remains 
invariant). The former notion (particularly if bilateral symmetry is included as an 
agreeable proportion among parts), is connected to the balance, and thus to several of the 
theories of collision. For instance, it is apparent in Archimedes' demonstration of the "law 
of the lever" in book I of On the Equilibrium of Planes, which states that two 
commensurable magnitudes balance at distances inversely proportional to the 
magnitudes. The book contains seven postulates and fifteen propositions; the law of the 
lever is the sixth of the propositions.764 His demonstration relies on the previously 
established 4th and 5th propositions, and ultimately on an assumption, i.e. the first 
postulate, which states, "equal weights at equal distances are in equilibrium, and equal 
weights at unequal distances are not in equilibrium but incline towards the weight which 
is at the greater distance." Although Archimedes would not have referred to it as such, the 
first postulate is a statement of symmetry.765  
 Often represented diagrammatically as a balance of equal weights at equal 
distances, the "symmetrical case of collision" (equal bodies with equal speeds moving 
toward each other) is given a position of importance in several of the theories of collision. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
764 T. L. Heath, The Works of Archimedes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1897), 192. 
765 Commentators do not agree on the status of equilibrium in Archimedes's works. Compare the following 
two passages from Palmieri and Roche. According to Palmieri, mechanical theorists noticed that 
Archimedes did not rely on a priori principles to derive equilibrium, but rather that he had postulated 
equilibrium. "In his footsteps, these mechanical theorists embraced the empirical nature of equilibrium, that 
is, they postulated principles of equilibrium that depend on certain elementary facts of experience. This 
moves towards empiricism, and away from a priori principles, opened up new vistas about the science of 
mechanics." Palmieri, "Breaking the circle," 306.  Roche, on the other hand, claims that Archimedes's first 
postulate does not appeal to common experience, and that it may well have appealed to symmetry or 
"indifference." Roche claims that "The Archimedean tradition in physics preferred justification by 
symmetry, whenever possible, to justification by experiment." John Roche, "A critical study of symmetry 
in physics from Galileo to Newton," in Symmetries in physics (1600-1980), ed. Manuel Garcìa Doncel 
(Barcelona: Seminari d'Història de les Cièncias, universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 1987), 15.  
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It is the trivial case of Wren's law of nature (and he explicitly depicts it as a balance). It is 
Huygens's second axiom (which he calls a hypothesis) and is thus stated without proof. 
He used it to derive other more complex cases of collision. And it is Descartes's first rule 
of collision (and the only Cartesian rule that Huygens did not reject). However, as shown 
in the previous section, the reasoning behind rules 6, 7c, and 1, have a complex 
relationship between equilibrium and the contest view in Descartes's impact law.766 As 
we have seen in chapter 5, this notion of symmetry played a significant role in Wren's 
theory—working in tandem with the values he put on brevity, unity, and the economy of 
the algebraic symbol—in the presentation of his theory, which was organized 
symmetrically. The diagrams, for example, were meant to be read in both the "Latin way" 
as well as the "Hebraic" (from left to right, and right to left, for different instances of 
collision).  
 
2.4.3 – Relativity and symmetry   
 
 In addition to the role of symmetry as a property, the latter notion of symmetry—
a transformation in which something remains invariant—is of primary importance in 
Huygens's theory of collision.767 Huygens's second hypothesis can be regarded as 
expressing symmetry of an entity.  But, as shown in chapter 5, Huygens's use of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
766 Aiton claimed that laws 1 and 7c have a problematic relationship with the impact law. Rather than 
consequences of the law, he claims that they must have been "interpolations." 7c is an interpolation 
between rule 7a and 7b, and 1 is a limiting case between rules 2 and 3. With my reinterpretation of 
Descartes's rules, the relationship is shown to be unproblematic. See chapter 3, and E. J. Aiton, "The 
Vortex Theory of the Planetary Motions," Annals of Science: a quarterly review of the history of science 
since the renaissance, 13 (1957): 252.   
767 The general manner of conceptualizing collision in terms of transformations, which rely on the general 
structure of a relation remaining invariant amid a change, can be seen in several other accounts of collision 
as well. For example, Beeckman, Descartes, and Wallis all attempt in one form or another to analyze some 
collisions in a two-step process. In several instances in which both bodies are initially in motion, they 
pursue a strategy of transforming the scenario into a case in which one body is initially at rest. However, 
these strategies do not employ principles of relativity, and they are piecemeal. 
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hypothesis two, along with his relativity principle (hypothesis 3) to establish other cases 
of collision, should be regarded as the latter notion of symmetry. For example, as a 
heuristic, Huygens describes a person on a boat holding pendulum bobs in each hand. If 
he were to bring his hands together at a constant and equal speed, the bodies after 
collision would move with the same equal speeds in opposite directions (hypothesis 2). If 
the boat were to move at a constant speed equal to that with which the man on the boat 
moves one of the pendulum bobs, to a person on the shore, the pendulum bob would 
appear to be at rest. And if the two men were to touch hands as the man on the boat 
brought the pendulum bobs together in accordance with hypothesis 2, the person on the 
shore would affectively hold one bob at rest and move the other bob toward it. The role 
of relativity as a transformation to describe the invariance in collisions is central to 
Huygens's theory. His notion of relative motion bears some similarities with Descartes's 
account of motion, but was likely an extension of Galileo's relative motion.768 Huygens's 
principles of relativity, however, was much more radical.    
  As shown in chapter 4 Huygens argued against Descartes's account of collision, 
from a position that initially appears to be internal to Descartes's own system. Huygens 
used Descartes’s first rule—that two equal bodies moving toward each other with the 
same speed will reflect and move away from each other with the same speed769—and the 
principle of the relativity of motion (which at least seems to be similar to Descartes's 
notion of motion) to argue that the Cartesian rules are inconsistent and that the Cartesian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
768 Vilain, "Huygens' Galilean Mechanics," 194-7. Alan Gabbey, "Huygens and mechanics," in Studies on 
Christiaan Huygens, ed. H. J. M. Bos et al. (Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger B. V., 1980), 179. 
769 AT VIII 68. Principia II 46. 
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“quantity of motion” is not actually conserved.770  However, Huygens modified 
fundamental components of Descartes's system, namely the conceptions of "body" and 
"motion." On close inspection, Huygens's understanding of motion, particularly his 
notion of relative motion, was not Cartesian. 
 In the Principles of Philosophy Descartes had described a "vulgar" and a "proper" 
conception of motion. The vulgar conception "is nothing other than the action by which 
some body travels from one place to another."771 Under this conception, Descartes shows 
that the same thing can be said "to move and not to move." He uses the example of a man 
seated on a ship. His surroundings on the ship appear to be at rest, but he and ship move 
away from the port.772 But this is only motion "as commonly interpreted." Descartes's 
"proper" conception of motion, which is "in accordance with the truth of the matter," 
attributes to motion some "determinate nature." By shifting the focus from a "change of 
place" to the "transference with respect to the immediate neighborhood," Descartes's 
"proper" conception was intended to limit the arbitrariness of whether a thing is in motion 
or not.773   
[Motion] is the transference [translatio] of one part of matter or of one body from 
the neighborhood [vicinia] of those bodies that immediately touch it and are 
regarded as being at rest, and into the neighborhood of others.774 
 
However, Descartes's also acknowledged that it is impossible to know whether the 
neighborhood moves with respect to the body or the body moves with respect to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
770 Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics, 148-58. Compare this to Dijksterhuis's rather anachronistic and 
abbreviated account of Huygens’s use of relativity in De motu corporum ex percussione. Dijksterhuis, 
Mechanization (IV: 143-4), 374-5.     
771 AT VIII 53. Principia II 24. Translation by Miller, Principles, 50.  
772 Ibid. "Thus a man, seated in a ship which is sailing out of port, thinks that he is moving if he turns his 
attention to the shores, which he considers to be at rest. But he does not think so if he turns his attention to 
the parts of the ship, in relation to which he constantly maintains the same situation." 
773 Daniel Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 162-72. 
774 AT VIII 53. Principia II 25. Translation by Garber, Descartes' metaphysical physics, 159-60. 
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neighborhood. Transference is reciprocal.775 Some commentators have claimed that this 
is evidence that Descartes's proper conception of motion is ultimately relative. Garber, on 
the other hand, has argued that even with the "reciprocity of transfer" Descartes provided 
a non-arbitrary distinction between motion and rest. Motion is the mutual separation of a 
body and its neighborhood.776  
 Whether or not the "reciprocity of transfer" entails some form of relative motion, 
Descartes's conception of motion is clearly different from Huygens's. Rather than the 
"vulgar" notion of motion in which the observer's perception determines whether a body 
is in motion, Descartes defined a "proper" conception of motion, which privileged the 
reciprocal transfer of a body and its neighborhood. Huygens, on the other hand "believed 
from the beginning of his career not only that the position of the observer influenced the 
perception of motion, but also that there was no privileged point of view, for all 
viewpoints were equivalent."777 
 Moreover, whether or not Descartes's account of motion is truly relative, it is 
incompatible with his own rules of collision. The rules of collision appear to be 
compartmentalized from Descartes's refined exposition of motion. The received view is 
that motion is relative for Descartes. If so, the classic example of inconsistency is the lack 
of symmetry between rules 4 and 5.778 But, even with a more subtle understanding of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
775 AT VIII 55-6. Principia II 29. "Finally, I added that the transference take place from the neighborhood 
not only of any contiguous bodies, but only from the neighborhood of those regarded as being at rest. For 
that transference is reciprocal, and we cannot understand body AB transferred from the neighborhood of 
body CD unless at the same time body CD is also transferred from the neighborhood of body AB." 
Translation by Garber, Descartes' metaphysical physics, 166-7. 
776 Garber, Descartes' metaphysical physics, 168. 
777 Vilain, "Huygens' Galilean Mechanics," 196. Also see Christiane Vilain, "Huygens and Relative 
Motion," in Relativity in General: Proceedings of the Relativity Meeting ‘93, ed. by Diaz Alonzo and M 
Lorente Paramo (Gif-sur-Yvette Cedex: Atlantica Seguier Frontieres, 1995), 161-9. 
778 AT VIII 68-69. Principia II 49-50. Rule 4 describes a small body approaching a larger body at rest. Rule 
5 describes large body approaching a smaller body at rest. If one can arbitrarily choose a reference frame to 
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Descartes's notion of motion (such as Garber's account), the rules remain problematic. 
With the latter approach, Descartes is understood to have made a meaningful distinction 
between motion and rest. Of primary importance to this difference is the immediate 
surrounding (i.e. neighborhood) of a part of matter. Motion is defined by the mutual 
separation (or transference) of the part and its neighborhood. Rest is defined by no 
transference between the part and its immediate surroundings. In the rules of collision, 
however, the two bodies are described in isolation. They are explicitly not surrounded by 
a neighborhood in the plenum. Thus, there is no meaningful way to describe a body at 
rest (according to Descartes's prior discussions), and yet three of the rules involve 
scenarios in which one body is at rest.   
 Huygens's relativity principle may have been inspired by Galileo, whom Huygens 
greatly admired.779 However, Galileo's relative motion was restricted to local problems. 
He did not intend to make a general claim about motion and space. "[F]or Galileo, the 
impossibility of judging from the inside whether a boat or the Earth is in motion does not 
imply that such a motion does not exist. Galileo never said that the shore or the stars 
could be considered as being in motion just as the boat or the Earth."780 Huygens's 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
describe motion, then the initial conditions of rules 4 and 5 are equivalent. However, the conditions 
described after collision in rules 4 and 5 are not equivalent. The smaller body rebounds after meeting the 
larger body at rest in rule 4, whereas motion is transferred from the larger moving body to the smaller at 
rest and both move together after collision in rule 5. 
779 Gabbey, "Huygens and mechanics," 175-81. Alan Gabbey has suggested that Huygens’s relativity 
principle did not originate with Descartes, but rather with Galileo. According to Gabbey, Galilean relativity 
involved “dynamic considerations” which Huygens too had used in his earliest work on collision. Huygens 
initially appealed to a force, the vis collisionis, in his 1654 notes on collision, and used the invariance of 
forces with respect to frames of reference in his early collision theory. Huygens would later abandon the vis 
collisionis, but it was present in his first arguments using relativity. Compare this with Westfall, Force in 
Newton's Physics, 150-1. In his chapter, “Christiaan Huygens’ Kinematics,” Westfall also argues that 
Huygens’s work on collision began with a notion of force that was later abandoned. However, unlike 
Gabbey, Westfall claims that Huygens used Descartes’s relativity principle against Descartes: “Here, of 
course, was the principle of the relativity of motion, Descartes’ own principle turned against his own 
conclusions.” 
780 Vilain, "Huygens' Galilean Mechanics," 196. 
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principle of relativity was far more radical.781 Together with the "symmetrical case" of 
collision, Huygens's relative motion was a principle of symmetry at the foundation of his 
theory of collision.  
 
 
Section 3  
Mathematization 
 
 This dissertation contributes to the renewed study of the "mathematization of 
nature." With a historicist methodology it provides significant reinterpretations of the 
mathematical theories of collision of several major figures in 17th century science. And 
doing so, it charts the emergence of an algebraic physico-mathematics, and describes the 
mutual impact of algebra and collision.  
 
 The "mathematization" of nature was a classic thesis of the scientific revolution, 
espoused in various forms by a wide range of historians and philosophers including E. A. 
Burtt, Edgar Zilsel, Edmund Husserl, Alexandre Koyré, and E. J. Dijksterhuis. In general 
it claimed that there was a developing trend in early modern Europe—running counter to 
Aristotelian philosophy—that understood the underlying structure of nature to be 
mathematical, and a corresponding conviction that the best means of explaining 
fundamental aspects of nature was through mathematics.782 Koyré, for instance, claimed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
781 Vilain, "Huygens' Galilean Mechanics," 196. Dijksterhuis, Mechanization (IV: 149), 378. HOC 16: 222. 
"True motion is relative motion." 
782 E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science, New York, 1924. Revised 
Edition 1932 (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1954). Edgar Zilsel, "The Sociological Roots of 
Science," The American Journal of Sociology 47 (1942): 544-62. Alexandre Koyré, "Galileo and Plato," 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 4 (1943): 400-28. E. J. Dijksterhuis, Mechanization of the World Picture: 
Pythagoras to Newton, Amsterdam, 1950, trans. C. Dikshoorn and reprinted (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1986).    
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that Galileo, led by a Platonist philosophy of mathematics, was the first to mathematize 
nature by identifying physical space and motion with corresponding idealizations from 
geometry.783 Through the latter half of the 20th century, historians and philosophers of 
science determined several problems with this thesis. Sophie Roux, in the article, "Forms 
of Mathematization," has reviewed several of these criticisms, and in light of them, has 
proposed a renewed study of mathematization.784 For example, there was not a rigid 
distinction between quantitative physics and Aristotelian philosophy. There had been 
mixed mathematical sciences since antiquity. Additionally, it has been questionable to 
assume that "motion" is the most consequential aspect of the scientific revolution.785 And 
mathematical languages are not neutral. "Even more clearly than in the case of a 
translation from one natural language to another, the shift from one symbolic language to 
another entails that certain possibilities are opened while others are closed."786  
Moreover, "there was never a working definition of mathematics in general"  
[T]here were different conceptions of quantities, and consequently different ways 
of conceiving of the unity of mathematics. [...] [It] is a fundamentally complex 
field, that has included various domains from its very beginning and that has kept 
developing new domains throughout history.787  
 
Michael Mahoney's work has also stressed this aspect of mathematics, and distinguishes 
in general, between geometric and algebraic modes of thought.788 Roux proposes, "we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  783 Koyré, "Galileo and Plato," 400-28. 784 Sophie Roux, "Forms of Mathematization," Early Science and Medicine 15 (2010): 319-337. 
785 Roux, "Forms of Mathematization," 321. Rather than focus on laws of motion, the "'relevant 
epistemological units' for an understanding of the Scientific Revolution are [...] a complex set of problems 
embodied in mundane objects." 
786 Ibid., 322. 
787 Ibid., 324. 788 Michael S. Mahoney, "The Beginnings of Algebraic Thought in the Seventeenth Century," in 
Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics, ed. by Stephen Gaukroger (Sussex: Harvester Press, 
1980) 141-55. Michael S. Mahoney, The Mathematical Career of Pierre Fermat 1601-1665 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1973, 2nd edition 1994) 2-16. In the latter Mahoney emphasizes the diversity of 
mathematics in the 17th century and provides a classificatory scheme. Wallis's and Barrow's competing 
conceptions of mathematics have been fertile ground for case studies of conflicts between multiple forms of 
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should neither look for a definition of mathematics in general, nor think of mathematics 
as a unified field of knowledge, but rather, submit to an historically situated and 
empirical definition of mathematics, namely what should be called 'mathematics' is the 
activities of those who called themselves or were called by others 'mathematicians.'"789 
With a focus on mathematical practice, rather than "idealization," she articulates various 
distinct forms of mathematization including "quantification" (arithmetic), 
"geometrization," "axiomatization," and the application of symbolic algebra.790  
 This dissertation follows in the tradition outlined by historians such as Roux and 
Mahoney. My historical narrative traces the emergence of an algebraic physico-
mathematics. And, using "historically situated" conceptions of mathematics, I have 
provided significant reinterpretations of Descartes's rules of collision as well as the 
development of Huygens's theory of collision.  
 Historians have taken care to avoid "presentism" in narratives of the conceptual 
development of science. However, they have been less conscientious with mathematics. 
The technical aspects of contemporary mathematics have been explicitly avoided, as if to 
focus only on the concepts of science. Treating mathematics as if it were a neutral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
mathematics in the 17th century. Katherine Hill, "Neither Ancient nor Modern," Notes and Records of the 
Royal Society of London 50/51 (1996/7): 165-78 / 13-22. and Chikara Sasaki, "The acceptance of the theory 
of proportions in the sixteenth century: Barrow's Reaction to the Analytic Mathematics," Historia 
Scientiarum 29 (1985): 83-116.  
789 Roux, "Forms of Mathematization," 234-5.  
790 Ibid., 325-6. Others have used a similar historicist methodology. Peter Damerow, Freudenthal Gideon, 
Peter McLaughline, and Jürgen Renn have emphasized the "theory of proportions" as an example of a 
component of "shared knowledge," in Exploring the limits of pre-classical mechanics, 2nd edition (New 
York: Springer, 2004). Niccolò Guicciardini has investigated the differences between analytic and synthetic 
methods, as well as the use of geometric versus analytic limits in Newton’s Principia and his work on the 
motions of the moon. Niccolò Guicciardini, "Geometry, the Calculus and the Use of Limits in Newton's 
Principia," in The applications of mathematics to the sciences of nature, eds. Paola Cerrai, Paolo Freguglia, 
C. Pellegrini (New York: Springer, 2002), 223-32. Niccolò Guicciardini, Isaac Newton on Mathematical 
Certainty and Method (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009). Niccolò Guicciardini, Reading the Principia: The 
Debate on Newton's Mathematical Methods for Natural Philosophy from 1687 to 1736 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999).    
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language, modern mathematics has been used as an interpretive tool to "clarify" the 
history of science. This obscures key features of the development of science. The changes 
that mathematics was undergoing, and the particularities of the various fields and 
traditions, notably impacted the development of the rules of collision, for example. The 
particular mathematical concepts were intrinsic to the mathematical study of nature.  
 Richard Westfall, for example, explained that in his history of ideas he "attempted 
to define the problems on which they expended themselves in their terms, and to see their 
proposed solutions in relation to the intellectual equipment at their disposal." However, 
he explicitly did not include the technical aspects of mathematics as a relevant part of his 
history of ideas: 
Whereas I devote no attention to social factors, I devote very little more to 
technical mathematical questions. I do not mean to deny in any way the 
importance of mathematics in seventeenth-century dynamics. With the calculus, 
for example, a whole new range of problems hitherto beyond the grasp of 
quantitative mechanics became amendable to exact treatment. My central concern 
has focused on conceptual issues, however; and bringing the development of 
dynamics up to Newton, such matters appear to me to have been central to the 
science of dynamics.791  
 
Although the technical aspects of calculus would provide greater exactness, Westfall 
claimed that the concepts themselves, particularly prior to the development of calculus, 
were not significantly influenced by the particular form of mathematics. D. T. Whiteside, 
in his paper "Patterns of mathematical thought in the later 17th century," emphasized that 
understanding the contemporary mathematics is important in order to understand the 
particular "proof-structures" that were used in the 17th century. Nevertheless he 
"reluctantly" used anachronistic notation: 
With few exceptions historians have in the past considered it not very important 
to study outdated forms of proof, considering them—if at all—the subject matter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
791 Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics, ix-xi. 
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of logic and preferring to substitute modern proofs. From the present viewpoint, 
however, the proof-structure is at least as important as the particular result 
obtained by it, and it becomes possible many times to see how the inadequacy or 
lack of proof-structures conditioned the development of whole classes of results. 
For the most part—notably in examining the method of exhaustion—where the 
original notations would seem to obscure ideas which can be clarified in 
appropriate symbolism, anachronistic notation is used. This concession to concise 
expression and to understanding was not made without hesitation, but rather than 
become involved in an intricate study of the modifying influence of symbolism it 
seemed preferable to substitute a cautious use of modern notation for the often 
unnecessarily cumbrous original.792 
 
Contrary to Westfall, this dissertation has shown that the technicalities of mathematics—
some of them quite simple, and in the years before the advent of calculus—are intrinsic to 
the conceptual development of science. Rather than focus on "proof structures," this 
dissertation has shown that changes in mathematics had an influence on the very 
formulation of concepts.  
 The reconstruction of historical ideas with modern mathematics obscures these 
developments. Examples of this practice could be presented for each of the figures in this 
dissertation. It is particularly striking in recent scholarship on Christiaan Huygens. I have 
argued that in 1652 Huygens's used Cartesian symbolic algebra as an innovative heuristic 
tool to criticize Descartes's rules of collision, and likely used the symbolic algebra as 
scaffolding to develop a new principle of conservation. Not only were Huygens’s uses of 
algebra novel, but his equations are not equivalent to modern reconstructions; this is 
particularly apparent in Huygens's avoidance of negative numbers. Huygens's use of 
algebra, and the successful predictions he made while using his equations at the Royal 
Society, were a key step in the development of an algebraic physico-mathematics. This is 
eclipsed by modern reconstructions of Huygens's equations from the 1652 manuscripts as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  792 D. T. Whiteside, "Patterns of Mathematical Thought in the later Seventeenth Century," Archive for 
History of Exact Sciences 1 (1661): 181-2. 
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well as reconstructions of his statement of conservation of quantity of motion with 
direction.  
 For example, in the 2005 biography of Huygens, Andriesse writes:  
It is rather unfair to view these pages [the "large single sheet" on which 
"Christiaan notes down all essential theorems for the concept of collisions" in 
1652] with our present-day knowledge of physics, but we can hardly do 
otherwise, and it does allow us insight into his achievement. If we then attempt to 
view the work with the knowledge of Galileo or Descartes, then perhaps this sin 
could be forgiven.793   
  
Andriesse goes on to "derive the laws of collision," presumably as he suspects Huygens 
may have done himself. However, Andriesse uses a combination of Huygens's concepts 
and modern algebraic equations.794 But more importantly he is not attentive to Huygens's 
avoidance of negative quantities, and presumes the modern convention of directionality 
with positive and negative signs: "This is perhaps even clearer when numbers are used, 
for instance, meters per second. Let velocities to the right be positive and those to the left 
negative."795 The link between positive and negative signs and the directionality of 
motion was in the process of emerging. In Huygens's summaries, published with the 
Journal de Sçavans and the Philosophical Transactions, Huygens claimed in the 5th 
proposition that when a contrary direction is subtracted from the former, Cartesian 
quantity of motion is conserved. However, he does not appear to have embraced the 
independent notion of a negative speed. Speed remained a positive magnitude in 
Huygens's mature work. When two equal bodies with equal speeds collide from contrary 
directions they rebound in opposite directions retaining their original speeds. It is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
793 C. D. Andriesse, Huygens: The Man Behind the Principle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 104.  
794 He does not use Huygens's Cartesian notation convention (x, y for unknowns, a, b, c for knowns), but 
rather uses his own convention: M and m for the "masses" of the bodies, and B for the initial velocity and A 
for the acquired velocity of the larger body, and b for the initial speed and a for the acquired speed of the 
smaller body. 
795 Andriesse, Huygens, 107. 
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until the work of Wallis and Wren that "nature obeys the algebraic laws of addition and 
subtraction," and directionality of motion is identified with positive and negative signs.    
 Similarly, Curtis Wilson's 2011 translation and commentary of Huygens's texts on 
"the rules for the motion of bodies arising from mutual impact" uses modern mathematics 
to reconstruct Huygens's ideas. The "Comments on Huygens's Summary" describe 
Huygens's rules in terms of the "conservation of kinetic energy" and the "conservation of 
momentum," and expresses Huygens's rules 5 and 6 in terms of the modern equations for 
those conservation principles. In an lengthy note on the commentary, Wilson et al. 
provide extensive symbolic derivations: "a derivation of conservation of momentum from 
Huygens's diagrams and his Rule 4," a "Derivation of Conservation of Kinetic Energy," 
as well as a "Derivation of Conservation of Velocity."796  
 Modern algebraic reconstructions are also at the heart of the longstanding 
interpretive challenges facing commentators of Descartes's rules of collision. The 
standard interpretation of Descartes's rules of collision has presented the quantity of 
motion as the product of body and speed. The forces involved in the impact law, such as 
the moving force and the force of resistance, have likewise been expressed by historians 
as algebraic products akin to the quantity of motion. Not only did Descartes not express 
these forces as products, three of Descartes's rules describe one body at rest. The above 
interpretation would imply that the force of resistance in the body at rest should be nil. 
This is an interpretive difficulty since Descartes claims that the force of resistance in the 
larger body at rest is greater than the moving force in rule 4, and is equal to the moving 
force in rule 6 (in which both bodies are the same size). The solution that historians such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
796 Gemma Murray, William Harper, and Curtis Wilson, "Huygens, Wren, Wallis, and Newton on Rules of 
Impact and Reflection," in Vanishing Matter and the Laws of Motion: Descartes and Beyond, ed. by Dana 
Jalobeanu and Peter R. Anstey (New York: Routledge, 2011) 160, 187-8. 
	   390 
as Aiton produced for this difficulty was to continue to express the force of resistance as 
a product, but rather than the product of the body and the speed of the body at rest, it has 
been argued to be the product of the body and the speed of the body approaching. I 
contend that this interpretation, which relies on a mathematical expression that Descartes 
did not use, is incorrect. I have also argued such an interpretation has led to several 
unnecessary interpretive problems with both Descartes's explanations in the famous letter 
to Clerselier as well as the French edition of the Principles of Philosophy. Using the 
received view of the force of resistance as a lens, it has been argued that there is a 
proliferation of new principles in the letter to Clerselier, with some, such as the Principle 
of Least Modal Change, bearing no connection to the impact law, and others seeming to 
be completely arbitrary with no justification at all. According to the received view, the 
subsequent French edition of the Principles relies on a hybrid of some of these principles 
in the justification of the rules of collision, but is ultimately a hastily composed 
unfinished draft.  
 If we maintain a historicist focus on the mathematics that Descartes himself used, 
and if we are attentive to Descartes's own guidance for understanding the rules of 
collision according to the outcomes of the contest between the force of resistance and 
moving force, we find that Descartes's rules of collision are much less problematic than 
has usually been alleged. There is an underlying pattern797 and method unifying the rules 
of collision, which we see clearly when they are reorganized as I have suggested. Chapter 
3 has attempted to make sense of Descartes's practice, and has recaptured the method that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  797 Chapter 3 uncovered a unifying pattern throughout the rules. There is a distinct similarity in the 
structure of those rules that share an outcome of the impact law—the force of resistance is not overcome 
resulting in rebound such as rules 4, 2, and 7b, the force of resistance is overcome resulting in a transfer of 
motion such as rules 5, 3, 7a, or there is a balance between the forces such as 6, 7c, 1. 
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was advocated and practiced by Descartes and others in the 17th century, the analytic 
method. I have shown that the letter to Clerselier is a well-ordered letter, in which 
Descartes explains himself in three interlocking ways. Rather than a hybrid of ideas in the 
French edition, we find Descartes revealing the analytic method to further explain how he 
attempted to solve the problem of collision.   
 Maintaining this historicist method also makes it possible to recognize the 
transformation in mathematization, namely the emergence of an algebraic physico-
mathematics, and the connection between the development of the rules of collision and 
the development of algebra used in a physical context, which will be reviewed in the next 
section. 
 
3.1 – Algebra and Collision.  
Philosophy [i.e. physics] is written in this grand book—I mean the universe—
which stands continually open to our gaze, but it cannot be understood unless one 
first learns to comprehend the language and interpret the characters in which it is 
written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are 
triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures, without which it is humanly 
impossible to understand a single word of it; without these, one is wandering 
around in a dark labyrinth.798 
 
For Galileo geometry was the language of the grand book of the universe. Its characters 
were triangles, circles, and geometrical figures. In general, this was the fundamental 
language used by Harriot (whose equations were symbolic representations of the steps of 
a geometric construction), Beeckman and Descartes (who relied on the magnitudes and 
proportions of the pseudo-Aristotelian balance), and Huygens (who formulated his theory 
in the axiomatic tradition of Galileo and Archimedes). However, mathematics was itself 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  798 Galileo Galilei, Il Saggiatore (Rome, 1623). Translation by Stillman Drake, Discoveries and Opinions 
of Galileo (New York: Anchor Books, 1957), 237-8. 
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developing. Descartes's La Géométrie was an important part of these developments, and 
in his private manuscripts and during experiments at the Royal Society, Huygens used 
equations written in Descartes's symbolic algebra. Wren and Wallis continued algebraic 
investigations of collision. For them, algebra was not understood as a mere tool. 
According to Wren "nature obeys the algebraic laws of addition and subtraction." In other 
words, as the natural world was increasingly being investigated mathematically, 
mathematics itself was changing. The rules of collision are a focal point of these changes. 
Not only did the 17th century see a "mathematization of nature," but there were 
significant changes in the mathematics of nature. Specifically, developing in tandem with 
the rules of collision was the emergence of an algebraic physico-mathematics. This new 
mathematics of nature made possible new conceptualizations of the directionality of 
motion, and provided a unified expression of collision in a system of equations with two 
unknowns. The algebraic operators + and − provide a new expression of contrary 
motion, and conversely the contrary motions involved in collision would provide (in the 
work of John Wallis, for example) a legitimation of heretofore "impossible quantities" 
such as negative numbers. 
 
Descartes's mathematics played a pivotal and ironic role in the emergence of an 
algebraic physico-mathematics. Beeckman investigated the apparent "destruction" of 
motion in the collision of bodies, using the proportions from the pseudo-Aristotelian 
balance. Rather than focus on the loss of motion, Beeckman's colleague, Descartes, 
changed the emphasis to the "quantity of motion," and put the conservation of this 
quantity at the heart of his system. Nevertheless, the mathematics of Descartes's early 
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view of collision is strikingly similar to Beeckman's use of the pseudo-Aristotelian 
balance. Descartes made a major contribution to mathematics with the publication of his 
La Géométrie, which used the tools of symbolic algebra to analyze classic problems in 
geometry, such as the problem of Pappus. Descartes was influential in the development 
of analytic geometry; he was also responsible for framing the topic of the rules of 
collision. Both proved to be influential, and both would become intertwined. However, 
Descartes himself never brought them together. Despite the claims by some historians,799 
Descartes never intended for his analytic geometry to frame his physics, which in the 
Principles of Philosophy remained largely a "mathematical physics without 
mathematics."800 The rules of collision are one exception in which Descartes's physics 
does contain mathematics, although only rudimentary numerical examples. Quantities are 
(positive) continuous magnitudes. The rules involve simple relations of quantities, 
which—like Beeckman's—are not unified in a single expressive system. Instead multiple 
mathematical strategies are used to express the various ways bodies collide. With four 
centuries of hindsight, we see that Descartes had nearly all the components available to 
him to understand collision in the way that it ultimately would be. Descartes was largely 
responsible for developing these tools in the first place, and yet he did not take advantage 
of them. This should not be seen as a failure. Rather, it is a sign of the deep significance 
of the differences in mathematical fields. And it indicates just how unapparent it was to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
799 See appendix 1.   
800 Mouy, Développement, 144. Koyré, Galileo Studies, 90. According to Mouy, "La physique cartésienne 
est une physique mathématique sans mathématiques. C'est une géométrie concrète, ce n'est pas une 
géométrie analytique, une algèbra de l'univers." This was also noted by Koyré, "It is well known that 
Descartes' physics, as it is set out for us in the Principes no longer contains mathematically expressible law. 
It is, in fact, no more mathematical than that of Aristotle." Also see Daniel Garber, "A different Descartes: 
Descartes and the programme for a mathematical physics in his correspondence," in Descartes’ Natural 
Philosophy, ed. Stephen Gaukroger, John Schuster, and John Sutton (New York: Routledge, 2000) 114. 
"The physics of the Principia is all words." 
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link together the symbolic analytic tools from Descartes's algebra with the relationships 
between physical magnitudes in the physico-mathematics of his natural philosophy.   
Huygens acquired in-depth knowledge of Descartes's algebra (being tutored by 
Frans van Schooten and contributing to Schooten's Latin translation and systematization 
of Descartes's La Géométrie), modified the domain of its relevance (rather than express 
geometric problems and curves, he used it to examine relationship between different 
kinds of physical quantities), and in his early manuscripts turned it against Descartes's 
physics (showing that Cartesian quantity of motion is not conserved and the rules are 
inconsistent). The composition of these early manuscripts coincides with Huygens's first 
announcements of his position against Descartes.  
Huygens heuristic work with algebra likely served as scaffolding for a new 
principle, the conservation of Cartesian quantity of motion with direction. However, 
Huygens did not fully replace Descartes's scalar quantity with a vector quantity. He did, 
however, state that the quantity of motion is conserved when motion in a contrary 
direction is subtracted. This amendment of Descartes's conservation principle was likely 
inspired through his various algebraic investigations of the quantities involved in 
collision.  
And Huygens used symbolic algebra at the early meetings of the Royal Society to 
accurately predict the motions of colliding pendulum bobs, surpassing everyone else who 
was present. This event must have made a lasting impact on his contemporaries, and was 
remarked upon in letters between Moray, Oldenburg and Spinoza.801 Individuals in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
801 HOC 5: 547. Oldenburg to Spinoza, 18 December 1665.  Also see OCH 2: 624-5. Moray to Oldenburg, 
27 November 1665.  See chapter 4. 
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attendance, such as Christopher Wren and John Wallis, would go on to produce their own 
algebraic investigations of collision.   
 Despite the successes of his algebra, Huygens appeared not to be completely 
satisfied with his equations. They remained private. His algebraic studies are found in his 
manuscripts but not in the treatises prepared for publication. The latter, which are 
formulated in the axiomatic tradition of Galileo and Archimedes, employ geometric 
notions and the theory of proportions with such a thoroughness that commentators have 
suggested that Huygens must have thought in geometry.802 Even after his successful 
predictions at the Royal Society, he scribbled out his algebraic equations. This may be 
due to Huygens's preference for the demonstrative power of classical mathematics, but it 
may also be due to what may have seemed to be the problematic consequences of 
algebra, which defied classical notions of quantity. On close inspection, we find that 
Huygens's algebra bears a complex position in-between modern algebra and the 
traditional requirements on quantity. As has been demonstrated in chapter 4, this can be 
seen in the great lengths to which Huygens went to avoid negative quantities in his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
802 A. E. Bell, Christian Huygens and the Development of Science in the Seventeenth Century (London: St. 
Ann's Press, 1947), 25. H. J. M. Bos, "Huygens and mathematics," in Studies on Christiaan Huygens, ed. 
H. J. M. Bos et al. (Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger B. V., 1980), 132. H. J. M. Bos, "Introduction," in Christiaan 
Huygens' The Pendulum Clock, trans. Richard J. Blackwell (Ames: Iowa State university Press, 1986). 
Joella Yoder, Unrolling Time: Christiaan Huygens and the mathematization of nature (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 172. Guicciardini, Reading the Principia, 119.  Many have rightly 
commented upon Huygens's strength and preference for geometry. According to Bell, “He was hailed as the 
reborn Vieta and compared with Pappus and Apollonius, two giants of Greek geometry.” Bos has claimed 
that Huygens must have thought geometrically. And Yoder has claimed that Huygens “regarded nature 
fundamentally as a geometric realm.” To support her claim she cites the following: “in the Cosmotheoros 
he argues that people on other worlds would still develop Euclidean geometry because the same 
mathematical principles abide throughout the universe. In other words, mathematics is not an abstract 
construct of our earthly minds but informs nature.” Yoder goes on to say that “he simply saw the physical 
world with the eyes of a geometer.” The Horologium oscillatorium (1673), often called a "geometrical 
physics," is organized in a strict axiomatic style and employs the theory of proportions with such rigor that, 
with almost no exceptions, no multiplication of dimensionally different magnitudes occurs in the whole 
work. Guicciardini has argued that Newton used Huygens's Horologium oscillatorium as a model for the 
Principia, but even so, Huygens was at times critical of Newton's non-classical use of the theory of 
proportions. 
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heuristic use of equations in his manuscripts.  
 Thomas Harriot had used symbolic equations to represent the steps of a geometric 
construction, which provided the underlying structure of collision. Descartes used 
symbolic algebra as an analytic tool to study geometric curves. He also framed the topic 
of collision in the context of the laws of nature, but the mathematics of his rules of 
collision was not algebraic. Huygens used Descartes's analytic tool (symbolic algebra) to 
challenge Descartes's rules of collision. It was also employed as scaffolding for a new 
principle, and in the successful predictions of experiments. However, algebra remained a 
private heuristic for Huygens. Wallis and Wren not only expressed their theories of 
collision algebraically and published them, but Wallis would use the notion of contrary 
motion, which is central in investigation of collision to legitimize the notion of a negative 
number.   
Many of the accounts of collision relied on traditional presumptions regarding 
physical quantities such as body and speed as "positive" magnitudes. This was supported 
by the conceptual use of the balance as a framework for the proportions among the 
quantities, and the representational use of geometric diagrams. In the dominant 
"geometric mode" of thinking, only positive constant magnitudes were used for speeds in 
any direction.803 Huygens, Descartes, Beeckman, and Harriot, for example, did not use 
algebraic vector quantities. Rather, bodies change speed instantaneously. And the speeds 
of the bodies in any direction are "positive." The line segment AC in figure 5, for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
803 Mahoney, "Beginnings of Algebraic Thought," 142. Michael Mahoney has distinguished between what 
he has called the geometric mode and the algebraic mode of thought in the 17th century. The algebraic 
mode of thought is “characterized by the use of an operative symbolism [...] [an emphasis on] mathematical 
relations rather than objects [...] [and] is free of ontological commitment.” The characteristics of Greek 
mathematics on the other hand, “are almost diametrically opposed to those just cited" – no symbolism, an 
emphasis on entities rather than relations, and a dependence on physical ontology. 
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example, is the speed of the larger body at A. This line is a positive continuous magnitude 
just as is the line BC, which is the speed of the smaller body at B.  In this example, the 
body at A is proportional to the speed BC as the body at B is to the speed AC. As such the 
bodies will have the same speeds (in the opposite direction) after meeting as they did 
before. The magnitudes of the lines are determined according to proportions and 
understood as the speed of the bodies.   
 
Figure 5. Christiaan Huygens, De motu corporum ex percussione, proposition VII, 1656 
 
 An algebraic expression, on the other hand, uses a symbolism that, in the context 
of a set of equations, may refer to negative velocities. In a geometric mode of thought, 
which according to Mahoney, relies more strongly on entities and is bound to ontological 
commitments, a negative speed is meaningless; in a purely algebraic mode of thinking, 
on the other hand, one would be free to operate with negative quantities. Whereas 
Huygens's equations in the manuscripts have an idiosyncratic in-between status bridging 
both traditional conceptions of quantity and the flexibility of symbolic algebra and 
avoided negative numbers, Wallis explicitly embraced the positive and negative signs to 
indicate the direction of motion.  Not only did this extend the symbolic algebraic 
physico-mathematics, Wallis would later appeal to the directionality of motion in his 
Treatise on Algebra to provide a legitimation of the otherwise "impossible" negative 
number.  
 Rather than reject or restrict "impossible" quantities that could be produced from 
algebraic equations, Wallis openly suggested that mathematics itself should be changed 
to accommodate them. Since they defied classical rules of mathematics, he could not 
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provide arguments from within mathematics. Instead he appealed to notions such as 
usefulness.  He acknowledged the impossibility of a "quantity smaller than nothing," but 
argued that if one supposes that the clearly impossible quantity were not impossible, then 
one would find instances in which it was useful. A negative number could be useful in 
describing the directionality of motion, just as the square root of a negative number could 
be useful in describing the length of the side of a square of land that is lost to the sea. 
 With Wren, the transformation from a geometric to algebraic language of nature 
is completed. Wren was present when Huygens successfully used algebraic equations to 
predict the motions of colliding pendulum bobs in 1661. Like Wallis, he was a student of 
William Oughtred's algebraic mathematics. Oughtred was an advocate of the brevity and 
immediacy of symbolic equations. It was not merely an analytic tool to solve geometric 
problems like a "trick." Rather, according to Oughtred, symbolic algebraic equations laid 
bare the internal structure of mathematics. In Oughtred's studies of the ancient authors, he 
rewrote the tenth book of Euclid's Elements from its "ponderous rhetorical form into that 
of brief symbolism."804 Wren's paper on collision for the Philosophical Transactions, the 
Lex naturae de collisione corporum, used the same notation and algebraic conventions 
found in Oughtred's works. It also shares Oughtred's characteristic ideal of brevity and, 
through the use of symbols, it is meant to be presented so that one can grasp "meaning at 
a glance."  
 There is an interesting parallel between the development of the theories of 
collision and the theory of equations, particularly the role of symbolism, which illustrates 
the gradual change from a plurality of rules to unified, generalized expressions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
804 Florian Cajori, William Oughtred: A Great Seventeenth-Century Teacher of Mathematics (Chicago: The 
Open Court, 1916), 28.  
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Throughout much of the history of algebra equations were classified into types, and each 
type had its own rules for solution. Al-Kwārizmī's Al-jabr (c. 825), for example classified 
equations into six types.805 After Leonardo Pisano included al-Kwārizmī's rules for the 
six types of equations in his Liber abaci in 1202, algebra spread throughout Europe and 
"by the sixteenth century al-Kwārizmī's rules [...] were available in printed textbooks in 
Spain, France, Germany, and England."806 Girolamo Cardano, despite having 
successfully solved cubic and quartic equations in his Ars magna (1545), did not use a 
symbolism, and used only positive coefficients. "[He] and his contemporaries referred to 
the unknown as the "thing" (res in Latin, cosa in Italian, and coss in German) and 
subsequent multiples of the "thing" as the "square" and the "cube.""807 The modern 
general quadratic, cubic, and quartic equations "did not exist" for him. Equations, which 
we would now express as follows: 𝑥! =   𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏 𝑏 = 𝑥! + 𝑎𝑥 
were understood "as distinct equations rather than equations that could be reduced to a 
common form. For Cardano, then, there were five basic types of quadratic equations:" 
1. the square is equal to a number 
2. the square is equal to the first power, 
3. "the square is equal to the first power and constant," 
4. "the number is equal to the square and first power," 
5. "the first power is equal to the square and number." 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
805 Jacqueline A. Stedall, Mathematics Emerging: A Sourcebook 1540-1900 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 29. "squares equal to roots, squares equal to numbers, roots equal to numbers, squares and 
roots equal to numbers, squares and numbers equal to roots, and roots and numbers equal to squares" 
806 Stedall, Mathematics Emerging, 31. 
807 Helena M. Pycior, Symbols, Impossible Numbers, and Geometric Entanglements: British Algebra 
through the Commentaries on Newton's Universal Arithmetick (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 13-4. 
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"He directed his readers that equations of type 1 had two roots, and he gave a specific 
algorithm for each of the other specific types."808 François Viète's Introduction to the 
Analytic Art was a turning point in the history of algebra. He initiated the use of arbitrary 
symbols instead of words and abbreviations, although in practice he used a mixture of 
symbols and abbreviations.809 The next generation of mathematicians, such as William 
Oughtred, Thomas Harriot and René Descartes consistently used symbolic notation.810 
The symbolism did not just excise the prolixity of rhetorical algebra. The symbol had a 
meaning independent of the object symbolized; it was not necessarily bound by 
preconceptions about quantity (e.g. it did not matter if the quantity was a whole number 
or an integer, and eventually if it was negative or the root of a negative). In the 
terminology of Viète and the 17th century, symbolic algebra was a "logistic of 
species."811 And secondly, symbolism allowed for the transformation of equations into 
other equivalent forms. The plurality of rules for the solution of various kinds of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
808 Pycior, Symbols, 14. "For the solution of an equation of type 3, for example, he instructed readers to 
"add the square on one-half the coefficient of the first power to the constant of the equation and take the 
square root of the whole. To this add one-half the coefficient of the first power, and the sum is the value of 
x [the thing]." 
809 Pycior, Symbols, 27-9. Tobias Dantzig, Number: The Language of Science, 1st edition, New York, 1930 
(New York: Plume, 2007), 81-2. Historians often describe three stages of development in algebra: 
rhetorical, syncopated, and symbolic. Rhetorical algebra is written entirely in prose. Syncopated algebra 
abbreviated commonly used words. Symbolic algebra uses arbitrary symbols.  
810 Pycior, Symbols, 28-9. "For example, he used abbreviations to denote powers. He wrote the square of 
the unknown variously as A quadratum, A quad, or, in the extreme, Aq. A later generation of algebraists 
would develop the more consistently symbolical notion for powers that is used in modern algebra. For 
example, the English mathematician Thomas Harriot would let aa stand for the square of the unknown, aaa 
for the cube, and so on; in 1637 Descartes would introduce the nearly modern notion for exponents, writing 
xx, 𝑥!, and so on."  
811 Mahoney, Fermat, 36. "Unlike numerical logistic, Viète pointed out in Chapter IV of the Introduction, 
the analytic art constituted a logistic of species, an arithmetic ‘set forth in terms of the species or forms of 
things, such as the letters of the alphabet.’ The species Viète had in mind was the species of quantity [...] In 
the Introduction to the Analytic Art [...] algebra was transformed from a sophisticated sort of arithmetical 
problem-solving into the art of mathematical reasoning itself, insofar as that reasoning was based on 
combinatory operations.”  
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equations became unified by the new generalized equations, made possible by the 
arbitrary symbols.812     
 The theories of collision also gradually changed from a plurality of rules and 
strategies to a unified account, some expressed in symbolic equations. As we saw in 
chapters 2 and 3, Beeckman and Descartes relied on a set of principles, but each used a 
variety of techniques to determine the outcomes of collisions, depending of the particular 
scenario. For example, unique strategies were used whether one body is at rest or both are 
in motion, whether one body is larger or if they are the same size, whether they move in 
contrary directions or the same. Whereas with Huygens, all collisions (of perfectly hard 
bodies) are explained with two principles: the conservation of motion with direction and 
the conservation of vis viva. And, with Wren, every scenario of collision is expressed 
with one "law of nature."    
 Wren was taught Oughtred's mathematics by his teachers Seth Ward and Charles 
Scarburgh. And both Wren and Ward would follow in the footsteps of Oughtred by 
rewriting, not Euclid's Elements, but rather Galileo's Discorsi in symbolic algebra.813 
Galileo claimed that one would be left wandering in a dark labyrinth without knowing 
how to read the geometrical characters of the book of nature. Wren understood that his 
symbolic algebra was not merely a tool to read the geometrical language. Rather his 
symbolic algebra was intended to lay bare the underlying mathematical structures. This 
had been the intention in the algebraic translations of Galileo's book. This was the 
purpose of Wren's symbolic algebra for the book of nature as well.  A new algebraic 
physico-mathematics had emerged in tandem with the rules of collision. Wren concluded 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
812 Dantzig, Number, 89. 
813 Renée Jennifer Raphael, "Galileo's Discorsi as a tool for the analytical art," Annals of Science (2014): 1-
25. 
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his Lex naturae de collisione corporum (The Law of Nature in the Collision of Bodies) 
with the declaration that "Nature obeys the Algebraic laws of Addition and Subtraction" 
(Natura observat regulas Additionis & Subductionis Speciosœ).  
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Appendix 1  
A brief history of the histories of Descartes and collision, 1847—present  
 
Historians of science have long held several commitments regarding the 
importance of the mathematical studies of collision in the 17th century. Perhaps foremost 
among them, the studies were taken to be important because of their apparent connection 
to the development of laws of nature. In the second volume of The History of the 
Inductive Sciences (1847), for example, William Whewell thought that they led to the 
third law of motion.814 “In its most general sense” this law states that “the quantity of 
motion remains unaltered, quantity of motion being used synonymously with 
momentum.”  
[M]omentum (which is proportional to the mass of the body and its velocity 
jointly,) may be taken, the measure of the effect; so that this momentum is as 
much diminished in the striking body by the resistance it experiences, as it was 
increased in the body struck by the impact. This was sometimes expressed by 
saying that the quantity of motion remains unaltered, quantity of motion being 
used synonymously with momentum.  Newton expressed it by saying that “action 
and reaction are equal and opposite,” which is still one of the most familiar modes 
of expressing the third law of motion.815 
 
Here we have another of the commitments. The studies of collision have been thought to 
in some way “look forward to” or imperfectly express the notion of momentum and its 
conservation. In another of Whewell’s statements of the law we find seeds of an 
additional theme: He writes:  “for the same body, the dynamical effect of force is as the 
statical effect” in other words, as he puts it: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
814 William Whewell, The History of the Inductive Sciences, from the Earliest to the Present Time, vol. 2 
(London: Parker, 1857) 56. “The third law of motion was still in some confusion when Galileo died, as we 
have seen. The next great step made in the school of Galileo was the determination of the laws of the 
motions of bodies in their direct impact, so far as this impact affects the motion of translation.” The third 
law to which Whewell refers is the law of motion listed third by Descartes in the Principles of Philosophy 
(but not The World, where it is listed second) and by Newton in the Mathematical Principles of Natural 
Philosophy, and everyone else thereafter.  
815 Whewell, History of the Inductive Sciences, 57-8. “In these solutions, we perceive that men were 
gradually coming to apprehend the third law of motion in its most general sense.”   
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[T]he velocity which any force generates in a given time when it puts the body in 
motion, is proportional to the pressure which the same force produces in a body at 
rest.816 
 
In Whewell’s assessment, people had confused and conflated the principles of dynamics 
and statics in the 17th century,817 which are the very two components of Whewell’s 
statement of the third law—the velocity produced by the (“dynamical”) force of 
momentum and the (“statical”) pressure.818 In part, this was due to “the close analogy and 
connexion which exists between the principles of equilibrium and of motion” which 
“often led men to confound their evidence” and resulted in ambiguity in words such as 
momentum and force.819 According to Whewell, upon clarifying this distinction, the 
obstacle was removed and the third law became known.820  Thus we find the beginnings 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
816 Ibid., 47. 
817 Ibid., 45, 56.   
818 Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, "Pressure," The Penny Cyclopaedia of the Society for 
the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge: Peru-Primates, vol. 18, ed. Charles Knight (London: Charles Knight 
and Co., 1840), 502. The article in the Penny Cyclopaedia on pressure, which happens to cite one of 
Whewell’s works, defines pressure as it is used here: “...the notion of motion caused or prevented.” The 
article elaborates on this point: “Whenever we see motion caused, prevented, or altered, we are apt to carry 
with us the notion that pressure is exerted. The weight in the scale of a balance is said to press the scale; not 
that we suppose the scale to have muscles to be acted upon, and nerves to carry news of the action to a 
living brain, but that we see a counteraction of the known tendency of the weight to fall, and know that if 
the counteraction were the work of a human agent, that agent would be conscious of the perception of 
pressure. Hence everything fitted to produce the sensation of pressure, such as a weight, the elasticity of a 
spring, &c., comes to be called a pressure, and the word loses its meaning of a perception conveyed, and 
takes that of an agent proper to produce that perception if the human being were situated so as to receive 
it.”  
According to the article, pressure is explicitly linked to the Newtonian concept “force.” Pressure also 
explains why a hammer rebounds when it hits an anvil, which takes place continuously in a short amount of 
time and not instantaneously: “[When] the contact begins both hammer and anvil begin to be compressed. 
[...] But the resistance to compression is enormous, and is a pressure which, though it takes time to destroy 
any velocity, yet will destroy [the velocity] in a very small fraction of a second. The moment the velocity is 
all destroyed the effort of the anvil and hammer (both of which are compressed) endeavouring to restore 
themselves, the continuation in fact of the pressure which destroyed the velocity, will give a velocity to the 
hammer in a contrary direction, or the hammer will rebound, as it is well known to do. In the appendix to 
Professor Whewell’s ‘Elementary Treatise on Mechanics’ (third or fourth edition), a mathematical 
investigation of such problems (by Mr. Airy) will be found...”  
819 Whewell, History of the Inductive Sciences, 58. 
820 Ibid., 34. For Whewell the principles of a “complete science” have “absolute universality and 
necessity.” His history of science in the seventeenth century, or at least the “Inductive Epoch of Galileo,” 
centers around the discovery of these laws. In this case the absolutely universal and necessary third law was 
discovered once the obstacle obscuring the distinction between statics and dynamics was removed. 
	   405 
of a theme that emphasizes and analyzes the connection between static principles of 
equilibrium and dynamic forces involved in studies of motion in the 17th century and the 
place of “force” in the studies of collision.  
 Regarding Descartes’s role in particular in the mathematical study of collision, 
Whewell’s position is one that has become quite familiar to historians of early modern 
science: “The laws of the mutual impact of bodies were erroneously given by Descartes 
in his Principia.”821 But Whewell did not stop there. He found little of value in Descartes 
work on the topic:   
We may here notice Descartes and his Laws of Motion, the publication of which 
is sometimes spoken of as an important event in the history of mechanics. This is 
saying far too much. The Principia of Descartes did little for physical science. His 
assertion of the laws of motion, in their most general shape, was perhaps an 
improvement in form; but his third law is false in substance. Descartes claimed 
several of the discoveries of Galileo and others of his contemporaries; but we 
cannot assent to such claims, when we find that, as we shall see, he did not 
understand, or would not apply, the laws of motion when he had them before him. 
If we were to compare Descartes with Galileo, we might say, that of the 
mechanical truths which were easily attainable in the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, Galileo took hold of as many, and Descartes of as few, as was well 
possible for a man of genius.822 
 
As we will see, later historians—while acknowledging the so-called errors in Descartes 
laws—take Descartes to be incredibly important in the mechanization and 
“mathematization of nature.”823 Whewell, however, makes no mention of this. Moreover, 
he deliberately does not discuss the actual mathematics used by those in the so-called 
“School of Galileo” such as Wren’s, Wallis’s, and Huygens’s mathematical studies of 
collision, and certainly not Descartes’s. In fact, Whewell claims that “[i]t is not necessary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
821 Ibid., 57. 
822 Ibid., 50-51. 
823 E. J. Dijksterhuis, Mechanization of the World Picture: Pythagoras to Newton, Amsterdam, 1950, trans. 
C. Dikshoorn and reprinted (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Modern Physical Science, New York, 1924. Revised Edition 1932 (Garden City: 
Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1954).  
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for us to trace the progress of purely mathematical inventions.”824 Unlike later advocates 
of the “mathematization of nature” as the defining feature of early modern science and 
perhaps even the scientific revolution, Whewell explicitly claimed that “mathematical 
reasoning” was not the most essential part of science, and meant to demonstrate this 
claim.825 
 While Whewell de-emphasized mathematics, Ernst Mach was not shy about 
presenting fairly sophisticated mathematics on the topic of early modern mechanics. 
However, Mach used mathematics modern to his own time and was not sensitive to the 
mathematical concepts available to the historical actors themselves.826 This is fitting for 
his project, particularly The Science of Mechanics: a critical and historical account of its 
development (1883, English translation 1893), which is not strictly historical, but rather is 
an attempt to show that the sometimes-confused and imperfect truths of the historical 
actors (expressed in latter-day form) can be explicitly deduced from later more 
fundamental and clearer truths closer to Mach’s time.827  Mach discusses “the laws of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
824 Whewell, History of the Inductive Sciences, 53. 
825 William Whewell, The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded upon their History, vol. 1 
(London: Parker, 1847), 163.  “[I]t may be seen how important an office in promoting the progress of the 
physical sciences belongs to mathematics. Indeed in the progress of many sciences, every step has been so 
intimately connected with some advance in mathematics, that we can hardly be surprised if some persons 
have considered mathematical reasoning to be the most essential part of such sciences; and have 
overlooked the other elements which enter into their formation. How erroneous this view is we shall best 
see by turning our attention to the other Ideas besides those of space, number, and motion, which enter into 
some of the most conspicuous and admired portions of what is termed exact science; and by showing that 
the clear and distinct development of such Ideas is quite as necessary to the progress of exact and real 
knowledge as an acquaintance with arithmetic and geometry.” Also see H. Floris Cohen, The Scientific 
Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 33.  
826 For example Mach uses an algebra that employs negative quantities, zero, and absolute values none of 
which were in use in the historical period under investigation. 
827 This is not to say that Mach was not interested in history. In fact he had high praise for history: “He who 
calls to mind the time when he obtained his first view of the world [...] will surely remember how upside-
down and strange things then appeared to him. [...] There are two ways of reconciling oneself with 
actuality: either one grows accustomed to the puzzles and they trouble one no more, or one learns to 
understand them by the help of history and to consider them calmly from that point of view. [...] 
[D]ifficulties lie in wait for us when we go to school and take up more advanced studies, when propositions 
which have often cost several thousand years’ labour of thought are represented to us as self-evident. Here 
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impact” and claims that they were “the occasion of the enunciation of the most important 
principles of mechanics, and furnished also the first examples of the application of such 
principles.”828  These “most important principles” include the principle of vis viva (the 
living force, anachronistically expressed as mv2), as well as “Newtonian principles.”  
Mach focused on experimental attempts to ascertain the “laws of impact”829 and 
highlighted the much neglected work of Marcus Marci in this regard. Notably, Mach does 
not mention Descartes’s rules of collision, perhaps because there is no mention of their 
experimental investigation in the Principia. In the discussion of Wren, Wallis, and 
Huygens, on the other hand, he emphasizes the experiments associated with the theorems.  
Unlike Whewell, the significance of impact is not its connection to the third law 
specifically. Rather, it as an “occasion of the enunciation” of important principles of 
mechanics. Even though “the investigation of the laws of impact contributed, it is true, to 
the discovery of Newton’s laws” they “do not rest solely on this foundation.”830 Instead, 
according to Mach, the partially confused, unrecognized, implicitly assumed principles 
such as the conservation of vis viva (mv2) merely became more clearly and explicitly 
enunciated. As an example, Mach analyzes Huygens’s work on impact. He attempts to 
show that the conservation of vis viva,831 although asserted as one of Huygens last 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
too there is only one way to enlightenment: historical studies. [...] Perhaps the following lines will also 
show the value of the historical method in teaching. Indeed, if from history one learned nothing else than 
the variability of views, it would be invaluable. Of science, more than anything else, Heraclitus’ words are 
true: 'One can not go up the same stream twice.' Attempts to fix the fair moment by means of textbooks 
have always failed. Let us, then, early get used to the fact that science is unfinished, variable.” Ernst Mach, 
The History and Root of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy (Chicago: Open Court, 1909), 15-17. 
828 Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics: a critical and historical account of its development (Chicago: 
Open Court, 1893), 305. 
829 Mach, The Science of Mechanics, 305-30. See chapter III, “The extended application of the principles of 
mechanics and the deductive development of the science,” part IV, “The Laws of Impact.”   
830 Ibid., 317. 
831 It should be noted that Huygens does not use the words “vis viva” at all in his 1669 paper, but instead 
refers to the conservation of “body and the square of speed.” 
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theorems, as Mach himself points out, is “unmistakably at the foundation of the previous 
theorems.”832  
Mach’s critical comments on Descartes833 are just as severe as Whewell’s. 
Although Descartes sought after “a more universal and fruitful point of view in 
mechanics” which is worthy of “merit,” Descartes had several “defects.”834  
Descartes, however, was infected with all the usual errors of the philosopher. He 
places absolute confidence in his own ideas. He never troubles himself to put 
them to experiential test. On the contrary, a minimum of experience always 
suffices him for a maximum of inference. Added to this, is the indistinctness of 
his conceptions. Descartes did not possess a clear idea of mass. It is hardly 
allowable to say that Descartes defined mv as momentum... Descartes’s greatest 
error, however,—and the one that vitiates all his physical inquiries,—is this, that 
many propositions appear to him self-evident  à priori concerning the truth of 
which experience alone can decide.  
 
According to Mach, Descartes’s defects are (1) no experiential tests of his ideas, (2) his 
conceptions, such as quantity of motion, were indistinct, and (3) he took several truths to 
be self-evident and did not provide evidence of their truth from experience. As an 
example, Mach singles out Descartes’s notion that “a body preserves unchanged its 
velocity and direction” and finds fault with the argument for it. Descartes treats the 
notion, which Mach calls the law of inertia, as self evident and uses experiences “as a 
confirmation of an à priori law of inertia.” What Mach thought Descartes should have 
done was to cite the experiences “as a foundation on which this law in an empirical sense 
should be based.”835 Mach thought these three defects spoiled all of Descartes work. 
Elsewhere he makes a similar comparison with Galileo as Whewell did, and comes to an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
832 Mach, The Science of Mechanics, 317. 
833 Ibid., 272. Descartes is mentioned in the context of the history of the ideas of “quantity of motion” and 
“vis viva.” See chapter III, “The extended application of the principles of mechanics and the deductive 
development of the science,” part II "The Formulæ and units of mechanics," section IV.   
834 Ibid., 273-4.  
835 Ibid., 274. 
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even stronger conclusion. Descartes’s work (at least on freely falling bodies) was 
insignificant and would be completely effaced.836    
In an earlier work by Mach, The History and Root of the Principle of the 
Conservation of Energy (1872, English translation 1909), he dedicates a chapter “On the 
History of the Theorem of the Conservation of Work.” He expresses the theorem in what 
he considers to be two equivalent forms:  
1.) ½∑mv2 – ½∑mvo2 = ∫ ∑(Xdx + Ydy +Zdz); and 
2.) It is impossible to create work out of nothing, or to construct a perpetuum 
mobile.837 
One might expect that the studies of collision in the 17th century would be an important 
topic in the history of the conservation of work, particularly given the conservation of 
mv2 in Huygens’s work. Here, surprisingly, collision plays an even smaller role than it 
did in the Science of Mechanics. Like the previous text there is no mention of Descartes’s 
rules of collision. But here the mathematical study of collision plays no role at all!  As 
was already mentioned, later historians would link Descartes to mechanization and 
mathematization, linking collision to the mechanical view of nature—all change occurs 
through the material contact of matter in motion. Even if Mach would have 
acknowledged these connections, Mach would probably still have maintained that 
Descartes and collision would have had little to do with the theorem of the conservation 
of work. This is because Mach thought the conservation theorem predated a mechanical 
view of the world. Moreover, it should not be “considered as the flower of the 
mechanical view of the world.”838 Rather,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
836 Ibid., 250. “Descartes elaborated Galileo’s ideas after a fashion of his own. But his performances are 
insignificant compared with those of Newton and Huygens, and their influence was soon totally effaced.” 
837 Mach, The History and Root of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy, 19. 
838 Ibid., 20. 
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“its logical root is incomparably deeper in our mind than that view. ... [It] is by no 
means so new as one tends to believe; ... indeed, almost all eminent investigators 
had a more or less confused idea of it.”839  
 
The principle of excluded perpetual motion (one of the two equivalent forms of the 
theorem) “cannot be founded on mechanics, since its validity was felt long before the 
edifice of mechanics was raised.”  Mach claims that long held ideas, which would 
eventually come to be this theorem, served as the foundation for “the most important 
extensions of the physical sciences.”840  But even here, instead of showing how this 
foundation shaped the rules of collision or perhaps the third law, Mach points to other 
examples: the stasis of a cord of bodies slung around a triangular prism from Simon 
Stevinus’s De statica, and the notion that a descending body will rise no more than the 
same vertical height from Galileo’s Dialogo, and Huygens’s generalization of this 
principle in Horologium oscillatorium, pars secunda.841 To put this in terms similar to 
The Science of Mechanics, these examples from mechanics are “occasions of the 
enunciation” of until then partially unrecognized, implicitly assumed principles. 
 In these early histories of early modern science we find a de-emphasis on the 
studies of collision in the history of mechanics (Mach) and no mention of it at all in the 
history of the conservation of work (Mach). Although, at least according to Mach, the 
studies would become an “opportunity for the enunciation” of vis viva. The histories 
make a connection between collision and the third law (Whewell), as well as momentum 
(Whewell and Mach), and the 17th century relationship between statics and dynamics 
(Whewell). No attention was given to the specific mathematical notions and methods of 
the time—Whewell de-emphasized mathematics altogether and Mach used modern 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
839 Ibid. 
840 Ibid., 41. 
841 Ibid., 28. 
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mathematics. The normative assessment of Descartes’s work in particular in these early 
histories is negative and dismissive. Although his laws took a general shape (Whewell) or 
at least sought after a universal form (Mach) which was considered to have some merit, 
his laws of motion are assessed as false in substance and the laws of impact in particular 
are erroneous (Whewell). In their evaluation, Descartes’s work pales in comparison to 
Galileo’s (Whewell and Mach), and was generally insignificant (Mach).  And Descartes's 
vision of science was seen as defective: he did not use, or propose to use, experience 
adequately to test one’s ideas, and he assumed that science could rest on “self evident” a 
priori truths (Mach).    
 
 Between the years 1897 and 1913 the eleven volumes842 of the Oeuvres de 
Descartes were published, edited by the historian of modern philosophy Charles Adam 
and the historian of mathematics Paul Tannery.843 The “Adam-Tannery” has been 
enormously influential on the history of science in the seventeenth century, and it 
generated new interest in Cartesian philosophy.844  While in the midst of the editorial 
project, Paul Tannery had proposed a study on Descartes’s seven rules of the impact of 
bodies, but it remains unfinished because Tannery died while at work on it.845 The 
incomplete study was nevertheless published as “Sur les règles du choc des corps d’après 
Descartes” in the second part of the ninth volume (1904) of the Œuvres de Descartes.846 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
842 A twelfth volume, Vie et oeuvres de Descartes (Paris, 1910) written by Charles Adam, was included in 
the first edition of the project as a supplement. It was not included, however, in the second edition. 
843 Paul Tannery was involved with volumes I-VII and IX. He died in 1904 before the completion of the 
editorial project on Descartes’s works.  
844 René Taton makes the claim regarding the renewed interest in Cartesian philosophy in the “Tannery, 
Paul” article in DSB 13: 251-6.  
845 AT VIII xiii. Charles Adam’s words on the subjects of Tannery’s death and his study on collision are as 
follows: “Paul Tannery avait été, malheureusement, interrompu, en plein travail, par la mort.” 
846 AT IX part 2, 327-330.  
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In it Tannery’s focus is on the error of Descartes’s third law and subsequent rules of 
impact.  Elsewhere, specifically in the editorial footnotes on the third law as found in the 
1647 French translation of the Principles of Philosophy,847 Tannery noted that whereas 
the first two of Descartes laws are considered as “scientifically acquired truth,”848 the 
third law had been shown to be incorrect since the seventeenth century by the work of 
Huygens. “It is on this point [Descartes’s false third law] that the principle error of 
Descartes’s physics is born, an error which mars above all the rules given in articles 46 
through 52 [i.e. Descartes’s rules of collision].”849  
The stated purpose of Tannery’s unfinished study was to “indicate with precision 
how the seven Cartesian rules, relative to the impact of bodies, differ from the theoretical 
rules from Mechanics applicable to the same cases.”850 In other words, he wanted to show 
to what extent Descartes’s rules deviated from corresponding rules derived from the 
theorems of rational mechanics accepted at Tannery’s time. The theoretical rules from 
mechanics, which would serve as the standard by which to measure these differences, 
would be deduced “from the theorem of la conservation du mouvement du centre de 
gravité (here supposed fixed), and from la conservation des forces vives, demonstrated in 
rational Mechanics for every isolated system.”851  Tannery used the same letters (B and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
847 AT IX part 2, 1-325. 
848 This is contrary to Mach’s position. 
849 AT IX part 2, 86n. “Tandis que les deux lois prédédentes sont aujourd’hui considérées comme des 
vérités scientifiquement acquises, la troisième a été ruinée, des le xviie siècle, par les travaux de Huygens 
sur le choc des corps. C’est sur ce point que porte la principale erreur de la physique de Descartes, erreur 
qui entache surtous les règles données dans les articles 46 à 52 ci-aprés.” 
850 AT IX part 2, 327. “Il m'a paru utile d'indiquer ici avec précision en quoi les sept règles cartésiennes, 
relatives au choc des corps, diffèrent des règles théoriques de la Mécanique applicables aux mêmes cas 
(corps parfaitement durs, isolés de tous autres, et n'ayant d'actions réciproques qu au moment du choc se 
mouvant enfin suivant la droite qui joint leurs centres de gravite, cette droite passant d'ailleurs par les 
points qui viennent en contact).”  
851 Ibid. “Ces règles théoriques sont comprises sous une formule unique qui se déduit du théorème de la 
conservation du mouvement du centre de gravité (ici supposé immobile), et de celui de la conservation des 
forces vives, démontrés en Mécanique rationnelle pour tout système isole.”   
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C) as Descartes, but referred to masses rather than “bodies” as Descartes did. Along with 
b, c, β, and γ, which Tannery uses for the velocities of the masses before and after 
collision, Tannery used the letters as variables in a system of algebraic equations.852 
There is no evidence that Descartes ever expressed collision in this manner or 
conceptualized it algebraically.   
The practice of using modern algebraic equations to represent modern physical 
principles (e.g. the equations for the conservation of momentum and the conservation of 
energy) in order to produce rules that are supposed to correspond to Descartes’s rules, has 
been persistent in the history of science until comparatively recently. This practice may 
be effective in showing how a modified version of Descartes’s ideas, which are expressed 
in a form quite foreign to Descartes’s, compare to contemporary ideas. But this practice is 
not effective in revealing much about Descartes’s ideas, or even how Descartes’s ideas 
compare to contemporary ideas. Important notions, such as speed, velocity, body, mass, 
force, momentum, conservation, and the possible relationships between physical 
quantities, are affected by the manner in which they are expressed. When they are 
expressed mathematically, the specific mathematical concepts and methods that are 
involved have an effect on the understanding of the historical notions.   
In 1929 the Société Hollandaise des Sciences published the sixteenth volume of 
the Œuvres complétes de Christiaan Huygens, which focused on the topics of percussion, 
the question of absolute motion, and Huygens’s work in statics and dynamics. Similar to 
Adam and Tannery, the editors of Huygens’s works consistently used modern 
mathematics to represent Huygens’s ideas. Since Huygens famously challenged 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
852 The equations of the two theorems, from which Tannery would produce equations of rules of collision 
corresponding to Descartes’s 7 rules of collision, were expressed as follows:  
(1) Bb + Cc = Bβ + Cγ    (2) Bb2 + Cc2 = Bβ2 + Cγ2   
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Descartes’s rules of collision, much of the historical and editorial work on Descartes in 
the volume focuses on Descartes’s “errors.” For example, the index of the volume has a 
lengthy set of references under the heading “Erreurs de Descartes” with subheadings 
such as Inexactitude de son assertion sur la conservation dans l’univers de la même 
quantité de mouvement;  Erreurs dan la dynamique; and dans la théorie de la 
percussion.853  
The attitude on Descartes’s errors found in volume 16 of Huygens’s works had 
changed from the previous histories. All of Descartes’s rules are reproduced from the 
1647 French translation854 in the introduction of the 16th volume. Immediately following 
the rules, the editor, applied mathematician and historian of mathematics Diederik 
Korteweg, commented on how clearly Descartes’s rules of collision (particularly the 4th) 
“are in contradiction with the most simple experience.”855 However, Korteweg did not 
immediately dismiss the rules. Rather he noted that Descartes’s rules “become a little less 
incomprehensible” when one realizes that Descartes considered them as theoretical rules 
and not rules realized in practice. He even quoted Descartes’s own words to clarify the 
point that the bodies in the rules are to be considered without any other surrounding 
bodies such as air or a liquid.856 It is notable that Christiaan Huygens’s criticism of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
853 HOC 16: 587. 
854 HOC 16: 4-5n. 
855 Volume 16 had been started by Korteweg, but, like Tannery, his death prevented him from completing 
the work. He was the lead editor from 1911 through 1927 and was responsible for pages 1-186, 202-212 of 
volume 16. J. A. Vollgraff oversaw its completion as well as the remaining volumes of the project. 
Notably, E. J. Dijksterhuis also worked on volume 16 (pages 344-349, 392-412, 463-469). It is Huygens’s 
work on musicology in the first part of volume 20 to which Dijksterhuis contributed the most. See HOC 22: 
816.      
856 HOC 16: 5n. “Il est clair que plusieurs de ces règles, nommément la quatrième, sont en contradiction 
avec la plus simple expérience. Seulement le fait de leur admission par Descartes devient un peu moins 
incompréhensible par ce qu’il considérait ces règles comme des règles théoretiques qui ne se réalisent dans 
la pratique que très rarement. Ainsi il dit à propos de la quartriéme que pour sa réalisation, il est nécessaire 
que le corps C “non seulement n’eust point de mouuement apparent, mais aussi qu’il  fust point enuironné 
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Descartes’s rules did not rely on the position that the latter’s rules contradicted 
experience. Rather, Huygens used theoretical and mathematical arguments to show that 
Descartes’s rules were inconsistent and incorrect. Korteweg’s familiarity with Huygens’s 
published and unpublished works, along with the impact of the Adam Tannery, might 
begin to explain his relative patience with Descartes’s rules.   
A few years earlier in the United States E. A. Burtt’s The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Modern Physical Science (1924) was published, which, regardless of the 
truth value of Descartes’s laws and rules of collision, placed Descartes as a key figure in 
what Burtt saw as a dramatic shift to the modern view of the world and humanity’s place 
in it. Part of this shift involved what has come to be known as the “mathematization of 
nature.” Descartes was presented as important because he “worked out a comprehensive 
hypothesis in detail of the mathematical structure and operations of the material 
universe.”857 Burtt claimed that just as Descartes had shown the relationship between 
arithmetic and geometry in his analytic geometry, “one not unnatural result of this 
notable invention” was that “the whole realm of physics might be reducible to 
geometrical qualities alone.”858 And thus mathematics would be “the sole key needed to 
unlock the secrets of nature.”859 Burtt indicated that Descartes’s early project, Regulae ad 
Directionem Ingenii (composed in 1629, but posthumously published in 1701) seemed to 
provide this very “mathematical method.” But, according to Burtt, Descartes made a 
wrong turn when he attempted to explain phenomenal qualities and motions by means of 
vortices in the plenum. Nevertheless, the assessment of Descartes’s influence in bringing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
d’air, ni d’aucuns autres corps liquides, lesquels, comme je diray cy-apres, disposent les corps durs du’ils 
enuironnent, à pouuoir estre meus fort aisement” et il revient encore plus d’une fois...sur cette restriction...”   
857 Burtt, Metaphysical Foundations, 105.  
858 Ibid., 106.   
859 Ibid., 105. 
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about (the metaphysical foundations of) modern science is quite affirmative in Burtt’s 
work, particularly when compared to the preceding historians of science. The emphasis 
was placed on Descartes’s proposal that the structure of the material world is 
mathematical, and that mathematics is the key to knowing this world. In addition, Burtt 
measured Descartes by his influence on his contemporaries and immediate successors, as 
well as his influence on the deep metaphysical commitments that moderns came to hold, 
rather than measure Descartes by what was taken to be the truth of modern physics as 
Whewell and Mach had done.      
The work of Descartes had an enormous influence throughout all Europe during 
the latter half of the seventeenth century, largely because he was not only a great 
mathematician and anatomist, but also a powerful philosophical genius, who 
treated afresh, and with a remarkably catholic reach, all the big problems of the 
age by hitching them up in one fashion or another to the chariot of victorious 
mathematical science.860   
 
 
The Dutch mathematician and historian of science, E. J. Dijksterhuis expanded 
upon the narrative of mathematization and Descartes’s place in it in his work 
Mechanization of the World Picture. According to Dijksterhuis, the increasingly 
prominent position of mathematics in the seventeenth century for people such as Kepler 
and Galileo was not merely due to the “indispensable services it rendered” but rather “to 
the fact that the structure of the external world was essentially mathematical in character 
and a natural harmony existed between the universe and the mathematical thought of the 
human mind.”861 Dijksterhuis went even further than Burtt with his position on 
Descartes’s place in this trend writing that  
the standpoint taken by Descartes cannot be better described than by saying that 
by carrying this conception to the extreme he virtually identified mathematics and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
860 Ibid., 125. 
861 Dijksterhuis, Mechanization (IV: 194), 404. Italics added.   
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natural science. Natural science is mathematical in character not only in the wider 
sense that mathematics ministers to it, in whatever function this may be, but also 
in the much stricter sense that the human mind produces the knowledge of nature 
by its own efforts in the same way as it does mathematics.862 
 
To support this position Dijksterhuis made several powerful claims that have since 
proven to be false, or at least rather unlikely. For example, the claim, also mentioned in 
outline by Burtt, that analytic mathematics served as the methodology of Descartes’s 
natural science has been criticized, particularly the use of the posthumously published 
work Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii (composed in 1629, but published in 1701) as 
evidence for this view. Dijksterhuis claimed that the Regulae contains “an exposition of 
the so-called Mathesis Universalis, which Descartes always regarded as one of his 
greatest methodological discoveries and which he wished to see applied in all the natural 
sciences.”863 It is true that Descartes discussed the idea of a mathesis universalis and it 
bears some similarities to algebra speciosa (formulated by Vieta) which resembles the 
analytic geometry that Descartes himself later developed and published in La Géométrie 
(1637), but Descartes broke off work on the Regulae and abandoned the project of a 
universal mathematics by 1628. He likely did not “always regard [it] as one of his 
greatest methodological discoveries,” had good reasons for abandoning it, and likely did 
not want to see it applied in all the natural sciences, nor did he in fact apply it.864 
Although evocative, Dijksterhuis’s conclusion does not follow: “Thus the aim of the 
Cartesian method is indeed to cause all scientific thinking to take place in the manner of 
mathematics, namely by deduction from axioms and by algebraic calculation.”865 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
862 Ibid, 
863 Ibid., (IV: 195), 405.  
864 John Schuster, "Descartes’ Mathesis Universalis: 1619-28," in Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and 
Physics, ed. Stephen Gaukroger (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1980), 41-96. 
865 Dijksterhuis, Mechanization (IV: 195), 405. 
	   418 
Dijksterhuis himself back-peddled a bit in his text, noting that there are “so few 
marks of it ... to be found in the work of Descartes himself and in particular that his 
scientific writing contains so few calculations.”866 He claims this is because Descartes is 
only one piece of a much larger “working-programme” that extended “for many 
centuries, not for the lifetime of one individual.”867 So, in Dijksterhuis’s view Descartes 
himself foresaw the application of universal mathematics to science, but it “remained 
hardly more than a remote ideal for Descartes.”868 Nevertheless, Dijksterhuis maintained 
a narrative that the real Cartesian method should be found in an unfinished work that was 
not published during his lifetime (Regulae), and although Descartes published his 
analytic geometry in an essay (La Géométrie) appended to his Discours de la Méthode 
(1637), the methodological rules described in the finished and published Discours are not 
his true method, rather traces of the mathesis universalis should be uncovered as the true 
method from an interpretation of the mathematics found in La Géométrie.   
In addition to Descartes’s important position in the mathematization of nature, 
Dijksterhuis understandably emphasized Descartes as a “rationalist.”869 According to 
Dijksterhuis, “physics” for Descartes “is the science of moving forms of space;” and 
geometry “is concerned with resting forms of space.” So, Physics, just like geometry, 
“can be deduced from axioms established a priori. The human mind brings forth not only 
mathematics but physics as well.”870  
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867 Ibid.  
868 Ibid. (IV: 198), 406. 
869 Dijksterhuis, however, to my knowledge, did not use the now familiar binary “rationalist/empiricist” to 
refer to and to categorize various early modern philosophies.  
870 Dijksterhuis, Mechanization (IV: 199), 406-7. 
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Like Diederik Korteweg, who edited much of the 16th volume of the Œuvres 
complètes de Christiaan Huygens (1929), Dijksterhuis, who also worked as an editor of 
Huygens’s complete works,871 emphasized Descartes’s work on collision only in so far as 
it erred and was corrected by Huygens. Like his predecessors Dijksterhuis used modern 
mathematics to represent collision for both Descartes and Huygens. He was explicit in his 
choice to use “algebraic symbols” and apparently saw no issue in doing so.872 The main 
error Dijksterhuis thought Descartes made is thus explained in concepts that had not yet 
been developed in Descartes’s time: Descartes did not understand velocity as a vector 
quantity, and thus his concept of the conservation of quantitas motus (which Dijksterhuis 
takes to be identical to a mistaken understanding of momentum) as well as his third law 
are flawed.  
That the total momentum does not change upon impact is true only if one takes 
into account the direction of the momentum, and so considers it as a vector. 
Descartes omits to do so, but only multiplies the mass by the magnitude of the 
velocity. This makes him think that if the velocity only changes its direction, no 
change of momentum occurs and that the originally resting body may therefore 
continue at rest, an assumption which in itself may appear plausible because its 
tendency to continue at rest is stronger than that of the other to persevere in 
motion. In reality the momentum of this resting body always has to undergo a 
change owing to the impact, so that it will undoubtedly start to move; the only 
case in which this would not happen is if it were kept at absolute rest or—which 
comes to the same thing—if its mass were infinite.873  
  
 The relevance of the development of the rules of collision in general in the 17th 
century for Dijksterhuis is quite similar to Whewell’s and Mach’s views: 
The subject [specifically Huygens work finding the laws for perfectly elastic 
impact] deserves our attention for two reasons: in the first place for the ingenious 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
871 E. J. Dijksterhuis edited several sections of volume 16 (pages 344-349, 392-412 and 463-469) as well as 
the first part of volume 20 which treats Musicology as well as pages 344-349.  
872 Dijksterhuis, Mechanization (IV: 143), 374. Just before “prov[ing] some of the propositions deduced by 
Huygens,” Dijksterhuis explained that “we will...make use of algebraic symbols for the sake of brevity.”  
873 Dijksterhuis, Mechanization (IV: 207), 411. 
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way in which certain mechanical principles, already discussed above, are used in 
the derivation, and secondly for the fundamental importance which the 
phenomenon of impact was to have in the development of the world-picture of 
seventeenth-century physics.874 
 
Like Mach, nothing all that new was achieved in the study of impact, rather it was an 
instance of the successful use of principles developed previously. Like Whewell, 
Dijksterhuis claimed that there were obstacles in the way of Galileo’s attempts to 
determine the rules of impact, such as the attempt to measure the moving forces in impact 
by the continuous static force of weight.875 Unlike either Mach or Whewell, the 
significance of the studies of impact was that they came to hold a fundamental place in 
the development of the world-picture of seventeenth-century physics, namely 
mechanism.  
Even if Descartes’s work was influential in bringing about a mathematical 
understanding of the structure of the world, Descartes’s attempts to do so were not 
without criticism. French philosopher and historian Paul Mouy provided an in-depth 
analysis and criticism of Descartes’s physics in Le développement de la physique 
cartésienne, 1646-1712. (Vrin, 1934), calling it “a mathematical physics without 
mathematics.”876 In 1939 Koyré also criticized Descartes’s “mathematization,” modifying 
an older critical trope—the comparison of Descartes with Galileo—but now placing the 
emphasis on “mathematization”: 
[T]he traditional historical view, which sees Galileo as the father of classical 
science, is not wrong. For it is in his work—and not in that of Descartes—that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
874 Ibid. (IV: 143), 373.  See section c, "The Laws of Perfectly Elastic Impact" (IV: 143-6). 
875 Ibid. (IV: 122-3), 358-9. 
876 Paul Mouy, Le Développement de la Physique Cartésienne, 1646-1712 (Paris: Vrin, 1934), 144. 
Alexandre Koyré also notes this: “It is well known that Descartes' physics, as it is set out for us in the 
Principes no longer contains mathematically expressible laws. It is, in fact, no more mathematical than that 
of Aristotle." Alexandre Koyré, Galileo Studies, trans. John Mepham (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities 
Press, 1978), 90. 
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idea of mathematical physics, or rather the idea of the mathematisation of the 
physical, was realised for the first time in the history of human thought.877  
 
Another of Koyré’s main criticisms of Descartes, which has had some influence, is that 
the combination of mechanisms in Descartes’s physics was too complicated to express 
with mathematics. To argue this Koyré points to a letter Descartes sent to Mersenne 
which discussed the law of fall. In it Descartes wrote that he did not have an answer to 
“the question concerning the slowing down of a heavy body’s motion by the air it is 
moving in;” Descartes explained that “this depends on so many things that I cannot give a 
clear account of it in a letter; all I can say is that neither Galileo nor anyone else could 
work out anything clear and demonstrative on this question unless they first knew what 
gravity is, and unless they have the true principles of physics.” Here Koyré takes 
Descartes to task: Descartes thought he did have the true principles of physics and he 
thought he knew what gravity was, but he still could not do it.  
So why then does he not give us the solution? Because it is too complicated. 
Because in a physics such as his own, a physics of the plenum and of the 
continuum, everything depends on everything else, everything acts 
instantaneously on everything else. One cannot isolate any phenomenon and as a 
result one cannot formulate simple laws in mathematical form.878  
 
The vortices in the plenum—the very point in Descartes’s philosophy that Burtt 
thought indicated his “wrong turn,” and the very aspect of the philosophy that Koyré 
thought rendered Descartes’s physics too complicated to be of any use—provided the 
context for an extremely influential study of Descartes’s rules of collision. This was E. J. 
Aiton’s much quoted 1957 article, “The Vortex Theory of Planetary Motions.”879  This 
article is significant for several reasons. (1) It includes a sustained and detailed exposition 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
877 Koyré, Galileo Studies, 201.   
878 Ibid., 93. 
879 E. J. Aiton, “The Vortex Theory of the Planetary Motions—I,” Annals of Science: a quarterly review of 
the history of science since the renaissance 13 (1957): 249-264.   
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of Descartes’s third law (the collision law) and his rules of collision in the context of their 
foundational role for explanations of phenomena by means of material contact in the 
plenum.880  (2) It includes a concise diagram of the rules of collision that has been 
explicitly reproduced by subsequent studies on the topic, which I too have reproduced in 
chapter 3.  (3) Like many before him, Aiton is critical of Descartes’s third law 
(particularly Descartes’s notion that the motion of bodies can only be changed by 
collision with other bodies), but rather than dismiss the law, and rather than focus his 
study on a comparison of it with the correct formulations of comparable rules derived 
from contemporary physics, Aiton sought to explain Descartes’s position as Descartes 
himself may have understood it. (4) The article is also significant because Aiton’s 
presentation covers many of the topics that subsequent histories of Descartes’s physics 
have continued to debate: 
- The role of experience and experiment in the formulation of Descartes’s rules of 
collision. 
- The connection between the rules and the third law, namely the derivation of 
several rules versus the “interpolation” of other rules. The latter being those rules 
that involve “equal forces” and cannot, strictly speaking, be derived from the third 
law, which, as stated, relies on a contest between unequal forces.    
- The specific meaning of Descartes’s rather ambiguous “force of resistance” in 
both moving bodies and resting bodies. In Aiton’s reconstruction, he models this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
880 Aiton, "Vortex Theory," 249. The context that determines the importance of this sustained and detailed 
exposition for Aiton is Newtonian dynamics. The Cartesian vortex theory was “formulated before the birth 
of Newton...[and] was still widely accepted on the continent a decade after Newton’s death.” To consider 
the theory as perverse does not do justice to Huygens, Leibniz, Jacques Cassini and John Bernoulli, “each 
of whom accepted the vortex theory with various modifications in preference to that of Newton. ... It 
appears evident that the rise of Newtonian celestial dynamics can be seen in historical perspective only 
when account is taken of the influence of the Cartesian theory.” Until Aiton, the vortex theory had received 
little attention with the exception, as Aiton notes, of Paul Mouy’s Le développement de la physique 
cartésienne, 1646-1712 (1934) and Piere Brunet.  
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on an algebraic expression of the Cartesian “quantity of motion.” Although this 
has been influential, I will argue that there is good reason to think this is incorrect.  
- The importance of Descartes’s notions of “fluidity” and “solidity,” and the case of 
a large body at rest in a fluid, which can be moved by the smallest force, and the 
relationship this has to Descartes’s 4th rule which states that a larger body at rest 
cannot be moved by a smaller body.   
- The discrepancy between Descartes’s two definitions of motion is discussed as 
well as the supposed relationship among the definitions, the notion of relative 
motion, and the controversy regarding the Church’s doctrine against the motion of 
the Earth.  
These topics, and Aiton’s position on them, are discussed and debated in the course of 
my study on Descartes’s rules of collision.881      
 In 1960 the Department of History and Philosophy of Science was formed at 
Indiana University. Three years later Richard Westfall joined the faculty. After 7 years he 
prepared a textbook drawn from his experience teaching the history of science in the 17th 
century: The Construction of Modern Science: Mechanisms and Mechanics, which was 
first published in 1971.882 The textbook presents the history of the “scientific revolution” 
as the conflict and resolution of two trends—the “Platonic-Pythagorean tradition” which 
maintained that nature was ordered fundamentally according to mathematics and could be 
best understood in geometrical terms, and the “mechanical philosophy” which maintained 
that nature was a machine and could be best understood by explaining the mechanisms 
underlying phenomena. In this textbook presentation, Descartes fulfills an enormously 
significant role, not in the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition which previous histories (Burtt 
& Dijksterhuis) emphasizing Descartes’s role in mathematization might suggest, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
881 See chapter 3.    
882 Richard Westfall, The Construction of Modern Science: Mechanisms and Mechanics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977). The text was first published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. in 1971.  
	   424 
rather in the mechanical philosophy (as Aiton’s emphasis on the vortex theory suggests). 
Or, as Westfall put it: “what appears to be a spontaneous movement toward a mechanical 
conception of nature in reaction against Renaissance Naturalism.”883 Although “no one 
man created the mechanical philosophy” Westfall claimed that   
René Descartes (1596-1650) exerted a greater influence toward a mechanical 
philosophy of nature than any other man, and for all his excesses, he gave to its 
statement a degree of philosophic rigor it sorely needed, and obtained nowhere 
else.884  
 
Westfall goes on to explain what he calls Descartes’s concept of “inertia” as well as the 
conservation of quantity of motion, noting (like so many prior historians since at least 
Whewell) that this “approaches the conservation of momentum” except for Descartes’s 
scalar rather than vector understanding of speed (as has also been pointed out by others 
such as Dijksterhuis and Koyre).885 Although Descartes’s conclusions “vary widely from 
those we accept,” Descartes’s study of collision was important because (1) “Descartes’ 
analysis of impact was the starting point of later efforts that bore more fruit” and (2) “his 
rules of impact provided the model of all dynamic action; in a mechanical universe shorn 
of active principles, bodies could act on one another by impact alone.”886  
Similar to Aiton, in the course of his slim text, Westfall addressed a number of 
important topics that have since become contentious issues. For example, he points out 
that “Descartes’ treatment of impact entangled itself hopelessly in his idea of the force of 
a body’s perseverance in its state,” and yet Descartes nowhere specified in his mechanics 
a “clear conception of force.”887 Aiton had provided an interpretation of a specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
883 Westfall, Construction of Modern Science, 30-1. 
884 Ibid., 31. 
885 Ibid., 32-3, 121-2.  
886 Ibid., 34. 
887 Ibid., 122. Italics added. 
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force—the “force of resistance,” as we have seen. Westfall’s point here is about force in 
general. He flags the issue but does not provide his own interpretation. This issue of 
“force” and its place (or lack of place) in Descartes’s physics has remained a debated 
issue among interpreters of Descartes.888 Westfall also addressed the “two-definitions-of-
motion-issue” in Descartes and, like Aiton, suggests that Descartes fundamental notion of 
motion was relative: “rest and motion were relative terms; [i.e.] since there is no space 
apart from bodies, we can only say that a body moves or is at rest in relation to another 
body.”889 According to Westfall, Descartes rules of collision, then, are inconsistent since 
they “unfortunately yielded different results for different frames of reference.”890 For 
example, a larger body at rest remains at rest after it is impacted by a smaller body in 
motion, but a larger moving body will change its motion after impacting a smaller body 
at rest, specifically, the larger loses as much motion as it gives to the smaller and they 
both move together after impact.891 The related positions, (1) that Descartes thought 
motion and rest were relative and (2) the rules of impact are thus inconsistent, had been 
argued prior to Westfall. I present them here since with Westfall “relativity of motion” 
and consequently “inconsistency of the rules of impact” became codified in a textbook 
presentation. However, there has not been academic agreement on either position. The 
current entry on Descartes’s Physics in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy by Ed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
888 For example some historians have claimed that Descartes was ultimately committed to the nonexistence 
of forces: Dijksterhuis, Mechanization; E. J. Aiton, The Vortex Theory of Planetary Motions (New York: 
American Elsevier Inc., 1972); and Daniel Garber, Descartes’ metaphysical physics (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1992). Other’s have argued that Descartes must have been committed to the position that 
forces are inherent in bodies: Martial Gueroult, "The Metaphysics and Physics of Force in Descartes," in 
Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics, ed. Stephen Gaukroger (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 
1980), 196-229; Alan Gabbey, “Force and Inertia in the Seventeenth Century: Descartes and Newton,” in 
Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics, ed. Stephen Gaukroger (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980), 
230-320; and Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes' System of Natural Philosophy (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002).   
889 Westfall, Construction of Modern Science, 126. 
890 Ibid. 
891 AT VIII 68-9. Principia II 49 and 50.  
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Slowik valiantly organizes the various possible positions and problems one can take on 
these topics.892  
The mechanical philosophy, according to Westfall, became an incredibly 
influential and pervasive force in the 17th century. “[It] defined the framework in which 
nearly all creative scientific work was conducted. In its language questions were 
formulated; in its language answers were given.”893 But, according to Westfall, the 
mechanical philosophy (and thus Descartes’s physics) was an obstacle of the Platonic-
Pythagorean trend and thus the trend of the mathematization of nature, which would not 
be resolved until the work of Isaac Newton.894 Throughout The Construction of Modern 
Science Westfall describes several ways in which the mechanical philosophy was 
influential and yet an obstacle to mathematization. One way, which is directly related to 
Descartes’s study of impact, is the issue of force for mechanical philosophers such as 
Descartes. In Westfall’s view they were unable “to consider any conception of force 
except the ‘force of a moving body,’” and had no way to understand the forces that cause 
motion. Thus, according to Westfall, they “tended to confine mechanics within kinematic 
problems” and could not contribute to “the development of a mathematical dynamics.”895 
Although “motion,” “motion as a cause of phenomena,” and “the cause of motion,” were 
all topics of interest to people in the 17th century, the kinematic/dynamic distinction was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
892 Edward Slowik, "Descartes' Physics," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2014 Edition, 
ed. Edward N. Zalta. Accessed January 25, 2015. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/descartes-physics/. Also see Edward Slowik, Cartesian 
Spacetime: Descartes' Physics and the Relational Theory of Space and Motion (Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2002).    
893 Westfall, Construction of Modern Science, 41. 
894 Ibid., 42. “Despite its rejection of a qualitative philosophy of nature, the mechanical philosophy in its 
original form was an obstacle to the full mathematization of nature, and the incompatibility of the two 
themes of 17th century science was not resolved before the work of Isaac Newton. Meanwhile, virtually no 
scientific work in the 17th century stood clear of its influence, and most of the work cannot be understood 
apart from it.” 
895 Ibid., 123. 
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not articulated until much later and can skew our understanding of the manners in which 
the historical actors understood motion, mechanics, and natural philosophy. In addition, 
Westfall presumably had in mind the seemingly “occult” notion of “attraction” as a 
“cause of motion”—a notion which mechanical philosophers would not accept. But it 
should be noted that Descartes did clearly name the cause of motion in the Principia. God 
is the primary cause of motion, and acting always in the same way, conserves the total 
quantity of motion. The laws of nature are described by Descartes as the secondary 
causes of motion.896  
Alan Gabbey has extensively investigated “the mechanical philosophy” and its 
relationship to “mechanics.”897 An influential text from 1980, “Force and inertia in the 
seventeenth century: Descartes and Newton” takes issue with “textbook simplifications 
[which] seriously misconstrue, and thereby distort, Descartes’ overall presentation.” In 
Gabbey’s view it is wrong to think of Descartes “as the arch-mechanist, claiming to 
describe a world fashioned out of extension and motion alone” with no ontologically 
robust notion of force.898  In Part I Gabbey pieces together an ontology of force for 
Descartes (while acknowledging that there is no systematic presentation of the topic in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
896 AT IX part 2, 83. Principes II 36. "After having examined the nature of movement, we must consider its 
cause, which is twofold: {we shall begin with} the universal and primary one, which is the general cause of 
all the movements in the world; and then {we shall consider} the particular ones, by which individual parts 
of matter acquire movements which they did not previously have. As far as the general {and first} cause is 
concerned, it seems obvious to me that this is none other than God Himself, who, {being all-powerful} in 
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Translation by Miller, Principles, 57. The laws of motion, on the other hand, are secondary and particular 
causes of the motions of bodies. AT IX part 2, 84-7, Principes II 37, 39, and 40. "Furthermore, from this 
same immutability of God, we can obtain knowledge of the rules or laws of nature, which are the secondary 
and particular causes of the diverse movements which we notice in individual bodies." Translation by 
Miller, Principles, 59.   
897 Alan Gabbey, "What was 'Mechanical' about the 'Mechanical Philosophy'"? In The Reception of the 
Galilean Science of Motion in Seventeenth-Century Europe, ed. Carla Rita Palmerino and J. M. M. Hans 
Thijssen (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004) 11-23. 
898 Alan Gabbey, “Force and Inertia in the Seventeenth Century: Descartes and Newton,” in Descartes: 
Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics, ed. Stephen Gaukroger (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980), 234. 
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Descartes’s writings), which depends on a subtle discussion of modes, qualities, and 
attributes. This is part of a broader comparison with Newton, Leibniz, and Hobbes, but, at 
least with respect to Descartes, Gabbey concludes that he “does not exclude force from 
body or its actions.”899 He says in Part II that Descartes’s “force to remain at rest” 
“reveals an empirical awareness of the nature of matter that is closer to the passive forces 
of the mature Leibniz and, as I hope will emerge in Part II of this study, to the vis inertiae 
of Newton, than the abstract geometrist conceptions normally associated with the founder 
of Cartesianism.”900 Part II of the text focuses on the “functional meaning of force within 
a mechanical system” by means of a comparison between the views of Descartes and 
Newton.901 It is here that Gabbey explains what he calls the traditional “contest view” of 
force:  
Taking seventeenth-century ‘dynamics’ as a whole...the great majority of its 
practitioners understood force as in its functional sense as that concomitant of a 
body—expressed in terms of its whole speed and corporeal quantity—which 
could be identified with the body’s relative capacity to overcome a similarly 
understood resisting force.... Interactions between bodies were seen as contests 
between opposing forces, the larger forces being the winners, the smaller forces 
being the losers: a conception of evidently anthropomorphic origin.902 
 
 He uses this to illustrate differences in view regarding the special case of a body 
colliding with another at rest. For those people (Hobbes, Malebranche, young Leibniz, 
etc.) who thought body did not have force, a resting body would have no force of 
resistance, and thus “the contest notion did not apply, the total available force being 
redistributed among the bodies according to the conservation principle. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
899 Gabbey, "Force and Inertia," 238. 
900 Ibid., 238-9.  
901 Ibid., 243. 
902 Ibid. Gabbey cites J. Herival as his source for the ‘contest’ analogy á propos Descartes. John Herival, 
The Background to Newton's Principia: A Study of Newton's Dynamical Researches in the Years 1664-84 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 49. See chapter 3, section 5.2.1 for my interpretation.  
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For others (Descartes, Newton and Leibniz in the 1690s), a body at rest reacts 
against any attempt to set it in motion, thus giving rise to a contest between 
opposing forces. However, it was Newton who fully realised that the opposing 
forces must be reinterpreted...so that they are always and necessarily equal. ... In 
other words, Newton saw that the opposing forces actually involved in an 
interaction do not determine the exchanges of motion, as is the case according to 
the traditional view, but are the dynamical expression of these changes.903    
 
Gabbey goes on to argue that Descartes’s conception of force is midway between the 
traditional and Newtonian view, although mostly traditional. Thus, he has provided an 
argument for the point made by Whewell 133 years before—the rules of collision lead to 
the Newton’s third law of motion. In making this argument Gabbey provides an in-depth 
analysis of Descartes’s laws and rules of collision as found in Le Monde, the Latin 
Principia, Descartes’s 1645 letter to Clerselier, and the French Principles.  
 Gabbey’s chapter is found in Stephen Gaukroger’s 1980 edited volume on 
Descartes, which was designed to shift attention away from “purely epistemological 
discussions of the hyperbolic doubt, the cogito and the ‘Cartesian circle’” and modern 
philosophers’ attempts to read “modern pre-occupations in epistemology, logic and 
metaphysics” back into Descartes.904 Instead, the volume was intended to be “a 
reassessment of some central issues in Descartes work,” particularly his “attempt to 
provide a philosophical foundation for mathematical physics” and other “issues in 
Descartes’ physics and mathematics.”905 Twenty years later Gaukroger (along with John 
Schuster and John Sutton) edited another volume on Descartes,906 informed by the (then) 
recent but growing scholarship on various less studied aspects of Descartes’s work.  It too 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
903 Gabbey, "Force and Inertia," 243-244. 
904 Stephen Gaukroger, ed., Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 
1980) ix.   
905 Gaukroger, Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics, ix. 
906 Stephen Gaukroger, John Schuster, and John Sutton, eds., Descartes’ Natural Philosophy (New York: 
Routledge, 2000).  
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was a “reassessment.” Again, it deliberately neglected the classic “textbook image of 
Descartes in philosophy or the history of ideas.”907 But now it deliberately focused—not 
on Descartes’s physics and mathematics—but on Descartes’s “natural philosophy,” 
which, depending on how the term is defined, encompassed the mechanical philosophy as 
well as “mechanics, optics, anatomy, and physiology,” and placed his natural philosophy 
in its social and intellectual contexts.908  
Descartes’s rules of collision are still addressed in Gaukroger’s 2000 volume, for 
example Peter McLaughlin’s chapter, “Force, Determination and Impact,”909 as well as 
Daniel Garber’s “A Different Descartes: Descartes and the programme for a 
mathematical physics in his correspondence.”910 The latter acknowledges what many 
prior historians have noted: that Descartes’s physics is in fact qualitative (recall Koyré 
and Mouy above): his basic conservation law is not given quantitatively, nor is it used in 
a quantitative way, his notion of centrifugal force which is central to his theory of 
vortices is never quantified, “his cosmology is entirely qualitative, as was his discussion 
of the Copernican, Ptolemaic and Tychonic cosmology... 
Descartes’ physics can be read like a novel, as he suggested to the Princess 
Elisabeth: there are elegant diagrams, and beautiful images, but not one single 
equation or geometrical argument. The physics of the Principia is all words.911  
 
But as Garber’s title suggests a “different Descartes,” who is actually engaged in 
mathematical physics, can be found in his correspondence. Additionally, Gaukroger 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
907 Gaukroger, Schuster, and Sutton, Descartes' Natural Philosophy, 1. According to the editors, the 
"textbook image" among historians of ideas was Descartes “as father of modern philosophy, or as the 
inventor of modern epistemology, mind/body dualism, or advocate of a universal method.”  
908 Gaukroger, Schuster, and Sutton, Descartes' Natural Philosophy, 1. 
909 Peter McLaughlin, "Force, determination and impact," in Descartes' Natural Philosophy, ed. Stephen 
Gaukroger, John Schuster, and John Sutton (New York: Routledge, 2000) 81-112. 
910 Daniel Garber, "A different Descartes: Descartes and the programme for a mathematical physics in his 
correspondence," in Descartes’ Natural Philosophy ed. Stephen Gaukroger, John Schuster, and John Sutton 
(New York: Routledge, 2000) 113-130. 
911 Garber, "A different Descartes," 114. 
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(together with Schuster) has an article that defends the notion that Descartes’s early work 
on hydrostatics forms the foundation of his later natural philosophy,912 and Klaas van 
Berkel provides a vivid description of Descartes’s inspired and later conflict-riddled 
relationship with Isaac Beeckman.913 Nevertheless, representative of larger trends in the 
professional history of early modern science, in Gaukroger’s 2000 volume, motion, 
mechanics, and mathematics is only a small part of a much more complex and nuanced 
portrait that includes discussions of experimentation, physiology, sensation, imagination 
and other topics in a more broadly conceived “natural philosophy.” 
Daniel Garber had been working on Descartes at least since 1979 and published in 
1992 an influential “handbook:” Descartes’ metaphysical physics. The focus of the book 
is on understanding Descartes’s thoughts on matter, motion, and their metaphysical 
foundations. According to Garber, his text was not intended to be a reinterpretation of 
Descartes’s thought, but rather it is  
a book that pulls together various aspects of Descartes’ metaphysical approach to 
the world of body and presents them in a systematic and coherent way, a kind of 
handbook of Cartesian physics, a general introduction to the mechanical 
philosophy as Descartes or a sympathetic but not uncritical contemporary of his 
might have understood it.914 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
912 Stephen Gaukroger and John Schuster, "The hydrostatic paradox and the origins of Cartesian dynamics," 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33 (2002): 535-72.   
913 Klaas van Berkel, "Descartes' Debt to Beeckman: inspiration, cooperation, conflict," in Descartes' 
Natural Philosophy ed. Stephen Gaukroger, John Schuster, and John Sutton (New York: Routledge, 2000) 
46-59. Aspects of Descartes’s “debt” to Beeckman have been suggested by historians at least since the 
1939 publication of the Journal tenu par Isaac Beeckman de 1604 à 1634. Tome 1: 1604-1619. Three more 
volumes of the Journal would follow: Tome 2: 1619-1627 (1942), Tome 3: 1627-1634 (1945), Tome 4: 
Supplément (1953). Cornelies De Waard edited the Journal for publication. Koyré, for example, took up an 
extended discussion of Beeckman’s possible influence on Descartes. See Koyré, Galileo Studies, 79-94, 
116-8n. The first volume of the Journal was published while Koyré's Etudes Galiléennes was being 
printed. Van Berkel takes the perspective of Beeckman rather than Descartes and argues that Descartes’s 
vehement reaction to Beeckman later in life was because he did not want Beeckman publishing his Journal, 
which would have revealed that Descartes’s ideas were not original to himself.   
914 Daniel Garber, Descartes’ metaphysical physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 3. 
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As Garber himself notes, the sympathetic but critical “handbook of Cartesian physics” 
did, however, provide a couple significant reinterpretations. Importantly, Garber 
reinterprets Descartes’s notion of motion. The received view of Descartes’s notion was 
that he advocated “relative motion,” which we have encountered in Aiton and Westfall 
above (but this has been argued by others elsewhere as well), and Descartes’s relative 
notion of motion was due to his attempt to reconcile his Copernicanism with the doctrine 
of the Church. According to Garber’s persuasive arguments, both points are mistaken.915 
Garber’s argument and its implications will be discussed more at length below.  
  In addition to Garber’s handbook, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics (1992) 
another important text for my study of Descartes and collision is Gaukroger’s Descartes’ 
System of Natural Philosophy (2002). Both focus on Descartes’s Principia, and discuss 
his other works in relation to this text. However, the two studies differ in emphasis and in 
their projects. Garber takes the Principia to be Descartes’s most mature presentation of 
his thoughts. As such, Garber focuses on sympathetically and critically explaining the 
organization and consistency of Descartes’s philosophy as presented in the Principia. 
Gaukroger, on the other hand, seems to be interested in the ideas and activities behind the 
Principia. This interest in the formulation of ideas may not be surprising since he had 
published Descartes: An Intellectual Biography a few years before in 1995. Additionally 
Gaukroger notes that the Principia project was left incomplete and takes it upon himself 
to reconstruct the remaining two parts of the project.916  For instance, regarding the 
former point, Gaukroger argues for the gradual formulation of the ideas that would come 
to be the Principia by drawing on evidence of Descartes’s early projects in mechanics, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
915 Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 156-96.  
916 Gaukroger, Descartes' System, 2-3. 
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primarily hydrostatics. He then argues that after the 1633 condemnation of Galileo 
Descartes shifted his attention to the “legitimation” of the natural philosophical ideas that 
he had already developed. Descartes attempted a variety of approaches, but settled on the 
systematic presentation that came to be the Principia.917 According to Gaukroger, 
Descartes was not a metaphysician whose “activity of science” constituted the deduction 
of his account of the world from a priori principles. Rather, through his work on 
individual problems, like the hydrostatic paradox, Descartes gradually developed a 
natural philosophy. Later he embarked on a project of “legitimation” for this natural 
philosophy and did so by providing a metaphysical foundation and re-presenting it 
systematically in a style similar to a scholastic textbook.  Garber’s emphasis, on the other 
hand is on whether or not and to what extent Descartes’s metaphysical foundations in fact 
support his physics.  
 These different strategies can be illustrated by the manner in which Garber and 
Gaukroger respectively explain some of the more contentious issues in Descartes’s work. 
For instance, consider the surprisingly complex (and possibly confused) topic of motion 
and rest in Descartes’s Principia. Garber stays close to the text and attempts to make 
sense of Descartes’s presentation using the criteria of “explanatory value,” i.e. motion 
and rest must be distinct because for motion to have explanatory value in Descartes’s 
system (which as stated in his text, ultimately relies on little more than matter and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
917 Ibid., 32-3. For example, prior to the Principia, Descartes experimented with a dialogue form to present 
his natural philosophy: La Recherche de la vérité par la lumiere naturelle. He also seems to have 
considered writing “a complete textbook of philosophy” which would have appended to the same volume a 
“traditional textbook with notes at the end of each proposition, in which his own views and those of others 
are compared. He seems to have decided on Eustachius’s Summa as the textbook.” He considered calling 
this work, Summa Philosphiæ, which in a letter to Constantijn Huygens he noted was the same title as 
Eustachius’s textbook, ‘to make it more welcome to the Scholastics, who are now persecuting it and trying 
to smother it before its birth’.” So too did he explain this project to Dinet, a Jesuit who had taught at La 
Flèche: ‘... I shall try to use a style more suited to the current practice in the Schools.’”  
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motion) motion must be distinct from rest.918 Gaukroger, on the other hand, argues that 
there are two layers operating behind the text which come to the surface in various 
sections. The deepest layer relies on two models of motion: one that is “kinematic” and 
has no distinction between motion and rest, the other which is “dynamic” and is rooted in 
a model from Descartes’s previous work in (hydro)statics which does have a distinction 
between motion and rest. The other layer which is closer to the surface (and also has 
kinematic and dynamic models) derives primarily from the dynamic model in the deepest 
layer. This, for Gaukroger, makes sense of the surprisingly complex topic of motion and 
rest in Descartes’s Principia.919   
 Similarly, these different strategies can be seen in Garber’s and Gaukroger’s 
respective approaches to the rules of impact. Gaukroger uses Descartes’s previous work 
in optics to explain some of the perennially debated topics, such as Descartes’s notorious 
rule 4 (a small body impacting with a larger body at rest will rebound without moving the 
larger body). 
“It is not too difficult to understand why Descartes should have insisted on Rule 
4, for it underpins his optics, and it is perhaps his realisation that it is needed for 
his optics that led him to change his mind on this question, for five years earlier 
he had written to Mersenne on two occasions allowing that a smaller moving 
body can dislodge a larger stationary one, and even indicating how the resultant 
speed is determined”920 
  
As we will see in the course of my study of collision, this explanation is incorrect for 
several reasons, but importantly the timeline is off. Garber, on the other hand, seems to 
downplay the rules of collision altogether, which have been considered a weak point in 
Descartes’s physics. He opens his chapter on impact by noting that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
918 Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 156-96. 
919 Gaukroger, Descartes' System, 106-14. 
920 Ibid., 126-7. 
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Descartes’ full treatment of impact was late in coming and, in the end, never fully 
worked out; the record shows him struggling with the problem, and never really 
arriving at a single satisfactory view on the problem.921  
 
Nevertheless Garber provides a complete and in depth study of the ways Descartes 
tackled impact in his various texts, noting in particular the changes he makes between the 
Latin Principia, the letter to Clerselier, and the French Principes.922 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
921 Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 231. 
922 Ibid., 231-262. 
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Appendix 2  
Descartes to de Beaune, 30 April 1639 
 
The text of the 30 April 1639 letter923 comes from Claude Clerselier’s Lettres de 
Mr Descartes, volume 2 (Paris, 1659).924 Clerselier provided neither a name of 
destination nor a date for the letter. Adam and Tannery are convinced that it is the 
“response to Monsieur de Beaune” to which Descartes referred to twice in a letter he sent 
to Mersenne on the same day.925 Not only did Clerselier include this letter in his second 
volume, he “quite wrongly” inserted the very passage in question—regarding a smaller 
body moving a larger body—in a letter to perhaps the marquis de Newcastle from 
March/April 1648 in his third volume (Paris, 1667).926 The editors of The 
Correspondance du P. Marin Mersenne have a lengthy footnote on this passage.927 
Rather than note the apparent contradiction between this letter and Descartes’s infamous 
4th rule, they discuss “le théorème de la conservation de la quantité de mouvement.”928 
They note that the theorem of the conservation de la quantité de mouvement dans le choc 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
923 AT II 541-4. Descartes to [Mr de Beaune], [30 April 1639]. The letter is also collected in the 
Correspondence of Mersenne. MMC 8: 420-2. René Descartes, à (Santpoort), à Florimond Debeaune, à 
Blois, (30 April 1639).  
924 Claude Clerselier, Lettres de Mr Descartes, vol. 2 (Paris: Chez Charles Angot, 1659), 166-8.  
925 AT II 530, 4. Descartes to Mersenne, 30 April 1639. “...and you see something of weight in my response 
to Mr de Beaulne [sic].” “You see in my response to Monsieur de Beaune why I no longer think that heavy 
bodies (corps pesans) increase (augmentent) their speed equally when descending.”  
926 Clerselier, Lettres de Mr Descartes, vol. 3 (Paris: Chez Charles Angot, 1667) 636-40. Also see MMC 8: 
421n. The text of this "1648" letter has been printed in AT V 133-9 as Descartes [to Marquis de 
Newcastle?], [March or April 1648]. Adam and Tannery note that this letter has neither a name nor a date 
in Clerselier's Lettres, but they have determined that it was likely sent in March or April of 1648, perhaps to 
the Marquis de Newcastle. The following passages correspond nearly word for word: AT II 543 line 8 
through 544 line 2 (of the 30 April 1639 letter to de Beaune); and AT V 135 line 22 through 136 line 13 (of 
the March/April 1648 letter to Marquis de Newcastle).   
927 MMC 8: 422n.   
928 The editors of MMC claim that this conservation theorem can be found for “soft bodies” in 1618 in 
Beeckman’s Journal. Contrary to the editor’s claim, Beeckman’s mathematical work on “conservation” did 
not involve “soft bodies,” but rather absolutely hard bodies that do not rebound. In addition, Beeckman 
seems to have been much more interested in the loss of motion rather than a mathematical theorem of 
conservation. He appeals to God’s perpetuo resuscitant et vivificant to explain why there does not appear to 
be loss of motion in nature, contrary to the findings of his mathematical investigations.  For details, see 
chapter 2. The editors of MMC point out that Descartes was very familiar with Beeckman’s manuscript, 
which is quite likely.   
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des corps appeared for the first time in Descartes’s Le Monde, which was begun in 
1630929, and was used again in a manière correct in a letter to Mersenne in December 
1639930 but il l’appliquera à tort in another to Mersenne in October 1640.931  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
929 The work was abandoned in 1633, but published posthumously by Clerselier in 1677. 
930 AT II 626-39. Descartes to Mersenne, 25 Deccember 1639.  
931 AT III 205-221. Descartes to Mersenne, 28 October 1640.   
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CORRESPONDENCE 
CLXI 
Descartes to [Mr de Beaune].  
[30 April 1639] 
Text from Clerselier, volume II, letter 25, p. 166 -168. 
 
Without name or date in Clerselier; but it is the “response to Monsieur de Beaune”, sent 
at the same time as the preceding letter, where Descartes speaks of two reprises (p. 530, 
l. 15-16, and p. 534, l. 3-4).     
 
Sir,   
 I believe the time that I took to consider your curved lines      
very well used,932 not only because    
I have learned much from it, but also   p. 542, l. 1 
particularly because you attest to have some satisfaction in it.   
I thank you for your exact measure of Refractions;933 ...  
... lines 5-16  
   I would like to be capable of responding to what you  p. 542, l.17 
want concerning your Mechanics; but even though   
all of my Physics is nothing other than Mechanics,  
however, I have never particularly examined  20 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
932 See the above letter CLVI, p. 513, l. 26 to p. 518, l. 6. [AT II 513-18. Descartes to M. de Beaune, 20 
February 1639]. [Footnotes reproduced from AT. Comments in square brackets are my own.] 
933 See page 512, l. 14. [AT II 512. Descartes to M. de Beaune, 20 February 1639] 
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questions that depend on measures of the  
speed. Your fashion of distinguishing diverse dimensions  
in movements, and representing them by lines,  
is without a doubt the best that can be; and as many  
diverse dimensions can be attributed to each 25 
thing, as are found of diverse quantities to measure.  
Your distinction of three lines of direction,  
which are parallel, which tend to a center or to  
several, is very methodical and useful.  The Invention  
of your Curved Lines is very beautiful; and the reason that you  p. 543, l. 1 
give for the quadruple tension of a cord which   
makes the octave, is very ingenious and quite true. It  
only remains to me to tell you what gives me   
difficulty regarding Speed, and at the same time, what I  5 
judge of the nature of Weight, <and> what you   
name Natural Inertia.934  
   Firstly, I hold  that there is a certain Quantity    
of Motion in all created Matter, which never increases  
nor decreases; and thus, when  10 
a body causes another to move, it loses so much of its  
movement as it gives of it to it [the other body]: as, when a  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
934 If one does not count “&” at the beginning of this phrase, as we have rendered it, it is necessary to 
consider it as a title inscribed by Descartes in the margin of the following paragraph, and introduced 
wrongly in the text (Ed.).  
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stone falls from a high place against the earth, if it   
does not return and is stopped, I conceive that that  
just shakes the earth, and thus transfers 15 
to it its movement; but if what it moves of the   
earth contains 1000 times more matter than it,   
transfering to it all its movement, it only gives to it  
a 1000th part of it speed. And for that, if   
two unequal bodies receive so much movement 20 
the one as the other, this similar quantity of movement   
does not give so much speed to the larger as   
to the smaller, one can say, in a sense, that the more a body  
contains of matter, the more it has of Natural Inertia;   
to which one can add that a body, which is large can 25 
better transfer its movement to other bodies,  
than a small one can, and that it can be moved less by them.  
In this way there is one strength of Inertia, which depends  
 on the quantity of matter, and another which depends on   p. 544, l. 1 
the extent of its area.  
   As for Weight, I imagine nothing other, if not    
that all subtle Matter which is from here  
to the Moon, turning very promptly around the 5 
Earth, chases towards it [the Earth] all the bodies which cannot  
move themselves so quickly. For it chases them with such force,  
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that while they have not yet begun to descend,  
when challenged they descend; for finally if it happens   
that they descend as quickly as it is moved, it no longer 10 
pushes them at all, and if they descend more quickly,  
it will resist them. From where you can see that there are   
many things to consider, before one can  
determine anything concerning Speed, and it is what always  
diverts me from it; but one can also account for  15 
many things by the method of these Principles,  
which one cannot attain formerly. As for the rest, I  
would not write to you so freely of these things, as   
I did not want to discuss this further, because the proof   
depends on my World,935 so I only hope that you  20 
interpret them favorably, and so I passionately wanted  
 to testify to you what I follow.  
 
  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
935 [Descartes’s treatise, Le Monde] 
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